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ABSTRACT

Brunel University, Uxbridge, England, Department of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering, Division of Cybernetics.
Ernin Der-Kureghian
"CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING A CYBERNETIC SIMPLE LEARNING MODEL;
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF MODELLING LEARNING."
1988

Learning is viewed as a central feature of living systems and must be
manifested in any artifact that claims to exhibit general intelligence.
The central aims of the thesis are twofold: (1) - To review and critically
assess the empirical and theoretical aspects of learning as have been
addressed in a multitude of disciplines,
fundamental features and elements.

with the aim of extracting

( 2 ) - To develop a more systematic

approach to the cybernetic modelling of learning than has been achieved
hitherto.
In pursuit of aim (1) above the following discussions are included:
- Historical and Philosophical backgrounds;
- Natural learning, both physiological and psychological aspects;
- Hierarchies of learning identified in the evolutionary, functional and
developmental senses;
- 'An extensive section on the general problem of modelling of learning and
the formal tools, is included as a link between aims (1) and (2).
Following this a systematic and historically oriented study of cybernetic and
other related approaches to the problem of modelling of learning is presented.
This then leads to the development of a state-of-the-art general purPose
experimental cybernetic learning model. The programming and use of this model
is also fully described, including an elaborate scheme for the manifestation
of simple learning.
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Having embarked on the task of the study of the phenomenon of learning,
and in particular its manifestation in machines, with a

background in

mathematics, electronics and control systems it was inevitable that an
analytical mechanistic bias would be the overriding feature of the initial
approach.

As a medium for the investigation of artificial 'learning' in

systems the construction of a state-of-the-art computer remote controlled
experimental mobile-robot was undertaken, which was hoped to embody the
implementation of a simple learning program that would enable the machine to
gradually 'learn' from very fundamental criteria, after a process of interaction
with its environment. The method of learning would be diametrically opposite
the other major approach to 'machine learning', that of incorporating a lot of
a-priori knowledge and information-base into the machine.
It was envisaged that a basic scheme could be devised which transformed

the initial random behaviour of the model into a more ordered and purposeful,
yet simple, patterns of behaviour. The elaborations of this scheme would, in
turn, slowly lead to more interesting behavioural instances; and, indeed, even
complex higher order learning capabilities could be displayed by later
developments of the basic program.

The actual embodiment of the 'learning

system' in the physical construct was only an incidental characteristic of the
design, chosen for purposes of clarity and ease of experimentation.
the mobile robot itself was designed in a

Hence,

very versatile manner, its

input-output features chosen in a non-machine-specific way that would allow
its use as a general purpose tool for a variety of experimental modelling
tasks.
The ensuing approach was, in fact, consistent with the intuitive 'natural'
manifestations of the process of learning.

Parallels could be drawn with the

evolutionary and hierarchical ordering of learning seen in nature, and the
continuity which is observed amongst various levels of learning behaviour (or
their underlying mechanisms).
The completion of the hardware model was followed by various software
developments which would emulate various simple behavioural patterns.

A

more elaborate 'learning' program was also planned that in a manner similar
to some other research in this area would attempt to realize. the ·learnin.'

capability in the machine.

ii

In a survey of the subject of "Machine Learning" it was seen that a great
many

fundamental

aspects

are

either

taken

for

granted,

or

various

misconceptions and inconsistencies are evident between alternate viewpoints.
Many hardware 'learning' models rely too much on the causalities of their
physical fabrics, or use 'clever tricks' and engineering solutions to portray
aspects of learning or human intelligence, Others incorporate a great deal of
designer's own knowledge at the outset, and the inherent learning potential
in-built within the model is sometimes misconstrued as "capability to learn
from basic principles". Methods used for representation or implementation of
'learning' in artificial systems were also varied.
configurations,

verbal

descriptions,

graphical

Ranging from physical

illustrations,

mathematical

equations, logical propositions, to elaborate cognitive conceptualizations. The
role of an external 'teacher' or 'supervisor' was also a rather prominent one
in most 'learning systems', detracting from the autonomy of their 'learning'
capabilities.
Hence, it was becoming increasingly evident that a much more fundamental
analysis of the problem and a deeper understanding of issues involved was
necessary, if we were not to get trapped in a self-propelling dogma of a
blinkered and narrow view of tl;le subject.

The endeavour of investigating

root notions such as teleological or entropic aspects of this class of models,
and identification of their 'necessary and sufficient' features was seen as a
worthwhile task on its own.
Immersion in a Cybernetics Department was the principal influencing factor
that lead to this broad and generalist outlook.

Since its introduction, in the

1940's, the science of Cybernetics has made an important contribution to the
breadth of scientific thinking.

Although, at times, suffering from the

generality of its concepts, nevertheless, cybernetics has been able to put
forward some specific methodologies for solving problem, in more narrowly
defined areas.
Cybernetics attempts to unify studies of living and inanimate purposive
systems, and in its true spirit it would have been appropriate to have a
methodology which could be equally applicable to both domains.

A general

cybernetic formalism on par with those in other well established sciences
would allow the analysis of natural phenomena in the context of artificial
systems.

Indeed, if such a hypothetical formalism was forthcoming, then

learning could have easily been manifested in systems. Yet, the complexity of
the task of devising an abstract cohesive language is such that attempts so
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far have been grossly inadequate, and have only managed to highlight the
underlying difficulties involved in such endeavours.
However, so far, the principal strength of cybernetics has not been in its
techniques, but in its promotion of a fresh and expansive outlook or approach
to problems.

The broadness of perspective means that prejudices which

sometimes hinder developments in other fields have been, generally, absent in
cybernetic enquiries.
Hence, in this cybernetic tradition. it was deemed necessary that before
we attempt to tackle our specific objective three main areas had to be
scrutinized in more detaiL

Firstly, the natural learning phenomenon in its

many forms should be looked at, and a variety of related issues addressed.
Secondly,

the

characteristic

problems involved in modelling a· natural

observation should be understood, and tools and techniques used for such
modelling tasks outlined. Thirdly, a general investigation of previous attempts
at modelling of learning should be made, to highlight relative merits, findings,
or typical difficulties confronted in each paradigm.
As the above undertakings were being pursued the multiplicity of facets of
the

phenomenon of

learning

and

its

studies were

being

much

more

appreciated; and, at the same time, the vulnerabilities of a narrow approach
to its simulation or synthesis becoming more prominent.

Each field of study

would lead to other subtopics or sublevels, and the interlinkings of issues and
subjects was gradually compiling a very complex multidimensional picture. All
aspects of description, investigation, analysis, simulation and synthesis of
learning were characterized by a hierarchy which spanned from the system or
behavioural levels to the molecular level.
The task of studying all elements of "learning" is an enormous one, and
for this reason each segment of the composite picture is scrutinised within a
predominant specialised discipline.

This singularity of approach (without

generally paying too much attention to alternate subjects) is seen in almost
all literature on learning, even those which take on a multi-disciplinarian

stance, normally, view the subject through lenses tinted by a particular bias.
A variety of subjects such as Behavioural Psychology, Cognitive Psychology,
Neuro-physiology,

Education, Sociology, Cybernetics, Pattern-Recognition,

Control Systems, Artificial Intelligence, etc. deal with learning; each having
its own conception of learning and the relative importance of issues involved.
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Bence, it was decided that as a joint objective of the thesis an overview
of the various aspects of study of the learning process and its mechanisms be
undertaken. Principally, the results of this non-standard approach will be of
benefit to a prospective designer of a 'learning' model.

Whereby, a very

broad awareness of many topics, issues, and similar research can be attained,
without cluttering the totality of picture with too detailed specifics of each
paradigm.

The aim is, however, not so much to try to unify the whole

subject but to point to the particularities and discrepancies of diverse view,
and the way they deal with various

issue~

in learning.

The level at which each topic will be covered is, generally, governed by
the its relevance to the second more specific objective of this thesis, namely,
the considerations in designing a cybernetic simple learning model. At times,
8

summarized tabulation, classification, or definition of specific features of an

I1pproach will be made without much qualification; yet, at other times, a more
detailed analysis or discussion of subtopics of a discipline will be attempted.
The intention of this

particular form of examination is to furnish an

informative coverage of principal keynotes, trends, and points of contention
involved in the variety of learning related disciplines which might have direct
or indirect bearing to our specific problem.

Additionally, by looking at the

underlying historical and developmental aspects of subjects, attention could be
drawn to their kinships and their commonalities of purpose.
All in all, it is hoped that the insight gained, and the deeper (and
broader) understanding of the whole subject, from the conglomeration of the
general and· the specific pursuits of this thesis will provide a firm platform
for later research into the much more difficult (and worthwhile) task of
devising a true 'learning' model, which in itself is a life-time long scientific
quest.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In this introductory chapter we will attempt to prepare the background for
our later more detailed analysis of various aspects of the learning process and
its modelling.

The schematic illustration of FIG.l.l outlines the principal

approaches and topics of interest to the phenomenon of learning, and shows
the variety of facets to this multi-dimensional concept.
However, the representation of FIG.l.l is not meant to be very precise or
exhaustive, and research in many other disciplines, directly or indirectly, bear
relevance to the process of learning -

similarly, the inter-linkings of

disciplines are not illustrated in FIG. 1. 1.
The approach of the initial part of this thesis will be a very broad 'global'
one.

Yet, at the latter parts, this generality will culminate into a more

focussed leaning towards the simpler modalities of learning, in particular, its
simple manifestations in models.

Indeed, it was the design and construction

of such a model which prompted this sweeping approach to the thesis.
We will begin by defining and analysing the nature of the problem. Mter
a general discussion of the notion of learning the developmental and other
aspects of learning (i.e., historical, philosophical, operational and technical)
will be outlined.

Then, more specific issues and problems of manifestations of

learning in various models, and approaches to such endeavours, will be looked
at in more detail.

In particular, the case for building hardware 'learning'

models will be argued.

Finally, the general and specific objectives of the

thesis, and the impetus behind the direction of its particular developmental
path, will be discussed, and an overview of the chapter8 described.
1.1 WHAT IS I..MRND«l ?

Learning and adaptation are central criteria of Ute, influencing almost all

aspects of human behaviour and aumy of ani.,.Js' behaviour. The concept of
"learning" in its intuitive hu.an-learning sense is an age old !lOtion, referring
to the way that humans and ArdRs increase their knowledge and improve

Tbe •• '.re

their skills.

of t.e
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But, the modern comprehension of this multi-faceted concept is

a complex and a different one, referring to many other connected aspects,
and implications of usage of the verb 'to learn' are far greater than its
established common understanding would suggest.

~E~~-NETS

._11.

~i~
L._"
......_..1 =-]J["":-PHYLOOE-N-si-s-"
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......
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NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
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Intelligence

Cognition

--------~Language

Perception~------

- - - - -... Memory

FIGURE 1.1. A schematic outline of "LEARNING" related disciplines, their
domains of interest, and some major phenomenologiCal issues or
topics.
Some researchers have suggested that "learning" is too general a label to
be used for such diverse range of activities and processes.

In this thesis,

also, it was found that a distinction was necessary, hence,· we will follow a
notation of enclosing the term LBARNING in single quote marks (' ') when it
refers

to

its

'artificial'

aspects,

or

its

manifestation

in

a

specific

non-biological

system

(e.g.,

machine

'learning',

a

'learning'

robot).

Conversely, without the quote marks when it is expressed in the global sense,
or within its natural context (e.g., the learning process/phenomenon, animal
learning).
In spite of the difficulty of devising an adequate definition of learning,
which can cover all its manifestations, it is surprising that there is not much
controversy or disagreement over the definition of "learning" itself. The main
problems arise in the interpretations of such definitions.

Later, various

definitions of the learning process will be expanded within each discipline.
But, an all encompassing simple expression of learning could be:
"TO PROFIT BY PAST BXPBRIBNCB".
An explicit premise of our extensive approach to learning is that the

process of learning should not be regarded as an exclusive attribute of man
and animals, and a machine or an abstract mathematical system satisfying
various criteria, given the right interactive circumstances, should also be
considered as a 'learning' entity.
The study of the learning process, as in many other brain related
phenomena, seems to have three general facets: 'epistemological' (knowledge
related) aspects, 'operational' (acquisitional or executive) aspects, and issues
and problems involving both epistemological and operational aspects.
Epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge, and knowledge itself
can be regarded as a product of the process of learning (in its broad sense).
Therefore, generally knowledge and learning are regarded as intrinsically
related.

Bence, epistemological considerations should always accompany the

investigations of learning. Of course. in the lower forms 01 learn1q, such . .
reflex learning, epistemological aspects are of a trivial nature.
The term 'adaptation' is sometimes defined
due

to

&II:

.ac:litication of behaviour

negative feedback from the environment.

But, in this thesis

adaptation will be looked at as a simple ..mt8lltation of the proce_ of
learning.

The illusive Batun of human 'thought' and ita attributes Ce.g.,learDing)
has intrigued man for thousands of years. and problelDB of tr7iDg to expJain
the mental and the behavioural characteristics of humans (and animals) have

been in the forefront of science of philosophy, as well as occupying workers
from many other disciplines such as mathematics.
But, generally it is regarded that a systematic approach to these problems
only began in earnest from the 17-th century, when the physical studies of
the surrounding world were starting to explain some of the dynamics of the
inanimate phenomena.

Galfieo was one of the

principal thinkers who

attempted

the

terms

to

explain

physical

world

in

of

mathematical

relationships, he believed that mathematics was the 'language' of physical
universe.
Some philosophers and mathematicians such as Hobbes had started looking
at

human

thinking

abstractions,

and

processes
with

the

in

terms

introduction

of

physical
of

and

Newtonian

mathematical
physics

the

mechanization of thoughts truly began its course of development.
It was Descartes, the famous "French philosopher/mathematician, who in his

attempts at unifying sciences explicitly addressed the mind/body problem, and
developed

a

theory

of

mind.

He

regarded

thoughts

as

symbolic

representations which could be fundamentally equated with mathematics, but,
he was also a 'dualist' who saw the mental and physical universes as separate
and non connected.

Descarte's conclusion was that mind and body were

distinct phenomena, and hence divided human activities into two groups of
'mechanical' and 'natural'.

Animals were declared as wonderful machines, yet

human beings were considered as machines with minds in the form of a

'soul'

imbedded deep within the brain.
Although, the notion of humans as machines was later argued by many
scientists and was common place, such as in f8lDOUs 18-th centur7 philosopber
Bume's concepts of "mental mechanics", a widespread belief in a discontinuity
between animal and human intelligence peraiated well into the

l~tb

century t

until the introduction of Darwinian evolutionary doctrine<.
During the 17-tb and the 18-th century many attempt. were also .ada to
copy various aspects of human and animal actiona, by constructin« siJaple
mechanical automata or devising aodels of mental proceseea.

Some abstract

models were based on the contemporary theories of mental phenomena, but
the majority of these models were artifacts built by aJdlled cl'aftmaen and
watchmakers to demonstrate intricate human like (or animal like) movements.

During the 19-th century many other elaborate walking or even talking
machines and automata based on gears. pulleys. levers and bellows were also
constructed;

some

in

the

latter

part

electromagnetic components in their models.

of

the

century

were

using

Similarly. game-playing machines

were devised. the most advanced of which could play end-games of chess
quite cleverly.

In parallel to the introduction of such wondrous constructs developments
were also being made in the field of design of calculating machines.

A

principal figure of the era was Babbage. who is sometimes considered as the
father of computer-sciences.

Be conceived the idea of "analytical engine".

and although did not fully realize his ambition of constructing such a
machine, his conceptualization. together with the development of an algebraic
foundation

for

binary

symbols

and

postulates

by

Boole.

prepared

the

groundwork for future computing machines.

The 'mind/body' problem, stated simply as: "Bow the mind and body affect
each other", also gave rise to another duality of approach. the so called
'empiricism' versus 'rationalism'.

The followers of the doctrine of empiricism.

including philosophers such as Bobbes and Dume. believe that experiences and
their associations are the only source of knowledge.

They also subscribe to

the 'mechanistic' view point whose thesis is as follows: "Mind is like a
machine built from simple non-vitalistic elements".

The rationalists, on the

other hand. believe that reason and relation of concepts are the basis of
knowledge. belief and action.

At the latter stages of the 19-th century and the earl;,. 20-th century. the
search for mathematical counterparts of reasoning and thinking was still a·
principal pursuit of ph:i1oaophers and mathematicians. Whitehead and Russell's
studies of knowledge and logic, and speculations into the mathematical basis
of

abstraction,

culminating

in

"Principa

Mathematics"

was

a

landmark

achievement in the attempts at unification of fundamental iaaues of reasoning.
logic

and

mathematics.

During

the

....

period, the tbeoret1cal and

methodological foundations of modern trends of the acience of paTChoioo was
also being eBtabHsbed.

The theories of learning were developed as a

subsection of ps;,.choloJU in two distinct major C81DpS:(1) -

The tassociationist'/tstiJaulua-reaponae'/ 'behavtourist.': whose followers
subscribe to the e.piriciat poin-" of view, and iDcluded .any of the
e~rimental ~B;,.choIogiats, name1;,. pioneerin. adherents such as
Tllorndtke ana Pavlov.

(2) -

The 'COJtDitiviat': who are fro. the rationalist school interested in
or~'liona1 aa~ts of human activit;,. and reject the mechanistic
doctrine, the ~=Cipal protagonists were Gestalt psychologists such as
Kohler and To
•

T~e •• '.re . ,
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The mass of experimental results obtained about learning processes, and
the theories proposed in various related fields, were incorporated in models
which could either 'simulate' the results of an experiment or 'synthesis' a
proposed postulate about learning, most such models were mathematical
abstractions.

It was the introduction of the science of Cybernetics by

Wiener, and its explicit declaration of man-machine equation, which signified
the start of the modern venture into the design of 'learning machines'.
Cybernetics was the catalyst which promoted the use of well established
mathematical abstractions to the problems of modelling of aspects of living
organisms in machines.
A yearning for mechanization, in the tradition passed on from Descarte's
time, compelled cyberneticians such as Ashby and many other system theorists
to formalise behaviour and thought on basis of mathematical concepts; and
later

try

to

manifest such concepts in hardware

models.

A notable

contribution was also made by the introduction of the 'information theory' by
Shanon, which allowed the quantification of some previously vague concepts.
As

well

as

cybernetically

the

modelling

oriented

of

'learning'

behaviour

neuro-physiologists

and

the

work

mathematicians,

of

some

namely

McCullock and Pitts, was the prelude to a whole generation of neural-network
type cellular 'learning' models.
The next. significant development in this field was the advent of the
digital computer, which without any doubt has proved to be the most
important single innovation for the modelers of the learning process.

The

infrastructure for today's computers was laid over a century ago by the
formalisms of Boolean aIaebra and the desi,cns of calculating aaachinery, such
as Babbage's "analytical engine".
However, the modern theory of computation owes a great deal to TurinJr's
abstract analysis of computational machinery, In particular bia conception of
ideas of "Turing Machines" and "Universal Turing Machines".

The. simple

abstractions were .ade of two basic components of • 'read/write head' and
an 'infinite-tape', which were constructed for aDaWeriDa theoretical queationa
rather than for u . in practical prob1e... Yet. the7 were iDIluential in Jatar
deve]opJBents of digital computera b7 other p:loneeriq workera, such as
who great17 contributed to the deaqrn of practical aeneral
purpose computers.

Turing's abstract machines were not suitable for representing human
behaviours or mental processes, yet, they were able to mathematically prove
an important assertion, which stated that if behaviour, language, or thought
could be specified in a formal sense then all human activities could be
represented by a Turing machine.
The most recent approach to 'machine learning' was established in the
early 1960's with the widespread availability of digital computers.

This so

called 'information processing' approach is the dominant paradigm of today.
The subject of ·Artificial-Intelligence" or A.I. (a name coined by one of its
pioneers, McCarthy) is the principal domain for research on the modelling of
learning today; and it predominantly relies on the use of digital computers.
Of course, during the past three decades, other computer structures were also
introduced, to deal with a variety of, mainly cognitive, modelling tasks (e.g.,
parallel, analogue, LISP, production-systems).

(i) - Philosophy
As we have seen the psychological theories of learning developed from

centuries of philosophical enquiry into the problem of mind/body distinction.
Other philosophical introspections into issues such as 'mind', 'self-reference',
'consciousness', or 'awareness' have resulted in hypotheses about knowledge
acquisition, or motivational aspects of behaviour; and have influenced the
contemporary psychological thinking.
It is,

therefore, hardly surprisina that when conceptual descriptive

terminologies of human mental states and functions are applied to alternate
domains of machines, computers or abstract systems then
arises.

80

much controversy

Concepts such as 'consciousness', 'perception', 'cognition', 'learning',

'creativity', 'memory', 'thinking', 'feeling', 'awareness', 'emotion', 'attention',
'intelligence', 'free-will' are to name but a few.

These concepts have been

intuitively used for centuries without much attention to their underlying
functional or biological basis.

Bence, the ezpJorationa of 'DaaChine' or

'mathematical' counterparts of the.. concepts are at beat speculative; and
loosely analogous to trying to

DaIDe

component. of an· autolDObile engine or

define their functions, in terms of 'muscular' mecbania1ll8.
Neverthele88, it is fair to - 7 that philoaopbical scrutinies mto the
mechanization of these ideas, besides providing interesting debatina topics,

have shed light on the nature of many previously opaque concepts; and have
allowed hypothesising about their integration. In some cases, however, due to
the

incompatibility

of

levels

of

descriptions

involved,

results

of

the

translations of human concepts to machine domain have been of a very
non-conclusive nature.
(n) - Growth

The growth and development of an adult animal from a single egg-cell is
governed by the blue-print provided in the genetic information within the
cell.

The development and changes of the brain and the nervous-system can

be seen throughout the life of an organism, the crucial stages being the
prenatal

and

early

childhood.

periods.

The

learning

capabilities and

behavioural changes which accompany such neuronal changes are, hence, of
interest to our wide perspective of this phenomenon.
(iii) - Evolution

Similarly, from an evolutionary perspective it can be seen that the
learning process has gradually developed from the simple response mechanisms
of uni-cellular primitive organisms to the most complex conceptual capabilities
of man, which even allows him

to introspect about the very nature of such

processes and their mechanisms.
Bence, perhaps, the attempts of those modelers who only concentrate on
the higher strata of learning hierarchy should be seen as a disregard for the
clear example provided by the 'natural' modeler of this procesa (i.e., the
natural selection).

Demonstrating

(in BOJDe 3.6 billion years) that the

development of a conceptuai.iaing organism requires a progreaaion of step.,
from very simple to highly complex and rich in knowledge, both in ita
ontogenetic and phylogenetic ordering.

The studies of learning ill ita natural domain have a
relevance

to

the

tartificial'

of

modelers

this

~t

phenoJDenon.

deal of

The

weD

docwaentecl empirical observations of learni.nc in p87cho)oa bave provided
IIUlD.J'

inaiahta

into

the

Dature

of

learned

orpnizational aspecta of ita structure.
functions of

behaviour,

and, alIIo

UIe

Many detbdtiona, attribute. and

different classes of Jearnin.r

bebavioura

have

ahJo

been
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characterised. In addition, the studies of the brain and neuronal mechanisms
have revealed illuminating underlying features of learning processes.
Today, it is unanimously accepted in learning related scientific fields that
mental phenomena are the consequence of underlying physiological structures
of the brain.
and

more

This mechanization of cerebral functions is, also, being more

validated

by

evidence

from

developments

in

sciences

of

neuro-physiology and psychology.
The interaction of 'analytic' and 'syntactic' aspects of studies of brain
phenomena have provided some of the most challenging scientific questions of
our time. Depending on the era (and fashionabillty of various paradigms) the
brain has been described as: "a network of canals", "a water clock", "a
mechanical clock", "a telephone exchange", and most recently "a digital
computer".
The complete understanding of inner workings of the brain is a very
difficult (if not impossible) task by the very nature of the problem.

Bence,

this problem has been tackled either by the studying, the theorizing and the
manipulation of inputs and outputs to the brain (and its elements); or by the
construction of organizational 'models' of neuronal mechanisms, and the
studying of model's input-output relationships.
A great volume of experimental results has been amassed in psychology on

the various manifestations of the process of learning in humans and animals.
Augmenting these evidence is the rich source of findings of 'coanitive
scientists' on the structural knowledge based aspects of the learning process,
and

also

the

psycholopts'

investications
on

the

of

'neuro-physiologists'

related

learning

mechanisms

and
of

'physiological
the

central

nervous-systems.
Some very precise scientific techniquee have been developed for the
rigorous recording and analyaia of the. ezperimenW results, both in
qualitative and quantitative tena..

Yet, there is no general consensus about

the explanations of these findinJrs.

Theories postulated within one field,

ltenerall7 have no direct relevance to other levels of investiJtation; and even
within a specific line of approach many qualifications have to be made about
the experimental observations before theorildna.

Therefore, for a given set

of evidence, it is not only sufficient to propoae a theory, but the

NaaoD8 for

putting forward such a theory should be justified. and the acope of ita
applications specified.

The above is a

fundamental problem in science, typical of complex

phenomena, such as learning, with many levels of descriptions.

However,

there are three principal ways of describing the learning phenomenon:(1) -

'Behavioural' or lGenera1j.si.ruc' descriptions which involve classifications
of equivalent events and discovery of behavioural causalities.

(2) - 'Neuro-physiological' descriptions of mechanisms involved in learning.
(3) -

lCo~tive',
IOr~tional' or
ISystem' descriptions which entail
deVIsing systems whose properties match with the observations of
behaviour or mechanism.

It must be pointed out that mathematical abstractions could be applied

to

any of the above three levels of description; and such formalisms should only
be regarded as a language for expression, and not a separate descriptive level.
Today, an obvious gap exists between neuro-physiologists or psychologists
and designers of 'artificial learning systems', which is hardly surprising if we
consider their differing backgrounds, techniques, skills, or terminologies used.
It is interesting to look at the significance and the contribution of various

artificial 'learning' models to the natural domains of the study of learning
phenomenon,

for

example,

psychology,

ontogenetic and phylogenetic sciences.
disciplines are

indeed

neuro-physiology,

teaching,

or

The views of the workers from such

diverse, they range from

skeptical repudiation,

dismissals as only interesting diversions; to serious enthusiasm, and utilization
of these 'artificial learning' models for purposes of simulation or better
understanding of their own criteria.
Although, many tnon-biological' assumptions are made in the design of
most 'learning' models, nevertheless, positive contributions bave clear17 been
made to the studies of learning in its natural domajn&
lartificial'

neuronal

models

and

networks

are

Por UBlDple,

eom.monly

used

in

neuro-phyaiology for better understanding of neuronal plaaticity. alao, in the
field of A.I. various discoveries bave been made about the pereeptual and
Hnguistic aspects of symbolic knowledge.

1.5 NA'ft&\L
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The fundamental queation of whether art::Iflcial qate.. (software and
hardware) can in fact 'learn' baa preoccupied ID8D7 workers involved in the

modeDing of learning p1'OC8ll88ll, and is a prilae COIUIideratiora in . . t A.I. and
cogmUve

The basic issue hinpa on the ,definition of
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human (and animal) 'intelligence'. In observing any natural learning behaviour
three major questions are posed:(1) - What are the mechanisms involved?
(2) - What are the components of learning?
(3) - How does learning change with time?
Each of above questions have been partially answered at some level of
observation in neuro-physiological and psychological sciences.

Yet, the

principal problem is that the manifestation of the learning process in man
(and in animals) is not clearly understood.

When a particular learning

behaviour is scrutinised then a linguistic description or a mathematical
quantitative evaluation of performance can be made; similarly, some aspects of
neuronal changes can be observed.

But, the hypotheses compiled are still

very incomplete and many ambiguities have yet to be resolved.
Putting aside the vitalistic objections, arguments against artificial systems
being able to 'learn' are, generally, either based on their superficiality due to
mimicry/duplication, or use entropic considerations (i.e., order is only possible
from order - a machine will only do what it is told or designed to do).

Yet,

it is a truism to say that many of the 'learning' models devised so far have
been able to display novel behaviours which in some cases have even
surprised their designers.

Others, also, in an 'open' interactive manner have

'learned' to perform specific tasks with a proficiency which at times surpasses
that of a human.
whether

the

In any case, the daunting question always remains present

manifestation of 'learning'

in

such an artificial model is

functionally equiValent to the human learning process.
Turing (1947) foresaw that artificial systems could be made to manifest
learning in human sense. and proposed that with technological development of
larger computing machines experiments along these lines.

The following

Turing's criteria for 'learning' in machines can be considered on an equal
I

footing to his now renowned "Turing test for 'intelligence'" (which will also
be discussed later):-

"Let us suppose that we have set up a machine with initial instruction
tables, so constructed that these tables might on occasion, if g09d
reason arose I modify these tables.
One can imagine that atter the
machine had been operating. for some time~.the instructions would have
been altered out of rec::ognition, but nevenIleleaa st:iJl be such that ODe
would have to admit that the machine was still doing very worthwhile
calculations.
Possibly it might atm be getting reiulta of the _t7P8
desired when the machine was set up, but in a much more efficient
manner. In such a case ODe could bave to admit that the p~raa of
the machine had not been foreseen when its or1ginal instruction. were
put in. It would be like a .pupil who had learnt much from hia JD88ter:,
but bad added much more til' BiB own work. When this haBr;ns I teel
that. one is obliged to regaru the machine as showing inle
enca. "

Turing (1950), also, in a very knowledgeable, and historically significant,
analysis

of

the

problem of

machine

'intelligence'

again

discusses

the

possibility of designing machines that can 'learn':"Instead of trying to produce a program to simulate the adult mind,
why not rather try to produce one which simulate the child'? If this
were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would
obtain the adult brain."
Turing looks at the adult's brain as starting from an initial 'state of mind'
at birth and going through a process of 'education' and 'experience'.

The

importance of the issues of 'reward' and 'punishment' (not in the emotional
sense) are also emphasised in such a 'learning child-machine'.
An important analogy is also made by Turing in comparing the process of
learning with the process of evolution.

'Natural selection' is seen as a very

slow learning process which is governed by changes brought about by random
'mutations' -

as opposed to changes brought about by 'motivational' or

'reinforcing' aspects of the process of learning.

This 'random' element is

regarded as a useful feature which could be utilized in some machine related
'learning' strategies; in particular, in non-trivial problems that have large
combinatorial characteristics, where other systematic solutions are inadequate.
There is a well investigated and documented empirical observation in
psychology, the so called 'superstitious behaviour', which shows a tendency in
humans and animals to attribute order and organization to events which are
totally random.

Another aspect of this feature of human psyche, evident

from the dawn of civilization, has been the desire to assign purpose and
intelligence to inanimate phenomena surrounding us.

Therefore, it is hardly

surprising that machines or systems that seemingly act 'intelliaent' are so
readily ascribed with human intellectual capabilities.
In this respect, we can make the interesting observation that almost
invariably one of the first considerations in the desian of a laboratory robot,
or an A.I. computer program, ia the personsUaing of the model with a human
sounding name (e••• , FREDDY, SIIAKBY, HACKBR, etc.); and these machines
or programs are often referred to aa "he" and not "it".
The proficient A.I. programs of today, such as chess playing programa,
would have unquestionably been considered as 'intelligent' a generation

aco.

But, the tendency is to dismiss a behaviour as 'intelligent' once it is broken
down to its logical components, elrBlDined, and a mathe_tical formalism
abstracted for its s7ntheBia.

One of the important ways which the more recent models of the learning
process vary from their biological counterparts is in their widespread reliance
on a tteacher' or 'operator' element.
direct

interaction and

experience

Most learning in nature is attained by
with

environment,

with an

tinternal'

evaluation of experiences prompted by 'goals', 'motives' or 'drives'.

The

earlier cybernetic 'learning' models did try to copy this aspect of natural
learning, yet, were only capable of performing very simple tasks.
The various 'teleological' explanations as to why humans and animals
should posses the learning capability have ranged from "entropic balance",
"evolutionary adaptiveness", "survival", "biological control", "preservation of
vital parameters", "purposiveness", "divinity" to many others. Similarly, such
considerations are thought to be pivotal in the design of complex 'learning'
systems.
It is conceivable that a genuinely autonomous machine with 'learning'

capacity may, after its interactions with the environment, develope a notion
of 'purpose' (in the abstract sense).

Yet, still at the more fundamental level

of design other internal teleological centers may be incorporated, which
enables the machine itself to direct its behaviour, rather than to exclusively
rely on the external judgments of its designer/teacher/operator/supervisor examples of this type of primary design principle are 'seeking equilibriums' or
'seeking change'.
There are also many instances where the psychological and biological
aspects of 'life' are too frivolously applied to machines, robots, computers or
even abstract models.

One extreme example is when some writers contend

that machine-tools or robots are 'reproducing' themselves when they are
engaged in the construction of other machine-tools or robots.

These

conceptualizations should be regarded with some degree of skepticism, and
also care should be taken in the choice of 'natUJ'Bl' concepts when applied to
various aspects of an inanimate design, alternately their defiDition ahould be
qualified for such artificial domains.
So we have seen that many problems arise when various terminologies

based on human attributes are acrutiniaed within diaciplinee iDvolved with the

modelling of

the

learmn.

proceaa.

ContradictioDs, overJappiqa, and

ambipities between different tenas become hlnderiDlr atuabliDa bJocka,
resultina in much effort being expencled towards

ararum. pointe of diaUnctioD.

Concepts of '1ntelliaence', 'perception', 'cotPdtion', '_morT', 'und8l"lltandm.',
'thinlri~', or 'knowW.e' are 801M of the

hiatoricaU7 ..... controversial such

notions.

So it is understandable that many workers have a striving for the

relative

safety

of

mathematical

descriptive

methods

where,

generally,

terminologies refer to precise concepts within the axiomatic framework of the
particular formaHv.ation.
Formalising in general means changing the universe of discourse (or the
language) by use of some translating rules. It is hoped that greater precision
could be achieved in the new body of discourse.

Yet, in the case of the

learning proceSB a lack of sufficient knowledge about underlying 'syntactic'
and tsemantic' rules has meant that the translations to the new formalised
domains have, generally, been in a very limited and narrow sense.
A

recent trend in the modelling of Imental' processes has been to

'externalise' the particular capabilities of the brain from its natural (neuronal)
mechanisms.

'Language' and tvision' are some other attributes of the brain

which have been studied and theorized in this vain (Chomsky and Marr
respectively), by inherents of their logical processes, rather than structural
details of entities embodying these processes.

In system theory various attributes of general systems are studied and
their properties compared.

A principal recurring argument of this nature

which has been applied against the use of computers for the modelling of the
learning proceSB is their tsequential' rather than 'parallel' character.

It is

contended that since nature, through the course of evolution, has equipped
animals with a brain which essentially works in a parallel IIUlJ1Der, then it is
only logical that the same principle should be incorporated in the design of
tools intended for the modelling of the brain's proceaaes.
Partly for this reason, and partly for other technological or commercial
considerations, the development of paraDel processors and parallel computers
have again become focus of much attention, and subject to much activity in
recent years.
Considerations have alao been given to the issue of 'digital'

All human and animal primary

_~

VB.

'BIIBlogue'.

and the changes in environment are by

nature continuous (or 1lI:I8loguft), the dillcrete (or dlCital) interpretation. of
such changes are only attributed at the higher 871DboUc repl'888ntaUoaal
levels of the brain.

RYen, the
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callecl on-off action of the

a 'description' of their real activity which is continuous.

DeUI'ODII

is oaly

However, it can be mathematically shown that any analogue process may
be approximated by an equivalent digital process, to whatever degree of
accuracy required -

by a process of 'sampling'.

Examples of such an

approximation abound in our verbal descriptions of surrounding world (e.g.,
hot, cold, dark, etc.).
Most of the early 'learning' models were based on analogue criteria, of
course, they were attempts at the simulation of lower non-symbolic levels of
the learning

hierarchy.

Some workers

have also contended that the

continuities of the environment can only be adequately represented by
analogue systems.

They see that changes of the real world, and continuities

of perceptions of such changes, carry significances which are lost when the
same changes are recorded and stored in discrete unconnected units.

Hence,

the digital computer is considered as a poor choice for modelling fast
analogue changes of the world which implicitly carry a vast amount of
'bonding' information (whose preservation is deemed crucial).
So far the fundamental necessity of analogue processes in the task of
simulation or synthesis of 'learning' has not been conclusively demonstrated,
and with the development of much faster parallel digital computing structures,
the arguments of relative merits of digital vs. analogue should be switching
from the 'computing device' domains into issues of principle.
1.7 lQ1RIJJlI} OF LBARNDIl

Synthesis of a model provides grounds for further testing of a theory or
its modifications.

Normally, if theories are simple then deductions can be

made either by verbal descriptions, simple hardware, symbolic logic, or
mathematics.

But, for the more complex theories linguistic descriptions

become very tedious; and hardware, logical or mathematical deacriptiona will
be too difficult to devise, or will be highly erroneous. It is precisely for this
class of theories which a recourse has been made to computers - particularly,
in explanations of higher mental activities of humans.
H a model is capable of uhibiting behaviour which functionally is a very
faithful duplication of the phenomenon it is trying to sbaulate, then It can be
said that the model has a close equivalence to the original.

Additionally, if

there were alao close physical resemblances between the .adel and the
original (i.e., texture, size, colour, etc.), then it is conceivable that the model
can replace the original without noticeable distinctions.

Various mathematical equations and other forms of parametric abstractions
have been devised to support different learning theories or specific learning
observations.

The techniques used in such abstractions utilize a variety of

mathematical criteria, such as 'probabilistic' or 'set-theoretic'.
Yet, the fact that the process of learning can be interpreted in so many
levels has led various researchers to express the theories of learning in terms
of simple models which are more easily understood than complex mathematical
abstractions

of

the

observations,

or

their

mere

linguistic

explanation.

'Learning systems' are realized as models in three basic ways: mathematical
abstractions, computer programs, and specially built hardware devices.
The hardware models have the added advantage of incorporating the
causalities of the physical environment within their design.

But, most of all,

hardware models are advantageous because of their practical considerations,
and

the clear insight they provide into the relation of structure and

behaviour.
A well conceived hardware model can aid explanation as much as a well
formulated abstract theory.

Getting a physical model such as a robot or a

machine to function properly is equivalent to demonstrating that the theory is
internally consistent; and running the robot/machine through several tasks is
logically

equivalent

to

hypothesising

about

a

particular

explanation.

Therefore, irrespective of the means used for realization (hardware or
abstract) theories can be functionally equivalent. In other words, there is an
'isomorphism' (point-by-point parallel correspondence) between the behavioural
patterns of such realizations.
Later, it will be seen that most 'learning' models, except perhaps the
designs used for simulation of lower modalities of learning (e.g., refiexive
behaviour, neural plasticity), have generally two basic design features refiecting the distinction of human 'action' from 'thought'.
Firstly,

the

'behavioural'

features

of

the

model,

and

secondly

tinformation-processing' aspects incorporated within the model.
tperformance' of a
acquisition

of

model is

knowledge

the

While, the

judged from its behavioural features, the

and

information-processing faculties.

all

tlearning'

is

centred

around

its

T~e •• ture
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A third higher descriptive feature, as in the case of humans, can also be
incorporated within a 'learning' model, and that is the capability to 'abstract'
or 'model' an internal isomorphic representation of the external world (and
the model itself).

Whereby, inductive inferences can be made about the

eventualities of the models behaviour without physically engaging in such
behaviour.

Generally, it is regarded that for this facilitation a 'language'

capacity is necessary, to enable the abstraction and extrapolation of syntaxes
within input data. Here, the philosophical issues of 'self' and 'self-awareness'
could find scope for exercise.
'Learning' models could be categorized according to a variety of criteria
(e.g., historical ordering, type of approach, type of data acquired, or domain
of application).

In an intuitive hierarchic sense, probably the simplest type

of 'learning' models are those which demonstrate basic reflex conditioning
behaviours or other innate features of animals.

Next in the line of hierarchy

are the models which use the reinforcements of favourable responses as their
basis, and generally involve statistical criteria. Such models can be regarded
as some kind of 'generalizing' or 'averaging' devices.

Their elaboration, in

turn, could entail adding secondary reinforcement centres which can determine
the 'good' features that were before determined by an external 'trainer' or
'teacher'.
The 'concept learning' models which utilize logical representations of
external world rather than their numeric or statistical features are, yet,
higher in rank.

Finally, the most complex types of models are those

incorporating a broad spectrum of intricate learning methods, mostly based on
knowledge intensive systems directed towards the acquisition of a specific
skill, and involving the higher strata of human learning capabilities.
When various models of 'learning' are evaluated or discussed we must also
consider whether they are "special purpose" or "general purpose" models,
referring to their relative range of applicability.

Many other considerations

will also be outlined in later chapters.

The

developments in

characterised

the

field

of modelling of learning

by over optimistic claims of its researchers.

have

been

Yet, failed

overeager predictions of cyberneticians and A.I. workers are not the kind that
disprove the whole theory, but only shows weaknesses in the choice of its
direction or pace of development.

T~e Mature of

tbe

Prob!e.
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In the 1950's and the 1960's, such modelers having analyzed the problem
and proposed a blue-print thought that it would only be a matter of time, and
improvement of appropriate technological tools, before their simple systems
could be elaborated into fully fledged sophisticated 'learning machines'.

This

scientific over-expectation is typical of many disciplines, and does not imply
that the workers involved have anything but the best intentions.
The advent of digital computers with their ever increasing computing
powers (faster and with more memory), although predicted by the early
modelers

of

the

learning

breakthrough expected.

process,

did

not

provide

the

revolutionary

The aspiration of pioneers of cybernetics for a

general purpose computational machine, with nearly unlimited potential, which
can be used for the simulation and synthesis of the learning process is almost
realised today in the shape of digital computers.

But, in spite of these

powerful tools, solid and successful global 'learning' theories which can be
applied to different tasks and systems have not been forthcoming.
recurring theme

has,

therefore,

The

been an under estimation of computer

capabilities, and an over estimation of its potentialities.

In a sense, we can

say that theoretical advances have not been keeping pace with technological
innovations.
1.8 DIFF.BRBNT APPROAaIBS TO THE PIUn.BH OF KlDElJJNG OF I...EARND«;

Some early designers of 'learning' systems

had anticipated

the two

developmental paths that would be taken by researchers in the field of
'machine learning'.

Which were the two diametric strategies of building-in

(or programming-in) a 'lot' or 'little' complexity into the initial state of the
system.

They contended that, on the one hand, complex logical inferences

could be incorporated at the initial state of the machine, hence, the pattern
of the 'intelligent' behaviour would be present from the start.

Or, on the

other hand, by incorporating just a minimal amount of information and a
capability to 'learn' the machine would be able to develope the 'intelligent'
behaviour gradually itself. The actual development of 'learning' models within
the past four decades has traversed quite an interesting (and logical) path,
which closely emulates the general pattern of these early predictions.
As it will become evident from our later discussions of various approaches

to the modelling of the learning process, and from many examples cited, the
notion of learning pJayed a

much

more

prominent role in

endeavours of designers of 'intelligent' machinery or systems.

the earlier
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Following the proliferation of the theories of learning, the development of
'learning' models generally progressed on a parallel lines to such theories, and
mainly incorporated

various

'natural' criteria in

their designs.

These

psychological models were principally used for the simulation and better
understanding of the theories of learning.
Later, such challenges were taken up by cyberneticians, control-engineers,
automata theorists, or general systems mathematicians, who used many more
abstractions in their models.

Similarly, other 'intelligent' models were

developed in subjects such as Neural-Nets, Logical-Nets, Self-Organising
Systems, and Pattern-Recognition which also featured many aspects of the
process of learning.
The advent of digital computers was a significant landmark. One group of
modelers continued on the path of simulating natural learning processes, using
these newly acquired tools and techniques. However, a substantial proportion
of the followers of the new 'information processing' paradigm decided that
the constraint of adhering only to the 'natural' aspects of learning was too
limiting, specially since progress was slow, and was dictated by the pace of
progress in neuro-physiological and psychological sciences.

Hence, they

embarked on designing 'cognitive' computer-oriented 'learning systems' using
various 'ad-hoc' techniques, and abandoning the emphasis and constant
references to 'natural' aspects of learning.

They contended that their

methods could achieve the end result pattern of a 'learned' behaviour in a
much faster and more efficient manner -

particularly, in specific task

domains.
The workers in this paradigm try to incorporate a great deal of prior
'information' and 'knowledge' into the initial structure of the system.

Yet,

generally, not much attention is paid to the 'acquisitional' aspects of the
design; also any 'learning' mentioned normally refers to a specific problematic
domain, and not to its 'global' sense.
Today, all the above approaches are still being pursued in parallel with
varying scales of followings and popularity. Adherents of BOme rejecting the
methodologies or even the viability of BOme alternate approaches, yet, others
seemingly adopt a

more accommodating and tolerant views of disparate

approaches.
In any case, intellectual feuds between followers of opposing paradigms
seemingly resulting from argumentation of relative merits of each approach is
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Specially, in view of many precedences in the history

of science, where alternate approaches have coexisted in parallel until
conclusive settlement (e.g., quantum theory vs. wave theory) - although, each
being argued with fervour and believed to be true by its followers.
Nevertheless, to find the real weaknesses of a discipline or approach it is
best to listen to informed counter arguments of its critics.

The frailties of

opposite views are invariably exposed more, and the relative merits of their
Therefore, to get a

own discipline are highlighted out of proportion.

balanced view, the two (or maybe more) accounts of the same story should at
least be heard.
It

is

a

prevailing

belief

of

workers

in

fields

such

as

A.I.,

pattern-recognition, robotics, cybernetics, computer sciences, etc., that within
the next 40-50 years there will be technical possibilities of constructing
machines with intellectual capabilities of an adult human.

Although, the

scenarios leading to such a development vary tremendously, ranging from an
optimistic utilizations of such machines to their doomsday type dominations.
Here, an implicit assumption is also made that parallel discoveries in brain
sciences and psychology will make new and significant contributions to this
pursuit

of

'intelligent'

machinery.

An

important

postscript

to above

conviction is that if human intelligence can be attained then it surely can be
surpassed, and the next level of speculation will yet bring to surface the
enormous possibilities which 'super-intelligent' developments will entail.
In

the following

we will attempt to elaborate on the

two resulting

principal approaches which have come to dominate the field of modelling of
'learning' •
1.8.1 '11IB CYBBRNBTIC "BJl"l'QI-UP' APIBWlI

The usage of term "cybernetic" is not a universally exercised practice.
Various other researchers refer to this distinct approach as "brain studies",
"natural", "neural-nets", "Self-Organising Systems", or "pattern-recognition"
approach.
context

But, the appropriateness of using the 'cybernetic' label in this

will

be

justified

in

our

later

discussions

of

the

subject of

Cybernetics.
A point of relevance, here, is that the wide perspective which this thesis
is advocating has been a characteristic of the cybernetic view of most
disciplines.

Georae

(1986),

in

his

discussion

of

the

development

of
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cybernetics, A.I. and related subjects, highlights the issues involved in the
diversification of a field of knowledge.
approach

(i.e.,

activities are

cybernetic vs. A.I.)

to

He contends that distinctions in
problems of modelling of human

non-fundamental, and each approach of these overlapping

disciplines only signifies "the different ways of slicing a cake", rather than
the divisions themselves.

The

early

cybernetic

learning

models

relied

heavily

on

ideas

of

control-theory, such as 'feed-back', and the intricacies of their designs were
generally attributable to clever interconnections of few electronic, electrical
or mechanical components and devices.

The pioneers of this paradigm did, in fact, approach the problem from a
very logical point of view.

Their intention was to manifest the elementary

modalities of learning in abstractions or artifacts, utilizing observations from
simple behavioural traits (mainly in animals) or simple neuronal mechanisms.
Their approaches are today, generally, described as mundane, simplistic,
weakly-specified, non-productive, or unfashionable. But, an important point is
lost in such assessments of these early trends, it was indeed not the intention
of their designers to show or to make models which could immediately
demonstrate the higher intellectual capabilities of humans.
interested in the underlying fundamentals, and a

They were more

slow progressive, yet

versatile, path to the higher strata of intelligence hierarchy - hence, the lack
of spectacular achievements.

However, it is true to say that cyberneticians, neural-net scientists, or
other adherents of the "bottom-up" approach to 'learning' have not exhausted

all possibilities of their paradigm.

Maybe, today, some 30 years after the

high point of their elementary 'learning' models, with the introduction of new
technological tools and techniques, and increased theoretical and empirical
knowledge, once again attention should be focused on this intuitive approach;
and BOme of the fundamental aspects of the modelling of the process of
learning scrutinised in much more detail.

The centuries old argument of brains vs. machines surfaced with a new
vigore with the flourishing of the new disciplines of computer sciences, A.I.
and Robotics.

Of course, the principal goal of the research in these fields is

not to cleverly mimic 'natural learning' (in a science-fiction sense), but to
scientifically create machines which are genuinely able to 'learn', and use this
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behaviour, in improving their

performance or knowledge.
The 'computer' or 'information' revolution is generally considered as the
second industrial revolution.

But, in fact, the course of the mechanization of

thought processes can be regarded more as an evolutionary process, which is
developing in parallel to the mechanization of muscular powers, currently
manifested in industrial robotics and automation.
Today,

developments

of

computer

technology,

currently

in

its

generation with 6-th and 7-th in planning, are taken for granted.

5-th
Their

power, speed and capacity are increased an order of magnitude every tew
years.
The general tendency in information processing is towards computer based
models.

At the root

ot this trend lies the central belief that mathematical

formulae, machines and robots are incapable of conveying 'mental' symbols
and carrying out complex computations on such

symbols; after all, the

ultimate objective. is to have systems which can display tacets of 'thinking'.
However, the computer is seen as a suitable vehicle for such abstractions.
This trend, in turn, accounts for the way that the learning process (and other
endowments of the brain) has come to be 'externalised' to the brain, and its
explanations based on higher organizational features of the structure rather
than the specifics of mechanisms or symbols themselves.

In other words, the

'fibre' of the model is no longer considered relevant, whether it is biological,
chemical, electronic, mechanical, or abstract; and the computer is simply
regarded as a convenient tool at disposal.
On refiection upon this latter point, if some of the current disciplines
involved with the modelling of 'learning' (e.g., A.I.) are looked at in isolation
from its 'computer' component, then distinctions between such subjects and
psychology, linguistics, sections of philosophy, or some other fields become
less clear cut.

It is the appreciation of this underlying kinship which has

compelled some workers to describe all these disciplines under the umbrella of
"cognitive sciences".
regarded

as

the

The science of "Cybernetics", in the same vain, can be

broader

interdisciplinary approach

which

encompasses

biological, cognitive and mechanical aspects of 'learning'.

A

characteristic

of

the

very

title

of

many

information-processing

disciplines of today such as "Pattern-Recognition", "Speech-Recognition",
"Artificial-Intelligence", "Problem-Solving", or "Theorem-Proving" is that their
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names actually refer to the ultimate 'goals' of their workers, rather than
signifying the 'course' of their scientific endeavours, as is the case with most
other scientific topics.

If, indeed, the objective of true artificial-intelligence

was attained then there would not be a point for such a pursuit.
Some early Information Processing models were clearly engaged in either
or both aspects of 'simulation' and 'synthesis'.

But, this distinction has

become much more vague in the increasingly more complex models of A.I.,
where the appreciation of underlying difficulties of the task has made the
distinction, to some extent, immaterial.
Within the doctrine of Information Processing no real attempt is made to
incorporate in a model the biological structures or the natural ways of
achieving the same end.

It is also believed (although not with very firm

conviction) that a conglomeration of sub-models, each capable of simulating
one aspect of human intelligence, will at the end lead to the attainment of
true artificial 'intelligence'.

'Learning' models in this approach are generally

devised for four major categories of 'learning' tasks:(1) -

Rote Learning: memorizing a sequence of tables for later use.

(2) - Parameter Learning: learning by adjusting or discovery of values of
certain parameters - e.g., in pattern-recognition.
(3) - Method Learning: algorithmic learning of procedures applicable to
different situations.
(4) - Concept Learning: building a knowledge structure out of elementary
concepts.
In recent years, the trend in this field has been away from the 'pure'
aspects of learning, and towards the 'problem-oriented' aspects.

Various

economic considerations have compelled many workers to seek more practical
and industrially-applicable results.

Therefore, the early 'learning' models

based on 'natural' phenomena are now, in the main, considered out of fashion
(and

to some extent futile)

by the adherents of information-processing

approach to modelling of learning - the emphasis has shifted to tackling
specific

clearly

defined

problems,

or

class

of

problems,

at

the

'representational' level.
1.9 WHY IIJIU) BARDWARB KDDS AND RB7lS ?

As we discussed previously, hardware devices, as models, have some
intrinsic qualities which can facilitate a better understanding or synthesis and
simulation of a

phenomenon.

In particular, the reason why hardware

simulations of 'learning' are attempted is because most behavioural, cognitive
or neuro-physiological experimental results are difficult to interpret; and
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theories based on them are, normally, imprecise and their consequences hard
to follow.
for

Hence, the way that mathematics provides a rigorous foundation

theorizing in the physical sciences, the machine simulation can be

regarded as fulfilling a similar function in behavioural sciences.
The conception of modern notion of "robotics" is generally attributed to
Czech play writer Karl Capek (term "robot" is a derivation of Czech word for
'workers').

Science-fictional robots aside, there is not much doubt that real

robots have been very useful in assisting man in situations where the
environment is dangerous, inhospitable, or inaccessible; or the task is
mundane, repetitive, routine, or dangerous; or when simply some improvement
of a performance criteria is required.

Today's

sophisticated

robots

(hardware

models)

are

mostly

used

in

conjunction with a digital computer, and, therefore, when referring to their
'intelligent' behaviour it is basically the 'intelligence' of their accompanying
computer program which is insinuated and not the hardware construct itself.
In addition to the advances made in computer technology, which are so
relevant to 'learning robots', numerous other areas of engineering have also
been providing their specific contributions to such designs.
Generally, the computer is regarded as the 'brain' of the robot, the
manipulators or mobile vehicles as the 'body' or 'effectors', and the various
devices which can provide almost any imaginable quantified measure of the
physical environment (e.g., light, colour, vision, heat, touch, smell, sound,
pressure, speed, movement, sonar, etc.) as the 'sensors'.

The inputs of these

sensors are converted to electrical signals which, in turn, are translated to
digitized codes of computer language.
The technology of robotics is forging ahead at a

brisk speed, and

constantly more precise, faster, more powerful or more versatile manipulators
and robot vehicles are constantly being developed.

The wondrous tasks that

some of these robots are able to perform are quite astounding, a recent
Japanese experimental robot can playa whole musical score on the piano
without

any

training,

by

recognising

the

musical

pattern-recognition system and using delicate finger type

notes

with

ma~ipulators;

a

other

advanced walking or hopping robots can now show very high degrees of
dynamic balancing capabilities.

Yet, in spite of all these achievements very

little actual 'learning' is included within their designs - most of the 'learning'
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achieved in the current generation of robots only refers to the memorizing of
spatial trajectories or paths.
Another category of robots, such as the project undertaken for the
purposes of this thesis, are the 'experimental robots'.

The forerunners of

this class of robots were the mechanical and electrical devices ('turtles')
which were constructed by cyberneticians interested in simulating specific
behavioural traits.

Since the early 1960's, various laboratories in academic

institutions have been engaged in building either 'roving' mobile robots or
'hand-eye' manipulative robots with many interesting and varying features.
Some mobile robots had manipulators or TV-cameras mounted on the carts,
others used legs rather than wheels for movement - here, the studies based
on human or animal limb movements have provided a helpful source of data.
Many of the early experimental mobile robots had their logic decision making
mechanisms embodied within the hardware of the design, however, the later
versions had the processing centre incorporated in a digital computer, which
was either on-board or housed separately and in communication via cables or
infra-red/ultrasound/radio signals - this dissection of the "brain" from the
"body" of robots was considered as an important breakthrough.
The computer controlled laboratory robots, as well as being interesting
scientific curiosities, are built for a variety of reasons.

In some instances it

is an obvious practical problem solving or industrial application which dictates
the necessity of this type of research.
vehicles

as

tools

for

Other workers are simply using these

experimentation

or

demonstration

of

particular

psychological or educational criteria; here, robots are regarded as a kind of
simple roving animal which interacts with a rich sensory environment.
Similarly, various cognitive postulates on perceptual problems may be
investigated using robots that have visual sensory devices attached to them;
and, indeed, they have been influential in a better understanding of the
processes of formation and acquisition of knowledge structures.

Some

experimental robots have aided the development of various programming
languages and tools (e.g., LOGO, PROLOG).

Finally, an experimental complex

robot can be a good medium for combining various isolated ideas within a
single autonomous body, such as combining a visual system with a navigational
system or a manipulative system.
The developments of laboratory robots have been progressing almost in
parallel to the technological advances of computer sciences, having nodes and
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in

the

early

1980's

such

developments

received

an
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For example,

impetus from

the

widespread use of LOGO programming language in educational establishments.
LOGO needed a simple 'turtle' for demonstration and many such devices were

constructed both in laboratories and also marketed commercially.
On the whole, the principal reason why these models did not quite realise
the early aspirations of their cybernetic designers is the lack of supporting
tgeneral'

software developments,

interesting

behavioural

emissions

which
from

would
such

have

allowed

models.

much

Hence,

all

more
such

laboratory exercises have concentrated on very specific behaviour patterns or
tasks.

To BOme degree, their designers have been frustrated that despite

having a versatile physical artifact, with many potentialities, they cannot find
appropriate methodologies to embody interesting behaviour within it.
1.10 THK mJJCrIVHS OF 'IHESIS:

DBSI~

OF A SIMPLR

'I..BARNDC'

RBJl'

Before we attempt to outline the objectives of this thesis in detail, it
would be a good idea to briefly explain the background, the progression of
ideas and endeavours, and the circumstances which were influential in
determining the direction and the development of the thesis in this partiCUlar
extensive way.
The original topic of interest was, of course, the modelling of learning,
principally, in the simpler manifestations of its hierarchy.

The objective was

to start from the lowest level and elaborate to the higher strata of learning.
After a preliminary study of the subject, the design and the construction of a
computer controlled mobile robot was decided upon as a project.

The aim

was to construct a very versatile experimental tool for implementing various
learning hypothesis, or using it for synthesis and simulations of specific
learning related criteria.

The task of designing and building 'learning'

machines or systems which in some sense can act 'intelligently' has an
intrinsic fascination.

The robot was to represent a very simple organism,

being able to interact with its environment in a primitive way.
The processes of design and construction of the robot was an interesting
and challenging endeavour, and will be discussed briefly later.

Various

considerations had to be made as to what features to include so that an
experimenter may interact freely with the machine, without various 'house
keeping', 'operational' or design constraints which characterised many other
such experimental devices.

Frequently, these constraints hindered the latter
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software developments of the machines, forcing their designers to change the
focus from 'fundamental' issues to 'machine specific' issues.
The

degree

consideration.

of

the

complexity

of

the

robot

was

also

crucial

Since if it had too many input or output devices, then the

fundamental issues of interest could not be represented faithfully.
if the

a

potentialities

of

the

model were too trivial,

behaviour of any significance could be manifested.

then

Similarly,

no 'learning'

It was decided that a

radio controlled device would be built, which would be in constant radio
communication with a computer that can continuously monitor the states of
its touch, shock, and sonar sensors; and, also, could transmit direction and
speed instructions out to the robot.

This device, which in certain functional

capabilities could be possibly compared to an amoeba or a virus, would be
able to autonomously rove in the environment of a laboratory, and should
have enough sensory complexity to demonstrate simple obstacle avoidance type
tlearning' tasks.
The actual building of the robot was an arduous task itself, and involved
many considerations and hurdles which had to be overcome, such as design
and

construction

of

motor-drive,

power

supply,

charger,

sonar,

data-communication, radio-transceiver and computer-interface circuitry, as
well as

the chassis, mechanical parts, contact-switches and various other

components.
After the completion of the tbody' of the robot and its successful testing,
the next stage was to start the development of an appropriate software which
would enable the robot to demonstrate, within its universe of discourse, a
tlearning' behaviour, more or less the way it would be manifested in a
hypothetical organism of same complexity.

Although, it was envisaged that

even with such primitive senses the same machine, with the aid of the
computer, could be made to conceptualize about its environment in a trivial
sense.

Yet, this higher level of description would be a choice of the

designer, and not intuitively detectable from the design.

It would clearly

stretch the capabilities of the robot which was not equipped to deal with the
conceptual level of description in the first place.

This point emphasises the

parity of behavioural complexity and underlying neural structural complexity
observed in nature; and should be an important consideration when attributing
tintelligent' aspects of behaviour to machines, or when dismissing a machine
as incapable of achieving such 'intelligent' behavioural traits.

Various simulation programs were written for operating the robot within
the laboratory environment.

These programs (written in FORTRAN) ranged

from simple traversing of graphs or mathematical functions, to the simulation
of a reflexive behaviour which entailed the machine roving around and moving
away from obstacles upon collision. The behaviourally most advanced program
involved the sonar scanning of the room by the robot and drawing a kind of
map of the environment on the computer display.

This allowed the robot to

plan a path and explore the room without bumping into various obstructions.
At a lower level of behavioural complexity, also, a simple algorithmic
procedure would enable the robot, using its sonar signal, detect a course of
collision and take avoiding actions.

The program itself was quite long, and

included many Imachine supervision' secondary aspects, yet, the essence of
the, so called, tintelligent' aspects of the behaviour was contained in a few
lines of programming (a simple mathematical deductive process).

Now, the

real challenge could be redefined as: how we could manifest the same logical
deductive process by a gradual Ilearning' in the machine starting from almost
random behaviour, and using basic criteria.
The search for the implementation of such a tlearning' process involved
looking at similar areas of research and designs of tlearning' robots; and even
the blue-print of a simple scheme was devised which without doubt would,
unfailingly, lead to the attainment of such a desired Ilearned ' pattern of
behaviour.

Yet, more and more, it was becoming evident that the objectives

of such simulation exercises must be clarified in the first place, and more
fundamental questions answered before embarking on such an endeavour.
It was observed that too often the designers of such programs, with the

aim of achieving interesting and quick results, delve in the specifics of a
particular formalism, methodology or behavioural pattern (normally from their
previous backgrounds), without considering the full implications of such
endeavours.

The results of this kind of hasty approach, in general, only

reinforced some preconceived ideas, and had very few surprises in store;
normally, leading to an even narrower perspective of the subject, and leaving
the elements of initial beliefs of the designer largely untouched.
Bence, a principal shift of emphasis took place, and it was decided that
before the specific preferences (prejudices?) of our design was set a journey
through the genesis of the phenomenon of learning be undertaken.

The approach taken was to get a kind of 'snap-shot' of the state of
research in various disciplines at this moment of time; and also to find out
the applications, future possibilities, and aspirations of workers in each field.
The underlying philosophical, historical, biological, evolutionary, and social
aspects would, in addition, be covered so as to understand some of the
interrelations of various disciplines, their common features, or backgrounds to
their development.
The challenge of a comparative study of all aspects and approaches of
learning was considered as both rewarding and daunting.

Yet, such a

multi-approach compilation was regarded as a valuable contribution to our
later more 'objective' analysis of the 'learning' models, and also to any
designer of such models at the preliminary stage of their task.

Specially,

since most studies of the learning process and its modelling are carried out in
the rigid boundaries of a single discipline, which reflect the common interests
or the typical backgrounds of researchers in its domain.
An attempt will be made to highlight the shortcomings of each paradigm,
as well as citing its achievements and strong points.

At the final analysis,

however, it can be said that the definitive statements of the weaknesses of
each approach to design of 'learning' models are much more conclusive than
the hopeful possibilities professed by their adherents.
Yet, deliberately, no particular angle of the arguments will be promoted on
exclusive basis, or pursued as a theme.

Since, not only it is the striving for

objectivity which culminated in this wideness of perspective, but, it is the
express advocation of this thesis that such a 'broad' view should be adopted
in "the modelling of learning".
thesis can be summed as:

Hence, in simple terms the objective of this

"MAKING QUALIFIED JUDGMENTS"

It is, however, not contended that for a real breakthrough a revolutionary

abrupt step need to be made in the development of 'learning machines' (i.e.,
starting from basic alternate criteria, possibly non-related to the natural
occurring processes).

But, the aim is to stop and view the whole topic with

the widest possible perspective and try to clarify few goals, and deviations
from such goals; and also to look at the 'total' context in a much more detail
without being prejudiced by a blinkered uni-disciplinary bias. In other words,
we would like to see what conclusions, interpretations, commonality of
concepts, or inter-relations exist between the branches which have sprouted
from

the

learning.

mainstream of the PS7chological and

philosophical studies of
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In

starting an undertaking

such

as

this

project there are certain

characteristic pitfalls which may pose problems for the researcher.

"Solving

the World" and" Ambitious Paralysis" are, according to Bundy (1984), two of
the traps which may hinder progress or even force the worker to abandon the
endeavour in frustration.

However, due to the very broad nature of this

thesis it was inevitable that at times deviations from the main objectives
would happen, and keeping the underlying aims in focus was one of the major
obstacles of this endeavour.
There is a saying that: "a little learning is a dangerous thing", and as we
are trying to 'learn about learning' in this wide ranging manner then the
difficult decision has to be made as to what depth should we probe the
various fields involving this ubiquitous phenomenon.

Is it enough to skim

over an approach, or should we familiarise ourselves with the particular
methodologies and formalisms of the approach.
Due to the extensiveness of task in hand, a compromise had to be made to
limit the investigations of subjects to a broad yet uniform sense.

With only

occasional indulgences made into detailed analyses which are considered
essential

to

the

core

problem

-

hence

the fundamental

aspects

(both

knowledge and behaviour related) concerning 'learning' models are more
emphasised.

Typical or historically important works of each discipline will

also be cited, their notable proponents mentioned, and the basic criteria and
viewpoints of the paradigm discussed.
We will not try to engage in very deep philosophical discussions of the
periphery concepts of learning.

These debates are typified by the scrutinies

of the concept of 'intelligence' and its various aspects in many A.I. related
literature.

Such a

pursuit, although

worthwhile and

interesting in a

philosophical domain, in a sense will probably narrow down the definition of
learning in the sweeping manner we wish to study, and will deter us from
covering

the

'adaptation').

widest

possible

range

of

approaches

to

'learning'

(and

The notion of 'learning', hence, will be discussed in its

consensus understanding of the concept, which, incidently, varies from
discipline to discipline.

In this work we will attempt to characterize the

process of learning from different points of view, and also to specify
, distinctions or unifying features.
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A decision had also to be made as to what levels the mathematical
abstractions should be scrutinised - in spite of personal preferences for such
abstractions, due to a mathematical background.

Based on the broad nature

of the thesis, the general criterion used was to include only formalisms which
were pertinent to the underlying fundamental issues, or where a direct
relevance could be seen to the specific goal (i.e., the design of simple
'learning' machines); and the understanding of which would not require
rigorous mathematical background.
Therefore, the outline of this thesis can be summed up in the following:(1) - Natural learning observations studied in a broad sense, including both
physiological and psychological aspects.
(2) - Hierarchies of learning identified
developmental sense.

in

evolutionary, functional,

(3) - Various features and
processes identified.

of

different

components

types

of

and

learning

(4) - Models and modelling discussed in general; and specific principles, tools,
formalisms and techniques involved in the modelling of 'learning
examined.
(5) - Approaches to the problems of 'simulation' and 'synthesis' of 'learning'
considered, their development outlined, some notable examples discussed,
and relevant issues addressed or argued.
(6) -

The design and construction of a hardware mobile robot discussed as a
~ssible tool for experimentation, simulation or synthesis of various
simple 'learning' schemes.

(7) -

Features deemed to be essential in design of 'learning' systems
discussed, both in general terms and also in the context of above
experimental hardware model.

1.12 AN OVBRVIBW OF 'l1IE CHAPrBRS
Finally, here, we will briefly outline the composition of each chapter, and
the course of development of the thesis.

The intermediary chapters or

sections, however, could be studied also in isolation, since they are separated
by 'natural' methodological, paradigmatic, or phenomenological breaks in
approach or level of enquiry.
In Chapter-1 we began by a general definition of the problem which is of
interest to this thesis, namely the process of learning and its modelling. The
various developmental aspects of related sciences were looked into, and
specific key issues of contention were analyzed in more detail.

Next, the

modelling aspects of the phenomenon of learning and various approaches
involved were discussed.

Finally J the
case for our particular global approach
r

to the issue was arg\led and the objectives identified.
In Chapter-2 we will be examining the three principal approaches to the
empirical studies of learning in man and animals.

The learning theories

developed

in

psychology,

brain-sciences and

cognitive

studies will

be

discussed, and the backgrounds to their development pointed out. Various
definitions of learning, its attributes, and related issues will be addressed; and
their underlying neuronal mechanisms described.

Also, different taxonomies

and hierarchies of the learning process and its mechanisms will be outlined.
Chapter-3 will be concerned with the general problem of the modelling of
learning, hence, discussions of some fundamental issues of modelling will be
undertaken; principally, involving its facets of 'simulation' and 'synthesis'; as
opposed to the empirical studies which mainly involve 'analysis'.

'Learning'

models will be broadly categorized into 'natural' vs. 'artificial'.

Finally,

abstract tools, mathematical theories, and techniques used in the modelling of
'learning' will be reviewed, and some teleological considerations outlined.
In Chapter-4 and Chapter-5 an attempt will be made to describe the
various synthetic (artificial) approaches tQ the modelling of the learning
process.

The order of discussion approXimately refiecting the historical

sequence of appearance or prominence of each approach. After outlining the
essential features and problems within

the various disciplines involved,

typical 'learning' models of each paradigm will be described.

In addition,

evaluatiQJl and analysis of each approach, its achievements and its goals will
also be undertaken in relation to the 'complete picture' we are trying to put
together on the topic of learning.
'adaptive control', 'neural-net',

The principal approaches covered will be:
'automata theory', 'self-organising system',

'cybernetic', 'pattern-recognition', 'artificial-intelligence', and 'robotics'.
In Chapter-6 the specific objective. of the thesis, or the

a~ysi.s

of

various aspects of design of cybernetic 'learning' models, will be pursued.
The robot experimental vehicle, referred to earlier. will be briefiy discussed;
yet, the actual technical details of construction or the developed software
will not be included.

Additionally, some fundamental issues in 'learning'

models will be discussed,

the

possibility of their realiv.ation in simple

hardware models (e.g., our particular robot) considered, and the blue-print of
a

hypothetical system capable of 'learning' will be outlined.

Next, in

Chapter-7 we will summarize our discussions and make final conclusions.
Finally, in the Reference section the various literature used in the course
of writing this thesis, in particular, the large number of papers accumulated
over the years on the subject of learning and its modelling, will be listed.
However, again, we will not include the many technical and computing books
or references used in the course of our hardware development.
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2

---------

EM'.PIRICS

AND

THEORIES'

OF

LEARN.:z-NG

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Observations based on the dynamics of the living and the inanimate world
surrounding us show an intriguing variety of learned and adaptive processes.
A child learns to coordinate its sensory-motor activities, or t.o recognize
the features and significances of its environment; a man trying to acquire a
physical skill learns to develop and control his muscular movements; a student
learns the meanings of new collections of symbols and grammatical rules, and
learns to solve a variety of conceptual problems; an animal in an experimental
psychology laboratory learns to tackle a complex maze-running problem; a
circus animal learns to perform astonishing feats.

All in all, animals in

nature from mollusks to mammals show a diverse range of learned behaviour,
and

even

simple

organisms

such

as

amoeba

or

bacteria

can

exhibit

adaptiveness to new stimuli in their environment.
Similarly, a robot in an industrial plant, or a roving mechanical turt.le in a
laboratory, can be made to improve its performance by using data from past
experiences; a chess or checkers playing computer program can 'learn' to play
at proficient level, and compete against human opponents, apparently by
'learning' from its mistakes; a complex pattern recognition system 'learns'
shapes of objects or human faces, and gradually makes fewer matching errors.
Problems involving learning or adaptation have puzzled the minds of
researchers from many diverse fields of science, as well as occupying the
'pure' researchers of the learning phenomenon.

Some of the principal points

of discussion and controversy are the definitions of criteria shared by
different types of learned and adaptive behaviour, and also the identifications
of underlying features of such activities - for example, in the above diverse
range of 'learned' behaviour.
2.2 VARIaE LEVm..S OF INVESTIGATIOO AND STUDY OF LEARN'1m

"Learning" in its general sense can be defined as: 'the process of adaptive
interactions between a physical entity or an abstraction and its environment'.
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Yet, the phenomenon of learning, as seen from the hierarchical representation
of TABLE 2.1, is a

multi-faceted

and

multi-dimensional concept, whose

investigations entail many specific descriptive or mathematical aspects and
levels.
TABLE 2.1.

The main disciplines associated with various domains of Learning
Research are outlined in a hierarchy; the first four columns show
the principal levels and aspects of study.

1_- -""-"---
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xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
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xxxxxxx,xxxxxxx (behaviour)
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xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx (behaviour)
xxxxxxx·xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
SYSTEMS
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx (NATURAL)
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xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
1 A. I • J.
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
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SYSTEMS
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xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx (organization)
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xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
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NEURAL/
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xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx (mechanism)
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx SUB-CELLULAR
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
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In fact, most scientific enquiries are characterised by a hierarchy of
explanations, and a variety of investigatory levels.

In learning sciences the

levels of descriptions range from speculative issues about the nature of 'mind'
and social aspects of learning, down to cellular and atomic features of its
manifestation.
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Scientific research, in general, involves the scrutiny of a subject in a
specific descriptive framework of reference.

Hence, normally the results

which are obtained are consistent and valid, if merely looked at from within
that particular body of knowledge.

The principal distinction between

different hierarchical levels are in their operational considerations. In other
words, the views that are held, the techniques that are used, the questions
that are asked, or the type of answers which will satisfy such questions.
A look at the historical development of most scientific enquiries shows
that the initial explanations and observations of a phenomena mainly begins
from the higher strata (e.g., the verbal characterizing) of the hierarchy of its
descriptive levels.
lower levels.

These observations, in turn, generate the more precise

The general consensus is that the statements at the lower

hierarchical levels are much more solid and fundamental, and can be applied
over a wider range of problems; yet, their explanatory powers lack the depth
and the reasoning features of the higher levels.
Of course, the boundaries of many such levels are only loosely defined,
and hence ambiguities arise when attempts are made to cross over these
descriptive boundaries.
predicted

as a

Similarly, when results occurring at one level are

consequence

of events at

another

level

then various

inconsistencies become evident. The principal reasons for such difficulties are
the lack of direct correlations between different descriptive levels; or, the
need

for

additional dimensions

of enquiry,

such

as

'ontogenetic'

and

'phylogenetic', to be taken into account in the higher levels of description or
investigation.
It can be seen from TABLE 2.1 that there are many specialized areas of

current

scientific

However,

investigation

most learning-theories

interested
have

in

the

process of learning.

been developed

from

within

the

following three principle branches of science:(i)

-

COGNITIVE SCIENCES: the cognitive scientists are interested in the
study of the accumulative and organizational aspects of learning
related temporal e~eriences. Bence, normallY-l knowledge structures
and other perceptual issues are investigated wi hin cognitive sciences.
Most of the research in 'Artificial Intelligence' (A.I.) could be
included in this category.

(ii)

BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES: the workers in this field investigate the
external and empirical manifestations of the learning-process in
human beings ana animals. The formation and the development of
learned and adaptive behaviours are the primary subjects of interest
in this area.

(iii) -

BRAIN and NERVE-SYSTEM SCIENCES: the researchers in this area
study the internal mechanisms of the learning process, observed by
the changes which take place within the nerve-system during
learning. The brain scientisl.s are in pursuit of the neural correlates
of adaptive behaviours.
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2.3 DEVEI.DPMENT OF I..EARNIKl THlnuES - PHIL<B>mICALIHIS'laUCAL PBRSPBCl'IVES

There is little doubt in the minds of researchers in learning that this
science has developed from the philosophical enquiries into the nature of
man's mind.

Over many centuries the problems of 'mind' and 'body', and

their relation to each other, had occupied the attention of philosophers and
later psychologists.

Elaborate concepts (e.g., consciousness, purpose, desire,

etc.) had been defined to explain the 'intelligent' activities of man.

A typical

theoretical framework as an explanation for such modes of human behaviour
was the doctrine of 'Hedonism' in the 17th and 18th centuries, which asserted
that individuals are motivated by a desire for 'pleasure' and by an aversion to
'pain' •
Historically, human subjects were the principle domain of investigation for
the researchers in behaviour. Much attention was given to the reasoning and
intellectual faculties of man, especially, the effect of experiences on the mind
and the organizational aspects of such mental impressions.
hundred

years,

the

presence

of

two

opposing

During the past

philosophical

views

of

'Rationalism' and 'Empiricism' has led to a major divergence of ideas in the
field of learning sciences.
2.3.1 AN OVERVIHW OF LEARNING-'11I1DU.BS WI'11IIN CXXNITIVB SCIENCES

In rationalism, reason rather than the sensations input to an organism is
the

basis

of

knowledge;

the animal's experiences are

dealt with

in a

non-reductionist and holistic fashion, and the raw data are interpreted only
according to certain forms of innate perceptual assumptions and relations.
The internal processes and concepts embodied in the brain are considered to
be as important as the experiences themselves.

The case for the Rationalist

view is much stronger in describing the higher forms of learning such as
problem-solving or language-acquisition, and also in explaining the structural
organization of perceptual data.

Cognitive scientists and philosophers share

the rationalist view point.
A major
rationalist
experiences.

school of thought,
view-point,

in

the

opposition

'Gestalt', was developed within the

to

the

'reductionist'

analyses

of

The Gestaltists were originally concerned with perceptual

organization and the unitary nature of sense information.

But, later, using

similar concepts, endeavoured to explain the problem-solving and learning
abilities of animals.

This was not done by considering only the animal's

Eaplrlca •• d

T~eorlea of

Learala'

37

input-output interactions, but by taking into account notions such as:
knowledge, thinking, planning, inference, intention, insight, goal-directed ness,
expectation etc.

In cognitive explanation of leaning, the worker is interested

in large-scale (molar) rather than smaIl-scale (molecular) action descriptions.
Many

elaborate

rationalist/cognitive

learning
view

theories

point.

have

Even,

some

flourished
mathematical

from
models

this
or

pseudo-behavioural learning models (e.g., Tolman's ) have been developed with
cognitive

inclinations.

Similarly,

many

of

today's

Problem-Solving,

Artificial-Intelligence and Pattern-Recognition models also subscribe to the
cognitive and organizational view.
The discovery of various knowledge related structural or information
retrieval (i.e., 'memory', 'remembering' and

'forgetting')

aspects of the

learning process is also attributed to Cognitive-Psychologists.

In future

chapters we will investigate the details of some cognitive learning models, and
discuss them more fully.
2.3.2 AN OVHRVIBW OF LRARNING-'J.'HlDUBS WI'lHIN BEHAVIOORAL SCIENCHS

The doctrine of Empiricism has the view that experience is the only source
of knowledge, and our 'ideas' are derived either by a direct copying of
sensory impressions in the brain, or by combining several simple (or complex)
ideas into one simple (or complex) idea.
physiological

psychologists

are

The majority of behaviourists and
proponents

of

this

view

of

knowledge-formation, and most of the associative theories of learning have
been developed within this school of thought.
Empiricism has four major components:(i)

-

SENSATIONALISM: all knowledge is derived directly or indirectly
through experience.

(ii)

REDUCTIONISM: all complex ideas are comp<?sed of a basic pool of
simple ideas and are, in turn, reducible to these simple ideas.

(iii) -

ASSOCIATIONISM: ideas or mental events are connected through the
proximity of their occurrence in time or space.

(iv)

-

MECHANISM: the mind is a machine like entity, built from simple
components, with no mystical dimensions.

The study of human and animal learning behaviour has been one of the
most intriguing subjects for the inquisitive scientists throughout the ages.
Initially, hampered by the complexity of the task and the vagueness of
methodologies, or other socio-religious obstacles, no significant advances were
made into finding a scientific understanding of the 'learning process'. It was
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Darwin's study of animals' common ancestry and the subsequent development
of evolutionary theories which laid a solid foundation for the systematic
research by behavioural-physiologists and behavioural-psychologists; namely,
principal adherents like Thorndike, Pavlov, Watson, Lorenz, Hull and Skinner.
The work of these behaviouriats have contributed to the rich body of
contemporary knowledge on animal-learning; and their rigorous empirical
enquiries triggered an explosion of scientific interest which has led to the
enormous variety of research into this subject.
It is relevant here to mention a dichotomy which exists regarding the

methods used for the investigations of learning in animal-behaviour sciences:-

EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: the experiments in this field are
performed in controlled laboratory environments using isolated
stimUlus-response investigations of a behavioural pattern, which may
not normally occur in the animal's encounters with nature. There is a
clear and deliberate omission of all mentallistic references (e.~.,
consciousness, mind, free will, imagination, emotion etc.). The mBlD
task is the prediction and the control of behaviour by the sole use of
observed data.; introspection plays no part in this method.

(ti) -

ETHOLOGY: or the study of animals in natureb-is historicalll the
established branch of behavioural-sciences, but.. 4 50 years ago It was
overshadowed by the rise of e~ri.mental psy-cnology. However, more
recently, the rigid settings and the unnatural surroundings of mazes,
boxes and pulleys of experimental psychology laboratories have
compelled some behavioural scientists to return the domain of study
baclt to the animals' more accustomed surroundings in nature.

(i)

2.3.3 AN OVERVIEW OF LHARNIKl '11DDUBS WI'l1IIN BRAIN AND NERVB-BYSl'BH SCIENCES
During

the

18th and

the

early 19th

century,

the

accumulation of

physiological knowledge was gradually localizing the brain as centre for 'mind'
and 'soul'.

This, later, followed by the general acknowledgment of the

nervous-system as the sole organ responsible for control and coordination of
all animal activities.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the discovery of

electricity and investigations of its effects on nerve and muscle tissues,
together

with

an

increasing

knowledge

of

electrical,

anatomical

and

physiological details of the brain (and its components the 'neurons') had led

to a much clearer view of the make-up of the brain and the nervous system.
Work pioneered by the famous Russian Scientist Pavlov into isolating
specific aspects of an animal's learning behaviour, and other early analytical
studies of response mechanisms, resulted in the introduction of associative
learning

theories.

These

endeavours

were

the

inspirations

for

the

brain-researchers to embark on a methodical study of the brain's functions
and structures.
The theories of 'Neural-Pathways' introduced

by Bebb

(1949), as a

progression of Pavlovian ideas was an attempt to find a coherent explanation
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of learning in terms of sensory impressions on nerve structures.

The

convergence of behavioural and physiological sciences helped to establish
many inter-disciplinary subjects.

However, several strictly behaviourist or

specialized

neuro-physiological branches of learning

sciences were also

developed.

Although, there have been many significant advances in all fields

of nerve and brain sciences, physiological theories that can offer global
principles or laws for different types of learning have not been forthcoming.
The most solid achievements have been based on the empirical observations of
specific isolated aspects of learning such as 'conditioning' or 'habituation';
and have, mainly, involved experiments on simple nerve-cell preparations or
lower animals.
The spectacular progress made in the science of Genetics, from the
speculative observations of Mendelian Genetics to the descriptive explanations
of Genes, followed by the molecular discoveries of DNA, RNA, and finally the
mechanisms of genetic coding, can be a good example as to how, ideally, the
theories of learning should develope.

Therefore, the study of the learning

process at the cellular level should really be complementary to the studies at
the behavioural and cognitive levels, and not isolated within its domain.
Since, only a

combined

broad

approach

will

enable

the

attainment

of

significant breakthroughs, on par with the science of Genetics.
2.4 BEHAVIOORAL APRDACH TO <X:NCEPrS AND ISSUES IN LEARNING

To understand some of the methods used by behaviourists in exploring the
mysteries of this enigmatic subject, we should look at some typical definitions
for "learning" in related literature.
LEARNING 1S:-

"A change in the strength of an act through traini!!g procedure."
(Hilgard and Marquis, 1940)
"The reassortment of animal's responses in a complex situation."
(Skinner, 1961)
"A process which manifests itself by adaptive changes in an individual's
behaviour as a result of experience."
(Thorpe, 1963)
"The process through which life experiences leave a mark on an individual
and permits an animal to develop new adaptations." (Dethier and Stellar, 1970)
"A relatively permanent change in behaviour which is not directly observable
(different from performance) and comes about as a result of experience or
practice."
(Mednick, Pollio and LOftus, 1973)
"An adaptive modification of behaviour towards a stimulus that can be traced

to a specific experience in an animal's life with that stimulus or a similar

one."

(Alcock, 1975)

"The change in behaviour or behaviour P.Otential to a given situation brought
about by repeated experiences in that Situation, provided that the behaviour
change cannot be explained on the basis of the subject's native resP-Qnse
tendencies, maturation, or temporary states. It
(Bower and Hilgard, 1981)
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We can see that in the above selection of definitions, regardless of their
generality or specificity: (a) - there is an underlying mechanistic approach to
the explanations of the learning-process; and, (b) - there is emphasis on thc
externally apparent aspects of learning, namely, the 'behaviour', and little
reference to any of its internal features.
A typical behaviourist's experiment deals with the categorization, the
isolation, and the scrutiny of a particular external behavioural aspect of an
animal's learning-process. Under a desire for objectivity (pcrhaps misplaced),
and a quest for theorizing the learning-process, the behavioural scientists
have demanded that all knowledge should be operationalized in terms of
behavioural responses.

The enormous volume of research amassed over many

years in the behavioural-sciences has resulted in the formation of a solid
framework of concepts and criteria about the behavioural aspects of the
learning-process.

Now,

without

trying

to

experimental or developmental details, firstly,

go

into

much

historical,

we will outline the basic

assumptions which have been the guidelines for researchers in this field, and
secondly, we will enumerate the major concepts that have emerged from this
body of science.
2.4.1 CHARAa:rHRISTIm I ATlRIBl1rES I cnlCKPl'S AND lAWS OF LEARNING

All classes of learning and adaptive processes in animals are intuitively
considered to possess a unique origin, this is in view of their common
phylogenetic background.

Hence, the differences seen between various

learning processes are not merely an indication of their accompanying
structural complexities, but, also, reveal the levels of an evolutionary ascent.
This hierarchy being the result of the endeavours of various species in trying
to cope with increasingly complex environments and learning tasks.

Ideally,

some unifying concepts and theories should exist to encompass and explain all
classes of adaptive-processes.
processes

have compelled

But, in reality, the empirical analyses of these

the behavioural scientists into defining rigid

boundaries and characteristics for different types of 'learned' behaviour.
2.4.2 IBARNDIl

VB.

INNAm BBHAVIaIl

One of the most notable points of discussion in behavioural sciences, as
well as being historically significant, has been the dilemma over 'innate'
against 'learned' behaviour.

This strict classification of behaviour led to

years of debating amongst researchers in animal-behaviour.
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The question of instinct vs. learning was also at the root of the so called
tNature-Nurture' controversy.

On the one hand, the hereditarians claimed

that behaviour is mainly the result of an internal genetic process.

On the

other hand, the environmentalists maintained that most behaviour is the
product of experience.
The validity of this distinction in a fundamental way is not conclusive, and
empirical results have shown a mutual dependance in the development of
innate and learned behaviours.

The Innate (unlearned) responses have been

classified into three major types:(1) - REFLEXES: simple neura-muscular reactions to stimuli.

(2) - INSTINCTS: complex patterns of inborn activities.
(3) - TAXES: orientation of the organism with respect to a stimulus.
Instincts are generally referred to the tstereotyped' patterns of behaviour
which: are usually complex in nature; are found universally amongst the
members of a species; are evoked without the need for prior learning or
experience; are seen in their complete form at their first occurrence; are
relatively invariant; and are elicited by a specific releasing stimulus.
The birds' song-learning or nest-building abilities and numerous other
ritualistic, predatory, maternal and reproductive activities of insects and
animals are classified as tinstinctive'. However, it has been observed that the
proper development of an instinctive behaviour is dependent on the external
presence of the appropriate environmental cues, as well as the internal
genetic make-up and hormonal secretions.
In the case of a young bird learning to sing, ethologists have made the
observation that the young bird must be exposed to the singing of a mature
bird at a critical phase of its development in order to acquire the complete
singing proficiency of a fully grown bird.

Similarly, the nest-bUilding

capabilities of birds, although quite complete in their first occurrence, are
refined in successive seasons as a result of gradual adaptations to various
environmental factors.
In

addition,

some

experiments

have

shown

that

sensory

or

other

deprivations, or the administration of artificial physio-chemical stimuli during
the development of an animal's nervous-system interfere with its acquisition
of normal learning-ability.
between

biological

and

Although, the precise nature of the correlations
environmental

interdependence has been demonstrated.

events

are

unknown,

a

clear
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A different version of the nature-nurture controversy is the attempt to
apportion the relative contribution of genetic and environmental factors in
the formation of a particular type of behaviour.
Today, instinctive-behaviour is no longer considered in a rigid either/or
fashion.

The phylogenetic composition of an animal determines the pattern of

such stereotyped activities which are, in turn, shaped to the individual
animal's ecological niche, or its other environmental conditions.
In a sense, the genetic native response patterns, inborn in the animals'
nervous-systems,

may

be

considered

as

the

link

between

phylogenetic-adaptations and ontogenetic-learning.
One of the most important characteristics of innate behaviours are found
in their 'Releasing-Mechanisms' (i.e., the sensory cues which initiate a set of
genetically programmed actions).

Innate behaviours such as: the reflexive

constrictions of pupils, the seasonal mating habits of birds, or the orientation
skills of insects, are all controlled by releasing-mechanisms. Releaser stimuli
could be either perceptual/physio-chemical/environmental inputs, or internal
releasers such as the hormones which regulate and dictate many aspects of an
organism's life.
2.4.3 LEARNING

VB.

arHER SENSCEY OIANGHS

Further distinctions are normally made between the behavioural changes
resulted from the process of learning and other behavioural changes. Some of
these changes show a striking resemblance to some features of a 'learned'
change brought about by conditioning or extinction, but they are generally
thought to belong to a different class of behaviour.
yet

if

there

are

completely

distinct

However, it is not clear

mechanisms

at

work

at

the

neuro-physiological levels of some of these apparently similar changes. These
non-learned sensory changes are as follows:(1) -

MATURATION: the developmental changes associated with growth
process, such as learning to walk in humans or learning to fly in birds.

(2) -

FATIGUE: a recoverable change to performance due to
exhaustion, such as reduced response time due to tiredness.

(3) -

SENSITIZATION: a reversible adaptive alteration to sense organs or
sensory habituation, such as can tie seen in the heat sensing mechanism
of the skin, where sensitization to excessive but non-damaging
temperatures may occur.

(4) - DAMAGE: a ~rmanent change to behaviour
impairment or decay of sensory motor system.

due

to a

motor

physical

Since learning itself is not directly observable (except possibly in a very
elementary

sense,

in

the associative conditioning

of a

simple animal's

nerve-cell preparation), a crucial distinction is made between 'learning' and
'performance' (i.e., the only external measure of the process of learning).
Simply observing performance, without taking some underlying parameters such
as motivation, attention, arousal and drive into account, will not give a clear
view of a learning-process.

It can be said that performance is an integral

'factor' or a 'variable' of the learning-process.
2.4.5 ATIRIB1I'.ES OF LEARNING
To narrow down the definition of an organism's activities which could be
called as 'learned', and exclude all other non-learned behavioural changes,
generally, the following three principles have been attributed to learning
within the literatures of behavioural sciences:(1) -

PERMANENCE: learnin,c may
animal's future behaVIour.

result

in

an

enduring change in an

(2) - ADAPTIVENESS: learning comes about as a result of practice or
experience which culminates in adaptive or advantageous change.
(3) - CONTROLLABLE: learning can be altered by experimental, instructional
or environmental intervention, and is a reversible process.
2.4.6 mmmOOING
A survey of psychological and animal-behaviour literature shows that the
origin of modern learning theories is, generally, attributed to Thorndike's
work on 'trial and error' learning at the end of the 19th century - in
experiments involving caged animals that learned to escape from puzzle-boxes.
These experiments led to the development of a conceptual framework, and
signified the basis for the methodology used by later behavioural researchers
in learning.
Another major landmark in the development of learning theories was the
Russian Physiologist Pavlov's experiments on the conditioning of animals'
reflex responses (e.g., the salivation response in a dog).

This work, in turn,

signified the start of a variety of 'Stimulus-Response' (S-R) associative
theories.

The 'Pavlovian/Type-I/Classical Conditioning' can be, generally,

thought of as a simple type of learning.

While. lacking the richness and the

descriptive/interpretative qualities of a complex learning process. this form of
conditioning has the advantage of being easily controllable and demonstrable
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experimentally; and the theories that have been developed from this type of
work have enabled the explanation of many aspects of simple learning in
organisms.
The physiological processes involved in the response conditioning of simple
animals have also been investigated, mainly, by noting the neuro-chemical and
neuro-physiologica1 changes that take place during conditioning.

Later,

'Skinnerian/Type-II/Operant/Instrumental

introduced which, yet, further developed

Conditioning'

was

the idea of stimulus-response

conditioning, and founded many new hypotheses and terminologies.

Unlike

classical conditioning which was mainly involved with the reflexive and
automated modes of behaviour; here, other more complex criteria were also
postulated by workers on this second type of conditioning to explain various
facets of higher order behaviour.
The main distinguishing feature of Type-I/Classical Conditioning from
Type-II/Instrumental Conditioning is that in type-I the stimulus which is to
be conditioned occurs independent of animal's response, while, in type-II such
stimulus ('reinforcer' or 'punisher') is dependant on the emission of some
designated response.

Generally, the essence of a conditioning experiment is

to isolate a specific behavioural pattern, and observe the establishment of a

bond between a previously neutral input (Unconditioned Stimulus) and an
elicited output (Responses/Reflexes) of the animal.

Such associations are

governed by the proximity of input-output occurrence, and also by the desire
of the animal to achieve or attain a favourable response.
An extension of simple Pavlovian conditioning notions has been the ideas
of 'secondary' or 'higher-order' conditioning.

This is the observation that a

second neutral stimulus could be paired with a Conditioned Stimulus (CS) t.hat
had already been conditioned to produce a response, and later this secondary
stimulus will itself evoke the response without the presence of
There

have

also

been

interesting

investigations

of

es.

the

so

called

'Introceptive-Conditioning' or the conditioning of internal involuntary reflexes
(e.g heart-beat) to some external stimulus.

This type of conditioning has

been demonstrated dramatically by experimental results - animals that had
been trained to reduce their pUlse-rate in return for the electrical stimulation
of certain pleasurable areas of their brain, would, in fact, reduce their
heart-beat to a fatal point.
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In addition to the learning theories which were introduced by the rigorous
investigations of the phenomenon of conditioning, many other S-R learning
theories have been put forward, namely by: Thorndike, Bull, Guthrie and
Estes; and generally, from the reductionist-behaviourist point of view.

The

following are some general principles which have emerged from the various
postulates on conditioning and other S-R theories:(i) - THE LAW OF CONTIGUITY
The principle of 'association' or 'connectivism' is one which prevails in all
S-R theories, it is the assertion that a connection is created between
experiences which occur closely together in time or space.

The extension of

this law to the classical conditioning ideas was to attribute the bonding of
Conditioned-Stimulus

(CS)

and

Conditioned-Reflex

(CR)

to

the

temporal

proximity of their occurrence.
Experiments on the relationships of the elapsed time intervals between the
Conditioned-Stimulus (CS) and the Un-Conditioned-Stimulus (UCS) have shown
that a time lag of under one second between CS and UCS is optimal in
establishing the corresponding bond. In other words, the rewarding stimulus
to the animal should, optimally, follow the occurrence of the stimulus to be
conditioned

in

little

less

than

a

second.

The associative

feature

of

experiences, as outlined by the law of contiguity, has been further highlighted
by

the

'inferential'

nature

of

stimulus

and

response

linkage

in

the

higher-order conditioning.
(ii) - THE PRINCIPLE OF REPETITION

The conditioning experiments have shown that the repetition of a CS and
UCS pairing strengthens the CR. This observation is universal in all types of
learning.
(iii) - THE CONCEPT OF GENERALIZATION

In the process of conditioning, the response once established to a
particular stimulus, will be evoked by a stimulus similar to

es.

This is called

'Primary-Generalization' to distinguish it from the learned similarity of two
stimuli, which is called 'Secondary-Generalization'.
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(iv) - THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION

This is the complementary concept to generalization.

'Discrimination' is

the process by which stimuli are differentiated, and the desired ones filtered
out from a range of stimuli.
(v) - THE PRINCIPLE OF REINFORCEMENT

This concept, in certain forms also known as the 'Law of Effect', is the
process

essential

experiences.

for

the

strengthening

of

associative

bonds

between

Reinforcement is, basically, about the role of 'reward' and

'punishment' in the consolidation or the weakening of associations.

It is the

general consensus that animals would learn to do things better if they were
rewarded with food, water or other rewards.
The major ideas of reinforcement were developed from the work on the
Skinnerian

type

Conditioning,

it

was

discovered

that

both

'positive-reinforcement' (reward) and 'negative-reinforcement' (punishment)
were

influential

factors

in

motivating

an

animal

to

learn.

Partial-Reinforcement has also been investigated, and attributed with the
interesting property of establishing a

stronger S-R bond than a total

'Goal', 'motivation' and 'drive' are relevant notions here,

reinforcement.

since many psychologists believe that these are the forces which activate an
animal's learning.

Although, these concepts could be correlated to some

physiological mechanisms, yet, they can only be inferred empirically from the
performance of an animal.

In the language of behaviourism; it can be said

that an animal is 'directed' towards 'learning' by striving for a 'goal', and the
energizing source for 'motivating' such behaviour is the 'drive'.

Here, some

workers, in attempting to explain the nature of the initiating forces of
learning, have speculated that 'drive-reduction' is the primary reinforcer in
the learning process, and that a stimulus is bonded to a response if and only
if the animal's drive and motivation level are reduced after such a response.
(vi) - THE LAW OF INTERFERENCE

This

law

covers

the

case

of

'Forgetting'

and

the

'Extinction'

of

conditioned/learned responses; it states that a learned or conditioned pattern
of events or behaviours may be weakened or inhibited by similar learning
endeavours.
emphasized

The permanent nature of learning mentioned earlier is also
by

this

law.

The

typical

gradual

extinction

of

a

conditioned/learned responses is believed to be due to 'inhibition' and not the

result of an irretrievable loss.

This can be demonstrated by a so called

'spontaneous-recovery' of a conditioned-behaviour which had been forced into
a

complete apparent extinction

by

the

retraining of the animal -

the

conditioned-behaviour is, normally, restored to half its original comlislency
after a rest period.
2.5 THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN LEARNING
During

the

development

of

behaviourist

explanations

of

the

learning-process, all knowledge had been considered to be reducible to
stimulus-response bonds.

This belief and its apparent inability to explain

many complex issues arising from the investigations of learning had impelled
many researchers to voice their criticism to the mechanistic view of the
subject. Cognitive-Scientists refuted this observational and empirical emphasis
in the analysis of the learning-process, and introduced a new outlook towards
this subject, the key notions being Information, Perception and Organization
of Knowledge.
In trying to tackle the problem of learning from a different angle, there
have

been

many

re-definitions

of

the

behavioural concepts

using

the

organizational approach, as well as the introduction of a number of new
criteria. However, in certain cases it is difficult to appreciate the validity or
the necessity for separate terminologies.

Numerous concepts within cognitive

and behavioural outlooks refer to identical properties of learning and many
underlying principles are common to both views.

The distinctions are

seemingly due to differences in:(1) - Levels of observations,

(2) - Interpretations put on empirical results,
(3) - Approaches to various problems,
(4) - Preferences given to specific experimental methods.
A typical behaviourist's experiment is that of an experimental animal
involved

in

a

maze-running

or

lever-pressing

task,

while

a

cognitive

psychologist typically engages in experiments on human su bjects in recall or
recognition of a string of symbols.

In the following without pinpointing the

underlying critical or diametric views, or the detailed experimental evidence
we will briefly enumerate the various definitions and concepts that have
emerged from the study of learning by cognitive-scientists.
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2.5.1 DEFINITIONS OF LEARNING
The question of 'learning' in cognitive-sciences is approached in a
fundamentally similar way to the behaviourist's view, it is considered that
learning should possess the same principle attributes of:(1)-~

(2) - AlW'rABILITY

(3) - axJKllABILITY

The holistic nature of outlook to problems has led the workers in this
field to define the process of learning in more abstract terms.

Sommerhoff

(1974) emphasizes this point: "The main correlation established during learning

appears to be between objects and goals rather than between specific neural
inputs and outputs."
2.5.2 PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS IN COGNITIVE-SCIENCES
The cognitive-sciences have historically evolved from the Gestalt school of
thought and have inherited many established principles of the theories of
Perception.
-

(i)

The main underlying principles of perception are:-

THE LAW OF FIGURE-GROUND: A distinction is made between a
figure and its background, using the perceptual features of it's
boundaries, this 18w can be equated to the 'concept of
discriminatIon'.

(ii)

THE LAW OF SIMILARITY: Items that have some common features
are grouped together, this law can be equated to the 'concept of
generalization' •

(iii) -

THE LAW OF PROXIMITY: The elements of a field of objects are
grouped together according to their nearness to one another, this law
can 6e equated to the 'law of contiguity'.
THE LAW OF COMMON-DmECTION: A set of percepts will tend to
group .to~ether if they appear to be in a sequentia order or points
on a sunple curve.

(iv)

-

(v)

- THE LAW OF SIMPLICITY: The perceptual information is divided and
organizes into simple and regular figures.
The 'Trace-Theory' of perception emerged from these principles, it was an

explanation for the neural processes which are active during perception. This
theory states that: "The perceptual experiences are reflected in neurons as an
enduring trace, in the same form as the original neural-impressions of such
perceptions".

Ideas or events are associated not by the formation of a bond

between two or more separate entities but by the creation of a new 'whole'
unitary percept.
memory trace.

'Recall' or 'Remembering' is the reactivation of a given

A trace continues to exist in the nervous-system and can be

retrieved by the selection of the appropriate cues, and the SUbsequent
amplification of the trace.

'Forgetting' occurs in either the retrieval-failure

of the trace, or the disintegration or modification of it.

Trace-theory and
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other theories of perception and cognition have been instrumental in the
formation of a cognitive explanation of the learning process. Various notions
to

the

behaviourist's

concepts of

contiguity,

reinforcement,

repetition,

interference, discrimination and generalization have, hence, been developed;
and, while some of these redefinitions are only a different way of construing
a concept the cognitive approach has. indeed, shed light on some specific
aspects of learning, namely that of memory-formation, knowledge-acquisition
and the concept of 'expectancy'.
2.5.3 STIMULUS-STIMULUS (S-S) THEORIES OF LEARNING
An alternate class of explanations of the learning-mechanisms. namely J the
Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) theories have emerged from the cognitive school of
thought.

The pioneers of learning research within Gestalt idealogy such as

Koffka and Kohler founded the lines of scientific work on the subjects of
insightful-learning and problem-solving.

This was later followed notably by

Tolman's

aspects

(1959)

work

on

cognitive

of

learning,

especially

Latent-Learning (solving detour-problems and cognitive-mapping by animals).
The resulting S-S explanations of the adaptive-processes which were
involved in these areas of learning research were contrary to the Bullian S-R
theories. the Pavlovian-Conditioning notion of stimulus-substitution is possibly
more akin to these S-S ideas.

The S-S theories state that: "The perception

of relationships between stimuli and the anticipation of consequences are the
primary functions in the modifications of behaviour during learning, also,
association is made between different stimuli rather than a stimulus and
response" •
The two varying S-R and S-S explanations of a learning-process is
illustrated in FIGURE 2.1. where a Type-I/Classical Conditioning task (e.g.,
conditioning of a reflex response) is analyzed using these two interpretations.
TYPE OF

EXPLANATION
S-R

PHASE 1
Pre-Test State

PHASE 2

Training-State

PHASE 3

Testing-State
CS

""""""*""uaojIo

CR

UCS - + UCR
...........
UCS ----,0\10 CR
............... .
+
(UnCon. )
(UnCon. )
(Con. )
Neutral
S-s
CS=UCS ---+ CR
______
....(Stimulus)
___________
(Response). . ._________
(Resp.)
Stimulus

,...;_.....&_ _ '"'1..._ _ _'_ _ _ _ _...

_

FIGURE 2.1.

The S-R and S-S explanations of a typical conditioned refiex
e;xperiment, the principal difference of these two theories are in
the final phase of learning. In S-S the Conditioned-Stimulus
and the Unconditioned-Stimulus are thought to have functionally
fused together, while in S-R a new associative bond is thought
to have been created between CS and CR.
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2.5.4 MEMORY
The proponents of conditioning experiments had contemplated the question
of memory-formation.

In their view a memory of experiences or events was

created and organised, and was an intrinsic and integral part of the
learning-process.

The explanations of learning-mechanisms involved in the

neural level was based on the Stimulus-Response (S-R) notions, the essence of
these theories was the consolidation of associative bonds between stimuli and
responses.
The S-S approach to memory-formation has culminated in a
theories and findings in the cognitive sciences.

host of

To elaborate some of the

issues that are involved, we will attempt to analyze a hypothetical learning
process.
Any organism or animal as an entity could be thought of as having three
general modes of activity:(i)

'Inputs' (sensory or physical) from the environment to the body.

-

(il)

'Out'puts' from the organism which brings about changes in the
enVlronment (or its movements).

(iii) -

'Internal Processes' occurring within the body of the organism.

-----_._._...

_ _-....

Within this universe of actions learning is an isolated phenomenon, with
some of its attributes enumerated earlier.

The existence of a persistent

sensory-impression of experiences at the neural level, and the relevance of
such a storage of information to the learning-process, was intuitively taken
for granted by early researchers.

The principles of tdirectiveness' and

'repeatability' of a learning-process are the main witnesses in support for
such a

'Memory-Trace' or

'Engram'.

The

presence of a

storage for

information in the brain can also be inferred, by the subsequent testing of
the performance or the knowledge of an animal that has undergone learning.
If

we

take

for

granted

certain

a-priori

concepts

regarding

the

environmental constraints and the internal modes of an organism (e.g., the
feasibility

of

response,

motivation,

drive,

attention),

then

a

tri-Ievel

explanation of a typical learning process could be depicted by the sequences
of TABLE 2.2.

Whereby, the various explanatory stages of verbal-descriptive,

state-of-knowledge, and memory-trace are outlined.

TABLE 2.2.

The different phases involved in a general task-learning activity,
the corresponding states in the knowledge level and the
memory-trace modes are shown.

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE

PHASE 1

PRE-LEARNING

PHASE 2

INITIAL
LEARNING OR
TRAINING

ACQUISITION
OF INFORMATION

TRACE-FORMATION

PHASE 3

END OF
PRIMARY
LEARNING

PROCESSING AND
STORAGE
OF INFORMATION

TRACE-RETENTION

......"" ..... 11..111.• __ ........ ..... ttt....."II_".......

U_III_lIIlutIUIIIIMUm_ItIlOltllltN./.I

PHASE 4
II/StMUnMI..." .......IH _ _ au

PHASE 5
-..nu....,IUIIINID""UtMtIl

! ....

I. . . . . . . .I.............

RE-LEARNING
.....

1111IUIIIIfC.I.....mn~.....,....""

...............1

PHASE 6

FORGETTING

PHASE 7

USE OF
LEARNED SKILL
OR KNOWLEDGE

--"'--'

'_._II....'U__. . '.....

...

IIIII'.UIU'III_Jn1II1.tI ' _ " " " _ _ ''''''''''III''''II_IIIUIIIJlUIIIJIIIIIIII.IIII,,"II,_''''_''''IIIUIIIII,nlll1l1

RECOGNITION AND
RETRIEVAL OF
LEARNED INFORMATION

TESTING
··_*...

.... ,Irt~ ...

ft' .."_III_'_..__........u . ._

PRE-LEARNING TRACE

TRACE-RECALL

WM~I . . ."""'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AltNll

REHEARSAL AND
REFINING OF
LEARNED INFORMATION
"*"..........
1~

__

I...lnu ..:

TOTAL OR PARTIAL
LOSS OF STORED
INFORMATION

TRACE-CONSOLIDATION
,.,....."."' _ _ _. . - . -_ _ II.....,...-sau............' _ _ I'.ttILII'

TRACE-DECLINE

EXECUTIVE
MODE OF
TRACE-UTILIZATION
INFORMATION .._-----_.

The explanations of TABLE 2.2 is by no means a blue-print for all learning
processes, various phases could be omitted, repeated or may occur in different
order, depending on the experimental or specific environmental circumstances.
2.5.5 DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEMORY
In the micro-level of observation of a learning-process, all the elements of
the brain (i.e., the 'neurons') may seem to be functioning, in a continuous and
seemingly random mode of electrical activity.

However, in the macro-learning

sciences various explanations and definitions have been devised in an attempt
to separate the brain into areas whose functions could be associated with
specific cognitive processes (such as 'retention', 'retrieval' or 'forgetting');
also, different types of memory-storage with distinctive mechanisms have been
elaborated.
Referring to TABLE 2.2, the phases 1 and 2 which refer to the static and
transitional learning stages of memory-trace will not be discussed in more
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detail here, since the acquisitional aspects of learning were covered earlier in
this chapter.
The investigation of memory-trace retention, the phase 3, has resulted in
the categorization of memory into different groups according to the type of
information

stored.

These

various

types

are

'Semantic-Memory',

'Spatial-Memory', 'Sensory-Perceptual-Memory' (audio, visual, touch, etc.) or
Procedural-Motoric-Memory (skills).
A further classification of memory is, also, made into 'Iconic-Memory',
'Short-Term-Memory' (S.T.M.) or 'Long-Term-Memory' (L.T.M.), according to
the duration of information retention within each type.
(1) -

Iconic-Memory: This is described as a very short lasting visual memory,
iconic-memory refers to the temROrary retention and recall capabilities
of visual and nervous systems when exposed to a brief visual percept.

(2) -

Short-Term-Memory: This type of memory is generally referred to the
temporary storage of perceived data for future evaluation, utilization or
disposal. The dominant feature of S. T .M. is the fast decay time of the
information. In the case of animal experiments involving place-learning
or latent-learning it was noticed tliat an animal that was allowed to
see the placinj( or a food object in a room established a S.T.M. of that
event, and if·· after a fairly short ~riod of time the animal was
released in that room, it displayed a delayed-action' by remembering
the location of the food and subsequently searching for it. Other
experiments on human subjects have established the capacity of an
average human's S.T.M. to 6e 7±2 symbols, letters, numbers or words.

(3) -

Long-Term-Memory: This ty~ of memory: contains a very large volume
of iriformation, experiences of an animal's life are accumulated in this
type of memory as well as the semantic-memorl in the case of humans.
Tile information stored in the primary level 0 S. T .M. is thought to be
transferred to this hig;her and more permanent level. The factors
contributin, to or inhibIting such transfers are motivation, arousal and
attention 0 the animal and the novelty, sil{nificance or repetition of
the eX]'!eriences. The rehearsal of the learnmg material in phase 5 of
TABLE~.2, facilitates the transfer of information from S.T.M. to L.T.M.

2.5.6 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN S. T.M. AND L.T .M.
The categorization of memory into L. T.M. and S. T .M. has been under
constant scrutiny by scientists. Yet, many critics have pointed out that there
is no conclusive evidence to justify such a distinction. This is mainly in view
of many similar and common principles which are observed in retrieval,
interference or decay aspects of both memories.
The physiological evidence of partially damaged brains or lesions of parts
of an animal's brain has indicated that such damage could impair one kind or
other of memory, but whether this conclusively proves the dual nature of the
memory mechanisms and locations is not clear yet.
For simple associative learning tasks in lower animals the 'plasticity' of
the brain as a homoeomorphic entity has been demonstrated.

The technique
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normally used is to observe the effect of lesions to various areas of the brain
on learning or recall abilities of an animal. It has been shown that there are
no specific regions in the 'cortex' (grey matter) of the brain, which are
uniquely responsible for the acquisition or the retention of this type of
learning.
The 'holographic' nature of memory-storage has, also, been demonstrated
by noting that the removal of a percentage of an experimental animal's cortex
does not extinguish a specific learned task, but only results in the reduction
of resolution of certain aspects of the animal's performance, speed or
learning-capacity.

In other words, such dissections lead to the reduction of

the resolution of memory, rather than the complete loss of chunks of
information.
It has also been noticed that the total loss of the thypocampus' of an

experimental animal's brain, only inhibits the transition from S.T.M. to L.T.M.,
and the prior contents of L.T.M. or the current information in S.T.M. is not
directly affected.
The results of these and other experiments have shown that, although,
distinctive

memory

processes

seem

to

be

involved, physiologically

the

existence of separate brain locations for the two memory mechanisms has not
been positively verified.

The main objection to the methods involved in this

type of work being the interference of such experiments in the actual
mechanisms under investigation.
2.5.7 REMEMBERING

The current cognitive-psychology research has been mainly involved with
the organizational aspects of memory formation and retrieval.

Remembering

or recall of an experience involves procedures of 'recognition' and 'retrieval'
of memory-traces.
In the act of recognition the animal given a multiple choice of stimuli
chooses one which has a particular set of cognitive attributes or cues.

In

higher learning processes, such as concept-learning or problem-solving, this
task extends to a 'search' for cognitive rules or procedures.
The

retrieval

of

information

from

distinction between S.T.M. and L.T.M.

memory

has

also

highlighted

a

Experimental results have shown that,

the retrieval of data from S.T.M. is done by duplicating or replaying the

original perceptual experience, for example, in the recall of a set of words
which are stored in S.T.M., only the sound is remembered and not the
meaning, while in recalling from L.T.M. the meaning or the context of an
experience is remembered.
The

process

of

information

retrieval

calls

for

a

'search'

of

the

memory-store for the appropriate attribute, the procedures involved in this
search could

be one of a

number of conceivable alternatives, such as

serial/parallel or holist/partist.

The experimental results in this direction

point to the search in S. T .M. being done by a Successive-Scanning of memory
in search of target information.

In L.T.M., also, a hierarchal and contextual

ordering of information, and search, has been demonstrated which indicates
that data is structured according to its meaning or context, and experiences
or inputs to a learning organism is classified in groups of similar percepts.
2.5.8 FORGETTING
Finally, in phase 6 of TABLE 2.2, the memory-trace formed during learning
and relearning is subsequently diminished by the passage of time. There are
five major explanations of this change as follows:(i)

-

Decay Theory: This is possibly the simplest e~lanation. It considers
the decay of the memory simply _as the erosion of blocks of storage
by time, and although it explains the reduction of recall at the
S. T .M. level guite adequately, It does not account for the persistence
of some trivi.ill information or skills over extremely long periods.

(ti)

Trace Change Theory: This theory attempts to e!H~in forgettinJ{ as
the result of a gradual rounding-off or gener . tion of varIOUS
details of memory of an event, and not the loss of strength of a
memory-trace. The shapes of percepts are thought to, either change
into familiar objects, or evolve into simpler shapes. Hence, although
some novel or unique events are preserved almost in theIr original
form, the mundane or routine events are rounded-off into their
nearest ty~ical occurrence. Trace-change theory is not unanimously
accepted by all learning. researchers, it started from the
perception-theories of Gesl.alt PsychologyL and it 'presupposes a
continuous rehearsal of memory-traces.
The experIments used in
proving this type of theory are normally based on the successive
evaluation of Ule learned-material, this is done by com~ing the
reproductions of the original learning at different time intervals.
The main criticism to this type of experiments is that the forgetting
could be simply due to the distortion of data during the continuous
rehearsals or reappraisals of information.

(iii) -

Retrieval Failure: This phenomenon indicates that forgetting is not
due to the loss of the learned-material, but is the result of a failure
in the retrieving of information from memory.
The ex:periments
conducted in support of this theory show that a memory WhICh seems
to have been lost: can in fact be recalled by the introduction of new
retrieval cues.

(iv) -

Intentional Forgettin,: Motivational influences on forgetting have been
shown to have a significance in extinlfllishing memories associated with
painful or un'pleasant e:g>eriences, .this tYJ)!t of forgetting is most
commonly evident in indIviduals suffering from repression, also in
controlled experiments ~ple could intentionally forget a learned
memory by consciously deciding to dispose of the contents of a S.T.M••
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aspects of learning has been exhaustively investigatea and a great deal
of sU}lporting experiments exist.
The observation that two similar
experIences over a period of time tend to interfere with the retention
of each others memorr-trace has led to the development of
'Interference-Theory', whIch in fact is comprised of two sub-theories of
'Retroactive-Interference' and 'Proactive-rnterference'.

(a) - letroacti,e-llterferelce: The lain clail of interference theorl is that lelor, once
established does not deca, or be cOle 10Bt, but is onl, displaced as a resu 1t of BOle lew
sililar laterial.
Bence, lere paBsale of tile does lOt contribute to for,ettil,.
Retroacti,e-Interference iB a rhenolenon which stateB that newl, learned laterial cal
replace the lelor, of pre,iousl, earned sililar laterial.
This obser,ation haB been delonBtrated b, elperilents il which half of a ,roup of
subject a in an task-learnia, elperilent participate oal, in the first part the erperilent,
aad are rested in the second part. While the felailial subjects continue with the learninl
elperilent.
The relati,e hi'h recal l abilit, of the rested ,roup in relelberill the
laterial which laa jointl, acquired, BhoiB that the continued traininl has in f.ct
interfered with the pre,iousl, learned Bililar ••terial.
(b) - Proacti,e-Ilterferelct: This is the cOlpleleltar, lotion to the ODe abo,e, it describes the
effect that pre,ious elperielces or lelories cal ha,e 01 the acquisition of lew laterial.
This tJPe of interfereDce is also deloDstr.ble \, elpirical reBults. B, uainl sililar
techniques to retroacti,e-ilterference erperileats, it has been cODcluBi,el, BhoVD that the
capacit, of learninl a particular tlpe of laterial II, diliniBh, IS the reBU l t of
interference fro. pre,iousl, learned Billlar laterial.
2.5.9 OTHER ISSUES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES

As pointed out earlier, cognitive sciences have been investigating primarily
the complex modes of learning-behaviours in higher animals and humans
beings.

Some existing concepts have been further developed and other new

ones introduced.

For example, the introduction of cognitive-search methods,

cue-selection procedures involved in concept-learning, and also in insight and
latent learning the idea of 'expectancy' of an event are some of the notions
put forward in this paradigm.

These 'issues seem to be relevant to our

discussion of learning and will be discussed here.
2.5.10 PROCEDURES AND STRATEGIES IN CONCEPT-LEARNING

The learning of concepts is basically an attribute of man, although it has
been shown that some higher animals possess conceptual capabilities in
learning symbols or audio-visual commands. Yet, to conclusively demonstrate
the notion of concept-formation, it would be necessary to know what an
animal thinks, hence, language capability could be considered an implicit
component of this type of learning process.
One of the key issues in concept-learning is, the methods involved in the
search of attributes/factors/cues of a concept in a specific context.

The

procedures for the 'search' and 'recognition' of these cognitive-cues bears a
close similarity to the activities involved in the brain in 'recognition' and
'retrieval' of memory-traces.

Experimental results of the investigations in
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this area have shown that the search and sorting of such attributes could be
done in the following two principle ways:-

Reception/Serial Procedures: where a subject forms a hypothesis
according to the successive encounters of the occurrence of an
e~erience.
To test such hfP.<?theses there are basically two distinct
strategies.
First, the 'holistic-strategy', which is to remember as
many occurrences of a 'significant' experience and to try to verify the
hYp<?thesis on the basis of such data. Second, the 'partist-strategy'
in which the hy~thesis is tested in each incidence of the 'significant'
experience.
Here, the 'significant' or 'positive' instances of a
concept-rule are those events which reinforce the subject's actions it may also be an instruction from a teacher, or a reward.

(ii) -

Selection/Parallel Procedures: are the complementary notions to serial
procedures. In this case, the eX'periences are confronted all at once.
The task is to extrapolate the slgnificant attributes from a selection
of inputs. Here, also, ~rincip'ally two main strategies are used. First,
the 'scanning-strategy in whiCh the subject forms a conceptual-rule
(a set of attributes) and tests for the significant/positive instances of
such a concept. This is done by successively scanning the context in
a random manner, and by evaluating the hyppthesis at each stage.
The second strategr is the 'focusing-strategy', which is to initialJ)"
choose a general exemplar' with the highest positive conceptual
attributes available. Su15sequently, conceptual events are selected in
such a way that each attribute can be tested.
This individual
verification and rejection of attributes, finally refines the general
exemplar, and yields the desired conceptual-rule.

(i)

2.5.11 EXPECTANCY

The notion of 'expectation' or 'anticipation' is also another important
concept which has emerged from cognitive-sciences.

This issue will be

elaborated here, the background to the development of such ideas outlined,
also the prominent role of Tolman (1959) in this area emphasised, and his
theories of learning using this criteria briefly described.

The particular

interest in this fundamental issue is in view of the possible applications of its
concepts to the problem of designing simple 'learning' models, as outlined by
the objectives of this thesis.
The survival of an organism requires the maintenance of certain physical
inputs of the animal within tolerable levels, such as food, water, oxygen, etc.
A notable feature of behaviourist's description of the learning-process is the
underlying assumption that learning is initiated as a result of an animal's
need to stay at its optimal physiological state.

An explanation of a learning

task achieved by a hungry animal, using the terminology of behaviourists
could be as follows:The animal 'motivated' by a 'drive' for the 'goal' of attaining food. is
'emitting' an 'exploratory' behaviour, this 'appetitive' task could bring ahout,
by chance or by experimental design, certain events which will 'reinforce' the
animal's behaviour. The 'contiguity' or the 'drive-reducing' properties of such
events helps the animal to learn and remember the behavioural sequences
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The higher the motivational level or

the drive of the animal the better the quality of learning.
The 'goal' in such learning-tasks may be an object which is acted upon or
ingested, or it could be the execution of a certain behavioural pattern, or,
more generally, it can be considered as a change in the stimulation of the
animal.

New goals and sub-goals may be learned if they are instrumental in

attaining the initial goal.

The organization of such goals are considered to

be in a hierarchal form in the order of survival-value priority.
Similarly, the motivation could be a physiological need (e.g., food, water,
pam-aversion), an acquired or learned motive

(e.g., in experiments on

primates, chimpanzees can learn to work for symbolic tokens which could be
later used to acquire food), or could be a motive with not a very obvious
purposive nature (e.g., the manipulation of toys by infants as noticed by
Piaget (1977), or a general need for perceptual change in stimuli).
The emphasis on the 'purposive' and 'goal-directed' nature of learning
behaviour is, also, a major feature of the cognitive theories of learning such
as Tolman's.

He pointed out that: (1) - behaviour should be analyzed at the

level of purposive actions rather than movements; and (2) - behaviour is
"docile", in the sense that it should be considered adaptable to various
changing circumstances, and the means available to the animal determine the
choice of actions it takes.

In his view, the actions of a motivated (e.g.,

hungry) animal are determined by the so called cognitive-mapping, which is
the use of the knowledge of the spatial paths and other perceptual aspects of
its

environment.

The

organism

is

capable of

putting

together

such

information, or inventing a solution for reaching the goal event. The current
behaviour is guided by the belief of the outcome of the actions rather than a
reflexive response to a given goal.
The analysis of behaviour of a hungry animal could be done at two levels,
on the one hand it may be considered as a collection of muscular responses
and on the other hand it can be looked at as a sequence of purposive mental
events.

However, as mentioned earlier, like most complex phenomena an

organism's behaviour may be described at several different levels, and the
distinction here seems to be the degree of emphasis given to the physical or
mental aspects involved.
Tolman was a proponent of the temporal and mentallistic approach to the
explanations of behaviour.

Be had the view that the organism engaged in a

E.piries
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Such notions, nlthough familiar in

human common sense, had a metaphysical flavour which resulted in a critical
reception of his ideas by other scientific researchers of behaviour. Bence, in
pursuit of a more objective explanation of his ideas he engaged in the
investigations of the problem-solving abilities of animals, and other cognitive
processes involved in learning.

Although, human subjects would have been

intuitively a more suitable domain for this type of enquiries, he mainly used
animals for his experiments.
In doing such research Tolman laid down the basis of an elaborate
learning-theory.
'signified'

He postulated that the internal representation of events

'what-Ieads-to-what'.

This

representation

was

a

strictly

un-observable mental process, and it involved the 'anticipation' of stimuli and
the 'expectation' of an event occurring.

He emphasised the distinction

between the 'acquisition' of learning and 'performance'.

At the physiological

level he favoured the S-S interpretation of the learning-process.
Some of Tolman's experiments were based on observations of place-learning
and

latent-learning abilities in animals,

these experiments involved

the

remembering of mazes or spatial paths by the organisms with no apparent
immediate rewarding or reinforcing agents.
The 'Law of Effect' which was introduced by Thorndike at the end of the
19th century, and also the later 'contiguity' principles, slated that, behaviour
is only learnt if it leads to the satisfaction of certain motivating conditions.
Hence, their explanations of learning-processes could not wholly account for
the observations made by Tolman.

Therefore, he introduced the "principle of

expectancy" which although not contradictory to the law of effect, yet,
attempts to explain the learning-process at a deeper level.

The 'reward' not

only reinforced a specific response, but also went one step further by
reinforcing
According

the
to

expectancy of a

Tolman's

view,

stimulus leading

"learning

takes

to such

place

a

response.

by confirmation of

expectancies. "
These theories explained the results of a class of experiments on primates
in which monkeys having previously seen the placement of a fruit (banana)
under a box upon the subsequent release into the environment expected to
find the goal-object by lifting the box.

But, if the banana was replaced with

a different fruit (lettuce), then the animal's reward expectation of the first
kind of fruit was not confirmed, and it rejected the second reward and
carried on looking for the original goal-object, although it would have
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Habits and their

formation is an important aspect of human behaviour in which the ideas of
expectancy and the confirmation of such expectancies play a prominent part.
For Tolman, the reward is not a necessary element of acquisition of
learning, and the law of effect is not a universally valid principle for
explaining adaptive learning changes. His principle learning theories based on
the notion of 'what-Ieads-to-what' stated that:(a) - Two or more stimuli events are combined in 8-8 relations to form the
basis of knowledge and.
(b) - A stimulus 81 its response R1 and another stimuli 82 that follows R1

form a three-term e~ectanc'y, written as 81-R1-S2. These expectancies
are strengthened if the subsequent occurrence of S1-R1 sequence is
followed by the expected stimulus S2. Similarly, it is weakened if
S1-Rl occurred but were not followed by 82.

An interesting feature of expectancies was that, they could be integrated
into larger strings of expectancies (S1-Rl-82-R2-••• ), such as in learning a
maze, the animal connects the expectancies at the choice points, it is
subsequently able to amalgamate these sequences into a single chain of
actions, which can be activated at the start of the maze.
Another issue raised from this line of research was the inferential nature
of thought processes, it was believed that an animal with a 81-R1-82
expectancy, and engaged in its appetitive exploratory behaviour, learns
associative relationships between pairs of events such as 82 and St.

It

subsequently makes an inference for a new expectancy of 81-Rl-S*. This is a
process by which the discovery of perceptual associations by an organism
(such as 82-S* pairings) at the cognitive level can help to solve a particular
problem, and effect the behaviour at the response level.

Using this method

the animal acquires a large number of 8x-Sy and 8m-Rm-8n connections.
This knowledge base could be organised into a sort of neural or cognitive
map, by which the animal is able to find the shortest or the most economical
chain of actions for attaining a desired goal.
Tolman used the metaphor of brain being a map-control room rather than
a telephone-exchange, where the incoming stimuli are not connected by single
one-to-one switches to the outgoing responses but are turned into a tentative
cognitive like map of the environment, which determines what responses if
any the animal will finally release.
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The main criticisms of this type of research have been: firstly, their
su bjective and mentallistic nature; and secondly, the lack of structural
theories which can specify ways that these expectancies could lead to the
appropriate actions.

However, many important issues have emerged from this

line of work, especially regarding the internal representation of the dynamics
as well as the statics of the environment in the brain.

The main question in

this respect is: how can the external flow of events be symbolised by internal
processes?
A proposal was made by Sommerhoff (1974) regarding the nature of
changes

involved

in

representations, on a

the

transition

of

external

more objective grounds.

dynamics

to

internal

Using the concepts of

'directive-correlation' and the notion of 'anticipatory-reaction', the following
speculations was made, as to what kind of processes could exist in the
internal mechanisms of expectancy-formation.
(a) - It is possible that the internal representations of expectancies bears no
direct correlations with behaviour, and the internal. processes involved
in the realization of such expectancies work at a different level.
(b) - The internal expectancies could be represented by a stochastic p-rocess,
based on the probabilities of events and outcomes and the consolidation
or weakening of such notions.
(c) - A deterministic model of expectancies is also conceivable, involving the
creation of isomorphic associations between internal representations of
events and their outcomes.
One of the main contributions of Tolman's theories to the contemporary
science of learning has been to emphasise the two distinct levels at which the
learning-process should be investigated.

A learning animal is constantly

making a mental model of its behaviour by constructing expectancies and
neural-maps; and, also, by using its behavioural responses and stimuli from its
environment it is able to confirm or reject these expectancies.

Hence, this

dual "processing + executive" nature of explanations has become the prevalent
feature

of

many

of

today's

information-processing

models

of

the

learning-process.
2.6 SOCIAL ASPECTS OF LEARNING AND TEACHING

Some relevant issues of social-behaviour, social-learning (in animals and
humans), 'intelligence', and the general area of education and the impact of
the learning theories on teaching will be discussed here.
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2.6.1 SOCIAL-LEARNING
Learning-processes which have been discussed so far have been mainly the
outcome of an individual organism's interactions with the environment. These
adaptive behaviours were emitted to enable an animal to survive.
such behaviours almost invariably occur in a social context.

However,
The social

organization has its own evolutionary survival advantages in facilitating
reproduction, rearing of the young and providing defence against predatory
and other challenges of the environment.
emotional

stress,

disease

and

At the same time, it contributes to

conflict.

Social

interaction/influence of individuals on each other.

behaviour

is

the

Various elements of

social-behaviour are:-

(i)

ReJ>roductive-Behaviours: To some degree a social element exists in
thls type of behaviours, for most species.

(ii)

Developmental-Factors: The critical inputs to the organism, that play
a major part in the setting of the pattern for social roles.
PhysiologiCal examples are the hormones that determine morphology,
and psychological and perceptual examples are the events that
determine response tendencies, such as the factors involved in
'imprinting' or the setting of social-dominance hierarchies.

(iii) -

Communication: Most animals have means of communicating between
individuals of s'pecies, varying from simple physio-chemical signals to
complex symbolic processes such as language.

(iv)

-

Territorial-Arrangements: The aspects of social behaviour influenced
by animals' breeding, habitat or food-source locations.

(v)

- Characteristic Species-S~ific Behaviour: These are the actions which
are determinea on tile basis of particular ecological factors
surrounding a species; such as materniil care or family organization.
A study of ethological and behavioural literatures reveals the variety of

behavioural adaptations that exist in the social level of animal's behaviour.
Examples for

each of the above categories are: the nest-building and

courtship-behaviour of birds; the imprinting of young birds to the early
experiences of their lives; the ritual dancing-display of stickleback fish at the
time of mating as a

means of communication; the territory establishing

behaviour of sea-gulls at the nesting time; and the food-begging behaviour of
young chicks.
balance

which

The intriguing feature of all these examples is the intricate
is

kept

between

the

learned/environmental

and

the

innate/genetic/hormonal contributions.
In the case of humans the theories of the social-learning have been
developed mainly within the science of social-psychology.

This type of work

generally has a combined cognitive and behaviourist outlook, and it analyses
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the learning, motivation and reinforcement of social behaviours in terms of
cognitive events intermixed with external behavioural events.
The

emphasis

in

the

theories

of

social-learning

is on learning

by

observation, rather than learning by doing or personally experiencing.

In

social-psychology and education the development of intelligence, and the
'Intelligence Quotient' (IQ) have been major topics of investigation; also, a
matter of special interest has been the heredity properties of intelligence.
The relation of intelligence or IQ with learning ability is a controversial
issue and has also been rigorously investigated.

It has been shown in some

experiments that in certain instances the IQ can be correlated to a specific
learning ability of a subject.

However, this is not a universal observation,

and is dependent on various environmental backgrounds or the training of
individuals.
Another fact which has emerged, is that the learning-proficiency can not
be transferred between tasks with different basic elements.

For example,

learning can not be transferred between manual and formal tasks.
The scientific study of higher forms of learning such as problem-solving,
concept-learning, and language-learning has established yet another area in
learning sciences, that of the instructional aspects of social-learning, namely,
'teaching' •
2.6.2 TEACHING

One of the most important contributions of the findings in psychological
learning-sciences has been to the development of instructional theories and
teaching-programmes.

Although, the work of many researchers on learning

deals with its purely scientific aspects, some investigators have ventured into
studying the ways this knowledge may be utilised in education. 'Teaching' or
'training' can be viewed as the control of a learning-process, or alternatively
as the transfer of knowledge or skill.
The investigations of learning as highlighted by the variety of theories,
approaches and views, and by the even less precise understanding of its
mechanisms, has not yet yielded a unifying descriptive science.

Hence, as

anticipated, many consensus also exist in the field of teaching-theories.
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Additionally, the validity or effectiveness of many contemporary teaching
techniques are questionable, this is in view of their inability to improve the
'quality'

of

the

learning,

rather

facilitation for learning or recall.

than

simply

providing

environmental

The earlier theories of instruction were

embodied within the 'curriculum theories' of the science of education, these
theories basically promoted the presentation of the learning-materials in some
orderly fashion.

In the past 30-40 years programmed-learning has been

introduced, in the development of which experimental-psychologists played a
major role.
Recently the accessibility of inexpensive computers and other audio-visual
aids, has facilitated the introduction of teaching-tools such as simulators,
films, TV, video, tape-recorders and computer assisted instructions, to many
schools and educational establishments.
The impact of this mechanization of teaching has been to increase the
importance of this field of study, and also to emphasise the need for an exact
theory

of

instruction,

which

will

help

the

devising

of

automatic

programmed -teaching strategies.
Cognitive and S-R theories as well as some notions from motivation and
personality

studies,

have contributed

to the following ideas which are

currently used in various teaching theories.
(i) - MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS

Learning is best fostered if a goal or a hierarchy of goals are set for the
learner, this could be a behavioural objective, such as obtaining a specific
proficiency-level after a number of lessons. This type of goal is usually more
effective than aiming for a
subject.

general understanding or appreciation of a

Also, the interest of the learner should be aroused, by setting

interesting tasks and goals with optimal degree of difficulty.
(ii) - PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS

A task or a skill which is to be taught should be broken down into its
appropriate components and organised into a hierarchy.

Thus, the learning

material should be ordered into sub-units and presented from simple to the
more complex units.

Also, the learned material is better retained and more

easily transferred if it is fully understood, than if the same material is
learned by rote-memorising.
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The perceptual structure of the teaching material is also important,
conceptual information could be learned better, by the proper organization or
presentation of learned material and the placing of vital visual cues.

The

environment of the study or the classroom has to reinforce the relevant
task-learning behaviour, poor concentration, poor attention, poor habits or
other distractions are all interfering with the optimal teaching-processes.
(iii) - STUDY TECHNIQUES

Recital;

practice;

manipulation of learned material by responding or

relating one part to another; asking of relevant questions; searching the text
for answers; will all enhance the learning of material.

These techniques also

help to form automated habits which improve the performance in future (e.g.,
the learning of some mathematical rules).

In studying a

text various

prescribed study guides are devised, these generally involve following a
specific sequence of steps, using which a student can improve the learning or
remembering of studied subjects.
Also various mnemonic or memory devices are elaborated, these are special
techniques of making the material more meaningful and hence, improve the
recall and learning abilities.
2.7 A TAXONOMY OF ADAPTIVE AND LEARNED BEHAVIOURS
In the following,

a

classification of different adaptive and

behaviours will be outlined.
in this stage.

learned

No special phylogenetic considerations are made

The list is simply a taxonomy of adaptive activities of animals

in order of their behavioural complexity, as defined in behavioural and
cognitive sciences.

Also certain adaptive observations may be accounted for

in more than one of the specified catagories.

(1) - INSTINCTIVE BEHAVIOURS: The simplest kind of ada'ptive behaviours in

animals, instincts are inborn-response tendenCIes which p'rovide
automatic mechanisms for adapting to the recurring situations in life.
Instincts are normally compfete in their first occurrence and are
triggered by a specific stimulus. There is normally.. an element of
learning or modification present in most instinctive benaviours.

(2) -

IMPRINTING: A highly specific and limited form of learning, it could
also be considerea as an externally triggered instinctive oehaviour.
Imprinting can be clearly observed in birds, during the early P-eriods of
their lives. The young birds in a 'sensitive' ~rioCi after hatching, will
take any large moving object to be their mol;her, this impression will
stay with the birds for the rest of their lives.

(3)

- HABITUATION: Possibly the simplest ty~ of true learning universally
seen within different species. Habituation is the waning of normally:
occurring behaviour.
An animal gradually decreases its normEil
res-POnse to a stimulus" which is re'peatedly being ex~sed to.
Altliough, habituation is similar in characteristics to fatigue or
sensory-adaptation, it is different in the sense that, it p'ersists over
long .periods of time. Habituation has the important survival function
of, filtering-out the insignificant and mundane aspects of life.

(4)

- CLASSICAL CONDITIONING: A very simple type of lear¢ng, involving
associations between stimuli. This phenomena was origirmJly observed
by Pavlov, in experiments on the salivation response of dogs to fex>d
stimuli, it was noticed that, a previouslr neutral stimulus, such as the
sound of a bell, could be bonded assoc18tively with the fex>d stimulus!
and after an appropriate number of training procedures, the sound 01
the bell alone wouIa evoke the salivation response.

(5)

- INSTRUMENTAL CONDITIONING: Instrumental/Operant Conditioning,
brou~ht to prominence by Skinner, is essent18lIy similar to ClassiCBJ
CondItioning, the main feature of this type of conditioning is the
choice that an animal has over the stimuli it receives and the
responses it makes. An animal that learns to depress a lever to get a
fex>a pellet makes an association between the foOd.-obtainment and the
lever-pressing, based on the reinforcement or the reward of its needs.

(6)

- TRIAL AND ERROR LEARNING: The term "trial &. error learninl{" was
brought into wide usage by Thorndike, this type of learning IS also
referred to as 'habit-formation', it has the basic elements of
instrumental conditioning, and normally, contains a subsidiary element
of classical conditioning. Trial and error learnin~ involves chex>sing
successively a response from a collection of PQsslble responses, and
evaluating the consequences of such response for future utilization.

(7)

- ONE TRIAL LEARNING: This type of learning is associated with
Gutherian learning-theories, which state that, a stimulus-pattern gains
its full associative strength on the occurrence of its first pairing with
a response. Guthrie attemfted to explain the subsequent lmp.rovement
in learnin(, as a matter 0 refining the learning for each element of
movement mvolved in a particular behaviour.

(8)

- REPETITION LEARNING: The acquisition of skills or knowledge as a
result of successive repetitions of a behavioural or j>erceptual pattern,
is normally referred to as 'repetition-learning' or 'Iearning-by-doing',
which could be thought of as a special case of trial &. error learning,
where there is no ·choice' of response for the animal.

(9)

- ROTE LEARNING: This type of learning involves the memorizing of
behavioural/cognitive patterns or response sequences and the
subsequent display of such behaviours in appropriate situations (e.g.,
learning of nonsensical string of letters); in this type of learninjt the
sound or the shape of stimulus is remembered and ~not its meanmg.

(10) -

SERIAL LEARNING: The extension of individual stimulus-response
bonding to the sequential chains of such J)8irings, and the learnmg of
associations in tasks involving such serial elements, are referred to as
'serial-learning', and was originally introduced by Ebbinghaus.

(11) -

LATENT LEARNING: This type of learning, the study of which has
been associated with Tolman, is the learning of s~tial or other
environmental information by animals, and although it takes place most
of the time, does not exhibit itself under normal conditions of
performance.
Latent-Learning, is basically the association of
mdifferent stimuli or situations without a patent reward (e.g., the
formation of memory-maps in normal foraging activities of animals).

(12) -

INSIGHT LEARNING: Insight reJates to the organizational aspects of
lear¢ng, also, the percep~ion of relationships.
Insight Learning
originally investifatea bf Itohler, is the solving of a problem by the
reorsanization 0
experIences or the sudden discovery of novel
relationships.
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(13) - PROBLEM SOLVING: Another category of insightful-learning, is
normally associated with cognitive-sciences, and ,enerally refers to
solving problems by humans using semantic descrIptive explanations,
incorporating mathematical or logiCal arguments in the process.
(14) - VERBAL LEARNING: The learning of verbal information, in terms of
associations based on ideas rather than the semantic lists of percepts.

(15) - CONCEPT LEARNING: The learning of conceptual relationships, by the
discovery of list of common attributes in a context. Some of the
methods involved in the research of this type of learning are:-

III - OdditJ-Priacirle-Learaing: Inyolyes preBeating severll stiluli to I subject, the tlBt
being, to pic tbe one which iB diCferent frol all the others in a particular attribute.
Ibl - Paired-ABBociati,e-Leafni.g: Subjects leara a list of discrete aBBociatioDB Ie.,., pairl of
SflbolB, one of the pair iB used aB a cue (Btiaulus) fOf the recall DC the second
IresponBe II.
(cl - Learaill-Seta Of Leaflill-To-Leara: A Bpecific concept Of criteria is preBented to the
Bubject Ie.,., tbe subject lust eltract the ilplicit conceptual-rule froa a selection of
objectsl. It hlB beeD aoticed that hi,her anilalB subBequeDtl, tactle a lililar tJPe of
problea luch better, and pOBBesB aD abilitJ of 'hov-to-learn'.
Idl - Free-Recall-Leafning: SubjectB after learDin, a list of iteas (serial or parallell, are
tested for leafning retention b, being asked to recall the iteaB In Bile order or randoalJ.
2.8 THE BRAIN AND NBRVR-SYS'l»f SCIBNCHS AP'Pln\aI 'ID ISSUBS IN LEARNING

So far in this chapter we have looked at the manifestation of learning
outside the body of an organism.

The brief references to possible internal

mechanisms have only been temporary digressions from the mainstream
external approach, prevalent in both behavioural and cognitive sciences.
The behaviour of an animal in nature, and in particular those labelled as
'learned', can be explained in many levels of: social interactions; states of
mind; changes in hormonal secretions or the levels of certain chemicals in the
blood stream; levels of sensory inputs; the altered patterns of brain cells; new
synaptic properties of a brain region; changes in protein synthesis or even
the changes in the atoms composing the animal's body.
The immense complexity and diversity of the task of explaining any
behaviour in absolute terms is obvious.

However, since not all such

information can be utilised all the time, the purpose for which a description
is intended, dictates the level of explanation.

The investigation at an

inappropriate level of enquiry, not only will be redundant, but would not have
the essential elements for the proper analysis of the problem.
The studies of the natural learning processes have, generally, been
conducted

in

three

major

empirical

cognitive/mental and neural/mechanism.

levels:

behavioural/executive,

The neural level, admittedly, is the

basis for both the behavioural and the cognitive levels.

But, while in

cognitive or behavioural psychology, normally, observations involve a single
domain (i.e., perception or behaviour), in neuronal explanations a hierarchy of

descriptive levels exist (i.e., system, single neuron, biochemical, biophysical,
etc.).
2.8.1 SOME PIDLOSOPIDCAL ISSUES - HOLISM

VB.

REDUCTIONISM

An organism may exhibit complex and intricate patterns of activity, but,
learning is said to take place only when previous experiences are utilised in
the subsequent behaviours.

The impressions of such behaviours at the

neuronal level, perceived by the subjective reality of the animal's senses and
transformed

into electrical

nerve

signals,

has

raised

many

issues and

controversies on subjects such as 'mind' or 'consciousness'. The legitimacy of
such physical/mental relationships, and also the question whether this problem
can be meaningfully tackled by man in a 'self-understanding' sense, has been
the concern of philosophers and psychologists throughout the ages.
An important philosophical distinction, Holism vs. Reductionism has been
made regarding the possible approaches to the study of the brain and the
nervous-system.

The Holist subscribes to the rationalist view that biological

investigations of the brain should be carried out on the totality of the cells,
and not on its elements or molecular components.

The brain is considered to

be 'more' than the sum of its interacting elements.
holism is the organizational aspects.

The main emphasis in

The Reductionist, on the other hand,

being from the school of empiricism, believes that the full understanding of
the complete workings of the brain is only possible by the comprehension of
its neuronal, molecular and sub-molecular components.

The notion of 'mind'

or any other mystical properties of the brain are rejected by the reductionist.
2.8.2 lllS'ImlCAL BAClmROOND

ro

'llIE DHVEL<>RomNT OF BRAIN-SCIENCES

The localization of 'mind' or other psychological phenomena in the brain
and nervous-system was only established from the late seventeenth century.
The more ancient theories regarded the heart as the centre for 'soul', and
the brain was considered as an organ simply for the cooling of blood.

Later,

the 'ventricular fluids' brain theories were introduced by Descartes who
believed the soul was located at the brain-stem.

For Descartes, the brain

consisted of a ventricular system of canals and pistons which circulated the
vital body fluids.

The mechanically minded scientists of the eighteenth

century replaced this model of the mechanisms of the brain with a clockwork
model of cogs and wheels.
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At the beginning of the 19th century, the science of 'Phrenology' was
introduced, namely by Gall. The phrenologists were interested in mapping llnd
labelling various areas of the cortex as responsible for particular mental
faculties and moral values.

Indeed, the issue of whether separate brain

regions are responsible for specific functions, or whether they fulfill many
roles; otherwise referred to as 'specifity vs. plasticity', has been a major
point of controversy ever since.
The discovery of 'Electricity' and 'Animal-Electricity', led to findings on
the neuro-physiological properties of animals' nervous-systems. Similarly, the
use

of

low-power

microscopes

in

biology

facilitated

the

investigations of brain cells, and the discovery of 'neurons'.

anatomical
Much of the

research which followed involved the electrical investigations of the brain and
neurons,

and

the

analysis

of

various

portions

of

the

brain.

These

investigations resulted in the introduction of a new class of models for the
brain mechanisms, based on the electrical-networks of its elements.

A

popular analogy was the brain being a "telephone exchange".
The modern era of Brain-Sciences began with the invention of electronic
recording and amplifying equipments, which have been progressively refined
ever since their introduction.

The discovery of the 'brain-waves' showed

that, regular electrical activities could be recorded, with their frequency and
strength depending on the various modes and levels of animal's activity, the
patterns of such electrical recordings were rigorously investigated.

Many

other technological advances such as: the probing techniques of the brain
using precision electrodes; the discovery of chemicals for staining or tracing
of nerve fibers; and the discovery of electron-microscope have shed light on
many anatomical and physiological features of the brain.

More recently, also,

the science of molecular-biology and neuro-chemistry have revealed many new
chemical properties of the brain-cells.
The

clinical

study

of

different

brain

disorders

and

defects,

both

psychologically and biologically oriented, also the study of the interfering
affects of various drugs on the workings of the nervous system, have been
major contributing factors to a better understanding of brain mechanisms.
2.8.3 THEORIES OF LEARNING - NEUROLOGICAL APPROACH
Today, in learning sciences the behaviour of an animal is considered to be
exclusively a product of its nervous system.

Keeping this in mind, it is

surprising that in the majority of definitions and theories of learning little
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There may be possible

historical or developmental reasons for this apparent neglect.

For instance,

until the early 1960's psychologists held the view that neuro-physiology had
very little to offer which was relevant.

However, with the explosion of

neuro-physiological research within the past three decades, the gaps between
the psychological and neura-physiological explanations are narrowing.
Using the metaphor of "brain and computer" for analogy.

Behaviour can

be thought of as the output of the computer, in the form of data.

On the

other hand, the neurons and sub-cellular elements of the brain can be
considered as the individual memory-cores, or the electrical charges in the
electronic circuitry.

The enormity of the task will be appreciated if we were

asked to investigate the workings of a computer by only observing the
movements of electrical charges within its memory storage.

Conversely, it

would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to understand the underlying
mechanisms of a computer from the analysis of its input/output data.
From the time of Pavlov, psychologists have speculated

notions and

theories regarding the nature of the physiological substrate of learning.

In

general, they hold the view that there are brain correlates of behaviour and
learning; and have postulated that an organism has certain primitive neural
mechanisms, with their specific functional rules stipulated by behavioural
implications.

However, not a

great deal of interest is shown towards

understanding the precise nature of the mechanisms of such 'engrams' or
'memory-traces' •
Neuro-physiologists, on the other hand, have been interested in the
mechanisms that provide the animal with the diversity of behaviour.

In their

view the investigations of biological correlates of learning and meticulous
probing of the hardware of the brain, will finally prove to be more rewarding
than the behavioural investigations.
Another point to mention here is that, although, the neurological domain
of

investigation

includes

the

central-nervous-system (CNS).

sense

organs,

the

muscles

and

the

Yet, the main areas of interest in learning

related biological sciences have been away from the peripheries, and mainly
involving the examination of changes that occur in the eNS during a
'learning-process'•
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2.8.4 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF OBSERVATION IN BRAIN SCIENCES

A study of the course of development of brain sciences highlights the
point that technological advances play a major role in the understanding of
brain-mechanisms.

One of the first techniques used for the investigation of

the brain was 'ablation', in which a portion of brain is destroyed or cut out
and the resulting behavioural changes noticed. This technique was refined by
the introduction of electrodes that could cause a small lesion at a more
precise location of the brain.

Another method, which does not entail the

destruction of the nerve-cell is the stimulation technique, which involves
using an external electrode or a permanently implanted electrode in the
animal's brain (sometimes activated remotely by radio waves).

Similarly,

recordings of the brain's electrical activities can be made using sensitive
electrodes which are capable of detecting the faint firings of a single neuron,
or the wide-scale electrical activities of the outer skull (EEG).

Computers

are, also, used to filter out the background electrical noise present in the
brain-wave patterns under observation.
The chemical stimulation (instead of electrical) and detection of nerve cell
activity is also possible - whereby, delicate hypodermic needles are used.
Neurally acting drugs under investigation can be injected in tiny amounts, and
their effect on behavioural patterns or an adjoining neuron detected.

Other

methods of stimulation or lesion of brain cells are also utilised, such

88

laser-beam, cooling, etc.
Although, many important discoveries are made using these techniques the
conceptual objections to methods such as ablation, lesion or stimulation are
still valid.

Specially, in view of our limited

knowledge of the actual

processes involved in the cellular levels of the brain, and the interference
which

these techniques

scrutiny.

might cause

to the delicate mechanisms under

Hence, these type of results should be viewed with caution and

supported by the evidence of other experimental methods.
Another issue which is relevant to these types of experimental techniques
is the subjectivity of the observation.

The occasional experiments on human

subjects, with the verbal accounts of the stimulated sensations, does not give
a systematic and consistent picture. Conversely, animals can be systematically
studied, but there is no verbal description of the induced sensations, and the
inferences must be made from the behaviour of the animal.

E.pl rl c:a

It

is,

also,

worth

noting

that

the

aDd Tbeorl ea 01

distinction

in

LearDi

the

a,

71

'holist'

and

'reductionist' approach is also manifested in a dichotomy of methods used for
the probing of the

brain.

The holist may scrutinize the patterns of

brain-waves during a learning process, while the reductionist will look at the
individual neuronal firings during such a process.
2.8.5 MODIFICATIONS OF THE BRAIN DURING LEARNING

The search for the 'engram', the neural substrate of learning experience
has proven to be so far

futile;

the problem may well be due to the

inappropriate way which the issue has been posed. The origins of speculative
brain mechanisms of learning was embodied within the associative learning
theories

of

physiological-psychology,

as

typified

by

Hcbb's

(1949)

"reverberating circuits" explanation of the formation of neural associations.
Such theories have been searching for neural mechanisms to support the
notion that new neural connections are made as a result of learning.

But in

view of more recent evidence, it progressively looks like that a subtle change
in the already existing network of connections, could be the only functional
change which comes about as the result of learning.
The investigations in this area of learning research, has amassed a useful
body of knowledge on the changes that some specific types of learning cause
to the nervous-systems of mainly simple animals.
valid principles have been demonstrated.

However, no universally

With the criteria used in such

investigations, differing neuro-biological mechanisms have been observed in
the cellular correlates of the phenomenon of habituation in cats and mollusks.
This shows that to find a true globally applicable engram, either we have to
increase our knowledge of the workings of the brain and nervous-systems, or
approach the issue from a different perspective and use different criteria for
observation.
The evidence of neural changes associated with learning are as follows:(i) - NEURO-ANATOMICAL CHANGES OF LEARNING

The prediction had been made in theories such as Bebb's 'reverberating
circuits', that an enduring oscillatory loop between two neurons will bring
about persisting structural changes

(of unknown nature); one possible

hypothesis was the anatomical growth of synapsis between the two neurons,
which results in both neurons acting as a single unit.
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The only positive finding regarding the induced neuro-anatomical change us
a result of external behaviour, is the relative large numbers of the neuronal
synapsis and the larger cortex size of the group of experimental animals
which are reared in complex environments rich in sensory stimulus, when
compared with a similar group of animals that have been reared in a dull
environment.

These anatomical variations primarily observed during the

growth of animals but in certain cases also in the experiments involving the
adult animals, are possibly attributable to some neuro-chemical secretions.
Bence, the general consensus in this field is that experience as well as
organising the existing neural synapsis in the brain, in a 'select and preserve'
fashion, 'directs' or 'causes' the formation of new synapsis.
(ii) - NEURo-PBYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES OF LEARNING

The proposal was made by Pavlov that possibly some electric fields could
be

responsible

for

the associative

bonding

of

two

neurons,

this

was

investigated later but no conclusive evidence for such mechanism were
discovered.
A method preferred by some researchers has been to use simple neuronal
preparations as a model for investigating various hypothesis regarding the
physiological changes in learning; these preparations range from a single
neuron to groups of identical neurons.

By observing the levels of electrical

neuronal firings, it has been established that many simple types of learning
such as habituation, sensitization, classical conditioning, and instrumental
conditioning can be demonstrated at the neuronal level in simple animals like
sea-slugs or locusts.
When studying the physiological manifestations of learning in such simple
animals, two major problems are evident: firstly, many problems arise when
attempts are made to generalise the findings to the more complex animals or
man; and secondly, when a neural preparation exhibits the properties of
habituation

or

conditioning,

it

does

not

necessarily

follow

that

they

correspond to habituation or conditioning at the behavioural level.
At higher levels of investigation, the experiments are carried out on the
intact nervous-systems of animals; the 'mirror-epilepsy' experiments have
managed to achieve the conditioning of neurons on the one hemisphere of
mammalian
hemisphere.

cerebral-cortex

to

the

firing

of

neurons

on

the

opposite

Other neural conditioning experimenters have accomplished

similar results with the conditioning of reflex actions such as the eyelid

Eapirlcs
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Also, in a class of experiments, the neuronal correlates of

particular learning tasks in the active animals have been localised on the
basis of the increased electrical activity of such neurons.
At the more holistic level, some researchers have demonstrated a shift in
certain brain-wave patterns or other electrical (EEG) changes during learning,
but generally speaking no clear explanation of the nature of the 'brain
product' of learning has emerged.
(iii) - NEURO-CHEMICAL CHANGES OF LEARNING

In

the

past

few

decades,

the

possi bility

of

the

existence

of

a

neuro-chemical substrate of learning has been rigorously investigated, often
with controversial and sensational outbursts of claims regarding the chemical
means of 'memory transfer' or dramatic enhancement of learning abilities by
use of certain chemicals.
The role of 'Ribonucleic-Acid' (RNA) in the transfer or acquisition of
learning is a subject under close scrutiny of many neuro-chemists.

It is

established that some modifications of the structure of the RNA takes place
during learning. Also, the maze-running proficiency of experimental rats have
been correlated with certain characteristics of the RNA molecules in their
brain.

Similarly, the administration of some drugs which inhibit the RNA

synthesis slows the learning in rats; however, this inhibition of protein
synthesis does not affect the contents of long-term memory.
By far the most dramatic claims have been regarding the transfer of
memory from one animal to another by means of 'encode RNA'.

In one set of

such experiments, planaria (earth-worms) were fed on the remains of other
'trained' planaria; and the claim has been made that the behaviour of the
recipient animals were modified as though they had gone through the original
training procedure.

In the absence of a plausible RNA memory hypothesis

which can explain exactly how RNA and memory are related, these types of
observations should be viewed cautiously.

Many other chemicals and drugs

are also shown to be able to interfere with or block the memory-trace in a
definite and well documented manner.
2.8.6 A BRIEF UXE AT 'I1IB MlDlANIfH3 OF 'llIE BRAIN AND NERVOOS-8YS"l'JM

The Brain is one of the most complex and challenging mysteries of nature,
the great volume of knowledge amassed about this object of intense scientific
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enquiry has only accomplished a minimal understanding of its mechanisms and
functions.
In human nervous systems millions of 'receptors' monitor internal and
external

changes

and

transmit

the

information

to

the

brain.

The

'molo-neurons' in various organs receive the commands sent from the brain,
for the execution of muscular movements or internal regulations.

In the

brain itself billions of neurons, with the number of possible interconnections
greater than the number of atoms in the universe (according to many texts),
process the incoming information and act appropriately.

In FIG.2.2 a general

view of human brain with its major anatomical components, also a typical
Qutline of 'neuron' and its action potential are shown.
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FIGURE 2.2.

a} -

The brain with its principal regions
b - The outline of a typical neuron and its major components
c - The pattern of a typical neuronal electriCal firing

t

(i) - THE NEURo-ANATOMY OF THE BRAIN

The brain is a mass of folded grey spongy tissue, made up of billions of
living cells called 'neurons' (approximately 10to cells in human brain).

The
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brain anatomically consists of two different tissues.

The outer cortex

(grey-matter) and the inner (white) sub-cortical nuclei.

The neurons in the

cortex are relatively independent of their near neighbours, but through
trans-cortical fibers, communicate with other distant neurons, and form a
neural-network.

The largest

co~ponent

of the brain of mammals and higher

animals is the 'cerebral cortex', it is made up of two mirror copy hemispheres
or lobes.

The cortex is the region of the brain mainly associated with the

non-automatic and adaptive behaviours of animals.

The concept of the

localization of functions or 'specificity', signifies that certain cortical areas
are devoted exclusively or primarily to particular functions, such as: vision;
audition;

tactile

sensing;

initiation

of

muscular

actions;

establishing of

associations; and speech.

More locally, however, there appears to be an

overlap of functions and

the duplication of many activities in different

regions of the cortex, this is referred to as the 'plasticity' of the brain.

The sub-cortical areas of the brain are mainly responsible for the mental
life of animals.

Their motivation, arousal, drive and attention, as well as

some automatic reflexive actions of their behaviour are controlled from this
region of the brain.
The units of the nervous-system, the neurons, come in a variety of shapes
and sizes, in different species and also in different parts of the eNS.

The

neurons are made up of three major components: the'dendrites' (for receiving
the

information);

the

'cell-body';

and

the

taxons'

transmitting of information from the cell-body).

(for

conducting

and

Each neuron is connected to

many other neurons via its axons and dendrites (e.g., 10' connections in a
typical human brain cell).

(ii) - THE NEURo-PHYSIOLOGY OF THE BRAIN
The nervous-system, as a vast network of receptors, neurons and effectors,
can be considered to be an electrical maze of elements in continuous modes
of activity.

The means of communication between this network of neurons, is

the electrical impulses that travel along the axons from one neuron to
another.

The neurons, typically, fire in interacting groups or modules, these

modules, in turn, are the elements of larger integrated subsystems in the
brain.

There

are

three

important

principles

of

neuronal interactions:

'convergence' (many neurons influence the firing rate of a single neuron);
'divergence' (each neuron causes the firing of many other neurons); and
'feedback' (a neuron influences the firing rate of the neurons that affect
them).
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The nerve impulse is usually described in terms of travelling electrical
charges or 'action-potential', this has an 'all-or-none' (on/off) characteristic.
However, the sensitivity of the nerve-cell is not constant, and after an
impulse the nerve is less sensitive to firing.
also

rise,

as

a

result

of

'adaptations'

The threshold of firing could

to

a

continuous

stimulus,

or

'accommodations' for a stronger stimulus.
The amplitudes of individual impulses do not vary and are of no value as
far as the information transfer is concerned.

The frequency of the firing of

neurons, although significant at sense organ and effector level, is not of
prime importance at

the

processing level,

where the

identity and

the

distribution of excited fibers, convey the real information.
Here, it is relevant to mention that the holistic approach to the electrical
investigations of the brain has produced a mass of important results, involving
the 'electroencephalogram' (EEG) recordings of the brain.

Various types of

EEG wave patterns are correlated with human mental states, and although,
initially,

strong

claims

were

made

regarding

the

significance of

such

recordings by their pioneering protagonists, their true composition is more
uncertain today.
(iii) - THE NEURO-CHEMISTRY OF THE BRAIN

The neuronal discharge and the progression of the impulse in dendrites are
generally considered in terms of the electrical properties of such phenomena,
in much

the

same way as an electrical charge travels along a

cable.

However, the transmission of neural impulses can be considered in terms of
the complex electro-chemical interactions that lake place in the dendrites.
The uneven distribution of charged 'ions' in the membrane ofaxons and
dendrites create a potential gradient which facilitates the passing of the
electrical

signals

through

the

cell.

Also,

other

chemicals

called

'neuro-transmitters' are responsible for the electrical impulse travelling
between the synaptic junctions of two neurons.
As mentioned earlier, the investigations of 'ribonucleic acid' (RNA), which
is a molecule in the nerve-cell body, and is responsible for protein synthesis
within the neuron, has been another important area of neuro-chemistry. The
production of RNA is shown, although not conclusively, to be related to
certain aspects of neural organization.
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Many hormones and chemicals have been shown to have blocking or
stimulating effect on neuronal activity, some interfere with the transmission
of impulses by loosening the synaptic connections between neurons.

It has

been recently established, that the brain also produces its own sensitizing
morphine like chemicals (tendorphines') to suppress pain.
2.8.7

nm

The

NEUROLOGICAL APmOt\CH 'ID SCJiE PSYCHOLOGICAL OONCEPI'S OF LEARNING

neuronal study of the

brain

has resulted in

the discovery of

mechanisms for the neural correlates of some psychological concepts.
relevant issues to learning and

Some

performance namely, attention, arousal,

motivation, drive, reward and punishment, will be discussed.
(i) - AROUSAL AND ATTENTION

The activities of a collection of diffusively arranged neurons, based at the
core of the brain-stem, namely, the treticular formation', have been directly
linked, with the phenomena of arousal, attention, alertness, awareness, sleep
and coma.

The process of attention or arousal, is the brain's way of limiting

the intake of information.

The learning animal

must extract from

its

experiences the stimuli which are important for its survival and need to be
remembered for future utilization.

The role of the reticular formation in the

attention mechanism has been clearly demonstrated ever since the work of
Bremer in the 1930's.
The different levels of arousal, from alertness to deep sleep have been
correlated with the patterns of EEG brain waves of animals.

Also, the

electrical stimulation of the reticular formation is seen to increase the
attention level of an animal.
Animals with ablations or lesions to their reticular formation would fall
into a

deep

sleep or coma.

However, in more controlled

and

careful

experiments, these animals if kept alive for a duration, would get some of
their normal behaviour restored and come out of the coma.

Again, the

plasticity of the brain seems to have been demonstrated.
Studies have also shown, that a group of experimental primates that had
learned to discriminate between two lights, and had their attention aroused by
the electrical stimulation of the reticular formation, prior to the training,
performed better than a similar controlled group.
attention had improved the learning.

Hence, the increased

The nature of actual mechanisms
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involved in attention is not clear yet, but it is thought that the sensory input
fibers to the cortex branch off at the brain-stem, and send their information

to the reticular formation within which the level of alertness is evaluated and
relayed to the cortex.
The

reticular

formation

sleep/wakefulness cycle.
received by the brain.

also

plays

a

significant

part

in

the

During sleep, only the important signals will be

In the awake mode, the reticular formation is thought

to exert some measure of control and modulation over the incoming sensory
inputs.

This modulation is usually inhibitory, attenuating a certain input

while attending to some other stimulus.
In 'habituation' phenomenon, the sensory inputs are blocked or attenuated,
so that the stimulus is no longer considered novel or significant.
concept of attention

is

of

prime

importance

to learning,

The

specially,

in

attaching 'meaning' to stimuli, and determining which inputs should

be

registered and which discarded.
Chemicals such as anesthetic drugs that produce unconsciousness, appear Lo
act by depressing the reticular formation.
alertness

(e.g.,

amphetamines)

and

Other drugs which increase

probably

improve

learning

ability

temporarily, also seem to exert their effect in this region of the brain.
(ii) - MOTIVATION, DRIVE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

Learning and motivation are highly dependant phenomena, as pointed out
in the behavioural discussions of the subject. The role of drive in acquiring
learning and performance is conclusively demonstrated.
The physiological investigations of the concept of drive and motivation,
have revolved round the common biological needs, such as, food, water, etc.
The mechanism of these drives have been rigorously examined. Various inputs
of the sense organs, levels of certain chemical or hormonal secretions in the
animal's body, collectively, determine the specific drive level of the animal
and are also instrumental in regulating the appetitive actions.
The neuronal centre for the motivational aspects of the behaviour, has
been found to be the 'hypothalamus' of the brain.

Different areas of which

are observed to be responsible for each type of drive or reward. The regions
for

the stop/start commands of an appetitive activity, are seen to be

allocated for the reward/punishment of the same activity.

E.pirie8

aDd Theorie8

of

79

LearDillr;

The ablation or lesion experiments have demonstrated that the removal or
destruction of certain parts of the hypothalamus could make an animal
overeat by large amounts (by interfering with the 'slop' mechanism), at the
same time the drive of the animal seem to have been diminished.

Similarly,

lesions to other regions inhibits the 'start' mechanism, and if not force fed,
the animal will die of starvation.

The lesions if not extensive, will allow the

animal to recover normal eating habits, after a period of time.

This also, is

in view of the plasticity of the brain cells involved.
The

significance

of

the

hypothalamus

as

a

centre

for

a

range

of

psychological variables, has been further emphasized by a line of research
started in the past twenty years, initially by Olds and Milner, this work
involved the mapping of reward and punishment centres in the brain.

By

using electrical stimulations of the hypothalamus, the 'pain' and 'pleasure'
centres of the brain have been localized.

An experimental animal would

self-stimulate a pleasure-centre, to the point of exhaustion.

Although, this

type of self-stimulation at some brain sites, seem to depend on the animal's
drive state.

Some controversial experiments have reported similar studies on

human subjects.

The chemical investigations of drive mechanisms, has shown

that, there are certain chemicals involved in facilitating or blocking of
synaptic connections in drive areas of the hypothalamus. The evidence of the
effect of many drugs commonly known as 'mood-altering', and also the
discovery of endorphines (the internally made morphine), show a conclusive
underlying chemical substrate to the machinery of reward and punishment.
2.8.8 THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF MEMORY
In earlier sections of this chapter, the notion of memory, its different
categorizations and various other relevant issues were discussed in detail.
Here, we will only briefly elaborate the neurological correlates of. memory.
The contemporary theories and speculations of brain mechanisms for
memory-storage systems are somewhat confusing, and do not provide an
adequate basis for solid explanations of this phenomena.
Memories are the stored records of an individual's experiences.

In the

physiological investigations of memory, it was established quite early that the
mechanisms involved are not as originally thought a collection of neurons
oscillating in a dynamic 'reverberating circuits'.

Baving rejected the purely

functional

'consolidation'

neura-physiological explanation,

the

theories of
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memory-trace, based on some enduring physical, structural or biochemical
changes in neurons, were introduced.
The experimental work on 'amnesia', induced in patients after accidents or
brought about on animals by 'electroconvulsive-shock' (ECS), has demonstrated
that, there appears to be two different memory modes of long-terru-mcmory
(LTM) and short-term-memory (STM).

2.9

nm

EVOUIDOOARY AND DEVElDRiENTAL ASP.ICl'S OF BRAIN AND LEARNING

In this section we will review the issues raised by the phylogenetic (the
evolutionary relationships in species) and the ontogenetic (the developmental
stages of individual's growth) Rtudies of nervous-systems and learning.
These two outlooks are intricately dependant on each other, and, as is
often said,

the various stages of animal evolutionary developments are

analogous to the developmental stages of an embryo into an adult mammal,
which involves the transformation of a single-cell into a fish like organism
then into an amphibian form and ending with a fury mammal.
The

fact

that

animals

and

plants

adapt

to

recognized long before the theories of evolution.

their

environment

was

The 'natural' classification

scheme and the similarities of different species were the main supporting
criteria.

However, ever since the introduction of the systematic explanations

of the process of evolution by Darwin, Lamarck and others, the scientific
search of the mechanisms of this complex process has been the objective of
researchers

from

many

disciplines.

A constant stream

of evolutionary

hypothesis, corroborated by empirical results or fossil records, have been
contributing to the true understanding of the origins of life and species.

A

prime example was the finding of the mechanisms of heredity, and variations
in animals, in the science of Genetics.
The first issue to be emphasized is that the biological evolution should be
only

looked

at

in

the

context

of

a

general

cosmic

evolution,

which

encompasses: nuclear, geological, chemical, organic, behavioural, social and
cultural evolutions, with a hierarchy of ordering.

Life has evolved filling a

particular 'niche' in the composite picture of cosmic evolution.
Biological evolution is defined as the process of adaptations seen within
the living organisms.

It has been the force which bas helped to enhance the

complexity of biological life.

The process of 'natural selection', as introduced
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by Darwin, is generally thought to be the primary law of evolution. However,
looking from alternate view points, the propagation/reproduction/nourishment
of the genes have all been considered as the governing agents of the process
of evolution.
The origin of life dates back perhaps 3.5 billion years, some 1.2 billion
years after

the

solidification of earth.

The

simplest forms of 'living'

organism, created by physio-chemical processes, were the organic molecular
structures capable of simple chemical

reactions.

The feasibility of the

synthesis of inorganic chemicals into complex organic molecules, such as that
found in the living cells, has been experimentally demonstrated by numerous
workers.
The earliest living organisms are envisaged to have been energy-producing
rather than energy-utilizing entities, possible conceptual models for such
mechanisms have also been put forward.

The forces of natural selection

acting on these simple life forms, which possessed the three vital properties
of 'multiplication', 'variation' and 'heredity', created the complex and varied
range of life seen today.
The process of biological evolution operating on all organisms, yet at
varying degrees and speeds, has produced, on the one hand, the plants which
are more or less homogeneous in their complexity; and, on the olher hand,
the animal species from simple bacteria to man.

Although, il must be noled

that the forces of evolution are active on all levels of life, and today's
single-cell organisms are of much greater complexity than that of say two
billion years ago.
2.9.1 THE EVOLUTION OF REACTION MECHANISMS (NERVOUS-SYSTEMS)

The 'nervous-system' is one of the most complex and intriguing products
of the process of biological evolution.

Life has evolved from the simple

living molecules into the thinking and symbolizing animals, that are capable of
questioning, observing and explaining in scientific terms lheir own nature and
origins.

In the science of biology, it is unanimously accepted that animals

share a common ancestry, this is not only in view of their unique genetic
coding mechanisms,

but also because of the similarities in their neural

transmission methods and other biophysical resemblances.
One of the most essential and fundamental properties of living matter is
'irritability', which is the capacity to respond to stimuli.

The most primitive
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organisms are thought to have exhibited this irritability by performing simple
chemical reactions, such as the process of photosynthesis.
organisms 'alive' or not is a matter of definition.

To call these

Viruses which in size and

complexity of activity approach the very largest of non Jiving molecules
(proteins), are normally considered an intermediary between living and non
living matter.
(i) - UNICELLULAR SYSTEMS
Evolutionary adaptations transformed some of the primitive simple living
entities into

more

complex

single

celled

organisms.

The present day

unicellular animals exhibit a variety of 'behavioural properties' which could
give an indication of the kind of forces active in the primitive life.

Initially

isolated masses of living material probably showed a general irritability,
through the course of evolution gradually the property of irritability came to
be localized and refined to special pathways, both in su b-cellular and acellular
levels.
There are three rudimentary properties which are seen even in the
simplest of the single cell organisms of today: Sensitivity, Reaction and
Conductivity.

In simple unicellular animals such as 'amoeba' and 'protozoa'

(e.g., Paramecium), simple stimuli (e.g., food, heat, cold, touch, chemicals or
light intensity) are sensed by specialized parts of the animals' body (e.g.,
photo-chemically sensitive molecules or sensory bristles).

Reactions of these

organisms consists of feeding or movements, which takes place by the
reshaping

of the

body

(amoeba)

or

the

movements of whip-like

'cilia'

(paramecium).
Even with the limited scope of these sense and reaction mechanisms these
simple animals show a wide variety of behavioural patterns, mainly based on
the attraction to or the aversion from different stimuli.

The amoeba's entire

behavioural repertoire seems to revolve on searching for food, capture and
ingestion of food depends on the specific type of the food and the satiety
levels of the amoeba, it invariably withdraws from all non-food stimuli.

The

'conductivity' is also present in amoeba in the biochemical channels of
communication within its cell body, stimulation at one point is followed by
the appearance of finger-like projections at another point.
The paramecium also is in a spontaneous state of activity, characterized by
the rhythmic and coordinated movements of its cilia, however, it switches to
specialized patterns of behaviour (e.g., feeding, object-avoiding, etc.) when
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The conducting system in these protozoa

being the forerunner to the early nervous-systems, is made up of a network
of thread like fine fibers connecting all the cilia together.

In the absence of

a neural mechanism for behaviour control, it is assumed that the genetic and
other information processing is carried out biochemically within the animal's
cell body.

The primitive life, on the one hand, evolved into more complex unicellular
organisms; and on the other hand, evolved into associatively joined cells, then
into tissues, tissues into organs, and finally organs into organisms, where lhe
adaptations of each unit is not solely in terms of the individual unil's
requirements, but in terms of the survival of the whole.

(ii) - MULTICELLULAR SYSTEMS

The

next

evolutionary

step

in

the

development

of

CNS

was

the

transformation of the single cell organisms into the multi-cell animals.
This process first involved the change into colonies of single cell units and
later into true multicellular entities.

The multicellular animals with their

infinite possibility of combinations of cell units, attained complexities much
higher than the unicellular organisms.

The resulting much larger animals

were made up of self contained cells, each with their individual metabolic and
dynamic attributes, yet affecting each other in varying degrees.
multicellular

animals

came

the

need

communication between individual cells.

for

greater

With the

coordination

and

The cells in the body were grouped

into specialized units and there was a division of labour in dealing with
different changes (both inside and outside the body).

Specific sense organs,

muscle

systems,

digestive

systems, etc.,

were

developed, which further enhanced the irritability of the animal.

The unicellular means of signaling, namely, chemical messenger systems
(hormones), were too slow and inaccurate (were diffused randomly throughout
the

body),

conduction

hence,
system.

were

gradually

This

environmental information

system
much

replaced
could

more

by a

sense,

efficiently.

more

rapid electrical

integrate and

react

to

The arrangements of

irritability and conduction cells, that control the functions of the whole
organism are called the 'nervous system'.
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(iii) - SIMPLE NERVOUS SYSTEMS

Whether the nervous systems were developed after the

emer~ence

of its

basic element the 'neuron', or were developed from equivalent biochemical
systems is not clearly known.

However, it is commonly accepted that, the

first neural structures were direct connections between the 'receptors' und
'effectors', and that the evolution of the nervous systems has resulted in the
development of less direct and more complicated linkages between the senso
and response mechanisms.
A large group of animals whose ancestors possessed the primitive nervous
systems are hydras, jelly fish, corals and the sea anemones.

In these

organisms, neurons and synapses are already fully developed.

Although, the physiology of the neuron is almost the same within all
species, there is a large variation of the type of synapses both within the
nerve-cells of a particular animal and between different species.

In the

simplest of the above group of animals, the hydra, reflexive behaviours, such
as feeding or movements away from dangerous stimuli have been developed.
To achieve

the

relatively high level of coordination required for

these

reflexive behaviours, basically three types of neural cells have been evolved:
'receptors', 'effectors' and 'conductors'.

These cells are organized mainly

near the surface of the animal's body close to the external stimuli.

Three

types of reaction mechanisms can be seen: (1) - effectors that can be directly
and independently stimulated by environmental inputs; (2) - effectors that are
stimulated directly by receptor cells; and

(3) -

receptor cells that are

connected to the effector cells via the conducting cells, hence facilitating a
more varied and complex range of reflexive behaviours.

In the colonial species of these groups of animals, a colonial nervous
system as well as the individual unit's nervous system can be seen.
More advanced sense organs (e.g., light sensitive) were also developed in
some species similar to jelly fish.

The 'nerve net' conduction system of these

simple animals, although appear to be a synaptic system, has two distinctive
features,

firstly,

unlike

synaptic

systems

they allow for

bi-directional

transmissions, secondly, the whole nerve net system is interconnected, and
every activity seems to involve all of the nerve cells.

The centralization of

these nervous systems were severely restricted by the radial asymmetry of the
animals'

body.

The ultimate in radial nervous systems is achieved in
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'Echinoderms' (e.g., starfish), with their much higher versatility of movements
and centra] structuring (though fairly superficially) of their nerve nets.
Almost from the beginning of the evolution of the nervous systems, two
major trends have been evident, one towards the specialization of units, the
other towards the integration of similar units.

The overall effect has been

towards centralization.
As the nerve nets condensed into nerve tracts and moved away from their
location near the surface of the body of animals, the distances between
receptors and effectors became greater, and the direct synapses between input
and output mechanisms all but disappeared.

The number of intervening

neurons between effectors and receptors increased, and were progressed
deeper into the animal's body. These developments and specializations allowed
animals to make more refined and coordinated responses that could be utilised
more or less independently (e.g., swimming, feeding).

(iv) - COMPLEX NERVOUS SYSTEMS (Invertebrates)

The next major evolutionary step was the formation of 'ganglionic system'.
Worms and mollusks are examples of the types of organisms which developed
the 'ganglia'.

These species have a greater repertoire of behaviour, have

more complex movements and unlike the simpler animals have a specific set of
neuro-muscular

connections.

Another

important characteristic

of

their

nervous system is that, while in the nerve net cells were dispersed evenly
throughout the organism's body, in worms and mollusks the int.er-neurons are
clustered together and cell bodies are formed into localized masses called
'ganglia'.

Nerves arrive at the ganglion from sense organs or other ganglia

and leave it for muscles or other ganglia.

Ganglia possess three different

types of nerve cells: receptor-neurons, motor-neurons and inter-neurons.
Thus the ganglia having all the essential features of the central nervous
systems, is the evolutionary link between nerves and brains.
The transmission of neural impulses in ganglionic systems are unidirectional
and a much more precise and rapid control of muscular activity is possible.
The

ultimate in neural conduction speeds

have

development of giant nerve fibers in mollusks.

been achieved

by

the

These neural developments

together with the bilateral configuration of the animals' bodies, evolved
organisms, that had their centre of neural activity (the ganglia), located in
their heads.

Unlike more primitive animals, worm like creatures had a

distinct 'head' and

'tail',

and their movements were biased in the forward
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direction. The evolutionary selection forces developed sense organs of higher
complexity, situated mainly in the anterior areas of the animal body.
Originally, the 'head ganglia' was a kind of relay centre for the sensory
and motor neurons that stretched their axons into it.

Later the messages

arriving from the senses were modified before being passed on to the motor
systems. Many inter-neurons were evolved, possibly independently, within the
confines of the ganglion itself.

The complexity and variety in structure was

reflected in the functional richness; many areas in the ganglion were localized
and specialized for specific tasks, and an hierarchical mechanism for the
control of the activities of animal evolved.
The ultimate evolutionary products of ganglionic systems can be seen in
today's arthropods, insects and mollusks.

The nervous systems of such

animals although controlled centrally, to some extent have a
autonomy within each individual functional group.

degree of

A severed tentacle of an

octopus will still function normally for a period of time.

This diffused nature

of ganglionic activity, together with the design and structural limitations
imposed on the growth of the brains of such animals, has resulted in the
development of highly successful and varied yet stimulus-bound species.
Insects

and

ganglionic

animals

with

their

complex

vision,

olfactory,

orientation and chemical sensory capabilities, exhibit an intriguing array of
instinctive behaviours and mimic many aspects of vertebrate life. An octopus
on the other hand, with the largest invertebrate brain, if allowances are made
for the peripheral ganglia, has only a rat size brain.

Ganglionic brains

seemingly do not have the adequate features which enable the evolution of
powerful learning mechanisms.
(v) - CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEMS (Vertebrates)
A separate

evolutionary

development

has

led

to the appearance of

vertebrate nervous systems and brains. For this to have happened two major
elaborations of the invertebrate nervous system was necessary, first the
separation

of

the

radial

neural

tract

from

the

gut,

and

second

the

centralization of the nervous system in the brain.
The development of bony skeletons in fish-like primitive animals was the
first ascending stage; the spinal cords developed within the solid tubular
bones of these animals, but relatively speaking spinal cords have not evolved

to a great extent during the course of time, however, they have lost their
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The development of these three regions of the brains and the relative
dominance of different regions and hence their relative sizes in different
species, is the prominent feature of the brain's evolutionary history.

The

primitive marine animals had the midbrain as the most utilized section of the
brain.

The 'cerebellum' started to feature as an important area in the

amphibians, needing a greater degree of coordination of movement and body
equilibrium.

With land based animals the forebrain started to develope into

'cerebrum', which was used for the processing of the more complex olfactory
environmental inputs.

The 'thalamus' developed in the amphibians to deal

with the coordination of different senses lost its dominance of this function
in the land based animals, to a more advanced cerebrum.

In birds, cerebellum

is well developed, perhaps to deal with the coordination problems encountered
in flight.

A variety of cortical developments can be seen in mammals.

The smooth

cortical surfaces are the feature of the cortex of the lower vertebrates and
the folding twisted cortical surfaces are seen in the higher mammals, this
presumably is to accommodate more volume of nerve cells within the brain.
The latest addition to the mammalian brain is the 'neocortex', which is the
only area in the mammalian brain that does not have a primitive equivalent in
the reptile brain.

Neocortex of the primitive mammal was used for motor

functions, but in the higher animals this region of the brain is used as the
'association area', which is an essential region of the brain in learning
animals.

Attempts to equate the intellectUal powers of animals and the size of their
association areas have failed, since the development of the brains depends
both on the quantity and the complexity of the sensory inputs.

Different

areas in the brains of various species are dominant, and the same areas of
the brain are sometimes used for different functions in two groups of animals.
In evolutionary terms there seems to be a steady increase in the size and
complexity

of

cerebral

cortex,

humans

are

amongst

the

highest

(cortical-neuron-number)/(body-weight) ratio animals (refer to Fig.2.3).

A

striking feature of human brain is that it has biologically evolved very little
from the brains of Bomo-Sapiens.

Also, despite the similarity to the brains

of BOme primates in shape and anatomy, human brain is of far greater volume
- an indication of the much greater reasoning and language capabilities of
humans.
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2.9.2 THE EVOLUTION OF ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR

Parallel to the evolution of reaction mechanisms and the emergence of
nervous-systems in animals, their behaviour has also been evolving and
modifying into activities of much greater complexity, hence prolonging and
increasing their chances of survival.

The adaptations of behaviour started

from the 'irritability' of crystal like living molecules and culminated into the
diverse and intricate patterns of individual and collective behaviours of
mammals.

to

According

the

hypothesis

of

natural

selection and

the empirical

observations concerning the inheritance of behavioural traits in successive
generations, it is assumed that as well as purely physical variations between
members of a species, behavioural traits and mutations also exist.
variations

are

passed

on

to

the

off-springs

in

the

form

of

These
neural

organizational patterns, and the preservation of such patterns governed by the
laws of natural-selection, controls the development of behavioural evolution.
In the case of man, the language capability has initiated the cultural
evolution which has accelerated the natural course of behavioural evolution by
many times, the information and knowledge is not only passed on to the next
generation in the genetic form but also by other symbolic and semantic
means.
An alternate explanation of the evolutionary mechanism, is the intuitive

notion that, animals pass on to their offsprings not only their genetically
coded information which is present at birth, but also part of their acquired
knowledge

during

modification).

their

lifetime

(possibly

by

some

sort

of

genetic

This hypothesis commonly known as 'Lamarckian' explanation

of the evolutionary process, has occupied the minds of many researchers since
the 19th century.
Yet, in spite of numerous experiments all attempts to substantiate such a
theory has been futile.

Specially, since the rise of Darwinian evolutionary

ideas there has not been a sympathetic scientific environment to promote
Lamarckian ideas much further.
The interesting point is that the mechanisms for

inheriting learned

behavioural traits (hence accelerating the evolution of behaviour) evidently
exists in the form of genetic-coding-machinerYJ which can accommodate very
large amounts of coded information within each cell body of the organism.
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Recent developments have shown some possible ways that the RNA and DNA
synthesis could modify the genes and transform the acquired information of
an animal to its next generation.
However, presently in the absence of any plausible solid explanalion, the
statistical effectiveness of large numbers of individuals and generations as
promoted by 'natural selection' is the commonly accepted hypothesis, but it
must be remembered that Darwinian explanation is not the only or the
complete explanation for the process of evolution.
In modern psychology, the evolutionary aspects are seldom looked at in the
topic of 'learning'.

In general, the main emphasis in learning research (in

geographical sense), have been the American Behaviourism, the Western
Cognitivism and the Eastern-Block Pavlovianism.
The evolution of learning behaviour, from
complex

conceptual

accompanying

the

problem-solving,
development

of

has

the simple habituation

been

nervous-system

a

slow

from

to

progression

the

single-cell

organism to man.
The process of evolution itself can be thought of as an elementary kind of
slow learning process.

A population of birds, under the influence of the

forces of natural selection, genetically adapt to certain new environmental
conditions (e.g., change in dietary supply), after a few generations of
encounter

with

such

conditions;

while the individual birds

show

some

adaptations (learn) to the same environmental conditions during the span of
their lifetime.
A principal question is: when exactly in the course of evolution did
associative

memory

and

learning

enter

life

and

behaviour.

Various

evolutionary developments indicate that in the same way that the birds
acquired wings before learning to fly, the mechanisms for learning must have
been available before any specific type of learning was exhibited. The extent
of learning ability has therefore been governed by the elaboration of the
sense organs, the development and the concentration of the nervous-systems.
The process of mental evolution and the evolution of learning behaviour is
characterised by many continuities and discontinuities.

As species evolved

into many diverse groups and phyla, variations in the rates of development of
different branches of evolution started to appear.

In some cases, an optimal

plateau seems to have been reached, and with the type of nervous-system
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incorporated within such species, the optimal potentiality of a specific level
of learning is also seemingly attained, such as the intricate innate behaviours
of insects with relatively poor degree of adaptability.

The view that the evolution of learning encompasses definite leaps is not a
universally accepted one, and although some novel types of learning such as
linguistic-learning in man is acknowledged, a continuous transformation from
instinctive reaction to conceptual thought is also generally envisaged.

Every

organism that is not solely dominated by innate modes of behaviour, is
capable of learning; and according to Pavlov and his followers organisms with
synaptic neural systems have the conditioning of reflexes as the basis for all
adaptation and learning they exhibit.

This argument has since been partially

justified for the lower animals up to mammals, though again different learning
processes seem to be involved in fish and birds.

In a comparative study of learning within species variations between
individuals or other environmental factors are ignored, and

simply the

existence or the lack of a particular type of learning in a group of animals is
considered under optimal conditions.

It must also be noted that certain physical commonalities superpose and

encompass all types of behaviour in species, also indicating a continuity in
the formation of various adaptive mechanisms and processes.

The causality

and the uniformity of physical events; the concept of time; spatial, visual,
auditory,

and

other

physio-chemical

properties

imbedded

in

perceptual

information; are examples of factors which seem to have identical intrinsic
values for all animals.

Such issues although trivial in a sense, and normally

taken for granted, should be considered and incorporated in any true model of
the learning process.

The speculative method which was used to trace the development of
nervous-systems throughout the evolution is even more apparent in the
investigations of behavioural evolution, and in particular the evolution of
learning.

No direct fossil records of primitive animals' nerve-systems exist,

hence predictions of their form and mechanisms are made using the present
day animals of identical physiology.

Similarly, in tracking the evolution of

learning behaviour the same criterion is used.

However, it must be said that

this hypothesis is even more speculative in the case of behavioural evolution
and can never be fully verified.
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2.9.3 EVOLUTIONARY STAGES OF ADAPTIVE AND LEARNING BEHAVIOURS

The most trivial types of adaptive behaviour in evolutionary tcrms arc the
'taxes'

(orientation responses to stimuli), 'reflexes' and 'instincts' which

govern the majority of the actions of lower animals.

Yet, the most primitive

true "learning" is probably in 'habituation', which manifests itsclf in the
protozoa, man, and even in the single neuron; the mechanism of habituation
has remained virtually unchanged throughout the evolution.
Habituation occurs when an organism no longer attends to repeated
arousable stimuli.

This action of nervous system (apparently based on the

actions of neuro-transmitter chemicals in the active neurons) ensures that
only the relevant information reaches the animal's brain.

Habituation also

implies

the

that a

sort

of

record

should

be

produced in

form of a

memory-image, since the habituated organism partially retains such response
in future occurrences of the stimulus.

The investigations of habituation in

lower animals gives a clue as to where and how this memory-image is formed.
Evolutionary kinship of habituation and associative learning is apparent from
the many similarities of their properties.
Sensitization is the next developmental step in evolutionary terms, it is
the opposite notion to habituation, where an animal is aroused or alarmed and
the probability of its response to a stimulus increases, whereby it reacts more
readily to the repeated stimuli.

Sensitization seemingly was not present at

the most primitive types of life and is only evident in the pre-vertebrates
such as worms and early vertebrates.
Learning of associations is the next major evolutionary category, an
association can be 'conditioned' in an animal based on the bounding of
various stimuli and responses, mediated by certain inhibitory or reinforcing
influences.

There are generally thought to be three types of conditioning,

which in their ascending evolutionary order are:(a) - Inhibitory (punishment) Conditioning
(b) - Classical (Pavlovian) Conditioning
(c) - Reinforcement (reward/operant) Conditioning.
Inhibitory conditioning or punishment learning can be observed throughout
the primitive metazoic animals.
replacement for habituation.

This process has evolved as a more efficient
In evolutionary terms punishment mechanisms

were evolved prior to reinforcement (reward) mechanisms; hence, these two
notions are not symmetrically opposite in the developmental sense.
The classical conditioning or simple associative learning is the core of
conditioning and the most typical manifestation of simple learning behaviour.
This type of conditioning can be readily seen in simple animals such as worms
and mollusks, and at the highest level can be observed in the conditioning of
the reflexive responses of man.

Classical conditioning has two basic varieties

of 'aversive' and 'appetitive', having different retention durations for the
conditioned response.
The

reinforcement

(reward)

conditioning

evolutionary ladder of development.

is

the

next

stage

of

the

The presence of reward systems in

animals of more advanced nervous-systems is apparent from both physiological
and psychological observations.
reward

and

The simple mechanistic relationship between

stimulus-response learning is the basis for

governing the

behaviour of simpler animals. The emergence of reinforcement conditioning in
animals can be correlated to the appearance of spinal cords, brain stems, and
hippocampal reward centres
Some higher forms of conditioning govern the more complex learning
behaviours of higher (perhaps more intelligent) animals.

Unlike the lower

animal forms, conditioning in the more complex animals is not so much
stimulus-bound and mainly originates from within the organism itself. Guided
by the hypothesis derived from experience, the animal attempts to reproduce
the

rewarding

and

pleasant

experiences

by

acting

on

the

basis

of

'expectations' rather than inputs, and in the process may use complex
symbolic

means

such

as the use of language in

man.

These

higher

conditioning forms have three basic evolutionary types:-

(i)

Sensory Preconditioning - (e.g., learning of associations between
sensory data).

(ti)

Integrative Conditioning - (e.g., latent learning).

(iii) -

Predictive Conditioning - (e.g., insight learning).

Even higher types of linguistic learning is prevalent in man, in the
form of symbolic learning which can also be categorised into following:(a) - learning of simple words;
(b) - learning of simple predications;
(c) - learning of 'propositional connections.
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development of learning is largely speculative and is based on tentative
criteria. However, several important principles have been postulated using the
evidence accumulated in this field Razran (1971):(1) - Higher levels of learning arise from the lower levels, and bring new
laws of learning manifestation.
(2) - Complex modes of behaviour are added to simpler ones and finally
repI8ce them.
(3) - Lower levels of learning continue as subsystems within the higher
systems, contributing to their processes.
(4) - At each level of learning new behavioural patterns emerge.
(5) - Higher levels of learning are more efficient but the lower levels are
more universal and less aisreputable.
(6) - Normally hi!{her levels of learning have control over lower levels, but
under certain conditions the lower levels are predominant.
(7) - The behaviour of simp-ler animals can not be accounted for in terms of
higher levels of learning.
(8) - Similarly, the behaviour of more complex animals can not be accounted
for by reducing it to simpler components of lower level learning such
as reflexes.
Some empirical observations justifying the hierarchy of the evolutionary
levels of learning are: Coelenterates (hydra, sea-anemone) can be habituated
but not conditioned; some spinal mammals habituate, become sensitized but are
not conditionable; gill extension in some fish can be modified by punishment
and classical conditioning, but not by reward conditioning; other fish and
lower vertebrates can be fully conditioned in all three types; the classical
conditioning is prominent in most invertebrates, but higher invertebrates can
also master reward conditioning; the sensory pre-conditioning and integrative
conditioning is possible in birds and mammals; predictive conditioning can be
seen in some birds (crows) and higher mammals (dogs, cats); higher forms of
learning are in general attributed to primates and the symbolic learning is an
exclusive achievement of man.

2.9.4 LEARNING ABILITIES IN DIFFERENT SPECIES
The relative dominance of various types of adaptive behaviours within
major species groups is outlined in FIG.2.5.
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FIGURE 2.4. An illustration of relative contributions of various tytles of
adaptive behaviours in the major groups of animal speCies, in
the ascending order of their evolutionary development (from
Dethier and stellar, 1970).
In the following each major animal phyla will be briefly examined for their
adaptive and learning potentialities.
(a) - LEARNING IN PROTOZOA: Protozoa of today represent animals of much
greater complexity than the primitive single-celled organisms, they
range from simple 'amoeba' to the organisms such as 'parameciums' with
their elaborate moving cilia.

Protozoa are observed to have innate

patterns of behaviour (mainly taxes), such as the 'avoiding reaction' of
a paramecium when it collides with an obstacle.

Habituation has also

been demonstrated, but less conclusively I since the habituated response
diminishes very quickly; hence, the temporary sensory change, damage
or sensitization cannot be completely ruled out.

Associative learning

has also been reported in these animals, but again the evidence has not
been universally accepted or substantiated, basically on the same
grounds as habituation.
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'hydra',

'sea-anemone', and 'star-fish' have a range of simple to complex modes
of stereotyped behaviours (e.g., feeding, locomotion, protection from
noxious stimuli, etc.).

Higher metazoa such as star-fish, characterised

by more freedom and dexterity of movement, have developed relatively
more complex range of behaviours, with faster and more coordinated
actions. Efforts to establish habituation and associative learning in this
group of animals have also met with many controversies, based on the
same critical argument as in the case of protozoa.

However, there is

enough experimental evidence to suggest that habituation and simple
associative learning can be displayed according to certain criteria,
which have to be chosen carefully in view of the limited perceptual and
sensory domain of such animals.
(c) - LEARNING IN WORMS AND MOLLUSKS: These animals are still very
much

stimulus-response

systems.

However,

here

habituation and

associative learning can be clearly demonstrated, even in the simple
examples of this group (e.g., flatworm).

The increased variety of

activity, allows experiments such as the learning of tT' mazes to be
conducted on these

~rganisms.

The development of 'ganglia' within this

phyla, is the major factor which has enabled the more advanced
mollusks such as octopuses to perform relatively complex learning and
discrimination tasks, and solve 'detour' problems.
ganglionic

cells

have also

been investigated

The dynamics of

in isolation for

the

presence of any adaptive characteristics, and properties analogous to
habituation, classical and operant conditioning have been demonstrated
within a single cell.
(d) - LEARNING IN ARTHROPODS AND INSECTS: This phyla includes more
species

than

all other

species

combined,

and

elaboration of form and behaviour is immense.

the

diversity and

The development of

acute sense organs, enabled the insects to perform highly specialised
individual and social patterns of innate behaviour.
plays a

Although, learning

small role in the life of arthropods which are basically

stimulus-bound organisms, a variety of different types of associative
learning have been observed amongst specific groups of arthropods;
examples are: habituation, classical and operant conditioning, trial and
error learning, maze learning, latent learning, imprinting, and even
some primitive forms of tool using.
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LEARNING IN FISH, REPTILES AND AMPIDBIA: These animals generally
possess all adaptive capabilities of the previous groups, fish have been
trained for various detour, maze solving, discrimination, and other
problem solving tasks.

The maze solving abilities of these early

vertebrates are found to be more rapid and consistent than the
invertebrates (with the possible exception of ants).
(d) - LEARNING IN BIRDS: Birds show yet more facility in learning of more
complex problems, and as well as other types of lower learning, there
are instances where the insightful behaviour has been demonstrated,
concept of numbers, territorial learning, complex imprinting, tool usage,
and other interesting facilities have been empirically observed.
(e) - LEARNING

IN

MAMMALS,

PRIMATES

AND

MAN:

Learning ability is

enhanced to its optimal limit in this phyla of animals.

The innate

behaviours of mammals are not as elaborated as other species, because
the process of evolution facilitated higher forms of learning, and freed
these animals from the dominance of simple stimulus-response and trial
and error type learning.

Mammals are able to use their experiences

more and more in the modifications of their behaviour; in higher
mammals and primates the conceptual learning aids the solving of
complex problems; and in man, the ultimate in learning, the symbolic
type learning is utilised for the rapid and extensive analysis and
processing of a diverse range of problems.
2.10 GIUmI AND DBVKLDfMENTAL PBRSPRCl'IVB OF '11m BRAIN AND LEARNING

Finally, in this chapter we look at the ontological aspects involved in the
formation of adaptive behaviours. The various stages of the development of a
complete adult animals' nervous system are normally initiated from a single
egg-cell. Through an accurate process of duplication and division, and using
the internal genetic instructions, the cell transforms into a complete animal.
The blueprint available to the developing foetus, designates the spatial
organization of various organs. The brain starts to develop by the formation
of a 'neural-tube' that is capable of producing large amounts of simple nerve
cells; these cells in tern, by using the chemical tags attached to them, travel

to their allocated region or make the appropriate connections; hence,
developing the wiring diagram of the brain. Extending axons search for their
destined targets, and after they are found the secondary dendrites are formed
in a similar manner.
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The degree of the brain development at birth (both physiologically and
biochemically), varies amongst different species.

In humans, the actual

production of neurons all but ceases at birth; the subsequent increase in size
of the brain and the developments which occur in the nervous system only
involve the restructuring and the growth of further neuronal connections.
Throughout

the

animal's

life,

its

neurons

become

less

modifiable

functionally, and a small percentage of them are destroyed, but unlike other
cells in their body are not replaced.

The variations of the modifiability of

neurons can be observed in the apparent ease with which children learn
languages.
Many sociological and psychological evidence have pointed out the factors
which can affect the development of the nervous systems; examples are:
nutrition, experiences, and environmental parameters that can enhance or
disrupt the quality of neural functioning.

The behaviour of an animal or

certain biochemical/physiological aspects of the brain may be modified during
a critical time of its life, referred to as the 'sensitive period'.
Using the criterion that performance and learning arc supported

by

appropriate neural mechanisms, then the behaviour of an animal should
develop from the very simple reflexive and automatic functions.

This type of

behaviour in fact can be evoked prenatally, and has been observed in human
foetus which display a reflexive avoidance mechanism.
At birth most of the activities present are non-cortex dependant, and are
normally controlled by the spinal cord or the lower brain regions.

Later

motor capabilities are developed followed by sensory processing capabilities.
Increasing interactions of the animal with its environment, causes the brain,
the perception, and the behaviour to develop in parallel; this is seen by the
increase in the brain mass and connectivity, and also by the modifications of
behaviour into the more complex adaptive forms.
In the case of humans, there have been many scientific investigations into
the changes which the learning, intellectual and perceptual capabilities go
through, during the early years of their life; most prominent in this area
being Piaget's (1977) extensive research into the origins of intelligence.
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During the span of behavioural and neural development, two criteria urc
prevalent, tspecifity' and tplasticity'.
(1) - SPECIFITY: This property can be observed in the way which certain
neural mechanisms have their implicit coding instructions dedicated to specific
tasks, and these mechanisms can not be modified to do a different function
(e.g., severed or damaged nerve tracts that regenerate in a specific manner).
Similarly, the specifity of behaviour can be seen in the fixed patterns of
reflexive or instinctive behaviours.
(2) - PLASTICITY: This property has been experimentally demonstrated by the
formation of certain neural connections in the brain which only become
functional as the system matures; it is shown that during the sensitive period
of animal's life, the development of these connections can be influenced by
experiences (e.g., in the formation of visual cortex of cats).

Behavioural

plasticity can be seen in all animals which display adaptive activities (i.e., by
using feedback from environmental sensory inputs, they can modify their
perceptual abilities).

The highest manifestation of the plasticity of the

nervous systems is the learning behaviour; in the most primitive form, such as
imprinting or the formation of parental attachments, a sensitive period during
the early life is crucial; but for other types of learning, the capability
persists throughout the life, with varying degrees.
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In the previous chapter we covered the broad spectrum of theories,
concepts, and mechanisms of learning from various scientific outlooks.

Such

observations had emerged as the result of extensive and diverse research on
animal and
explaining

human learning.
the

learning

The emphasis was on understanding and

phenomenon

by

use

of

empirical

methods

of

investigation. Formalization and theoretical analysis of such observations was
not dealt with to a great extent.
In understanding the nature of learning, the immense volume of data
available will not be of any use unless supported by appropriate theoretical
hypothesis.

Similarly, to verify a theoretical model we need the empirical

data and proofs - the best models are always those based on experimental
results.
Many psychologists or

brain scientists are also

model-builders, and

construct analytical representations of their subjects of interest.

Various

examples can be cited from diverse areas of research on learning behaviours
or

learning

mechanisms of

the

brain.

Similarly,

workers

from

other

disciplines have attempted to model the process of learning, in terms of
vaguer non-empirica1 notions of their own paradigms. These analytical models
of cyberneticians, A.I. scientists and brain-theorists should all, in a sense, be
regarded as an attempt to close the gap between the behaviourist's and the
neuro-physiologist's models.
A model in psychology or brain-sciences is, normally, based on a specific
criterion observed in animals.

It often has rigid boundaries for descriptions

of a natural phenomena, in the form of a range for variables or sets of
possible elements.

No great attempt is made to associate the concepts under

scrutiny with other notions outside the requirements of experimental situation.
The problems are looked at in isolation and the holistic view is not generally
favoured.
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In the modelling of a phenomenon as complex as learning, with many
intrinsic problems (as outlined in the previous chapter regarding the variety
and the hierarchy of levels of explanations and investigations), an assortment
of diverse

approaches

have

been

utilised.

At the cellubr

level,

the

brain-theorists concerned with the mechanisms of learning in nature, have
devised models based on the primary units or elements (i.e., nerve cells) of
the brain.
At the

higher functional and

behavioural levels,

some

psychologists

(cognitive and behavioural) and workers in the information-processing sciences
have concentrated on the organizational and executive aspects involved in
learning, the models designed by such theorists do not generally stress the
details of their internal physical construction, in other words, a 'learning'
system is not believed to be the product of 'unique' internal interconnections.
Also, in the view of some cognitive or information-processing workers the
brain should be studied holistically, since they believe that the summation of
the isolated explanations of parts will not yield a true explanation of the
whole.
'Modelling' and 'simulation', are different from simple replication, are
normally used as tools for: better understanding; condensing of results in
coherent forms; and communicating ideas to others.

In the modelling of a

psycho-physiological notion such as learning an initial description of the
system is necessary, the essential features involved should be identified and
understood as much as possible.

A learning animal itself can be thought of

as a complex model-builder; in a constant process of creating models of its
percepts, testing various hypothesis about such models, and modifying the
models into more efficient ones.
be analogi sed to a

The brain of a newly born animal can, also,

system of genetically primed units of model-making

elements.
A model is the simplified representation of a physical reality, which can be
used to draw conclusions about that reality without direct reference to it.
The model retains the essential features of the original, and together with
the embedded inferential structure of rules can be used for comprehension,
explanation or experimentation.

It can be one of the three types: 'visual',

'symbolic', or 'physical'.

The nervous system is an example of how the real world can be modelled
using neural networks and connections, problems can be solved using a
combined physical and symbolic neuronal domain rather than manipulating the
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However, it must be remembered that irrespective of the

complexity or the accuracy of a model it is not the reality but only a
representation of it.
The type and the complexity of a model or simulation is stipUlated by the
particular usage requirements.
manipUlation of a

model,

Simulation is the dynamic execution or

in simulation predictive methods are used

constantly validate a model against its reality.

to

Three major factors have to

be decided in simulation:(a) - the 'usage' level,

(b)- - the 'domain',

and (c) - the 'approach'.

In constructing the model of a natural learning process, the su bjectivity of
the perception and the limitations of the senses of an animal in representing
the reality are prime considerations.

The animal, using its past experiences,

constructs a predictive internal model and conceptualises the reality.
to design

an accurate

representation of such a

Hence,

process, the intrinsic

continuous (space and time) nature of the environment should be incorporated
in the model, and the ordering and the scale of various realities maintained.
Also, in trying to create an autonomous 'learning' system, the philosophical
objection of tinfinite regression' is raised regarding the true objective value
of descriptions.
The goal of model-builders in learning sciences is to construct models or
machines (physical models) that exhibit the properties of natural learning,
hence

enabling

the

discovery

of

new

facts

about

biological

learning.

However, to build true models of natural learning, much more should be
known about the workings of brain and the way knowledge is represented in
nervous systems.

The question exists, whether the physiological experiments

on animals or neuro-tissue cultures are the quickest and best methods for the
understanding of the learning phenomenon, or whether the study of the
external effects of learning processes is the more fruitful approach.
other hand,

On the

the objective of some workers in fields such as artificial

intelligence is to construct models and machines that outperform humans in
specific tasks.
3.2 MODELLING AND SIMULATION

In this section we will briefly discuss the issues involved in modelling and
simulation.

Also,

different

types

of

representation of models will be outlined.

models

and

tools

used

for

the
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As mentioned earlier a model is a simple representation of an original
entity;

it

can

understanding.

be

used

for

explanation.

experimentation

or

beller

We can only say a model is a 'good' or 'true' model of the

original. if its specific functional behaviour follows closely that of the
original within a particular contextual use.

The specific purpose of an

experiment determines the type and the choice of essential parameters and
variables to be included in the model.
The concept of 'system' is a useful notion in studying most scientific
objects which are distinguished from their 'environment' (though boundaries
are arbitrarily defined).

Examples of such systems can be found in: biology,

physics, mathematics, psychology, cybernetics, economics, etc.

Modelling can

be thought of as a definite kind of similarity between systems.

In general

this similarity can one be of two types:(1) - Models of behaviour: similarity between the behaviour of t.wo
syst.ems.
(2) - Models of mechanisms: similarity between the structure and
mechanisms of two system.
For animals, a model of mechanism could be one which displays the
essential features of the organization of nerve cells and networks, and a
behavioural model could be one that represents a specific behavioural pattern.
The

well

established

theories

of

systems

are

able

to

analyze

the

similarities of behaviour or structure between two formal systems, and based
on the isomorphic properties of systems, judge if one is a good model of the
other.

However. in the psychological and biological sciences major obstacles

are encountered in isolating and identifying the essential features relevant to
a system; whereby. detailed models can be devised which suffer from extreme
vagueness or imprecision.
In constructing a model, the objective is to represent the original in a
simple form; the initial model can either be a 'complex' type, where gradually
the non-essential features are excluded. or it could be a 'simple' type, having
the minimal properties of the original. where more features are supplemented.
Following

the

identification

of

the

essential

features,

the

task

of

a

model-builder is to discover the various relationships that might exist between
such features and devise an inferential structure of rules.
The choice of the medium used for modelling is determined
particular use it is intended for.

by the

A 'qualitative' view of the original can be

conveyed in graphical or descriptive models.

The 'quantitative' forms of
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representations involve mathematical, physical, electronic, and computer-based
(digital and analogue) models.

Also, an 'analogue' of a

system can be

constructed, which is essentially different from a model, it simply duplicates
the behaviour of the original using entirely dissimilar physical properties.
An important phase in model-building is the procedure of 'validation'. The
behaviour of the model is matched and tested against that of the original,
and various adjustments made for a better correlation.

A model can become a

substitute for the original for the purposes of experimentation or testing.
The exploration of a working model is known as 'simulation', which is used
for the testing of various hypothesis about the model.

In the course of

simulation additional properties might emerge about the nature of the original,
these properties can be consequently validated or rejected.

A' good' model

should be able to predict the original's behaviour for different variable values
in diverse experimental situations.
Finally, the results obtained from simulation and modelling should be
translated to the original domain, by making conclusions about the original's
behaviour.

Care should be taken in the generalization of observations or the

introduction of new properties, if

too much commitment is made to a

particular model many incorrect results can easily emerge.
3.3 MODELLING AND SIMULATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND LEARNING

The mind/brain dichotomy, a dominant feature of many scientific fields
until early this century, imposed the belief that even the most detailed
understanding of the workings of the brain would not give an insight into the
mental activities of animals.

The erosion of such views and the development

of more mechanistic concepts of mind and brain, has introduced the idea that
in principle models and machines that can perform mental processes are
conceivable.
The principal supporting evidence for the mechanization of thoughts has
been the discovery of various neura-physiological mechanisms and structures
of the brain.

These findings have shown that specific physiological units

could be correlated with certain mental concepts.

The mechanistic view

prevalent today is that if you can understand something, you can build a
model or a machine to imitate it.
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In the explanations of the nature of intelligence, and one of it.a most
fundamental attributes learning, various approaches have been undertaken:(a) - The non-biological approach: involves criteria outside the body and the
brain.
(b) - The cellular approach: involves the investigations of the properties of
nerve cells and their interconnections.
(c) - The structural approach: involves the organizational aspects, and the
total patterns of electrical activities of the brain.
(d) - The cognitive approach: sees the brain as a deterministic machine, and
analyses the functional aspects of parts of such machines.
3.3.1 MACHINES AND ROBOTS

Historically, the earliest types of modelling of intelligent behaviour can be
associated to what is known as 'robotology', or the mimicking of various
aspects of intelligent behaviour by constructing machines and models that
would appear to have some 'mental' faculty.

There is a long history of

automated machines made up of gears and pulleys, attempting to copy the
living organism in crude ways.
such

automata

were

Spec\llatrix (1953).

Examples of the more advanced generation of

Ashby's

Homeostat

(1952)

and

Walter's

Machina

These machines were able to show to some extent a

modifiability of response under different environmental conditions.
objective in building such physical models was to simulate a

The

behaviour

isomorphic with natural learning behaviour.
The technological advances and the techniques available for simulation and
modelling,

have

been

some

of

the

major

influencing

factl'"Jrs

in

the

development of 'learning' models; many of the theoretical mod.-:ls seem to
have evolved around the technology present at the time.
The abstract concepts used in the design of a 'learning' machine should in
principle be similar to those involved in the design and function of living
organism; robots or machines constructed with such concepts in mind, would
only be a physical embodiment of these theories, and the type of hardware
used should be an irrelevant issue.

However, in reality there is an intricate

relationship between hardware and theoretical development, and
seem

to

have

derived

from

hardware

considerations.

U011Y

theories

BenCA9, in some

instances, seemingly, the problem is approached from the wrong direction.
In spite of this

paradox, the machines and robots that

have been

constructed to demonstrate specific aspects of learning behaviour, such as the
early simple conditioned reflex machines or conditional probabilit7 computers
and the later more sophisticated electronically oriented machines, ;are not only
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interesting curiosities of the 'state of art' technology, but. are genuine
attempts to discover the nature of adaptive behaviour; each generation having
more and

more

functional components identical to the

nat.ural learning

process.

3.3.2 ANALYTICAL 'LEARNING' MODELS
The earliest types of quantitative models of learning, originating from the
science of behavioural psychology, involved the mathematical modelling of
various aspects of learning.

The most prominent researcher in this field was

Estes (1967) who introduced the probabilistic Stimulus-Sampling-Theory based
on experimental results on animals.

Other mathematical models of learning

and conditioning have, also, been developed in stimulus-response studies, and
Borne have been used in teaching and educational sciences.
Another early trend in the modelling of learning was the system and
automaton approach in conjunction with logical decision making t.echniques,
examples of which are the neural nets and the self-organising systems; the
development of these fields contributed to the introduction of disciplines such
as

'pattern-recognition'

and

'control

system

theory'.

The

analytical

researchers of the learning phenomenon, are eager to transfer the problems
encountered in learning sciences to a mathematical domain, where they seem
to be more skilled and confident in manipUlating the criteria and extracting
deductions.

3.3.3 COMPUTERS
The introduction of digital computers was a
development of modelling techniques.

The

major landmark in the

rapid progress of computer

technology, presently in its fifth generation, has given rise to countless
discussions and arguments regarding the relation of such potentially powerful
machines and the brain.

Questions such as: - can computers and brains be

equated in any functional or structural sense? similarities?

what are the relative

will one eventually exert a control over the other? -

can

intelligence be a property of a machine? are raised, and many philosophical
and scientific controversies have emerged.
In the early computer simulations of learning, such as Newell and Simon's
(1972) 'learning' models, computers were used as tools for making deductions.
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Basically, the task of computer simulation of learning in principle involves
two stages.

Firstly, the discovery of what is going on during the natural

learning process; and secondly, how to make computers go through the same
It is not surprising that in view of our fragmented and limited

process.

knowledge of the former

the progress in devising successful 'learning'

programs has been slow.
A secondary and more recent objective of computer modelers of learning
has been to discover methods and techniques which will enable a machine to
learn a specific task much faster than humans, yet the process need not have
any resemblance to natural learning.

3.3.4 BRAINS vs. 'INTELLIGENT' MACHINES
Brains resemble machines in numerous but generally primitive ways.

Yet,

many functions of the brain seem to be purposive and directive in nature,
with seemingly unique living qualities.

A concept such as 'intelligence' must

involve all aspects and activities of the brain as a whole.

Leaving aside

'animal qualities', to make computers which are functionally identical to the
brain, we must make machines with

the

same input/output

behavioural

characteristics and the same capability for adaptive modifications.
According to Arbib (1972): "To be intelligent is to perceive the elements of
a situation beyond raw sensations."

Hence, a complex machine that blindly

follows

rules,

a

deterministic

set

of

with

no

true

element

goal-directiveness, would not qualify for this definition of intelligence.

of
It is

generally accepted that the term 'intelligence' is a matter of definition, and
saying a machine is intelligent does not mean that it has to learn to be
intelligent.
Turing's (1950) test for 'intelligence', is a criterion which can be used to
establish whether an entity possesses such an attribute; the lest involves
interrogating the machine in question through a channel of communication,
hence, not noticing the obvious physical differences; and if at the end of
exhaustive examinations we still cannot establish whether there is a human or
machine

at

'intelligence'.

the other

end,

then,

we

can

attribute

the

machine

with

However, the subjective nature of this criterion must be

pointed out, whereby, we can never be sure if the machine or the person
under interrogation has any sense of 'understanding' or 'purposiveness'.
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3.3.5 CYBERNETICS AND SYSTEMS THEORY
Before advancing to the discussion of information processing and A.!.
models of learning, it is relevant here to mention the role and the influence
of the science of Cybernetics in the development of 'learning' models.
Cybernetics was defined as: "the science of control and communications in
man and machine," by its principal proponent Wiener (1948).

The basic

characteristic of a cybernetic model is its generality of use for various
systems of organization.

The concept of 'system' is a primary prerequisite of

any cybernetic model, various notions of general systems theory are used in
the cybernetic modelling and simulation, such as: input, output, variables,
states, operations, transitions, fields, etc.

Also, the idea of tfeed back' is a

dominant feature of most cybernetic models, especially

in designing of

automatic control systems.
In modelling a natural learning behaviour or mechanism, the relation of
parts are seen as the important factor rather than the analysis of each part
in isolation.

Furthermore, the animal is seen as a deterministic machine,

whose behaviour is the product of the totality of its parts, and with such
criteria the supposition is made that an artificial device or system can be
made, that like the brain will be able to develop adaptations in its behaviour.
Although, cybernetics has been suffering from diversity and generality of
its concepts it has been applied successfully to more specific problems in
engineering, social sciences and economics.

General system theories and

Automata theories are other fields which have benefited from the growth of
cybernetics.
3.3.6 INFORMATION PROCESSING
The merger of various notions from fields of cybernetics, system theory,
information theory, communication theory, and the methodology of computer
simulation has culminated in the introduction of the information processing
concepts and models of learning.

The computer is used as a machine for

expressing and developing different cognitive and behavioural theories.

In

simulation, the computer language is used to devise a sequential program for
actions; the hardware of the computer is of no interest.

In information

processing models, the transmission of information is viewed using various
engineering notions such as: coding, decoding, signal, noise, and channels of
communications.
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The earliest types of information processing 'learning' models, involved
symbolic concept oriented learning, and included many applied A.I. and
pattern-recognition models which solved conceptual problems by means of
creating goals and sub-goals for the task.
Cognitive

modelling

is

another

area

of

the

science

of

information

processing, models of various functional properties of the brain such as the
formation and search of memory are simulated on computers.

f-10delling of

skills, knowledge, goals, motivation are some other examples of the tasks
undertaken by cognitive scientists. Various 'production-rules', 'strategies' or
'propositional-beliefs' are used in the design of such models.
3.3.7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial intelligence (A.I.) is a specialised area of information processing
sciences, the principal difference of A.I. models from other general system
The goals of A.I. are to

models is the specificity of application in A.I.

design and build intelligent machines that perform tasks normally requiring
human intelligence, and to simulate and study the natural learning phenomena.
Learning in A.I. is defined as the adaptive changes in a system that enables
the

system

to perform a

task

or a

similar

task

more

efficiently

and

effectively next time.
The theoretical analysis of learning in A.I. provides a means of exploring
various possible methods of learning, since, although through the process of
evolution human learning is possibly close to optimally efficient, by no means
is the only form of learning.
In comparing natural learning with machine 'learning' we can see some
distinct differences: (a) - the natural learning can be a very slow process for
certain tasks, such as the acquisition of skills or knowledge, while, in

~.I.

once a 'learning' model is successful the performance will quickly improve and
'learning' can be easily duplicated; (b) - the perception of a machine is quite
poor compared to that of an animal; (c) - the two 'learning' systems may
accomplish the same results but in differing ways; (d) attributes

cannot

be

modelled

successfully

on

machines,

certain mental
examples

are

'consciousness', 'awareness' and 'insight', although attempts have been made

to define these notions in machine terms.
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A.I. can aid cognitive psychology by means of computer simulation and
investigation of certain aspects of natural learning such as: perception,
problem-solving,

verbal-learning,

concept-formation,

thinking,

memory,

meaning, knowledge-representation and understanding natural languages. Also
concepts in A.I. can be used to devise computer assisted teaching methods.
There are basically two main forms of tlearning' models in A.I.

Firstly,

the skill refinement 'learning' models which involve the devising of tlearning'
strategies for a

particular domain of application, the various tlearning'

strategies include: 'rote-learning', 'learning by instruction', 'learning by
analogy', tlearning by example', 'learning from observation' and 'learning from
discovery'; in these task oriented models, the performance of a functioning
system is improved in a more or less automatic manner, at a sub-conscious
level.
Secondly, the knowledge acquisition tlearning' models, again involving
various 'learning' strategies but in this case within specific domains of
knowledge; the main functions of these models are the obtaining of new
descriptive information, the perceiving of relationships, and the understanding
of the meaning and usage of input data.

Recently, the knowledge intensive

models involving specific expert-systems have been the dominant area of A.I.
research.
A different categorization of A.I. tlearning' models could be made as
follows:(a) - The models designed for specific task oriented analysis.
(b) - The models used for the simulation of natural cognitive processes.
(c) - The models devised for the general theoretical investigations of all
possible learning methods independent of their application.
3.4 PRINCIPAL CXHJIDERATIC»m AND ELBHENTS OF A GBNBRAL tLEARNING

K)J)E[,'

Taking the mechanistic view that certain aspects of mind and brain are
deterministic and in principle can be modeled, then, it is clear that the main
problem of the design of a 'learning' model is one of programming rather
than the hardware construction of equivalent elements.
In devising such models of learning, certain criteria and considerations
should be applied.

A choice can be made whether the model is to be

tinitiallised' with a preformed framework of knowledge about the learning
task, or more or less start the learning from zero like a child, the level and
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The domain of the

'learning' machine or model could be either a specific fixed domain or a more
general changing one, in which case the model should be designed to be more
critical in separating the significant experiences.
The relative contribution of 'instructed' or 'experienced' inputs to the
model should be assessed in the 'learning' strategies involved.

Unless the

'learning' model is based on purely abstract notions which do not directly
relate to any natural phenomena, then natural concepts such as punishment
and reward or other mental and
incorporated.

physiological parameters are normally

Also, a random element can be included in the model to enable

the discovery of novel situations.

Other important considerations could be:

the criterion for the self-realization of the model; and the ultimate goal of
the model, which could be based on notions of seeking novelty, change,
stability, etc. The basic elements of a general, simple 'learning' model can be
enumerated as follows:(1) - FilterinJ element: to limit or focus the relevant data from environment
for utilization, this element can be an instructor or a teacher.
(2) -

Memor¥ element: to store in dual form of short and long term the
essential features and information extracted from various experiences.

(3) -

Evaluation element: to compare with a standard, or ascertain the
achievement of goals, usually manifested by reward/punishment centers.

(4) -

Learning element: to modify and improve the response by translation of
the evaluation element's outputs.

(5) -

Executive element: to select the response for each stimuli.

(6)

Generalization element: to extract specific concepts from the mass of
stored experiences in memory.

(7)

Discovery element: to distinguish novel or significant experiences.

(8) -

Planning element: to devise strategies and theories for future actions.

3.5 "NATURAL" LEARNING MODELS
Historically, the first attempts at the modelling of aspects of learning
involved the 'natural' approach to the subject, these models exemplified
various qualities of natural learning using empirical observations.

The

'natural' model builders do not explore the possible alternate learning
processes or methods, but are mainly interested in the simple representation
of the psycho-physiological concepts in learning.
learning have two distinct types:

(a) -

The models of 'natural'

the models of natural learning

behaviours, and (b) - the models of natural learning mechanisms.
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3.5.1 MODELS OF NATURAL LEARNING BEHAVIOUR
The emergence of analytical models of learning behaviour can be traced to
the work of experimental psychologists who were involved in the empirical
studies of learning.

The earliest learning theories, proposed models which

were mainly based on a descriptive explanation of processes involved.

The

pioneering adherents of such theories namely Ebbinghaus, Thorndike, Pavlov,
Gutherie, and Skinner did not give particular quantified versions of their
criteria.
However, some quantitative methods were established for the recording or
describing of learning behaviour; the strength or latency of a stimulus or
response could be measured in terms of its amplitude or relative frequency,
attempts were also made to fit the results of the experimental work into
specific

mathematical

functions.

For

example,

mathematical

'learning

functions' such as hyperbola, exponential growth or other functions were
proposed which could depict certain aspects of learning experiments such as
forgetting or performance changes over successive experiments. Yet, none of
these learning functions involved any axiomatic considerations about learning.
Gradually, the trend inclined more towards the precise analytical models of
learning behaviour, in an attempt to explain and predict the exact details of
experimental results.
The early programmatic theories of conditioning and learning processes
were

supplemented

by

Hull's

(1943)

analytical

theories

which

strongly

emphasised the need for the development of quantitative learning theories.
He postulated sets of both descriptive criteria and quantitative mathematical
equations, mainly based on generalized empirical results; despite the rich
analytical flavour of Hull's writings, his most important contribution
learning

research

was

the

comprehensive

and

clarified

nature

of

to
his

'qualitative' work.

Hull's formal knowledge base for learning processes, also

the

other

influence

of

disciplines

such

as

'information

theory',

were

instrumental in the introduction of mathematical learning theories from the
late 1940's, these theories included the stochastic as well as the deterministic
views of behaviour, and generally involved the estimation of some parameters.
Mathematical learning theories and models have on the main concentrated
on the associationist approach and the experimental situations which were
exploited by Hull, Skinner and oiher S-R researchers, but generally for
simplification purposes do not incorporate the immense range of variables and
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parameters which influence animal learning, many factors such as the 'drive
level' or the 'stimulus intensity' are

taken to be fixed

throughout an

experiment.
The range of behavioural phenomena investigated by mathematical learning
theories

include:

'reinforcement',

'classical'

and

'extinction',

'operant'

conditioning.

'generalization'.

'discrimination-learning' ,

'serial-learning',

'paired-associate-learning', 'memory'. 'imitation-learning'. 'concept-formation "
and many other aspects of learning and conditioning.
Such theories and models have also been applied in the optimization of
educational teaching programs; for the optimal determination of methods of
presentation, amounts of teaching material. or various other features of
classroom organization.

The formulation of these theories if done correctly

can result in a very accurate model of the learning situation and a vast
amount of useful information can be gathered from the simulation and analysis
of results.
More recently some cognitive hypothesis have also been represented in
mathematical forms.

In the following we will briefly discuss Estes' (1967)

'Stimulus-Sampling-Theory'

(SST).

one of the

most

developed mathematical models of learning behaviour.

prominent and

best

Many of the ideas in

SST have also been translated into theoretical notions in other disciplines
such as cognitive-modelling or information-processing.
Stimulus-sampling-theory started as a formalization of S-R associationist
ideas.

The basic assumption is that an organism 'learns' by attaching new

adaptive behaviours to stimulus situations which formally did not have an
appropriate response.

The effectiveness of an adaptive response is evaluated

by the 'reinforcing' outcome.

This use of reinforcement as the essence of

the learning process, as referred to previously, is the basis for explanations
incorporating the empirical 'law of effect'.

According to SST a subject

experiencing a reinforcing outcome (0) as a consequence of response (R) to
stimulus (S) forms a S-R-O sequence in internal representations and learns
associations of all pairs of elements S-R, R-O, and S-O.
Stimulus-sampling-theory considers the behaviour to be a probabilistic or
stochastic process.

The choice that a learning animal makes in any situation

(e.g., learning a maze) is looked at in terms of the probabilities of responses,
according to criteria based on groups of animals or numbers of successive
trials.

The behaviour is thought to be causally determined, but in view of
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the large number of possible factors involved such as: genetic make up,
motivation levels,

sensory differences,

fluctuations

in

recalling

memory J

variety of environmental stimuli, and many other un-measurable factors, tho
best

prediction

of

behaviour is

considered

to

be a

probabilistic one.

Although, it is assumed that if all such causal factors were precisely known
then the behaviour could be completely deterministic.
The main variable of a statistical learning theory is the probability of
response of a subject at any point of time,the probability of a correct
response should approach 1.00 as learning progresses.

Many inferences and

predictions can be made from the simulations of statistical 'learning' models
such as those in SST, but care should be taken to avoid the pitfall of
fictitious deductions.

An SST model is normally based on a small sample of

individuals, from which conclusions are made about the populations of such
individuals. The performance variations between the members of a population,
such as differing response tendencies or learning rales can be incorporated
within the model by the inclusion of a 'variance' factor.
One of the basic assumptions of SST is that a learning organism that is
confronted by the environmental stimuli, only has a limited sample of N
elements (normally fixed) available for processing, the sample may vary due to
environmental or the subject's fluctuating circumstances. And it is postulated
that each element in the sample can be assigned a particular probability for
each trial.

Another assumption is made about the connection of responses

with the sampled stimuli, a deterministic criteria is used whereby a response
for a particular stimulus is fixed at any specific time and the 'state' of the
'learning'

model

is

the

listing of

such

stimulus-responsc

pairs,

thesc

connections and hence the state of the system changes from trial Lo trial.
Although, the probability of a response associated with a particular stimulus
is 1.00, at anyone time there is a probability attached to the occurrence of a
particular response within a sampled set of stimuli, this is due to the
probabilistic nature of the stimuli.
The 'performance' is judged and reinforced by evaluating the 'reinforcing
outcome' after a subject responds to a particular stimulus sample.

This

reinforcing outcome changes the conditional connections of the elements
sampled in the trial and updates the model.

By utilising this general

principle, successive trials results in the attachment of 'correct' or 'rewarded'
responses to increasingly more stimuli elements and the gradual detachment of
inappropriate responses.

The phenomenon of 'extinction' is also embodied
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within such process, whereby the stimulus-response connections which arc nol
rewarded frequently are slowly phased out.
Using such basic criteria on stimulus-samples, linear learning-equations are
formulated for various learning experiments or situations, and by following
the progress of different S-R connections global inferences or predictions are
made about many aspects of the populations of such samples.

Of special

interest are the small element samples, for which SST can be applied much
more consistently and precisely.

Hence the models which are based on simple

conditioning or learning situations can predict the behaviour much more
accurately.

One by-product of such investigations has been to propose

systems of basic building blocks of learning elements which could be used in
synthesising much more complex learning processes.

More recently, lhe

stimulus-sampling-theories have shifted from the purely response oriented
associative views to the more cognitive event and memory formation ideas.
As well as SST, other mathematical methods such as Bush and Mosteller's
(1955) have been developed to model specific aspects of natural learning
behaviour.

A different class of models of natural learning behaviour, those

that strongly emphasise or depend on hardware will be dealt with in later
sections - the distinguishing feature of the design of these models is the
particular attention which is given to the intricacies of their physical
construct.
Simulations and

models

of learning

behaviour

involving

the

use of

computing machinery as tools for the implementation of logical deductions will
be investigated later, these models mainly attempt to duplicate the human's
higher mental processes

such as thinking and

problem-solving.

Other

non-computer based models of various aspects of mental activity have been
devised by cognitive-modelers; generally, in the cognitive type models, lhe
inclination is away from the simpler aspects of learning and conditioning.
Simple natural learning situations such as conditioning or trial and error
learning can be easily simulated by a non-analytical programmatic computer
model, displaying the appropriate behaviour and characteristics of the process,
yet it should be recognised that to investigate any novel aspects of such
learning situation, it will be necessary to dispense with the model and create
a more complex and elaborate one.
for other crucial assumptions.

The new model could be further explored

The problem envisaged with such computer

simulations is that although a good fit to empirical results can be achieved
and

interesting

data obtained,

no important

theorems

in

the

accepted
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mathematical sense can be derived or proven, since the emphasis is heavily on
the simulation aspects of the learning process.
There is a gap between the computer simulations of learning behnviour,
such as the A.I. programs, and the simulations of learning in experimental
psychology, the principal reason being the difference in background nnd
approach.

In psychological simulation the model tries to mimic slep by Rlcp

the process which a learning organism goes through, while in A.I. the modeler
is interested in efficient programs that perform a task regardless of how a
living organism might achieve the same task.
3.5.2 MODELS OF NATURAL LEARNING MECHANISMS
The mechanism by which the learning process is manifested within an
organism's nervous system has been a prime subject for the model-builders of
many scientific fields, some of the diverse processes and devices that have
been employed in such models include: the flow of fluids in pipes, optical
vibrations,

electro-chemistry,

animal

electricity,

wires

and

conductors,

electrical and electronic circuits, and digital and analogue computers.
In this section we are basically interested in the models of learning
mechanisms more or less based on the structural features of the natural
processes of learning.

Hodels involving functional equivalences of natural

learning with no regard for the underlying biological mechanisms will be dealt
with

later,

processing

such

models

aspects

of

mainly
a

incorporate

learning

animal

the

information

rather

than

flow

the

and

specific

correspondence of elements in physiological learning systems.
The principle question in the modelling of natural learning mechanism is
the physiological basis of association.

Although, the physiology of learning

can be modelled in many different hierarchical levels (from biochemical to
total electrical activities

of brain

regions),

generally the most fruitful

investigations of the learning mechanisms have been carried out by the
modelling and simulation of nerve-cell action and nerve-network activities.
In

the

modelling

of

the

behaviour

of a

single

nerve-cell

various

characteristics and functional parameters of the nerve-cell activity are
duplicated in conceptual, mathematical or abstract forms.

The degree of

elaboration is determined by what parameters are incorporated, some examples
of such cell characteristics are: excitation and inhibition thresholds, synaptic
integration, coding and decoding of pulses, pulse generation, resting and
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active potentials, conduction; and many other features of nerve-cell uctivily.
Such individual nerve models have also been constructed in hardware using
physical or electrical components.

The objective of devising such models is

to develope networks made up of these elements, also to test and discover
specilic functional characteristics of individual elements and networks of
cell-models, hence predict and understand the behaviour of real neurons.
Simple idealized neuronal models were devised as a simplified tool for such
investigations.

The earliest and the most notable examples were the "forronl

neurons" introduced by McCulloch and Pitts (1943), initially these models were
abstract configurations with several inputs and one output, which could have
been excited or inhibited at particular threshold values, laler models were
developed to resemble the natural nerve-cell more closely.
The introduction of such abstract models of the neurons allowed lhe
simulation and manipulation of networks of such elements using formal logic
notions and mathematical operations.
'computing

element'

physiological

in

the

observations

The model could also be used as a

engineering

could

be

sense

simulated

and
on

many

experimental

computers,

any

new

properties discovered during such simulations could be further verilied or
refuted by experimentation, hence contributing to the better understanding
and explanation of neuronal activities. Even the simple abstract single neuron
model can be made to display a kind of simple learning.

By changing the

weighting or the threshold parameters of the model according to a specific
algorithm, the model can learn to distinguish between stimuli received more
frequently from the less frequent ones.
The

collective

modelled.

behaviour

of

nerve-cells

have

been

also

extensively

Firstly, by the modelling of biological nerve-networks; these types

of models have been mainly based on the peripheral sensory or motor
neurons, since these neurons are easier to isolate and observe as a system
(e.g., cat's visual system).

These models provide a theoretical framework for

the investigation of activities of groups of neurons, using which deductions or
inferences can be made about the natural nerve-networks.

Initially, the

models were represented in a simple conceptual or pictorial form but later
more abstract mathematical and computer-based models were developed which
contributed

to

the

establishment

of

new

disciplines

'pattern-recognition', 'robotics'. 'self-organising systems' etc.

such

as

An important

discovery which has emerged from these nerve-net models is the significant
role of the process of 'reciprocal inhibition' in nerve activity, whereby the
excitation of a cell is accompanied by the inhibition of other cells.
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Secondly, the modelling of the nerve networks is carried out using groups
of abstract single nerve-cell models developed previously.

The behaviour of

such networks being composed of more precise analytical units, can be defined
and analyzed much more readily.

The problems encountered are analogues to

many problems in logic nets and the mathematical notions and operations of
Boolean Algebra could be applied to such models.

In comparing this type of

models with the natural neural-networks, we can see that to have the same
degree of efficient and reliable operation we need to incorporate into the
model a high degree of redundancy which is prevalent in all natural systems,
hence duplicate and cross over networks and extensive inter-connectivity is
the feature of most networks of model neurons.
Various

reflex

conditioning

experiments

can

be

demonslraled

using

networks of abstract models of neurons, even more complex discrimination and
performance capabilities can be shown by the appropriate manifestation of
such networks. Using a criteria for 'success' or 'failure' (punishment/reward)
and devising feedback channels from the environment, autonomous
systems have been developed

'lenrnin~'

that are able to adaptively modify their

behaviour under various situations.

Rosenblatt (1958,1962) showed lhat in a

randomly interconnected network of model neurons an orderly discriminatative
performance can be produced, and more recently olher elaborate and complex
neural models have been developed that are able to simulate interesting
features of conditioning and learning.
Although, the workers in this field do not claim that such automata
created using abstract models of neurons have any direct similarity to the
natural processes involved, nevertheless they contend that by the use of a
simplified model of neuron they are able to show some of the capabilities of
a learning organism.
A criticism of the majority of the neural-models is that they favour
stimulus-substitution notion in the formation of associations, and the idea of
goal-directiveness is not generally featured, it is assumed lhat stimuli and
responses

have

corresponding

neural-pools

and

the

learning

of

stimulus-response patterns is accompanied by the formation of the neural
equivalent of such associations.
In the physiological sense we know that the temporary proximate activity
of two nerve-cells causes them to become associated in a primitive or basic
manner, so that one can now excite the other while previously was unable to.
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in the formation of

associations during learning was put forward by Hebb (1949), in his so called
"reverberating circuit" theories, he postulated that synapses modify or activate
during the formation of the associative memory which plays an important roJe
in the process of learning; according to Hebb the cell assemblies arc formed
as a result of increased efficiency of 'excitation' of one neuron by another
neuron.

Later, Milner (1957) postulated that in addition the increase in the

'inhibitory' synaptic efficiency is also an important factor.

The investigation

of these and other similar theories using the neural modelling techniques and
various computer-based simulations has shown that indeed cell assemblies can
be formed around each block of input cells, the excitatory synapses become
strong and the inhibitory synapses become weak, however the inhibitory
synapses are shown to be more dominant.

The neural activity can propugatc

in the form of oscillations, either in rhythmic unison or bursts of activity.
These observations loosely correspond to the characteristics of the EEG
recordings that are made from the brain activity of an animal engaged in the
learning of a task.
Although, no direct physiological proofs have been found

for

Hebb's

fundamental postUlates, and clearly memory and learning are much more
persistent than initially implied by the purely functional changes of Hebb's
theories, still many adaptive 'learning' and self-organising models have been
devised using such criteria.

A follow up to this line of ,",'ork has been a

considerable amount of research into the process of memory formation, and of
particular interest to learning sciences, the findings on the organizational and
functional aspects of the associative

memory formation

within the LTl\1

system.
3.6 "ARTIFICIAL" 'LEARNING' MODELS
The animal learning mechanisms and processes have been studied and
modelled
sciences.

intensively in

disciplines

rooted

in biological or

psychological

In spite of having the same final objectives as the 'natural'

modelers 'artificial' models of learning have, also, been developed by workers
from many diverse fields of science unrelated to biology or physiology.

In

such areas the problems are usually tackled by attempting to develop 'simple'
models of natural learning-processes which incorporate some abstract criteria
not readily seen in nature.
improved

in

an

learning-processes.

effort

Su bsequently, these models are analyzed and
to

approach

the

complexities

of

biological

The emphasis in most such 'artificial' models are on the

underlying techniques, theories, media or the physical hardware used in the
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model construction, and not on the empirical observations of natural learning
phenomena.
Scientists in the more theoretically inclined

sciences of Cybernetics,

System-Theory, Automata-Theory and other analytical subjects, have developed
models based on the notion that learning is in fact a universal phenomenon
applicable to all types of living and non-living systems capable of directive
behaviour, the animal learning being a special realization of this phenomenon
in nature.

Using various stochastic or deterministic metaphors, adaptive

'learning' systems are devised.

On the one hand, general and abstracl

cybernetic systems are developed encompassing all types of adaptive processes,
and on the other hand, specific and precise systems with well defined
boundaries are designed in fields such as adaptive-control-systems, dealing
with particular real-life problems.
A different approach in the development of artificial 'learning' models has
been to construct hardware realizations of different learning theories in the
form of physical models.

The technological advances and tools available to

such model-builders have been the major factors in determining the direction,
the complexity and the accuracy of these models.

The building of 'robots'

that can exhibit true learning has been the ultimate objective of researchers
in the science of Robotics; other workers have devised mechanical, electrical
or electronic models which demonstrate some features of conditioning or a
learning-process. Although, these hardware models have been mainly used to
simulate or test theories previously developed in the more abstract learning
sciences, in certain instances, the actual physical characteristics of a specific
hard"rare device is used as the fundamental criterion and the starting point
for su bsequent developments. The hardware oriented models will be discussed
later and their contribution to the learning science analyzed.
Finally, in the past 30 years with the advent of computers and the
explosive development of related sciences, 'learning' models based on the
information-processing notions have been devised, whereby, the flow of
information during the learning process is depicted on computers in the form
of

programs.

Workers

in

the

field

of

Artificial-Intelligence

(A.I.)

or

Cognitive-Psychology design 'learning' models which can be simulated on
computers,

displaying

various

behavioural

or

cognitive

aspects

learning-processes without necessarily following the 'natural' way.

of

Elaborate

systems have been constructed that can 'learnt specific tasks in particular
domains, but they are far from the definition of versatile animal or human
learning systems. The computer in such sciences is seen as simply a tool for
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the simulation of the model, but the implicit dominant role of computers in
the design and development of these artificial 'learning' models must be
emphasised.
3.6.1 'LEARNING' MODELS IN CYBERNETICS

In this section we will briefly sketch the historical background and the
development of the science of Cybernetics, and describe briefly some of the
underlying objectives of constructing cybernetic-models.
The origins of the name 'Cybernetics' can be traced to the ancient Greek
word of 'KYBERNETES', meaning the 'steersman' in the navigational sense.
However, philosophers like Plato used this term to denole "the arl of
steering" in the governing of various activities, the word 'KYBERNETIKOS'
hence implied a knowledge of a subject and the ability to remain in command
in order to reach a goal.

The next landmark in the use of word 'Cybernetics'

was the introduction of this term by the 19th century mathematician and
physicist Ampere, he used "CYBERNETIQUE" in the context of 'statesmanship'
with reference to politics.
The introduction of the modern terminology of 'cybernetics' is attributed
to Wiener (1948), generally considered to be the founder of this new branch
of science.

In an attempt to unify subjects from a variety of fields such

HS

biology, mathematics, physiology, psychology, electrical engineering, control
and communication engineering, Wiener defined the distinctly new discipline of
'Cybernetics' as:"The science of control and communication in the animal and the machine."
The

of

development

cybernetics· has

different

disciplines

been
of

highlighted

science,

followed

by

many

by

the

specializations in the form of newly created independent field of study.

The

collaborations

with

main reason for divergence of such specialized subjects away from the
mainstream cybernetic research, has been the lack of a formal 'cybernetic'
structure for unifying various concepts.
During the late 1940's with the appearance of digital computers, devices
that were capable of fast and complex symbolic-manipulations, cybernetic
ideas were tied with many mathematical notions in formal-logic, the whole
area of computational

machinery

became a

major

area

of interest for

cyberneticians but gradually the trend of such work drifted away from
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As well as

logic, other mathematical theories and concepts have had brief or more
permanent and deep coalitions with cybernetics.
Cybernetics can be seen as a science which cuts across many other
established sciences, it is primarily interested in the interactions and the
functional aspects of an entity, the energy and physical aspects arc of only
secondary importance.

Although, the machines and mathematical worlds, were

from the beginning the principal domains of enquiry for the researchers in
cybernetics, the biological and physiological mechanisms that could be modeled
or scrutinized analytically were of strong concern too.

For some workers

(specially in the eastern-block countries) cybernetics is used even in a more
broad sense, encompassing many mathematical or statistical socio-economic
theories.
As evident from Wiener's definition of cybernetics, a principal metaphor in
cybernetics is that an 'animal' is considered to be a kind of 'machine', in
particular, the brains and the nervous-systems are equated with computer-like
processing machines.

The effort of some workers in cybernetics has been

directed towards the design of machines, that in principle can emulate some
intelligent behaviours or brain-functions.

The biological results are analyzed

and reconsidered in mathematical terms, these quantitative frameworks allow
much higher degrees of precisians and manipUlations of results than the
ordinary linguistic descriptive models.

Although, the gap between organism

and machine is immense, effective cybernetic theories and models have been
constructed

to

show

some

similarities with

living

phenomena,

but

the

resemblances have been primarily at performance level.
Wiener's formal definition of the science of Cybernetics does not expressly
state the topics and the range of criteria that can be investigated by this
discipline, it specifies: (a) - the types of objects for which the cyberneticians
could formulate their hypothesis about (man and machine); and (b) - the
points of view with which the problems are approached, defined and analyzed
(control and communication).
The evolution of cybernetics and

its applications

have

shown

that,

possibly, Wiener's definition is too general to account for the distinctive yet
diverse views that have been developed, and the type of the problems that
have been tackled in cybernetics; other definitions of cybernetics emphasising
the

'system',

the

'control',

the

'information'

'organizational' aspects have also been devised.

or

the

'structural'

and
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The principal aims of the science of Cybernetics according to George
(1973), who also considers "the pursuit of artificial intelligence" as the central
feature of cybernetics, are:(1) - To construct effective theories, with or without actual hardware, which
realize the principal functions of humans.
(2) - To simulate the functions of human behaviour by the same logical
means used in human beings.
(3) - To produce models which are constructed from the same colloidal
chemicals as are used in human beings.
The approaches to the above objectives have ranged from 'theoretical',
'experimental' to 'engineering'; many overlaps with other disciplines have
created

'applied-cybernetic'

subjects

in

areas

such

as

economics,

neuro-physiology, mathematics, etc.
3.6.2 ANALYI'ICAL ~ AND TJDJNI~
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In the following we will briefly look at some important methodologies,
concepts and analytical tools that have been incorporated in various 'learning'
and 'adaptive' models - in particular, many cybernetic models.
(i) - SYSTEMS AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

The concept of 'system' has been widely used for the description and
analysis of the learning process. The framework of terminologies and theories
developed in 'system-theory', have helped the formalization of many processes
in the living world as well as the inanimate.
principal elements of system-theory and

We will enumerate some of the
other

notions relevant to our

discussion of 'learning-models'.
A 'system' in general terms can be defined as: 'a set of interrelated
elements'; in the case of 'learning' systems, the concepts of tchange' and
'variety' are of special concern, hence for our purposes the system can be
considered as la set of variables' - a variable here is any measurable quantity.
In 'physical-systems' everything not included within the system can be
considered as the 'environment' of the system, but usually a more restricted
form of environment is chosen which only includes the elements of the
tuniverse' relevant to the design of the system.
The system and the environment must not be looked at in isolation,
whereby the environment is only seen as the
organism from the outside.

ex~ernal

forces which act on the

The environment and the system must be
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considered as mutually interactive, or in the case of the more nbstract
systems as mutually interrelated.
Every real physical organism can be attributed with an infinite nUJllber of
variables,

a

major

task

for

the

scientist

devising

a

system

is

the

'identification' of the appropriate selection of variables from the indefinite
list of possibilities.

A 'good' system representation is one that only includes

variables which have a bearing to the 'context' and the 'resolution-level' of
the problem.
The 'state' of a system is defined as the set of values which the variables
take at any instance of time, 'inputs' or 'stimuli' to the system denote all the
parameters of the environment that effect the system, similarly, 'outputs' or
'responses' of the system are all effects of the syslem on the environment.
A schematic diagram of the main system components are outlined in FIG.3.1.
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FIGURE 3.1.

A general system configuration with its main elements.

The properties of a system can be divided into two different basic groups
of:

(1) - behavioural,

and

(2) - structural.

The behaviour of any general system can be completely and uniquely
defined by: the 'state-transition-functions', which determine how the state
will change under the influence of various inputs; and the 'output-functions',
which determine what the system outputs will be for different inputs, given a
specified state.

The 'behaviour' of the system can be represented by a 'line

of

or

behaviour'

a

'phase-space',

whereby

the

transitions

from

an

'initial-state' are shown respectively as successive states drawn against time
intervals or as 'vector' representations, a 'field' is a phase-space containing
all the possible lines of behaviour.
The structure of a system describes, on the one hand, the organizational
aspects or the 'couplings' between the elements of the system, and on the
other hand, the interactions between these elements.

The coupling between
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the elements of a system can be achieved by 'series', 'parallel' and 'feedback'
methods, as shown in FIG.3.2.
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(b)

(a)

FIGURE 3.2.

(c)

The three types of coupling between the elements of a system:
(a)-series, (b)-parallel, (c)-feedback.

The notion of 'feedback' is an important feature of most systems, an
organism or a system is said to have 'feedback' if its outputs have some
bearing on its inputs.

A special class of systems the 'servomechanisms' or

'negative-feed back-systems' have a special significance for learning modelers.
These systems use the feed back loop to incorporate an error reducing element
which enables the system to achieve a 'desired' state or performance. It was
the analysis of this type of systems that influenced the thoughts of the
founders of modern cybernetic theory; for example, Wiener's work on the
aircraft tracking servo-systems.
Systems have also been classified into distinct types and groupings such
as: 'Physical' against 'Abstract'; 'Continuous' against 'Discrete'; 'Artificial'
against 'Natural'; 'Open' against'Closed', where in open systems all possible
interactions between an organism and environment are considered, while in
closed systems (or partially closed systems) no interaction (or limited paths of
interactions) are considered; 'Deterministic' against 'Stochastic', where the
response and the new state of a deterministic system can be uniquely
determined by its previous state and the present stimulus, while, the
behaviour of the stochastic-system for any given input-state pair is only
predicted in terms of the probabilities of outputs and new states.
As mentioned earlier the two major properties of a

system are its

'structure' and 'behaviour'. The types of problems that system-theory can be
applied to, invariably depend on the investigation or the discovery of one or
both of these fundamental properties.

A specified system behaviour can be

either the result of a unique system structure or a class of structures.
principle, the problems are classified as follows:-
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(a) - The 'synthesis' of a system: a specified behaviour is known .. a structure
is to be designed so that it can exhibit the prescribed behaviour.
(b) - The 'analysis' of a system: the structure of a system is known, the task
is to determine the behaviour of such a system.
(c) - The 'black-box' problem: a partial or no knowledge of the structure
exists, the problem consists of determinin,g the behaviour by empirical
experImentation and inferring a hypothesIs about its structure.
It must be noted that learning sciences utilise all three approaches (in

varying degrees) in the design of 'adaptive learning models'.
A special class of systems are those called the 'control-systems'; the word
'control' is normally understood to mean 'regulate', 'direct', or 'command.
The criterion of control in systems is applied to 'dependant' variables or
elements that interact and influence each other's behaviour.

Control, is a

subjective and relative notion, depending on various contextual limits imposed
on the performance of a system, the actual physical connections of variables
are of no great consequence in the definitions of this concept.
In the most general and abstract sense every physical or non-physical
object can be considered as a control system, and for every system an
arbitrary number of control elements defined.

However, in science, normally,

the notion of control system is defined on more objective basis as: systems
that

can

'actively'

regulate,

command,

thermodynamic-equilibrium-seeking

or

systems.

direct;
These

hence
control

excluding

the

systems

are

sometimes referred to as 'purposive' J 'teleological' or 'goal-directed' systems.
Control systems are normally classified into two categories: 'open-loop' and
'closed-loop' or 'feedback' control systems; in open-loop control systems, the
control-action is independent of the output; while, in closed-loop control
systems, the control-action is influenced by the output.

However, the

arbitrary and subjective nature of the definitions of control-action and other
elements of systems must be remembered.

The general scheme of a feedback

control system is outlined in FIG.3.3.

FIGURE 3.3. A feedback control system: control is established using the error
signal which is a summation or the difference between the
reference input and a factor of the actual output (the feedback
signal).
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The use of mathematical techniques in the modelling of learning has helped

to devise formal systems that by utilising accurate criteria are able to
describe,

ask

questions

and

provide

answers

about

specific

problems.

Mathematics is a precise language with a structured axiomatic framework
where 'consistency' and 'completeness' are prime concerns.
Of course, the researcher in learning is not interested only in 'pure'
abstractions in mathematical domains, but also is involved in the design of
some

'applied'

predominantly

mathematical
by a

techniques

digital computer.

for

realization

of

his

In the following a

models,

selection

of

mathematical topics of interest will be briefly discussed.

(a) - SET THEORY
A 'set' can be defined as simply a collection of elements, the set-theory
has a well formed axiomatic framework of representations and functions; these
notions have been employed in models where the representation of 'class' of
objects

or

elements

have

been

of

concern.

Ashby's

(1952)

formal

representation of the property of Homeostasis (regulation) in organisms, and
many other models of human thinking and memory, are examples where the
set-theory notions are utilised.
(b) - THEORY OF LOGIC
Logic is generally considered to be the foundation of mathematics, logic
has been called the 'grammar of reason' because of its intuitive similarity
with the process of mental reasoning and thinking.

But unlike the ordinary

language which has an implicit vagueness in its construct, logic has been
abstracted on orderly and objective criteria.

Logic has been extensively

applied in the understanding of cybernetic systems, it has been used to
perform 'deductions' (generalizations), 'inductions' (proving statements) and
finally 'abstractions' within such systems.
In logic variables stand for 'classes' of objects; an algebra for classes (the
'Boolean Algebra') has been devised, one interpretation of Boolean algebra is
when it is performed on classes of propositions or statements.

The Boolean

operations of 'and', 'or', 'negation', 'class-inclusion', 'class-exclusion' and
'equivalence' preserve their intuitive linguistic meanings when acting upon

,.
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theories

of

'propositional-calculus' have been developed, which by using simple arithmetics
of propositions allow the combinations or manipulations of statements.

Bence,

the validity of relationships between statements in a particular mathematical
system can be examined and various theorems proved.
An extension of propositional-calculus is the methodologies and theories of
'predicate-calculus',

predicate-calculus

is

utilised

in

the

majority

of

'theorem-proving' research of today. The predicate calculus is concerned with
a more detailed analysis of propositions, allowing for some inner structural
aspects of propositions as well.

A 'predicate' is a function that maps terms

onto truth values 'T' or 'F' (conventional notions of 'true' or 'false').
(c) - PROBABILITY THEORY

'Probability' is the single notion of mathematics most widely used in the
learning related sciences.

Probability theory is the formal foundation of

statistical inferences, sampling and survey of problems, and the design of
many experiments. The probability of an event occurring is calculated on the
basis of the three criteria:(1) - The logical and semantic analysis of possible outcomes.

(2) - The frequency of occurrence of events.
(3)

The speculative judgements of possible future outcomes of unique or
novel events.
Generally, a language or a sequence of symbols which characterises events

and

has

probabilities

'stochastic-process'.
mathematical

associated

with

each

symbol

is

called

a

The notion of stochastic process and the accompanying

techniques

have

been

applied

to

many

non-deterministic

'learning' systems, in particular, to natural systems where there are no
certainties

associated

with

outcomes

and

events.

A

special

class

of

stochastic-processes are the 'Markovian-Processes', they have the added
property that the probabilities of symbols in a so called 'Markov-Chain'
depend on a finite number of previous symbols, these ideas have also found
important applications in the theory of communication.
(d) - GAMES THEORY
The theory of games as founded by von-Neumann (1947) has been used as
a mathematical tool in BOme 'learning' models.

The game theory methods can

be applied to many 'goal-directed' systems where twining' optimal strategies
can be achieved by probability estimations.

The notions of game theory
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which involve chance situations between two or more opponents, can be
further extended to games where one opponent is the environment, hence
'games-against-nature'

could

be

devised.

Similarly,

the

subject

of

'dynamic-programming' of special interest to cybernetics and A.I., has been a
development arising from the field of game-theory.
(e) - STABILITY THEORY

The formal concepts of 'stability', 'steady-state' and 'equilibrium' have
been

incorporated

in

the

design

of

some

cybernetic

type

models

adaptive-processes, in particular, those based on biological systems.

of
An

organism or system is said to be seeking-stability, if its behaviour is seen to
be directed towards a state of equilibrium. Many artificial or natural systems
can be observed that have this 'regulating' property, they react to modest
disturbances from an equilibrium-state and normally by the use of feedback
loop try to regain the steady-state.

The process of 'homeostasis' is the

biological counterpart of the stability concept; some examples of this process
are: the physic-chemical cellular regulations, the automatic regulations of
individual

anatomical

organs,

or

the

central-nervous-system/hormonal

regulations of totality of animal.
(f) - INFORMATION THEORY, COMMUNICATION THEORY

The concept of 'information' may be considered as one of the central
issues in science, the implicit relation of information to learning is analogous

to the kind of kinship that the concept of numbers have to the subject of
mathematics. The word 'information' is used to signify a quantifiable variable
which can be conveyed by a variety of physical, symbolic or other means. In
the most general sense, information can be defined as 'the measure of the
amount of organization'.
Shannon and Weaver (1949) laid the foundation of what is now known as
'statistical-communication-theory' or
1940's.

'information-theory'

during

the

late

The theory of communication according to Weaver (1949) can be

regarded in the following three distinct levels:(1)

The 'technical' or •syntactical'
transmission of symbols.

level,

interested

in

the

accurate

(2) - The 'meaning' or 'semantic' level, concerned with the conveying of
precise inferences about the transmitted symbols.
(3) - The 'effectiveness' or 'pragmatic' level, concerned with the degree a
message is able to influence the receiver's behaviour.
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The classical theories of communication only deal at the technical level of
However, in learning

problems.
investigated.

related

sciences all

three levels are

The communication aspects of a system are looked at in a

broad sense, the total interactions of a system and its environment are taken
into account, and also attention is paid to the 'meaning' and 'effect' as well
as the quantitative measures of the message.
The fundamental components of a
shown in FIG.3.4.
and

the

general communicatio~s system are

The messages that originate from the 'source' are 'coded'

resulting

'signals'

are

'transmitted'

through

a

'channel'

of

communication which may be distorted by 'noise', at the other end of the
channel, the signals are 'received' and after being 'decoded' to their original
form reach the 'destination'.
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A schematic representation of a typical communication-system
and its principiil elements.

In the science of information-theory, a statistical view is favoured in
dealing

with

the

problem

of

message

or

symbol

transmission,

hence

communication is seen as a kind of 'stochastic process'.
Various quantitative measures and theories have been developed for
different aspects of communication, both in the engineering oriented discipline
of communications and

also independently in the mathematical field

of

probability theory. The amount of information ('bits') that could pass through
a channel can be measured; the 'capacity' of a channel of communication can
be determined; the 'uncertainty' or the 'redundancy' of a communication
system can be defined in terms of the 'entropy' of a message, the term
entropy is derived from a related measure used in thermodynamics, entropy is
a measure of disorganization, an increase of information corresponds to a
decrease of entropy J and vice versa; also efficient methods for 'coding' and
'error-correcting-codes' have been devised. The law of 'requisite variety' as
introduced by Ashby (1952), has pointed out the various limitations that exist
on the amount of control exerted by a system over a specific channel of
communication.
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Many technical findings in the science of communications have resulted in
the widespread use of information-theory concepts in
learning.

the modelling of

Although the engineering notions of 'communication' are used in a

much wider and

general sense.

Parallels of the engineering oriented

terminologies are drawn for the elements of natural information-processing
systems, and many questions regarding the influence and the extent of
interactive forces in such systems answered.
(g) - TURING MACHINES

The work of mathematician A.M. Turing during 1930's on the theories of
'computability' and 'computing-machines', gave rise to the notion of 'Turing
Machines' and laid the foundations of 'Automata Theory'.

Turing as a

mathematician was interested in finding out a formal basis to deal with the
solvability of problems; hence, the theory of computable functions were
applied to an abstract simple construct called the 'Turing Machine'.
machines,

in

spite

of

having

very

basic

components

are

Turing

capable

of

representing all computable functions.
The principal underlying concepts in Turing machines, are the ideas of
'effective procedures' or 'algorithms' for carrying out a
computations.

given class of

An algorithm is a purely mechanical procedure, which starting

from a particular initial data, will allow us to uniquely attain a defined goal
by a step-by-step following of fixed rules. An algorithm need not necessarily
be a terminating one, but it will in any case guarantee a result.
of algorithms'

has introduced

The 'theory

the concept of 'potential-realizability' or

'computability', which is not concerned with the 'limits' but only with the
'existence' of algorithms.

Turing machines are capable of realizing all

algorithms that can be completely specified by an ordered collection of logical
states or machine-tables.

An implication of Turing machine concept is that if

a theory can be translated into a blueprint for a particular Turing machine,
then such theory can also be realized in numerous hardware forms (e.g.,
physical, chemical, computer-simulation, etc.).
Although, Turing machines are very trivial in hardware sense and simple to
construct (with some limitations), they possess no practical value, since they

will be extremely slow and cumbersome in carrying out computations and
solving problems. The principal applications of Turing machines have been in
the theoretical domains of the 'theory of recursive functions' and the 'theory
of computability'.
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An important viewpoint that has emerged from the study of concepts of
computability and the theory of machine is that: human and animal behaviour
or mental activity can be achieved by machines, provided good enough
descriptions of internal processes are available.

The question of hardware ia

separated from the understanding of the behaviour of an entity; consequently,
any natural phenomenon such as the learning-process could be duplicated by a
variety of mechanisms and non-natural artifacts.

Arguments developed from

this standpoint, have generally involved two distinct approaches as far as the
interactions

of

mathematics

or

logic

and

physiological

processes

arc

concerned; firstly, it is proposed that artificial machines can be constructed
using natural observations; and secondly, it is contended that the analysis of
artificial abstract machines can be beneficial to our understanding of natural
organisms.
Turing (1950) in his analysis of the "fundamental problem of artificial
intelligence" suggests a procedure for testing an organism for intelligence.
Turing's test involves the interrogation, experimentation, and observation of
the entity under question, and the comparisons of its performance with that
of humans.

However, at the conclusion of such tests, the question still

remains whether the artifact only 'mimics' intelligence, or does actually
'possess' it.
In the most general and indirect sense an analogy exists between the
logical states of a Turing machine and the mental states of humans, also
between the structural states of a Turing machine and the physiological states
of the brain; yet, a great deal of 'analysis' of human and animal activity is
required before we can confidently embark on the 'synthesis' of such subjects
in machine terms.

Many unmistakably 'human' mental processes such as

self-awareness or consciousness, point to an intuitive gap that exists between
'physical' and 'mental', or between 'machine' and 'animal'.
Our observations of many higher mental faculties suggest that activities
such as problem-solving or thinking do not have a fixed algorithmic nature,
and in many instances a 'heuristic' metaphor is more suitable, whereby the
'strategy' or the 'rule of thumb' gives the appropriate explanation.

Whether

the heuristic approach only differs from the algorithmic approach in degree,
or if it truly represents the actual mental processes involved, is not clear
yet, but seemingly, the animal's behaviour is the result of both algorithmic
(deductive) and heuristic (inductive) type processes.
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machines and

the

Turing machine is

characterization

of

its

major

components as shown in FIG.3.5 is comprised of: a control unit device, u
read/write head, and an infinite length tape.
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The basic components of a Turing machine.

The control unit can assume one of a finite set of symbols, it can move
the tape a single discrete unit to left or right, it can 'halt' the machine, and
also has a 'blank' symbol as one of the elements of ils stale-space.

The

read/write head scans the tape and transmits the information to and from lhe
control unit to the tape.
The tape can be ideally infinite, but it is realistically lhought of as finile
but 'polentially infinite' or 'indefinitely extendable'; the tape itself is marked
out into distinct squares lengthwise, and contains a blank or symbols from a
finite set of symbols which can be read or written on one square at a time;
the tape can be thought of as an external storage medium for information.
The behaviour of a Turing machine during successive discrete time sleps
can be determined by: the change in the internal-slale of the control unit;
the change in the scanned symbols of the tape; and the motion of the tape to
left, right, or a stop.

A complete Turing machine can be described by lhe

three 'input', 'output' and 'internal-state' sets, together with the state and
output mapping functions.

Starting from an initial state, given the exact

description of a Turing machine, a unique sequence of operations will take
place.

A symbol will be read from the tape; the state of the machine

changed according to the state transition table; the output associated with
this transition decoded by the control unit; and finally, a symbol may be
written in the scanned square of lhe tape, or the tape moved along to lett,
right or stopped.
The 'algorithms' based on these simple operations can be represented by
tabulated sets of symbols; the 'programs' of a Turing machine will hence
define its actions for various state-symbol combinations; a 'computation' will
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denote a set of actions starting from a particular data point and ending with
a halt.

Turing was able to show that every algorithm could be represented

by such a machine, furthermore, he was able to demonstrate that a so called
tUniversal Turing Machine'

(UTM) was able to perform any computation

performed by any other machine, provided we had a description of its
operations.
The behaviour of a UTM is determined by the program it reads from the
tape rather than the specific computations prescribed by a fixed control unit.
The fundamentals of modern digital computers can be described by universal
Turing machines, and although the practical computers are not built as Turing
machines, they can be simulated by the much simpler mechanisms of Turing
machines, and many computational theories can be verified or discovered.
The original Turing machine has

been modified into many alternate

versions using different operating considerations, but in each case it has been
shown

that

equivalent

Turing

machines

could

be

devised

which

in

mathematical terms have identical operational capabilities; however, despite
the functional

equivalence, the distinctive features of different Turing

machines are of interest to cyberneticians.

Some examples of these modified

Turing machines are:(1) - One-Ended Tape Machines: the tape can only move in one direction.
(2) - Post-Davis Machines: cannot change both the symbol and move at the
same step.
(3) - Paper-Tape Machines: a blank square can written on but only once.
(4) - Multi-Head Machines: more than one head per tape.
(5) - Multi-Tape Machines: more than one tape, each with its own head.
(6) - Multi-Dimensional Machines: tapes with more than a single dimension.
(7) - Two-Symbol or Wang Machines: having only two symbols of 0 (blank)
and I, but a large number of states.
(8) -

Two-State Machines: having only two states (0 and I), but the number
of symbols may be large.

Shannon (1956) also made the important discovery that Turing machines
with just two state or symbols can be constructed which are equivalent to
any other Turing machine, these ideas being specially appealing to computer
scientists because of the binary connotations of digital computers.
(h) - AUTOMATA THEORY

Many natural or artificial tsystems' can be defined by imposing arbitrary
boundaries between a collection of entities and their environment.
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concepts of 'Automata Theory' could be applied to the dynamics of any such
system which has the three principal identifiable components of 'input',
'output' and 'internal-state'.

'Automata', generally refers to the abstract

devices of finite size at any particular time, their behaviour is completely
defined in terms of relations between their three basic elements (i.e., inputs,
outputs, internal-state); whereby, the internal-state and output at any specific
time is determined by the previous internal-state and input. Automata theory
has developed within the science of mathematics as an independent abstract
discipline; yet, many interpretations have been imposed on its concepts when
applied to other scientific fields such as computer science, nervous-system
networks, control-systems and biological or behavioural systems.
theory

is

used

as

a

formal

descriptive

language

to

Automata

characterize

the

information processing and the behaviour of many automata.
Established behavioural and cognitive theories have been expressed by the
conceptual framework of automata theory, these theories are seen to be
logically identical to their

automata theory representations.

Adequate

mathematical techniques such as 'logical nets' have evolved to represent the
features of the external real world into the internal states of an automaton;
many 'learning' neuron-like network models have been developed using the
automata theory notions, some incorporate neura-biological phenomena, others
have a more abstract formal nature.
The problems of 'synthesis' and 'analysis' of systems represented by
automata also arises.

The analysis problem is to determine models and

formulae that can efficiently represent the behaviour of a given automata,
this can be achieved by devising:(1) - Mathematical

descriptions:
eJg>ressed
by
'transition-functions',
'transition-tables'A and 'transition-diagrams; examples of each are
outlined in FIG.3.b.
(8)
G I So I
••

M

=<I,O,S,O,P>

(I)

I is the inpUt set.
o is the output set.
S is the internal-stat set.
G : SxI --> S
is the next state function.
F : SxI -> 0

81

1-;;-'-;;-

1.
_1 __ 1 _
il

I

I•

SI

I

II

So

is the next output ftmctian.

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

FIGURE 3.6. The representation of the behaviour of an automaton by three
common methods:i) State-Transition-Function,
h) State-Transition-Table,
ill) State-Transition-Diagram.
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(2) - Physical descriptions: such as circuit diagrams, indicating how the
automata could be built using basic constructable elements.
(3) -

Formal lan~age descriptions: such as 'regular events' and 'regular
expressions, which are notions devised primarily for the investigation
of the nature of classes of realizable events, or the limitations of an
automaton in recognizing classes of sequences.

The synthesis of an automaton is generally the more important problem;
given a specific formulation for the behaviour of an automaton, the task is to
design such an automaton if possible.

In some cases these problems are not

algorithmically solvable and 'heuristic' methods must be used to abstract the
desired automaton, and then 'decision-theory' methods employed to evaluate
how closely the end result satisfies our criteria.
An important question which has been tackled by automata theorists, such

as Kleene (1956), is to identify the simplest forms of any given automaton.
Kleene has shown that most natural or artificial events can be characterized
by an equivalent automaton using nets of simple logic elements of 'and',
'or', 'not', and 'delay' or 'memory'.
Automata have been categorized into many different classes.

'Growth'

automata as opposed to 'fixed' are those which can get arbitrarily large in
size, they can be considered to be potentially infinite; Turing machines are
interpreted as growth automata.

tpartial-growth-automata' or 'growing'

automata, can grow but have a limit to their growth, this type of automata
are effectively identical to the fixed ones in their computational capabilities.
'Discrete' automata are those acting over specified time intervals, their
inputs, outputs and

states are only considered at those instantaneous

descriptive moments; while, 'continuous' automata are considered during an
entire span of time interval; 'analogue-computers' represent a

kind of

continuous sutomata. However, it is established that most continuous systems
can be effectively approximated by an equivalent discrete systems.

Another

distinction is made between 'synchronous' and 'non-synchronous' automata, the
former having elements which act in unison.
A 'deterministic' automaton is one in which the present state and output
are the inevitable consequence of previous state-input pair, the behaviour of
this type of automata is precisely defined by its transition functions. A more
random device, where each state-input pair could lead to more than one
state-output pair, is called a 'non-deterministic' automaton.
non-deterministic

automata

which

has

been

studied

A class of

rigorously

is

the
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'probabilistic' automata, these automata have specific probabilities attached to
each alternate transition.
In principle, the probabilistic machines are capable of no more than the
deterministic

ones,

but

can

often

do

things

much

more

economically.

Probabilistic or stochastic automata, have been formulated as models for
systems that have unreliable components effected by various 'noise' factors,
they have been used for the modelling of adaptive 'learning' systems, and also
in aiding the simulation of a psychological phenomenon such as learning.
'Finite Automata', are a category of automata used widely in the modelling
of real objects, they are assumed to be fixed, synchronous, discrete,
deterministic,
universal

finite-input,

Turing

machine

finite-output,
embodies

a

and

finite-state

automata.

A

finite

automaton,

but

a

having

potentially infinite memory, is not a practical concept for the modelling of
physical entities such as digital computers or other artificial and natural
systems.
Finite automata can be considered to be Turing type tape machines, with
the following provisions: (a) - they have two separate input and output finite
tapes both moving one square in one direction at each interval of time; (b) only the symbols on the output tape may be changed.

Other intermediate

forms of tape machines have been designed, having applications in more
complex

computational

situations,

these

tape

machines

can

have

many

different tape or read/write-head specifications.
Although, finite automata are much simpler than Turing machines in
construct, computationally they are not as powerful, this is because they do
not possess the external memory storage facilities of Turing machines.

Many

systems with finite constitution of discrete elements, have been defined using
the notions of finite automata.

Of special interest to the modelers of

learning behaviour and mechanism, are the 'neural network' representations as
finite automata.

The theories of logical nets, based on the mathematical

treatments of systems composed of logic elements, have been applied widely
to the biologically oriented neural network models.
The most extensive use of logical nets in the modelling of nerve systems
can be seen in the 'modular' type networks introduced in 1943 by McCulloch
and Pitts (1947).

Their concepts involved the fusion of ideas from Boolean

algebra with networks of idealised neurons.

A feature of this type of neural

network was the ease of their construction in hardware using sequential
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electronic switching circuits, implicating the possibility of their use in digital
computers.
Neural network models were discussed earlier in this chapter, but their
significance to modelling of learning is in their use of mathematical concepts
and formulae in representing aspects of behaviour of a natural entity.
The original 'idealised' neuron models of McCulloch and Pitts, depicted the
actions of a nerve-cell at a very simple level.

A typical configuration for

such nerve model is shown in FIG.3.7; the neuro-physiologica1 notions of
'inhibitory' (I) and 'excitatory' (E) input, 'refractory-period', and 'threshold'
value, were incorporated in these models.

The idealised neuron is activated

(fired) according to various criteria based on: the summation of excitatory
and inhibitory inputs, the total number of excitatory inputs, or the majority
of excitatory and inhibitory inputs.

Also, in later developments the delay

element was embodied in neural models, hence giving a memory or storage
facility.
inputs
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FIGURE 3.7.

A representation of McCulloch and Pitts type neuron model L (Ei)
are the excitatory ll1Puts, (Ii) are the inhibitory inp'uts f"l") is
the threshold value fOr the fIring of the neuron, ana (oJ IS the
output.

The concepts of 'threshold-logic' and other mathematical theories were
used to devise more precise models of neurons and networks of such neurons,
both as ways of simulating physiological processes and also as tools for fresh
lines of research.

Effective procedures had been designed so that networks

similar to any given behavioural pattern could be described.
These ideas have found many domains of application in 'learning' systems,
in particular, in the field of pattern-recognition.

The adaptive modifications

of nerve-network automata have been investigated, both as the structural
changes of hardware and also as the programmatic changes of behaviour. The
hierarchical cognitive processes are also a convenient and widely used subject
for

modelling.

Many

aspects

of

perception,

memory,

motivation,

generalization, classification of inputs and outputs, and even emotion have
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Examples are the automata designed by

(1961), Stewart (1967), or Culbertson

(1963) which displny some

features of cognitive classification of input data.
A different branch of automata-theory is the study of 'cellular' type
automata, in finite or infinite form.

This is the relatively more recent urca

of automata-theory, which is concerned with the behaviour of EystemB made
up of regular arrays of identical interconnecting elements.

The theoretical

subjects covered in this field include the study of the computational powers
and the limitations of such automata; and the applications include the design
of computers and cellular type machines.
The behaviour of a simple cellular automaton can be investigated by the
examination of the activity of networks made up of small number of elements
that follow a set of specific transitional rules.

Different initial configurations

of states, normally, result in one of the following patterns of behaviour:(a) - the activity dies out after a while,
(b) - the activity reaches a stable state,
(c) - a repeating pattern of behaviour emerges (oscillations),
(d) - the behaviour seemingly changes indefinitely.
Von-Neumann (1956) was interested in the behaviour of cellular automata
that had eJements which did not perform ideally, and had a smaH probability
of malfunction; he was basically concerned with the role of error in
in

automaton.

The

main problem was

to find

the

lo~ic

probability of

and
the

malfunction of large networks which were composed of cells, euch ""ith a
small probability of breakdown.

Von Neumann showed that if the individual

probabilities of the cells were small, then the total probability for malfunction
need not be very large.

These considerations are part of the so called

'reliability' studies of the systems of inaccurate cells; an obvious choice for
this type of automaton was the first generation valve computer.

A basic

method for improving the reliability is to incorporate 'redundancy' in the
system; there are two distinct ways of doing this: (a) - having redundant
components that act continuously, and (b) - having redundant components that
are kept as spares.

Von Neumann used some of the parallel features of the

brain and nervous systems, which are able to function in a highly reliable
fashion, in the design of nerve-networks.

More reliable cellular automata

were devised using elements with multiple inputs; later other methods such as
'quad ed-logic' and various techniques for the testing of reliability of automata
were also introduced.
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The idea of a universal cellular type machine similar to the UTM was also
proposed by von Neumann, this automaton, as well as being computationally
and constructionally universal, was also able to 'self-reproduce'.

Other

complex cellular automata such as Arbib's machine (1969) have been devised.
3.6.3 SOME UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 'LEARNING' SYSTEMS

The study of adaptive 'learning' systems within analytical subjects, such as
cybernetics, has revealed or resulted in the redefinition of some basic
underlying principles of adaptive and learning processes.

In this section we

will discuss the nature of the criteria that are, normally, deemed to govern or
The main concern will be the

trigger the adaptive modifications of systems.
forces

which

seem

to

activate

interpretations that can
components

of

the

learning

be imposed on such

mechanisms

involved,

such

process,

or

processes.
as

the

the

holistic

The specific

memory

or

the

reward/punishment centres, will not be elaborated here.
Some of the attributes to be discussed in this section have equivalent
psycho-physiological counterparts, while others are only
non-biological abstract theories.

by-products of

Another point which should be emphasised,

is that there is no unanimity amongst various researchers regarding the
precise meaning of some terminologies, and many different interpretations of
the same phenomenon exists, depending on the approach and the background
of the individual worker.
(a) - GOAL-DIRECTEDNESS

Notions of 'goal', 'intention', 'purpose', 'drive', and 'motivation' have been
discussed earlier in their biological or psychological contexts.

Thorpe (1963)

described the two concepts of 'directiveness' and 'purposiveness' as the
central features

of all adaptive

behaviours.

Similarly,

Tolman's

(1959)

learning theories emphasised the importance of the ideas of 'purposiveness'
and 'goal-directedness' in learning.
Many animal activities are clearly goal-directed, hence it is a prerequisite
of any adaptive or 'learning' system that purports to be animal like, to also
be goal-directed dilemma

is

by displaying a selective or purposive behaviour.

anticipated

here,

since

the

intuitive

notion

purposiveness is extended to the domain of 'inanimate' objects.

of

A

'animal'

The absence

of intrinsic intentionality in a machine or abstract system means that when

-
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we sayan artifact is goal-seeking, we are speaking in purely subjective
terms, there is no comprehension of the notion of 'goal' - and in the cuse of
simple

goal-directed

automata, such as the

physical equilibrium-seeking

systems, not even a memory of the goal event.
Goals and sub-goals are defined for adaptive systems either by having
specifically defined target goals to be reached or maintained, or by a sel of
imprecise general improvement type goals; great difficulty is encountered in
conveying the meaning and the rationale of achievements (c.g., 'winning' in a
chess game) in objective terms.
Even the highly adaptive artificial 'learning' systems seem to only mimic
the

goal-directive

behaviour

by

following

a

predetermined

set

of

error-reducing actions stipulated by a hierarchy of goals - where the sense of
achievement is normally determined by 'hedonic' principles of reward and
punishment.

The problem is further complicated since we can also look at a

natural goal-seeking behaviour in 'drive-reduction' terms, where an animal
seeking food can be equally construed as trying to reduce its hunger.
duality

of

explanation

is

equivalent

to

the

dilemma

of

This

interpreting

goal-directed ness as error-reduction in artificial systems.
Despite

such

epistemological

and

other

philosophical

objections,

the

property of goal-directedness is seen by many workers as a universal
phenomenon,

applicable

to

all

types

of

adaptations.

The

structural

interconnections of a system is what determines the goal-directed behaviour;
hence,

goal-directed ness is seen as a

system phenomenon; a

temporary

swaying of behaviour from the obvious features of directive ness is allowed,
provided the total behaviour is pointed towards a goal.
'Teleological' systems are those that show a goal-directed behaviour, and
appear to have a purpose.

The problem has been to formalise in mathematical

terms the behaviour of such systems. The difficulties involved in the precise
definition of purposive type behaviour has also resulted in many controversies
in their analytical characterization.
Rosenblueth,

Wiener

and

Biggelow

(1943)

distinguished

clearly

the

structural studies and the behavioural studies of systems, they believed that
goal-directedness was a behavioural property of systems that dynamically
interacted

with

their

environment

to

maintain

certain

constancies,

the

behaviour was directed by the goals it was trying to seek or maintain; while
the simple goal events could easily be observed in both biological and
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inanimate systems, the more complex hierarchical goals were difficult to
manifest in artificial systems.
Ashby

(1952)

proposed an objective criterion for the explanation of

teleological behaviour; he defined goals in terms of the objectives of an
equilibrium-seeking system.

Some examples for such goal-directed behaviour

were described as: the behaviour of stable systems around their state of
equilibrium, and other regulatory type systems such as servo-systems. These
and other biological systems that steered toward a goal under various external
disturbances

were

thought

to

be

equivalent

in

principle;

the

natural

phenomenon of 'homeostasis' was depicted in his stability-seeking automaton
(Homeostat), which appeared to behave purposively.
Sommer hoff (1969,1974) has analyzed the functional relationships between
the variables of teleological systems, and has given a formal definition to
what is meant by purposiveness in biology and psychology. Additionally, the
two notions of 'subjective-purposiveness' and 'objective-goal-directedness' are
distinguished

(he calls

the

latter

"directive-correlation"); also,

by

the

introduction of the condition of 'orthogonality' (acting independently), has
excluded the thermodynamic equilibrium-seeking systems from the class of
living teleological systems.

However, artificial adaptive systems, such as the

servo-systems are considered to be in the same class as the natural
goal-directed systems, provided they are considered in their broad context of
application.
Sommer hoff envisages the difficulty of applying his state-determined
approach to the more complex hierarchical goals of natural systems, and
devises an integration scheme for goals and sub-goals.

He also emphasises

the goal-directed ness rather than the goal-achievement aspects in his work,
and mainly deals with behaviour rather than its means or ends.
Another argument for distinguishing the thermodynamic equilibrium-seeking
systems

from

other

teleological

systems

was

put

forward

from

the

information-theory sciences, the former is seen to be closed to information
flow, while the latter is considered to be open to transfer of information
from its environment.
(Ii) - SOME OTHER PROPBRTIES OF TBLEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

WhUe

goal-directedness

explains

the

nature

of the

behaviour of a

teleological system at executive level. it does not account for the reasons
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behind the appearance of such activity in organisms, in other words, it does
not tell us why such a pattern of behaviour should come about.

This

question, of vital importance to the survival of all organisms, has brought
about varied and sometimes contradictory explanations.
The widespread opinion is that an organism is 'seeking-stability', hence in
Ashby's terms, is trying to keep the essential variables within acceptable
limits. The seeking of uniformity, stability, or equilibrium in biological life is
an intuitive notion; however, some interesting observations such as the
behaviour of animals that are apparently satiated, or experiments on human
subjects that have had all their sensory inputs blocked, show that such
'stable' situations are not ultimately desireable, and a need for 'change' is
possibly an equally powerful criterion of life.

Therefore, some explanations

have been devised based on 'instability-seeking' or 'change-seeking' concepts.
Another argument is that the living organism seeks a 'concise' or 'economical'
representation of its internal information, from which the successful features
are extracted.
The degree of organization within an entity is also sometimes seen as the
desireable cause for the initiation of goal-directed behaviour; such systems
are

thought

to

be

'negative-entropy-seeking',

since

the

entropy

(of

communication theory) is a measure of uncertainty in systems, and the lower
the entropy value the more organised the system is, hence the system must
have a negative rate of entropy change to show purposiveness towards more
organised states, rather than move towards randomness and chaos.
Finally, more recently the concept of 'autopoiesis' has been introduced by
Maturana and Varela (1974), to characterise some of the most fundamental
properties

of

living

organisms.

This

abstract

new

insight

into

the

organization of living animals refers to the capacity of the living organism to
develop and

maintain or more loosely put to 'self-copy' their identical

organizational properties.

The emphasis is on 'circularity' in the living

organism; the holistic unitary view of the organism is adopted, hence the
interest is in the interactions or the relatiolls of the components of complex
networks,

rather

than

the analysis of individual components

reproduction or adaptive centers).

(such as

Also, a clear distinction is made between

t.he 'structure' and the essential 'organization' of a system.

Autopoiesis is

seen as a property of the organization of systems with 'internal variables'
which can give rise to other similar type systems; all living organisms are
considered to belong to such class of systems.
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Cellular automata have been constructed as models to display this primary
function

of

life.

Autopoetic-systems

also

have

a

strong

bearing

on

'self-organising' studies.
A paradox emerges when attempts are made to abstract definitions or
criteria for living organisms; once processes such as directive-correlation or
autopoesis are defined to a certain degree of precision, essentially 'artificial'
models

or

machines

could

be

constructed

to

display

such

properties.

Therefore, to have a consistent definition for the distinguishing features of
living from the non-living, we must devise the concepts in terms of some
biological functions, hence excluding all artificially constructable systems.
(iii) - SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS

The notion of 'self-organization' is also an intuitive concept, introduced
principally as the result of observations based on the animal nervous-systems
which seemed to possess similar properties to self-organization. This process
is considered as an important aspect of goal-seeking systems.

The peak of

interest in self-organising systems and machines which were closely associated
with learning and adaptive systems was during 1950's and early 1960's.
Self-organising systems, according to Glorioso (1975), can be defined as:
"adaptive or learning systems in which the initial states are unknown, random,
or unimportant;" they are able to change their internal states and hence the
reactions to specific stimuli; they should also be able to act autonomously,
whereby no external adaptive element (e.g., a teacher) should be involved,
this type of 'self-modification' can be achieved in principle by incorporating
hedonic centres in the system.
The question of control is also an important consideration, which is to
determine how to keep the system within viable regions of environment, for
this reason most self-organising systems have two loperational' and 'learning'
components.
The process of self-organization according to Ashby can come about in
variety of ways; one possibility is to have independently acting separated
parts, which become joined and organised, an example of this type is the
process of nerve cell growth in embryo; another method envisaged is to have
a system of loosely connected parts which become better organised, this
method is more akin to the process of learning and adaptation.
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One of the major problems with self-organising systems is their subjective
and observer-dependent nature. A self-organising system does not mean much
unless defined in relation to its environment, it can only display organization
if there is an external source of order in environment. The law of 'requisite
variety' postulated by Ashby (1956), describes this aspect of the interaction of
system and environment, by stating "only variety can destroy variety."
Various abstract theories and formalization of self-organising concepts
have been developed by cyberneticians, using information theory notions such
as redundancy or entropy, or feedback control concepts. Models of different
classes of self-organising automata ranging from the networks of neuron-like
information processing elements to more complex economic systems have been
constructed, most such models show a degree of self-organization, but on the
whole do not display any efficient learning or adaptation.
this

reason,

during

the

past

two

decades,

the

Mainly because of

work

in

mainstream

artificial-intelligence research has not involved a great deal of self-organising
concepts; and has generally depended on the heuristic techniques which rely
on an external teacher or instructor to direct the organization of a system.
(iv) - SELF-REPRODUCING SYSTEMS
The

process of 'self-reproduction'

is

indisputably one

of

the

most

fundamental properties of living organisms, for it can be seen even at the
lowest levels of life, such as cells, viruses and molecules.

Self-reproduction

involves the processing of matter and information, but our main interest in
here is from the cybernetic organizational point of view.
Systems have been devised to satisfy the basic criteria of self-production,;
at the lowest level, some simple mechanical automata have devised which
depict the 'self-replicating' properties of some physical processes such as the
formation

of

configuration

crystals,
of

Penrose

for

example,

(1959),

the

although,

self-reproducing
possibly

the

low

mechanical
level

of

information in this type of structure does not warrant their definition as true
self-reproducing, as only the identical copies of the original are made.
The pioneers of cybernetics considered the process of self-reproduction, in
both man and machine, as part of the vital processes of 'self-maintenance'
and 'self-regulation', which in their totality determines the goal-directed ness
in the organism.

The manifestation of this process in machines is not seen

as the machine-tool type operations that can produce other machines, but the
reproduction of similar structural and organizational intricacies.
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The automata of today are only in their primeval evolutionary stage of
development, and it can be envisaged that they will be able to reproduce like
artifacts in future.

Already some computers are used to design

new

generations of computers.
Von-Neumann (1951) had also proposed two approaches for the analysis of
the problem of self-reproduction, a "kinematic" (mechanical) and a "logical"
approach.

His work having a strong biological flavour was based on the

McCulloch and Pitts type networks of idealised neurons.

He showed the

theoretical possibility of constructing machines that could self-reproduce other
machines as copies of itself or other similar machines.

Be abstracted a two

dimensional cellular automaton which constituted an originally inert lattice for
the analytical machine, such an environment would provide the 'matter' for
the machine to self-reproduce; three types of element were incorporated in
the automaton to perform 'logical-control', 'transmission', and 'muscular'
functions in the abstract sense.

The notion of a genetic-blueprint was

utilised within the machine in the form of a

'tail'

(borrowed from genetics

terminology) which carried the information about what it is to build, this tail
would always be copied in the new machines hence giving the off-springs also
the ability to be self-reproducing.
This type of automata being a special class of growing-automata, have
been studied and investigated by other researchers; 'computational-organs' and
other evolutionary or ontogenetic aspects of natural self-reproduction have
been depicted in the abstract form.
(v) - SELF-REGULATING SYSTEMS

The notions of 'stability', 'regulation', 'equilibrium', and 'homeostasis' were
discussed earlier in this chapter.

Some mental, emotional and biological

processes can be seen to be clearly 'self-regulatory', the body as a whole can
be considered to be also a self-regulating system.

On a much larger scale,

some theorists have applied the concept of self-regulation to the whole
functioning of the plant earth - the 'Gaia' hypothesis.

Some physiological

organs such as the 'hypothalamus' have been associated with biological
regulatory processes; similarly, in psychology, self-regulation is observed in
processes involving various goal-setting, motivational and reinforcing elements.
In general system terms, the notion of regulation is intricately related to
control, and various aspects of the amount and the degree of regulation can

Tools aad TechaiQuea lor

Hodellin,

Leara'a,

be defined by the use of Ashby's (1956) 'Law of Requisite Variety'.

147
The

principal component of a self-regulating system is its 'feed-back' loop, and
the main feature of the design of this class of systems is their ability to
internally set their own goals and objectives, rather than have such criteria
determined by external interventions.
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CHAPTER

4
--------.PART-I

4. 1 INTRODUCTION
'Learning Systems' in some literature exclusively refer to the formal
manifestations

of

learning

in

control

systems,

or

to

the

general

systems-theory view of the realization of the learning process in systems.
But, in this chapter, 'learning systems' will refer to all physical artifacts,
abstract theories, or computer programs which can be defined independently
from their environment, and can display some kind of 'learning' or 'adaptive'
qualities.

A broad definition of learning in systems according to H. Simon

(1983) is:

"Learning denotes changes in the system that are adaptive in the

sense that they enable the system to do the same task or tasks drawn from
the same population more efficiently and effectively the next time."
All four aspects of 'simulation', 'analysis', 'synthesis', and 'black-box
problem' can be seen in research involving learning-system modelling.

But,

the main issue is the design of systems which use information obtained during
one interaction with environment to improve performance during a future
interaction; the basic criterion used could be some form of generalization,
averaging, or selection of 'ideal' (typical) elements of the set of past records.
Andreae (1977) specifies three principal qualities for learning (teachable)
systems, they are: 'potential', 'aptitude', and 'resilience'; respectively referring
to: the highest levels of task complexity achieved, the speed and ease of
learning, and the ability to deal with new knowledge or 'noisy' information.
The

terms

'learning',

'adaptation',

'concept-formation',

'induction',

'regulation', 'self-modification', 'self-organization', and 'self-repair' have all
been used in the context of 'learning system' research.

The goals of

learning-system scientists are to construct machines or systems that can
perform such processes.
Robotics,

Many workers in subjects such as Cybernetics,

Artificial-Intelligence,

Computer-Sciences,

Pattern-Recognition,

Adaptive-Control-Theory, Automata-Theory, and Cognitive-Psychology have
been intensively involved in pursuit of these goals.
There

are

basically

three

outlooks

in

learning-system

sciences:

'task-oriented studies' (or engineering approach), 'cognitive-simulation', and
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'theoretical analysis', each involving structural (knowledge) based and/or
behavioural (skill) based problems.

Although, workers in this field initially

aim towards one of the above three distinct objectives, their research often
permeates into different areas and, in turn, creates new lines of investigation.
The majority of the significant achievements have involved the 'task-specific'
type research; work implicating 'general' principles of learning, such as the
finding of efficient global adaptive methods and theories, has been progressing
at a much slower pace.
Many taxonomies are possible in the field of 'learning systems'.

A

classification based on the underlying strategies or inferences can be made,
ranging from the simple rote-learning of programmed learning to the complex
learning involved in discovery and observation; the relative role of the
'teacher' is of prime concern here.

Other classifications are also possible,

based on: the methods of representation of systems (e.g., hardware, computer
program, abstract, etc.); the types of acquired knowledge or skills (e.g.,
parameters in mathematical expressions, classifications, formal or grammatical
rules,

etc.);

the

domains

of

applications

(e.g.,

robotics,

education,

natural-language-processing, etc.); or the forms of alterations involved in
systems (e.g., parameter estimation, structural changes, changes in assertions,
etc.).

Another important consideration, which can be used as a basis for

classification, is the developmental feature of a 'learning system', whereby,
the systems that interact with their environment, and go through a specific
training phase, are distinguished from those that continuously interact, and
whose performance and training stages are not sharply differentiated.
In this chapter we will attempt to outline a

number of examples of

'learning systems', and discuss their characteristics. The particular taxonomy
used will be based on the branches of science involved in this area, each
class is characterised by a commonality of approach in dealing with the
modelling problems of learning-systems.

Most researchers in such fields,

while ultimately seek to compare and relate the results of their work to
natural learning processes, do not, usually, attempt to replicate the mechanics
of natural learning phenomena; and generally use alternate artificial means for
manifesting learning and adaptation in systems.

The distinctions made here

are by no means exhaustive or clear cut, but simply represent the research
fields that share a common methodology~

Many overlaps and similarities, as

well as differing points of view, may arise; furthermore, research under
different headings could in fact be referring to the same concept, and
conversely, results which satisfy the requirements of one discipline may not
be suitable for application in a different discipline.
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4.2 ADAPTIVE AND 'LEARNING' CONTROL SYSTEMS APPROACH
The scientific use of terms 'adaptation' and 'adaptive' originate from
within the sciences of biology and psychology - referring to tsuccess' in a
changing environment.

However, these terms have taken special meanings in

different disciplines.
Wiener (1948) defined learning in a broad all-encompassing form, to include
both 'ontogenetic' and 'phylogenetic' adaptations; while, on the other hand,
Shannon (1953) gave a more selective definition for the term learning, based
on a time dependent measure of 'success' or 'adaptation' to the environment,
hence

restricting the attention to the ontogenetic aspects of learning.

Andrew (1967) distinguishes learning as the more elaborate manifestation of
self-improvement than adaptation.

In formal control systems, generally,

learning is seen as a special form of adaptation which is related to time, and
hence its effectiveness is of issue.
An engineer, normally, equates learning and adaptation and often uses
these terms interchangeably; but, a psychologist makes a clear distinction; and
a biologist has an in between view point.

In engineering a tmachine' is

considered to be adaptive if it has one or both properties of tstability' and
treliability', in other words, is able to remain within the constraints of
prescribed bounds and/or is able to repair its actual failed machine parts. In
such disciplines 'adaptiveness' is seen as a property of a particular class of
system, whose desired (almost predetermined) 'adaptive-states' can be reached
or maintained

by a

series of estimations or error-reducing algorithmic

techniques, less emphasis is given to the further improvement of the system
beyond its initially specified goals - the main issue is the attaining of stable
and

reliable

performance.

On

the

contrary,

in

natural

sciences

the

developmental view is adopted; adaptation is seen as the manifestation of a
constantly improving system which interacts with its environment, with the
end result being largely unknown.
The basic elements and relationships of a learning or adaptive system and
its environment, as seen by the engineering control scientists, are outlined in
FIG.4.1. The system is deemed to be 'adaptive' if the 'critic's' output remains
within prescribed bounds as the 'environment' and/or the 'machine' change (a
simple servomechanism is a trivial example of such systems).

Similarly, the

system is said to be 'learning' (in engineering terms) if the critic's efficiency
is increased during a specified period of time following a change in its
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'Self-repair' type systems are also defined as those which can

their

performance after a

failure

or change in

some

internal

components.
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FIGURE 4.1. Schematic representation of an engineering 'learning system'.
'Feedback' is seen as an important and convenient way of manifesting
adaptation, but is not a necessary or sufficient precondition for all adaptive
behaviour (i.e., a well programmed machine with no feedback loop may appear
to

behave

adaptively);

although

most

adaptive

control

systems

are

'closed-loop' and use feedback, in particular, those systems whose inputs do
not reflect the important environmental or structural fluctuations.
simple

hierarchical classification of systems in

machine-environment interaction complexity could

Here, a

the ascending order of
be considered: 'random

systems', 'directive open-loop systems', 'adaptive closed-loop systems', and
'learning closed-loop systems'.
The

notion

of

'self-organization',

and

its

manifestation

by

the

'self-organizing control systems', has also been frequently touched upon in
this area of research, normally, referring to and emphasising the internal
structural changeability of an adaptive system.
Adaptive or 'Learning' Control Theories are an extension of 'Automatic
Control Theories', and a significant amount of research has been carried out
in this subject since the middle 1950's.

Application areas have included the

control of aerospace and industrial processes as well as man-machine and
socio-economic systems.
The goal of the designers of adaptive or 'learning' control systems is to
construct

effective

mathematical

models

(in

the

more advance

systems,

normally, formulated in stochastic and non-linear terms), from which they are
able to find or learn the values of certain parameters which optimise some
criterion in the system.
In deterministic or stochastic control systems with known structural and/or
behavioural (input/output) details, if the exact nature of performance criterion

APproaches

to

ModelliD(

of

LearDiD«

-

153

par\-l

and its relation to different system elements were known, then the various
standard analytical methods,

such as error-control techniques or other

formalizations provided by system theory, can be used to det.ermine the
appropriate optimal behaviour of a system, and keep its performance within
satisfied constraints - the control and modification of the system would be
done on the bases of its known internal structure and external behaviour.
However,

in

the

case

of

unknown,

or

incompletely

known,

criteria or

parameters of a system, the techniques of adaptive or 'learning' control are
utilised to reach or maintain the optimal performance; since, the observable
changing parameters do not provide sufficient data to enable us using the
existing optimising techniques of control theory.

If the living organisms are

looked at in this vain, as Ashby (1956), then we can say that "learning" is
evolved to tackle the adaptive control problems of life.
An adaptive control system can, usually, be functionally decomposed into a
quickly changing component, loosely termed as 'the state' of the system, plus
a slowly changing component which includes the adaptation elements.
distinction

is

vaguely

analogous

to

the

bimodal

representation

This

of

the

experiences of an organism, by the 'short-term' and 'long-term' components of
its memory, as specified in the behavioural sciences.

More formally, adaptive

control systems are characterised by its two major components: a 'plant.'
which is to be controlled, and a 'controller'.

This is shown in FIG.4.2.
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A general schematic functional diagram of an adaptive or
'learning' control system.

4.2.1 ADAPTIVE CONTROLLERS
An adaptive controller functions by constantly monitoring the performance
of a system relative to Bome desired performance criterion, and subsequently
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making modifications, by closed-loop action, to the system structure and/or
behaviour, so as to approach such a criterion.
There are two principal types of adaptive controllers: 'passive' and 'active'.
The designers of passive controllers only use real-time information, that is to
say, they use parameters which are already available at the outset of an
experiment - the unknown information is either ignored or given a tentative
value.

On the other hand, the designers of active controllers incorporate the

possible future availability of further information into their systems; hence,
such systems, as well as real-time data, can estimate other new unknown
parameters during their operation; this type of controllers are based on the
sO called 'dual control theory'.
Passive adaptive controllers, in general, are the simpler yet the more
inefficient and sub-optimal controllers, however, they have been investigated
much

more extensively.

Active adaptive controllers are able

to

make

estimates of the values or the forms of various parameters, and gradually
improve the system's performance. Active adaptive controllers should ideally
approach an optimal controller, the final performance of which should be on a
par with the performance of a controller designed with all the required
information known in advance.

Due to the similarity of this second type of

adaptive control action to the process of natural learning (as far as their
performance improvement characteristics are concerned), this class of adaptive
systems are more readily referred to as 'learning control systems'.
4.2.2 ADAPTIVE CONTROL PROCEDURES
Referring back to FIG.4.2, if the exact 'input' to 'output' transformation
functions of a system were known, then, as mentioned earlier, the control
theory methods could determine the course of the optimal behaviour of the
system.

However, in some cases there are very rapid or large variations of

certain system parameters under environmental or internal influences; or
alternately, we do not know enough about the details of the system or its
operation; in either case, the techniques of adaptive control, by means of
successive approximation or estimation, are able to predict the unknown
parameters or functions, and achieve the desired behaviour of the system.
The brain is an example of such a system, whereby, it has to cope with the
changes in its structure through growth and decay, and also make sense of a
variety of changing or novel perceptual experiences.
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The 'input' in FIG.4.2 refers to some 'desired' or 'reference' conditions,
and is normally not known a priori. The adaptive control syst.em functions by
choosing a tentative input which generates an output from the plant;. the
'measuring element' directly or indirectly measures some aspects of the output
and applies it to the 'teacher element'; the 'teacher' or the 'evaluation
element' compares such measurements with the input of the system, and
makes adjustments to the state variables of the controller.

The system's

overall performance gradually improves by the updating of the controller, and
also the revising of control and performance criteria.
4.2.3 THE TEACHER ELEMENT
The 'teacher' or 'evaluation' element in an adaptive or 'learning' control
system has one of two forms, either it is 'external' (i.e., supervised learning,
off-line learning, or training) or it is 'internal' (i.e., non-supervised learning,
on-line learning, or self-evaluation); in both cases, the function of the
teacher element is to oversee the overall performance, and evaluate and
direct the process of learning or adaptation.

In the externally supervised

systems the exact desired answers are normally known in advance, but, in the
non-supervised systems, where the 'teacher element' is an integral part of the
adaptive controller, the optimal answers are gradually approached by using
some built-in performance criterion.

It must also be noted here that the

external teacher, on the whole, will be largely ignorant of the workings of
the system, although it might be able to predict some aspects of the
behaviour of the system.
The 'teacher element' is universally observed in all types of learning and
adaptive systems - both natural and artificial. In nature, there are abundant
examples of 'learning

systems'

which

distinctively

have

non-supervised

characteristics; but, in artificial systems such a categorization is not so
clear-cut,

since,

the

seemingly

operate

in

majority

of adaptive

autonomous

and

or

'learning

self-learning

systems'

mode

have

which
their

performance criteria or goals specified by their designers or external teachers
prior to their operation.

Although, some artificial systems are genuinely

capable of setting their own independent goals and sub-goals during their
operation.
It can be argued that no precise classification of internal vs. external

'teacher' can be made, since in both natural and artificial systems it is
virtually impossible to isolate the internal teaching or evaluation element as
an independent functioning entity - either the external events directly or
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indirectly influence the evaluation criterion or the initial design concepts
(inborn genetic information in the case of animals), to some extcnt, guide thc
future goal setting aspccts of the system.

However, for practical purposes

such a distinction is made, specifying if during the course of the operation of
an adaptive system an external supervisor is involvcd or not.

The external

supervision, normally, resulting in the relatively quicker rate of learning.
Some adaptive control systems are designed with both types of teacher
element.
The switch'S' incorporated in FIG.4.2 could be used to run the system in
two phases of 'training' and 'operating'. Once the system has been traincd to
an acceptable level of performance and modified accordingly, then the system
can be

switched to its operating mode, further

training

becomes only

necessary if the performance criterion (the same or a different one) is no
longer satisfied.
4.2.4 IDENTIFICATION, DECISION. AND MODIFICATION
The adaptive control law, as defined by most authors in this field (e.g.,
Mendel

and

McLaren,

1970),

has

three

major

functional

elements

of:

'identification', 'decision', and 'modification'.

The process of identificaUon

characterises the various constituents of a

plant or environment.

The

decision element determines how and which aspects of the system's actual
performance should be related to the desired performance conditions.

And

finally, the modification element changes the system parameters in accordance
with the findings of the identification and decision processes - by updating
the system towards the optimal performance setting.
The 'identification problem', as posed by Arbib (1972), is: "To use repeated
experiments upon the input-output behaviour of a system to build up a
state-variable description for a system which yields similar behaviour."
problem which

involves

the

measuring

and

the

estimating of

significant features is of crucial importance to control

This

system's

scientists.

In

cognitive terms, identification is loosely synonymous with the process of
'feature

extraction',

an

important

aspect

of

the

problem

of

'pattern-recognition'. Identification procedures could be used in two different
situations: (a) - to identify or recognise some static parameters, and (b) - to
identify or estimate the time-varying parameters of a dynamic process.
A further classification of identification procedures can be made for the
'parameter adaptive control systems', which is: 'explicit identification' against
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'implicit identification'. Both procedures are used prominently in the 'passive'
type adaptive control systems; the explicit techniques, although less general,
are usually simpler and have the advantage of being able to adapt more
rapidly to changes in environment.
The explicit, or sometimes called 'indirect', identification schemes are
based on the observation of the behaviour of the plant, and allow the
updating of the systems's state equations.

This approach was developed to

utilise the existing control techniques which required exact plant descriptions.
The alternate method, which avoids the specific design of individual plant's
controller, is the implicit or 'direct' identification.

In this case, a general

purpose controller is utilised which can accommodate the degree of the
complexity of the particular system; the control parameters themselves are
adjusted

to

improve

the

performance

of

determining the exact parameters of the plant.

the

system

without

actually

One way of implementing this

second type of identification procedure is in the 'model reference control
systems', in which the inputs to the controller also drive a predetermined
model in parallel to the main system, the output of this model is continuously
compared with the plant's output, and the controller's parameters modified in
accordance.
4.2.5 STABILITY ANALYSIS AND SEARCH TECHNIQUES

Broadly

speaking,

two

techniques

are

utilised

in

the

identification

processes of adaptive control systems, they are: 'stability analysis' and 'search
techniques'.

By using these methods a control scientist is able to establish

the values of various adaptation parameters and also their convergence
characteristics (i.e., whether it converges to an optimal, and if so at what
rate).
The stability analysis of partially known or unknown system parameters (or
performance functions) can produce adaptive control algorithms which yield
estimated optimal values for such parameters. These algorithms, if found, are
normally 'asymptotically stable' (i.e., converge towards a unique origin); the
most common method used in this area is 'Lyapunov's Stability Criterion'
(Mendel and McLaren, 1970).
Search techniques are the other important class of analytical tools, widely
used in a variety of subjects. In the discrete combinatorial system structures
of problems in A.I., the 'heuristic' type search procedures are used much more
extensively.

On the other hand, if the area of search is a continuous lattice,
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such as in most real-time control systems, then predominantly algorithmic
search procedures are employed.

Recently, many computer based techniques

have been developed using both algorithmic and heuristic search, and have
found applications in diverse areas such as: operational research, economics,
engineering design, pattern-recognition, etc.

The problem of seeking the optimal (minimum or maximum) of a function
can be applied either to systems whose parameters have to be optimised; or
to the more complicated systems with unknown parameters, in which case, a
measure of effectiveness (performance index) is optimised.

In adaptive and

'learning' control systems when estimating the parameters of the plant or the
controller search techniques are

basically

used

to minimise

some error

measurement function.

In

some

cases,

such

as

'statistical

decision

theory'

or

'dynamic

programming', the probability distribution or the density functions of some
system or environment parameters are to be estimated (or 'learned'); here,
stochastic techniques such as 'Bayesian estimation' are employed.

Another

class of search techniques which are designed to operate in 'noisy' situations
are the 'stochastic approximation methods'.

J.1any classifications of search methods have been devised

(McMurtry,

1970); some of these distinctions, without much elaboration, are: 'uni-modal'
(examples of uni-modal search techniques are: 'Fabonacci Search', 'gradient
search', and

'steepest ascent

or

descent

search')

against

'multi-modal'

('random search' techniques have been devised to cope with multi-modal
problems);

'single-dimensional'

against

'multi-dimensional';

'deterministic'

against 'stochastic'; 'discrete' against 'continuous'; 'simultaneous' against
'sequential' (in sequential search the results obtained at each step are used in
the future steps).

Other considerations are the 'stopping rules' for the

termination of search, and also the 'step size' adjustments of a particular
algorithms.
The algorithmic, and more recently some heuristic, techniques which have
been developed to identify and estimate the values of various parameters or
functions of a

system provide a

applications.

However,

these

powerful tool-kit for many specialised
techniques

are

mostly

limited

to

the

environment and system parameters which change at a relatively slow rate
when compared to the identification procedure itself; they also, generally.
have specific domains of application with defined boundaries (in view of
various stability considerations).

The designer of a complex adaptive system
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has the task of dividing the system into significant yet simple subsystems for
which adequate parameter estimation techniques are already available.

4.2.6 SELF-ORGANIZING CONTROL SYSTEMS
The concepts of 'self-organization' was discussed in the previous chapter.
This notion refers to processes which cause a system to change from a poorly
organised or non-organised state into an organised state; or alternately, from
separated parts to joined parts.

An obvious example being the growth of the

nervous systems.
There are many controversies regarding the necessity for defining such
terminologies, and whether such concepts can already be accommodated by the
notions of adaptation and learning.
The earlier argument raised regarding the objectivity of defining an
independent internal evaluation element also applies to the concept of
self-organization.

Von

Forester

and

Ashby

have

both

investigated

self-organizing systems, and introduced some analytical methods for examining
such systems.

Ashby's 'Law of Requisite Variety', stated loosely as 'only

variety destroys variety', has formalised the above argument by stating that a
system can only be self-organizing if it is defined with respect to some
external source of order, hence, implying the implicit need for an 'external'
teaching or training

element in any

non-random

system.

The use of

information theory concepts such as 'uncertainty', 'redundancy', and 'entropy'
have made it possible to establish many important mathematical notions about
self-organizing systems and their environments.
Self-organizing

control

systems,

aside

from

being

intrinsically

non-supervised, are according to Glorioso (1975) defined as: "adaptive or
'learning systems' in which the initial state is either unknown, a random
variable, or a 'don't care'."

These additional conditions imposed on adaptive

and 'learning systems' could be considered to be quite arbitrary, however,
many self-organizing controllers have been designed in control sciences. Such
controllers initially have no information regarding the nature of correct
control actions; a tentative control signal is generated by the controller, and
its

results

assessed;

if

there

is

some

correlation

with

performance

improvement, the same class of actions is pursued, otherwise, a different
randomly

chosen action

is

tested.

An

interesting

extension

of

such

controllers are the 'multiple-input multiple-output' control systems where the
inputs are correlated with outputs in a specific or unknown manner; these
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of

'pattern-recognition' •
4.2.7 'LEARNING' CONTROL SYSTEMS
Adaptive control systems using passive controllers were based on real-time
(instantaneous)

performance

measurements,

or

alternately,

on

averaged

performance measurements for a short preceding interval. On the other hand,
control systems can be designed with active controllers, which continuously
monitor and renew the 'control-law' at each step by using the previously
estimated parameters and states.

This second more complex category of

adaptive control systems are, normally, called 'learning control systems'; they
have been devised to deal with rapidly changing or very poorly defined
environments where adaptive control methods cannot be utilised.
Two basic additional concepts are featured in the design of 'learning'
control systems.

Firstly, the controllers for such systems classify inputs,

outputs, or states into classes of 'control situations', and learn the best
'control action' for each class through specific algorithms; this is necessary
because, normally, the individual inputs, outputs, or states are too numerous
to be stored or are ambiguously defined.

Secondly, the system is provide

with a 'long-term-memory' element, this provision is made to make a more
extensive use of the results of previous measurements for the computation of
new parameters.

Often, 'learning' control systems are viewed as adaptive

control systems with memory.
The time constraint on the system's performance which, as defined in
section 4.2, was the main distinguishing feature of 'learning systems' is
incorporated implicitly in the design specifications of any 'learning control
system' specified

'learning' occurs if only the average of performance over a
number

of

trials

shows a

trend

towards

improvement.

The

performance of a 'learning control system' is gradually improved with time (at
an

acceptable

rate),

due

to

the

identification

or

estimation

of

some

parameters of the system; the size of the memory element determining t.he
extent to which past experiences are used.
In designing 'learning' controllers, two approaches - are normally used:
'parallel' and

'serial'.

In

parallel approach,

all

possible

input-output

combinations are considered, and the control choice is made on such basis.
In

serial approach

(or

'performance feedback'

approach),

the

'learned'

information is considered as the experience of the controller, and if similar

ApprOillcbeB

\0

ModelliDIC

01

LearDiDIC

-

Par\-l

161

situations recur such experiences will be used to update and improve the
associated estimates of control or plant parameters.
The serial approach has been adapted in many control systems because of
its similarity to the natural course of the learning process.

The studies of

learning phenomenon in psychology, physiology, and other subjects have
resulted

in

the

formulation

of various

'learning'

models

and

theories;

mathematical models, in particular, have been widely used in the synthesis of
control systems.
The importance of the primary concept of 'the law of reinforcement' has
been recognised by many control engineers who have used this principle as
the underlying criterion of the design of many 'learning' control systems.
This class of systems, normally, referred to as 'reinforcement learning control
systems', mainly, use the probabilistic models of reinforcement learning which
was developed by learning theorists.
Reinforcements
reinforcements'

in

such

('rewards')

models
or

are

'negative

of

two

types

reinforcements'

of

'positive

('punishments').

Rewards and punishments are used to change response tendencies; rewards
represent the favourable reactions which are strengthened, and punishment is
used to suppress the associated unfavourable reactions.
These two reinforcement processes normally function simultaneously, thus,
fortifying the favourable responses and weakening the alternatives.
stochastic

(noisy)

environments, rewards are also used

In

to increase the

'extinction threshold' of a response - making it more immune to extinction.
'Secondary reinforcements' or 'acquired/learned rewards' can alE;r) occur,
whereby, the 'primary goals' or 'primary rewards/punishments' are replaced by
'sub-goals' or 'secondary rewards/punishments', this is useful if the primary
goals are difficult to achieve or are not well-defined.
Another feature of such models is the way stimuli or responses are
generalised into classes of similar elements.

Furthermore, some Bf;condary

rewards could be used as a generalised version of a class of primary rewards.
A clear distinction is also made between the concepts of learning and
performance in such theories, the notion of performance referring to a
measure of learning.
'Learning control law' has all three elements of adaptive corlf.rol law,
namely, identification, decision, and modification.

Additionally,

8

'memory'
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modification

functions are accomplished by using reinforcement principles.
A

'learning'

control

system

operates

environment nor plant details are known.

in

situations

where

neither

The system, in a self-organizing

fashion (i.e., with no external supervision), is able to make changes to its
control actions during its real-time operation.

The best control actions are

evaluated at each instant of time in the absence of complete information; the
basis of this evaluations is the results of previous control choices, made
according to prescribed reinforcement criteria.

In general, if after a control

action there is a marked improvement of the performance then such control
On the contrary, if there is a decline in

action is rewarded (strengthened).

the performance then the previous control action is punished (weakened). All
such changes are

stored in the

memory

element and used

for

future

evaluations of control actions.
Mendel and McLaren (1970) have analyzed the above interpretation of
'learning' control procedures in a more precise form, and described four basic
notions of 'mapping', 'control situations', 'sub-goals', and 'memory' as the
essence of such systems.

Mappings refer to transformations from points in

control-choice space to points in plant-environment/state space of a system.
Control situations refer to regions in plant-environment/state space which are
associated with a single control-choice. Sub-goals are some intermediate type
goals which are used to direct the learning process towards the optimal
solution; sub-goals should be consistent with the primary goal at each
separate decision stage.
of 'short-term' and

Finally, the memory, normally with two components

'long-term', is

a

separate compartment for

pertinent information about control situations.

storing

Based on such primary

notions, a heuristic 'reinforcement 'learning' control algorithm' is introduced
which can be used in the synthesis of various 'learning' control systems (e.g.,
precise control of orbiting satellites).
Although, 'learning' control systems are, generally, not used for the
purposes of investigation or simulation of biological learning, many of the
concepts developed for such systems are clearly depicted from the notions of
natural learning processes.

Furthermore, particular parallels have been

established between the elements of 'learning' control and the elements of
mathematical learning

theory.

alternative';

'control

situations'

distribution

of

various

control

'Control-choice' is equated
are

equated

actions

is

to

equated

to 'response

'events';

probability

to the

probability
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distribution of response alternatives; and also, the reinforcement methods of
such probabilities are paralleled.
Fu (1970) describes how the concepts of statistical learning theory can be
applied to the design of a linear reinforcement 'learning' control system. The
learning

in

such

performance

by

reinforcement.
control

a
the

system
use

is

of

achieved
the

control

by

methodically

action

improving

(response)

the

probability

The 'quality' of control actions (responses) for different

situations

(events)

or, in other words, the performance of the

controller is evaluated by using the outputs of the plant (outcomes). Various
algorithmic methods and
described

for

measuring

equations (incorporating Markov processes) are
response-probabilities,

evaluating the performance.

performance-indices, and

A classification procedure for control situations

is also outlined; this type of classification can be thought of as some sort of
'generalization' of data for parsimony reasons.
4.2.8 OTHER ISSUES IN ADAPTIVE AND 'LEARNING' CONTROL SYSTEMS
Another class of control systems, which are specially related to the higher
more complex forms of learning, are the 'hierarchical multilevel systems'.

In

these systems separate adaptive or 'learning' control systems (or algorithms)
are interconnected, and the learning at each level is influenced by the
learning at other (one or more) levels.

The overall goal of such systems iR

to coordinate and control the actions of all levels, either in a subordinate
manner or in a distributed fashion.
The parameters which are estimated using 'learning' control algorithms, in
general, converge asymptotically to their true optimal value as the number of
trials approach infinity. However, in practice, appropriate cost and efficiency
considerations are specified to limit the iterations to a finite number.
convergence considerations, in a

Such

more complex form, are a]so made for

multilevel type systems.
More recently, also, the concept of 'fuzzy logic' has been applied to the
design of some 'learning' control systems.
In summation, although, all approaches used in this branch of science have
similar properties, the specific techniques used are very diverse and require
varying amounts of prior information. This fairly new discipline has benefited
from the rapid development of computer technology - which has enabled the
quick processing of complex algorithms in various applications.

The majority
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have involved stationary

have focused

on parameter

selection; algorithms for non-stationary environments have also been devised
based on 'nonlinear reinforcement' theories; or alternately, the non-stationary
environments have been approximated by a

finite

number of stationary

environments.
There is a remarkable degree of complexity involved within the particular
adaptive techniques used for single-level domains of application, such as the
control of various processes or plants, and numerous elaborate mathemalical
methods have been abstracted to deal with rigid 'learning' control problems.
On the other hand, global axiomatic postulates and concepts which could be
adequately applied to all adaptive control systems have not been developed to
the same extent.
4.3 NEURAL-NETS APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS'

The concepts of 'neural-networks' were introduced in the previous chapter,
both in the section dealing with the models of nervous system mechanisms
and also as tools for the representation and investigation of cybernetic
systems.
Neural-net approach to the modelling of learning processes has been one
of the principal paradigms of 'machine learning' and 'learning systems'
research.

Historically, it is considered as one of the earliest significant

formalizations of 'learning systems', mainly, involving systems with little or
no initial structural or task-oriented knowledge.

Because of the primitive

nature of computer technology at the outset of these disciplines, the majority
of

early

work

was

either

theoretical or involved

experimental hardware models.

the

construction of

Learning in neural-nels view, generally,

consists of changing the probabilities of certain functions of its elements
(e.g., changing the probabilities of activation of neuron-like logical elements).
Neural-net approach is closely related to the automata-theory, cybernetic
and self-organizing systems approaches (to be discussed later), and often the
boundaries of their methodologies overlap.

Adaptive and 'learning' control

systems approach (section 4.2) was also developed in parallel to the neural-net
and automata-theory approach in the more engineering oriented sciences.
Later, the fields of 'pattern recognition' and 'decision theory' emerged from
the extensive

research

on

neural-networks

subjects will also be further discussed later.

and

logical-networks,

these
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The present diversity of approaches in 'learning systems', is partly the
reflection of a dichotomy which has been evident mainly from late 1950's.
On the one hand, the so called 'mainstream' A.I. scienti,sts have been involved
in

the

modelling of the 'macroscopic'

(organizational) aspects of human

learning, without attempting to simulate any of the notions of nervous
systems; their studies strongly depend on the use of computers and 'heuristic
programming' notions; and the models they devise do not, general1y, learn
from direct experience, but, use conceptual interpretations of inputs to
simulate the higher levels of human cognitive learning. These workers believe
that the complexity of the task is such that they need to incorporate as
much of the designers knowledge in the model as possible, this is achieved by
using elaborate information processing mechanisms in their designs.
On the other hand, contrary to the high-level view of the learning
process, workers in the field collectively referred to as 'neural cybernetics'
(Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963) have approached the subject from a 'cellular'
(component) view point.

They design models which are made up of large

numbers of information processing units or are composed of rudimentary
elements, these models normally start the learning from very little or no prior
knowledge, and use specific simple criteria to improve their performance,
Neural

cybernetics,

'pattern-recognition',

which

includes

'self-organizing

diverse

subjects

systems',

such

'neural-nets',

as
and

'automata-theory', is closely related to the issues of neuronal plasticity in all
animals; while 'mainstream' A.I. deals with the higher brain functions of
humans.
Many of the pioneers of mainstream A.I. research (e.g., M. Minsky) were
originally adherents of the neural-net approach.

Continuous attempts have

also been made to cross over the boundaries of this dichotomy, by explaining
the functions at the microstructural level using the concepts and the obtained
results of the higher cognitive level, and vice versa.

1t is evident that

neural-net researchers are ever more trying to elaborate their concepts to
higher and more complex levels, while, the A.I. workers try to simplify and
find the basic elements of their notions; it is envisaged that ultimately these
two levels should merge to yield a complete model of the learning process.
It is fair to say that due to the limited success of neural modelling

techniques and the unfulfilled original high expectations of this discipline, the
research using such methods has gradually been overshadowed by the more
symbolic and knowledge based type A.I. work.
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In the next sections, issues involving learning in neural-networks and
logical-nets together with some examples will be discussed, followed by an
analysis of systems which use the concepts of automata-theory.
4.3.1 MODELS OF NEURONS
The first logical step in producing any model is to look at its working
example.

In the case of 'learning systems', the nervous system was the

obvious primary choice for copying the possible mechanisms involved.

This

endeavour has been persistently constrained by the limit.ed knowledge of the
workings of the nervous system.

But, it is clear that the specific concepts of

interest are not inherently apparent from the physical structures of nervous
systems; since, similar physical structures can display entirely different.
behavioural characteristics, and conversely, different physical constructs can
have identical behavioural patterns.

Hence, it is futile to try to study models

of the brain based on the exact copying of nerve-cell connections, rather, the
real interest should lie in functional intricacies.
During the late 1930's, the popular analogy of 'brains as telephone
switchboard centres' suggested that the nerve cell could be considered as a
simple switching relay; based on this type of view points, the original
postUlates used to devise the early simple models of neurons were also
dependent on the 'all-or-nothing' information content of a nerve cell.

The

neurons were seen as information coding devices, and the brain was thought
of as a large matrix of these units of information which was reacting and
communicating with its environment; an implication of this 'information' vie,.,
being

that

the

brain

is

considered

as

an

'information-receiving',

'information-transmitting', and •storage' system.
A great deal of nerve-net research started off from the original work of
McCulloch and Pitts (1943).

Their proposals, discussed in the previous

chapter, signaled the introduction of explicit forms of cybernetic modelling.
They described mathematical principles for constructing a class of computing
machines whose elements were modelled on neurons, and could be used to
simulate behavioural and mental theories (the only provision was that such
theories should be finite and causal). They also proposed hardware models of
brain cells which incorporated BOrne of the information theory and cybernetic
concepts being developed during that period.
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The neuro-physiological investigations of the brain had established various
relationships between pulse frequency and levels of excitation in nerve cells,
but, the basic criterion used in the early nerve models was the simple
all-or-none aspect of neural pulse propagation (same as the binary logic of
computers).

The early

neuronal models

(tideal neurons') functioned

by

activating their outputs when the summation of inhibitory and excitatory
inputs exceeded some threshold value.
A vast amount of work has been done on artificial nerve cells, and many
hardware based or mathematical models have been devised, simulating various
neural properties of texcitatory' and 'inhibitory' propagation and other aspects
of neuronal information transmission (e.g., Walter, 1961; Harmon, 1961; Young,
1973; Deutsch, 1967; Kent, 1978).
Neural

models

are

useful

simulation of nerve action.

interpretations

for

low-level

analysis

and

But, even the protagonists of such simple models

(McCulloch, 1959) acknowledged that to closely resemble the complexities of
nerve cell behaviour, we need to define differential equations of several
orders.

The fact is that the basic biological neuron is an enormously

powerful

device,

taking

a

variety

of

specialised

forms

for

different

applications, and making optimal connections to suit the requirements of a
variety of functions.

And although, in neural-net approach, neurons are

considered as digital information processing tools, their overall behaviour is in
fact composed of many analogue and digital components; whereby, spatial
locations or time and frequency variations of inputs determine the output of a
cell.

The neuronal processes include many utility functions as well as the

functions related with the information transmission or storage of data.
It has increasingly become apparent that the neuronal models based on a

single pulse propagation are not an adequate representation of information
processing aspects of neurons; and the. significant notions which should
seemingly be incorporated in the design of such models are the frequencies of
firing and the summation of the frequencies of inputs (Powers,' 1978). Bence,
we can argue that the real usefulness of neural-net models have been to
stimulate thought and to lead to other practicable applications such as their
use in pattern recognition systems or the design of computers.

4.3.2 MODELS OF NEURAL AND LOGICAL NETWORKS
Models

of

single

nerve

cells

have

networks of interconnected elements.

been investigated

collectively as

The primary objectives in developing

Approac:bea

\0

ModelliDg

Or

LearDiDg

-

168

)'ar\-I

'neural-nets' were: to examine the possibility of their use as test beds for
different

postulates

on

nervous-system-activity.

nervous

systems,

or

to

directly

simulate

the

But, more generally, neural-nets cun be considered

as a methodology for representing, simulating, or synthesising

varjom~

dynamic

systems.
Neural-nets can be considered as 'finite automata', either in 'fixed' or
'growth' forms; the elements of these automata can, in turn, be seen as finite
automata themselves.

Numerous investigations of such networks have been

undertaken, and many aspects of neuronal plasticity modelled and simulated;
furthermore, attempts have been made to simulate certain higher cognitive
functions of the brain.
neural-net

models

We should note that during the development of
of

nervous

systems

a

typical

cycle

of

'modelling-abstraction-simulation-verification-updating' has been in progress starting from a simple model of a neuron, developing into an abstract form
and finally applied to the original natural domain.
The

neural-net approach to 'learning systems', firmly

rooted in the

biological studies of neural plasticity, originally resulted in the introduction
of simple models of the workings of nerve cells and various associative
networks and mechanisms.

These early developments were hampered by the

limited neuro-physiological information available at the time, and also by the
lack of JIlathematical or computing tools for treating more complex models.
Later, based on such studies, other formalizations and abstract analytical
elements were devised, some ,,>"jth no direct reference to neuronal activity;
networks

of

such

mathematical

(logical)

elements could

produce

similar

properties to the networks of biological nerve models.
Some rhythmic brain activities (e.g., alpha waves) have been simulated by
hardware assemblies of nerve models.

Psychological and neuro-physiological

theories of learning such as Bebb's (1949) recirculating storage assemblies of
nerve elements, Milner's, Lashly's, and many others have been simulated and
studied using networks of neuronal models.

Even, in the case of randomly or

non-specifically organised nerve-nets, many workers (e.g., Beurle, 1962) have
demonstrated some neural manifestations of simple learning.

Later, nets were

designed as models for specific sensory mechanisms or for higher cognitive
central processes (e.g., concept-learning, problem-solving, thinking).

The

introduction of the discipline of 'pattern-recognition' is a consequence of the
investigations

of

neural-nets

by

early

researchers

Rosenblatt and Wid row in late 1950's and early 1960's.

such

as

Selfridge,
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Logic is the basis of neural-nets, and the notion of logical-net was
introduced as a more abstract formalize of such networks.

The concepts of

symbolic logic were applied to neural networks and used in the modelling of
nervous system activities.

The brain was seen as a network of logical

elements assembled in a cellular or matrix form.
way which

the

nervous

systems are

It was argued that the same

seemingly composed of elcmenlury

neurons, some logical-nets could be devised from primary logic elements to
mimic animal and human activities.
Theoretically it is conceivable that all logical functions and computations
could be realised by appropriate logical or neural networks; however, it is the
specific characteristics of such designs, and the similarity of their operation
to the natural mechanisms which determines their usefulness.
restrictions

involved

in

the

methodology

of

logical-nets,

The severe
such

as

the

consideration of these networks only at disjointed instances of time, has
posed many questions regarding the validity of such models as conceptual
nervous systems.
In logical-nets, the basic building block is the 'threshold element', many
variations of which have been adopted.

In some threshold element models the

inputs could have assigned relative values, as in the case of 'linear weighted
models'; or, the functioning of the element could

be based on specific

criteria, such as the 'majority logic'.
The single threshold element is capable of implementing ordinary Boolean
Logic functions by adopting different threshold values.

Many properties of

threshold elements and their networks, in particular, their abiJity to realise
logical functions, have been extensively investigated.

It is worth noting that

conventional logic is a special case of general threshold logic.
The threshold element is a powerful computing tool, and can be used in
the implementation of computing machinery; however, so far, its apparent
advantages have not been fully realised in computer system designs.

The

more fruitful contribution of logical nets has been to the development of
pattern-recognition systems.
Various noise and tolerance considerations are of prime importance in the
design of logical-nets; and investigations involving these issues have led to
the establishment of the 'reliability studies' of cellular type automata with
stochastic elements (von-Neumann, 1956) - a computer is an obvious example
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The notions of self-repair and self-reproduction have also

been investigated in some computer-based models of neural and logical nets.
Some mathematicians like Turing (1950), von-Neumann (1956) and ncurlc
(1962) had proposed that randomly connected logical-nets starting from an
unspecified initial state could, with experience, change into a specific and
well organised goal state.

Here, an important question is poscd, whether

neural and logical nets need to be 'fixed' or 'growth' type to adequately
simulate various aspects of the brain's functions; the indications are that for
the low level simulation the fixed type models can be sufficient, but as the
complexity of description increases, it might become necessary to incorporate
some growth or 'learning' capabilities into such models.
Although, the drawing of complicated neural or logical nets (and their
hardware

construction)

is

a

cumbersome

task,

various forms of matrix

representation have been developed which together with algebraic operations
simplify this task greatly, and also facilitates their computer simulation.

In

the abstract matrix form, however, all anatomical similarities neural-nets and
nervous systems have been sacrificed for functional considerations.
Memory, in its simplest form, has been represented by a 'unit delay organ';
but, other models have been devised which show some of the properties of
human STM and LTM, this is achieved by changing the threshold values of
the elements during their operation.

4.3.3 SOME EXAMPLES OF LEARNING IN NEURAL-NETS AND LOGICAL-NETS
In this section we will briefly look at few examples of neural and logical
nets which were devised to display some adaptive or learning features.

The

more advanced cellular networks which model various perceptual aspects of
cognition, in particular, the classification of percepts,

~rill

be discussed in the

section dealing with the pattern-recognition approach to learning.
It is mathematically possible to describe any behavioural pattern in terms

of neural-net configurations, provided the behaviour can be accurately
described and translated to some analytical terminology.

The implication of

this observation for learning behaviour is that specific nerve-nets could be
constructed to display apparently 'learned' behaviour.

However, in the

realization of such structures, the problems of complexity and size become
overwhelming hindering factors.
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Consequently, the main objective of workers in this field has become the
construction of 'economical' structures that could exhibit complicated learning
properties; such researchers, according to George (1973), wish to build
automata that mimic learning by having a "build in capacity to learn and not
the details of learning itself."
compromise which

should

An essential consideration here is the

be made

between

the generalization and

the

discrimination of data in order to faithfully produce the desired descriptive
level of a learning process.
The principles founded by McCulloch and Pitts, and later elaborated and
abstracted by workers such as Kleene, Rashevsky and von-Neumann, have
been used to construct simple networks for various behavioural patterns
described in terms of logical formulae.

McCulloch and Pitts (1947) devised

and constructed simple neural-nets with few elements which were able to
recognise (learn) different musical intervals or various visual forms.

Many

other workers have used neural-net models to simulate visual and other
neuro-physiological systems which can display simple forms of learning.
Stewart (1967) describes simple associative networks, originally suggested
by von-Neumann (1956), which can be considered as being able to learn
associations between inputs. Hardware models called "Flebus" have been built
which could be programmed to simulate various cybernetic properties.

An

example of this type of basic associative net is outlined in the schematic and
non-detailed form of FIG.4.3.
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FIGURE 4.3.

A simple neural-net capable of displa->'ing response conditioning

of one stimulus with a second stimulus. ;Initially, after firing,
the stimulus element 81 elicits response Rl+Ra by itself alone
and SI elicits response Ra, after a unit instant of time. Bul
after conditioning, SI should be able to elicit the response
Rz+Ra by itself.
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The network of FIG.4.3 in its simplest form, with N=O and M=O (i.e., with
no intermediate counting networks), is according to Stewart (1967): "nearly
the simplest net that could exhibit 'learning' behaviour."

More generally, we

can say that S2 may be conditioned to elicit the response R3 by itself alone,
provided it occurred simultaneously with SI for N consecutive occurrences every non-occurrence of SI with occurrence of S2 would reset the N-stage
counter to zero.

Similarly, the conditioned response will be extinguished if M

consecutive occurrences of 82 were unaccompanied by 81.
It must be remembered that the use of psychological terminologies here is

only a specific interpretation of a purely deterministic logical behaviour.
Originally, in logical-net language, it was said that S2 became 'a sign for' 81
when the network established or remembered their prior incidental firings.
The above principles can be elaborated to much larger automata with
memory capabilities.

George (1973,1977) constructed units similar to the basic

model of FIG.4.3, and assembled, from such units, automata which were able
to realise some characteristics of simple learning.
George (1972) also illustrates a simple automata/environment configuration
which uses neural-nets - the automata is a simple maze-running machine, and
the environment is a maze.

This abstract model is capable of displaying a

simple 'intelligent' behaviour.
this

system

are

also

similar

The elements which are used as the basis of
to

the

network

of

FIG.4.3,

however,

the

conditioning and extinction networks are substituted for other appropriate
networks which satisfy the specific criteria set by the design.

The general

class of this simple maze-running systems are also considered, such automata
are deemed to have the potential to represent much more complex patterns of
learning behaviour.
The above class of networks can be constructed based on a variety of
other hypotheses for establishing associations between receptors and effectors;
thus, various behavioural learning patterns can be described in a formal
language, loosely emulating a neurological mechanism.
Stewart (1967) goes on to describe a method for the classification of input
and output patterns of neural-nets.

A layered net is described, which in its

general form, with n input (or m output) elements can represent 21l (or 2--1)
different states or patterns on its receptors (or effectors).
version of such classifying nets is illustrated in FIG.4.4.
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FIGURE 4.4. Schematic diagram for a possible input/output classifying method.
An automaton can be constructed by connecting the input and output

classification

networks

together.

There are

K=2-x2-x ••• x2-

(2 D -multiple)

ways of realising such networks, including the open connections. Bence, it is
conceivable to build K different types of automaton each having a distinct set
of behavioural patterns.
The

use

of

this

general

classification

principle

together

with

the

introduction of simple memory networks, such as shown in FIG.4.5, will allow
the design of automata which by employing serial or parallel information from
their environments are capable of displaying quite complex behaviour for a
range of situations -

by selection of appropriate responses for various

patterns of input, these automata may also exhibit some adaptive qualities.
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FIGURE 4.5.

(a) - An n-stage simple parallel storage, once an element is

activated it will keep firing; a reset function could also
be incorporated.
arbitrary
(b) - A k-stage memory network which can be of
length} each stage of the chain will remember the
preceding input that occurred a unit delay (T) time ago.

However, the feasibility of the more complex versions of such systems
becomes highly questionable, since the number of the internal elements
required for the realization of larger networks is extremely high; and a
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complete classification of inputs and outputs, and the establishment of all
'negative' and 'positive' associations becomes implausible.
A simple calculation will show that using this method of classification a
typical human

brain with

1010 nerve-cells will accommodate the sensory

pattern permutations of only 33 sensory cells, therefore, clearly this type of
classification cannot be a basis for natural neurological mechanisms - the
patterns of activity must be the critical issue and not the individual cen
firings.

Hence, it can be concluded that neural-nets, to be able to learn

efficiently from their environments, need to have a capacity for generalization
(i.e., making inductive references).
The importance of the classification of input patterns, rather than the
individual inputs, is acknowledged in this line of researc:h.

A possible

hypothesis is suggested by stewart for neural classification (and its possible
use in modelling), whereby, inputs from the environment are received in the
higher processing levels of nervous system in a coded form; this type of
encoding can be done internally for the sensory type inputs, but for the
symbolic type inputs, the encoding process can be thought to have been
partly carried out in the external environment; after this encoding process,
similar or associated patterns are assigned to various classes on the basis of
some similar identifiable features.
It is obvious that this approach is diametrically opposite to the previous

classification procedure of FIG.4.4 which involved an expansion of the number
of input lines rather than their reduction.

We can also deduce that only the

adopting of this holistic view of the sensory percepts will enable us to devise
possible efficient neural modelling methods which can explain the immensity
of temporal information.
Stewart (1967) also describes a class of tself-modifying' networks which
can be devised by using the principles of 'reward and punishment'.
design

features

are

incorporated

which

can

Specific

modify

stimulus-response

connections of nets similar to the network of FIG.4.3.

Sections of such

automata could be regarded as 'motivational units', thus determining the
effectiveness of associations.
networks could
environments.

These motivational, rewarding or punishing,

be made to change according to the demands of their

The important observation is that as well as the association of

stimuli on contiguity basis, by using some innate factors of nets, we can
determine their actions by means of selective reinforcement.

The principles

involved could be extended indefinitely to encompass the more complex
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adaptive behaviours; a 'random' element could also be included to ensure lhal
at some future time the correct responses shall be made.

These models are

also construclable in hardware and simple examples were given.
George (1973) describes a so called 'B-net' (Belief-nel), similar to the
neural

network

of

FIG.4.3,

which

is

the

basis

for

his

'C-systems'

(Cognitive-systems); B-nets are represented by the general form of B(rn,n), n
being the number of inputs, and m the number or the length of the storage
elements.

Generalised linear chained connections can be established between

such B-nels and simple storage-nets (such as those in FIG.4.5) which are able
to remember associations to any extent - as a function of: the order of
occurrence,

the

frequency,

or

the

number

count of

evenls.

Various

behavioural properties of such B-nets can also be described in terms of lhe
probabilities of the occurrence of inputs.
George goes on to elaborate a 'cognitive' model of the central nervous
system based on: 'B-nets', 'Control-nets', 'Cognitive-nels', 'Memory-nels'
(long-term and

short-term), 'Motivational-nets', and

'Emotional-nels'.

A

general form of this type of automaton described by George is illustrated in
FIG.4.6; such systems will be able to classify, recognise and also reason, but
not necessarily using any actual naturally occurring

phenomena.

The

computer simulation of such complex automata are also thought to be possible,
maybe, with the help of an automatic coding procedure.
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FIGURE 4.6.

Block diagram of a general intelligent adaptive neural-net.

George (1973) discusses the question of perception within the theoretical
context of neural-nets, proposes some molar principles for the neural-net
realization of various perceiving adaptive automata, and highlights some basic
issues such as: 'memory', 'motivation', 'attention', 'purposiveness', 'belief', etc.
He also discusses the general problem of the simulation of behavioural and
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cognitive theories by neural and logical nets, with special attention given to
the aspects of 'hierarchy' and 'growth' of such models.
Culbertson (1963) defines a theory of behaviour and consciousness based on
the neural-net approach.

'Consciousness' is taken to mean 'mental' events or

experiences (the 'mental' events are believed to 'consist' of physical events),
and is deemed to be applicable to humans, animals, automata, and robots
alike; here, a 'robot' refers to a finite automaton reproduced in hardware.
Be also abst.racts various conscious automata which can display learning.

It

is argued that even 'memory-less' (unconscious) robots could exhibit some
kind of 'intelligent' behaviour, and the 'intelligence' may be enhanced by
adopting some probabilistic rather than deterministic model; and furt.hermore,
by adding storage facility a fully conscious (intelligent) robot is conceptually
realizable.
An important perceptual issue for a neural network is the 'meaning' it
attaches to a stimulus, in other words, how can a neural-net automaton be
made to react differently to apparently similar stimuli; the answer, generally,
envisaged is that for the simple modes of behaviour the single-level logical
design specifications of the net can in fact manifest such variations, but, for
the more intelligent types of behaviour and learning, such as the formation of
concepts, we need to incorporate a second meta-level into the design of the
non-peripheral sections of the nerve-net.

This feature will enable the

automaton to 'evaluate' each situation and assign the proper meaning to an
output.

Even, a higher semantic level is also thought to become necessary

for the understanding of the external descriptions of environments which are
received in symbolic form.
Some neurological postulates of learning, such as Hebb's and Millner's cell
assemblies, have also been represented by neural-nets in a
physiology

sometimes

cybernetics'.

referred

to

by

'neuro-cybernetics'

or

branch of
'biological

George (1973) has shown bow such learning cell assemblies

could be constructed by neural-net configurations.

Deutsch (1967) has

proposed neural-net models based on neurological observations, and using an
engineering oriented approach, has simulated auditory and visual neurological
systems, and described models and hardware constructs for simple 'learning
systems'.

Amari (1977) presents primitive neural models of association and

concept formation by a mathematical analysis of neural "pools"; the principle
of neuronal 'self-organization', as proposed by Bebb's theories, is verified,
and

simple

mechanisms

for

learning,

storing and

using of

knowledge
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Other important mathematical treatments of neural-nets has been

carried out by Griffith (1971).
More recently, the control engineering oriented researchers have applied
some of their techniques to neural-net models of learning. Bobrowski (1984 &
1982) describes a set of formal mathematical learning algorithms and rules,
which can be applied to both 'supervised' and 'unsupervised' learning
neural-nets.

In lhese models, neurons are considered as 'fi1lers' which pass

signals most frequently received; alternately, they are seen as 'deteclors of
rareness'.

The

stochastic

methods

used

will

approximale

lhe

optimal

(adaptive) configuration of a network which, usually, has been laid down in
advance - a decision rule at each instant of time varies certain weighting
parameters until the learning is achieved.

Kohonen (1984) describes a set of

experiments for the formation of 'ordered neural-net maps', based on adaptive
selection; these specific patterns are formed, in a self-organizing manner, as
a result of sensory experiences.

This process is believed to be occurring at

the higher central processing levels of the brain; and simple two-dimensional
neural-net arrays are devised which reproduce such maps using some 'primary
laws of adaptation'.
4.3.4 AN OVERVIEW OF NEURAL NETS APPROACH

The above neural-nets have demonstrated possible ways by which bolh
'macro' (pattern, concept) and 'micro' (direct sensory impression) levels of
inputs could

be

represented

in a

model,

and

also

have

suggested

a

methodology for constructing large scale experimental automata (both software
and hardware).

Although, mathematical techniques to sufficiently manipulate

associations between such representations have not been developed, yet, to a
great extent.
The

introduction of

neural-nets

as

a

kind

of Turing

machine

was

considered as an important cybernetic development in the early 1940's.
However, neural-nets have only resulted in the realization of trivia} types of
behaviour.

Consequently, in the last two decades, the interest in this area

has gradually waned, with some exceptions in specific subjects. On the other
hand, some of the mathematical ideas and methodologies of neural-nets which
spread to other disciplines, such as biology and neurology t seem to have
retained their potency, and have been firmly established as a concrete tool
for the analyses of natural systems.
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decline

are:

insufficiency of neura-physiological findings; lack of early computing tools and
machinery;

contradictions

with

neurological

observations;

vagueness

or

imprecision of some terminologies to other disciplines; too many assumptions
about the significances or interpretations of models; too much attention to
the hardware realization; eagerness to simulate higher cognitive aspects, and
define their neural-net correlates.
The comparing of the concepts of neural-nets and the actual processes of
the brain has been one of the major issues in this field.

McCulloch, in

proposing his theories of neural-nets, assumed that humans started life with
inborn fixed

'universals'

consisting of various sensations, reflexes and

appetites; and he thought of the brain as an interconnected mass of randomly
organised nets, experiences would rearrange such connections and manifest
learning, memory, prediction, and purpose.

An important implication of this

view was that 'mind', probably for the first time, could be described in
scientific terms.

However, von-Neumann (1956) recognised that although it

was possible to model the processes of the brain in a digita1 binary form, the
actual indications were that the brain itself was using a mixture of digital
and analogue processes.

Dreyfus (1972) in his analysis of the feasibility of

computer realization of intelligence concludes that the analogy of digital
computers and brains is a weak and outdated concept, and digital automata
(neural-nets)
intelligence.

cannot

be

used

to

produce

a

true

'artificial'

model

of

The problem of applying discrete criteria to the modelling of an

essentially continuous system and environment, such as the brain, has also
been argued by Andrew (1967,1983).
Furthermore,

in

view

of

the

deficiencies

of

'sequential'

models

in

representing the processes of the brain such as learning, it is speculated that
serial mechanisms are, in principle, not capable of imitating the brain which
seemingly has non-serial characteristics.

For this reason, some researchers

have become interested in the design of parallel computing machinery and
their possible applications to the neural-net type models of learning.
Digital computers have been developing alongside the more analytical
computing automata of neural and logical nets, and in spite of possessing the
same logical foundations,

computers

have

come

cognitive aspects using a very different approach.

to

simulate

the

human

The new approach, A.I.,

has made the understanding at the cell level unnecessary; although, intuitively
it is more appropriate to start the investigations from the point of trivial to
the more complex, as promoted by the methodologies of neural-net.

Hence,
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the 'information processing' rather than the 'information theory' aspects have
dominated the field of artificial learning-systems, shifting the paradigm of
'machine intelligence' from

energy and

matter

to information;

and

the

computing machines have come to be considered as 'information processors'
and 'symbol manipulators' rather than the crude copies of nervous systems.
Neural-nets, on the whole, have made an undeniable contribution to
learning sciences.

In the course of their development they have spanned a

typical pattern of scientific progress, whereby, postulates are postulated upon
and enormous bodies of knowledge amassed in a hierarchical form.

Once the

pattern of development is set, and a number of researchers commit themselves
to a particular approach, generally, fundamental questions regarding the basis
of a paradigm are not raised from within that particular paradigm, and it
becomes quite a difficult task to break away from the mainstream views of a
discipline.

In addition,

the

discipline

is

diversified

into complex and

specialised branches which are heavily reliant upon the previously accepted
postulates.

Therefore, as in the case of neural-net methodology, if at some

stage of development general problems are confronted and adequate solutions
are not foreseen, then the whole paradigm suffers adversely rather than the
specific path of the development.
Initially,
computers)

the
were

back-up
not

necessary

forthcoming;

by

some

while,

such

technological

tools

(e.g.,

supplements could

have

corroborated certain lines of development or proposals which were pushed
aside and generally not pursued later on.

For example, in the 1940's and

early 1950's, it was inconceivable to compare the capabilities of the nervous
systems and reasonable size computers, while, today, in Dlany aspects (e.g.,
memory size and

speed of calculation)

computers

have overtaken their

neuronal counterparts.
Hence, it can be argued that some of the previously discarded ideas could
be

reinvestigated

in the light of the

new

scientific and

technological

breakthroughs, and the questions which were thought to be impractical or
vague might be seen to be pertinent now.
Various new lines of development could be envisaged if the elements of
neural-networks were modelled much more closely on the actual actions of
nerve-cells, or were of a more complex nature, specially in view of some
recent neurological discoveries.

Ultimately, the extent of future research in

this direction will be governed by the interest shown in the simulation and
the understanding of the structural aspects of behaviour.
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4.4 AUTOMATA-THEORETICAL APPROACH TO tLEARNING SYSTEMS'
Various concepts of 'automata-theory' and lautomata' were discussed in the
previous chapter as a general mathematical tool for modelling. In this section
we will survey the field of automata-theory as a conceptual framework for
manifesting the process of learning in systems.

A specialised class of

automata, namely the combinational type cellular 'learning' automata, which
normally feature the classification aspects of inputs, will be covered in the
future section dealing with the pattern-recognition approach to 'learning
systems'.
It is worth mentioning here that neural-nets are a special class of finite

automata, and many of the previous section's discussions are a]so appropriate
to the automata-theoretical concepts.

The origins of automata-theory can be

traced to the introduction of Turing-machines.

However, during the early

1940's, the notions of neural-net and finite automaton were, usually, used
synonymously; but, gradually, the concepts of automata-theory came to be
discussed in a broader analytical sense of abstract computational machinery,
while, neural-nets were seen more and more as application tools.
4.4.1 BASIC CONCEPTS OF AUTOMATA-THEORY
Automata, in analytical terms, are defined as tape-machines, or as a formal
class of information processing machines.

An automaton has three basic

elements: 'inputs', 'outputs', and 'internal-states'; various definitions and
categorizations of different types of automaton were outlined in chapter
three.

Of particular interest are the finite-state automata which can be

described as: any system constructed from finite number of parts (e.g., cells,
elements,

etc.).

The

notion

of 'finite-state-machine', in

preference

to

Turing-machine, was introduced since it was more appropriate for abstracting
fundamental

models for

a

variety of

natural and

artificial information

processing machines, especially, computers and switching circuits; a great deal
of interest also stemmed from the rise of neural-nets.
An important distinction is made between automata, and that is the
'deterministic' against the tnon-deterministic'.

A deterministic automaton in

any particular state will give a fixed response to a particular input; and
starting from an initial point, will behave in an identical manner for a given
sequence of inputs.

The 'stochastic' or tprobabilistic' automata, being a

special sub-class of non-deterministic automata, on the other hand, can have
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a 'random' element or 'noise' incorporated, which may result in outputs not
necessarily identical for every application of the same input.
Automata studies have two major components of: (a) - behavioural aspects,
and (b) - structural (mechanism, anatomical) aspects. The main feature of the
behavioural aspect of an automaton (provided it is not a random automaton) is
that

its

output

and

state

at

any

instant

of

time

is

dependent

(deterministically or stochastically) upon its previous state and its previous
input.

Another point to mention here is that most learning related studies of

automata involve the 'discrete' type, in which the changes of an automaton's
characteristics are only considered at disjointed instances of time.
The state changes of an automaton are determined by its 'state-structure'
which, in a sense, represents the dynamic organizational intricacies of a
machine, yet, it does not directly refer to any actual physical hardware - the
state-structure is closely related to the movement of information within an
automaton.
both

the

According to Aleksander (1978): "state-structure is a function of
physical

structure

and

the

function

of the

elements

of an

automaton."
4.4.2 MODELLING OF SYSTEMS USING AUTOMATA-THEORY CONCEPTS
Automata-theory is concerned with the logical properties of dynamic and
specially non-linear systems; and although, it has been developing separate
from the subject of computing theory as a discipline in its own right, the
concepts of automata-theory have contributed greatly to the development of
computing machinery and computers. The 'reliability' studies of von-Neumann
(1956) in the context of probabilistic automata is a prominent example of such
contribution, whereby, stochastic automata have been used to model computers
which have unreliable components; similarly, other automata-theory studies
have been applied to the coding theory and the time-sharing of computers.
As well as abstracting the information processing aspects of machines,
without actually referring to the hardware or the technology, the automata
theorists have also been concerned with the actual input-output behaviour of
various automata, and have developed methods for describing and analyzing
the dynamic behaviour of mainly discrete systems.

Some of these methods

have been applied to computers, neural-nets, control systems, biological
systems, and aspects of animal and human behaviour.

In chapter three, we

also outlined the various ways of representing an automaton matrices, transition-functions, tables, etc.

graphs,
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Kleene (1956) demonstrated that automata could be built that for any given
input situation choose an appropriate output by looking up in a kind of
'dictionary'.

This means that once any pattern of behaviour has been

translated to a mathematical language it can be represented by an automaton's
isomorphic behaviour.

The same line of argument was developed for the

neural-nets of previous section, but automata-theory is concerned with the
more abstract logical and mathematical consequences.
Automata-theory concepts can be applied to a broad spectrum of systems,
starting from a simple clockwork mechanism to much more complex social
systems.

Animals and humans have also been looked at as a form of

automaton, and their behaviour defined in such manner; a special advantage of
this conceptualization is that it does not imply the equating of men and
machines.

A great deal of such analytical simulations of natural behaviour

have been undertaken; similarly, many workers have been trying to translate
the findings of automata-theory to the natural domain - by explaining the
natural phenomena in the mathematical language of automata-theory.

When

psychological theories are used, the concepts of 'input' and 'output' are,
normally, equated with the notions of 'stimulus' and 'response'; furthermore,
the precise automata-theoretic concept of 'internal-state' is correlated with
either

the state of the excitation of the nervous system, or with

the

cognitive organization of· the brain.
Automata-theory has also attempted to analyze the higher aspects of
human's experiences, such as learning, thoughts, and other mental events,
using a mechanistic view of these notions.

Mental activities have been

paralleled to the state changes of an automaton, hence enabling various
quantitative analysis and evaluations based on some mathematical features of
such mental activities.
Aleksander (1978,1983) argues that the state-structure of the br~n is a
kind of reflection of its environment, ignoring the unimportant details of the
environment and making 'sense' of its experiences. He pursues the point that
the automatic homeostatic/regulatory functions of the brain and also the
concept

of

'mind'

are

all

attributable

to -the

brain's

state-structure.

Furthermore, he describes various temporal concepts such as: 'learning',
'thoughts', 'emotions', and 'self-knowledge' in terms of the characteristics of
this state-structure; conjectures are also made regarding the questions of
'free-will', 'awareness', 'attention', and 'perception', and it is argued that
such features could be explained in the proposed automata-theoretic model -
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by thinking of the state-structure as a hierarchical conglomerate of relatively
autonomous sections which are able to control and coordinate each other.
Some 'deeper' mental properties such as 'unconsciousness' and 'sleep' are
considered, and speculations are made regarding the nature of variouB
pathological problems - models proposed for a 'psychotic automaton' which
could in a very basic sense display the symptoms of Borne psychological
disorders.
Aleksander goes on to elaborate automata capable of modelling the genetic
mechanisms

of cell division, in particular,

Kauffman's discovery of

the

existence of short stable cycles in the assemblies of randomly connected
networks is modelled; these proposals exemplify the use of automata-theory
methods in the studies of an autonomous biological activity.

Finally, social

interactions, such as the family relationships, are seen as another suitable
domain for the application of automata-theory concepts.
An important and relatively recent landmark in the automata-theoretic
research has been the introduction of Chomsky's linguistic theories, regarding
'syntactic structures'.

His ideas based on the underlying structures of

language

has

in

automata.

The concept of an abstract language, having symbols and formulae

resulted

the

introduction

of

'artificial

languages'

for

rather than words and phrases, was defined for formal machines, the syntax
of such a language could be expressed in terms of various 'production rules';
many developments have been achieved in this direction, some relevant
examples will be covered in the future section on the A.I. approach to
learning.
Before attempting to discuss learning in automata and outline some specific
examples, it is relevant to make few general comments about the development
of

automata-theory

machine-intelligence.

within

the

past

40

years

and

its

importance

to

Automata may be described as abstract machines that

process information, but, it is true to say that the main influencing factor in
the

development of this science has

computers

rather

than

the

need

for

been its relevance to the digital
constructing

abstract

intelligent

machinery.
As far as the modelling of the biological systems or the low-level aspects
of human activities are concerned, there has been a gradual decline of
interest following the initial enthusiasm; the reasons behind such a decline
are more or less similar to those outlined and discussed for the case of
neural-nets.

However, automata-theory has been able to divert its attention
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and flourish in subjects relating to the formal representation of logic and
language in computing machinery.
Automata theorists, on the whole, have a diametrically opposite view to
workers in A.I.; and like neural-net researchers, favour the basic analytical
approach to the investigations of intelligence, rather than the high-level
cognitive outlook.

And the computer, featured heavily in their techniques, is

seen as a simple tool for simulation and not, as proposed by most A.I.
workers, the sole means of attaining or simulating 'intelligence' in machines.
4.4.3 'LEARNING' AUTOMATA
Ordinary automata differ from 'learning' automata, since the majority of
the

non-learning

automata

are

designed

on

the

basis

of

specific

state-structures which can only realise a particular information processing
The 'learning' automaton, on the other hand, can adapt to a

machine.

specific task from a range of different tasks.
'Learning' automata interact with their environment, and modify their
response on the basis of the responses they receive from their environment.
Normally, the general concept of reinforcement, in the form of rewards and
punishments from the environment, are used to update some aspects of the
actions

of

the

automaton

for

various

given

input

situations.

The

automata-theoretic learning techniques have been used to model a variety of
systems in biology as well as having applications in the engineering and
control fields such as: optimization, adaptive control, statistical decision
making, etc.
Aleksander (1983) argues that for automata (and robots) to be able to
'learn', it would be necessary to incorporate a facility for the design of new
state-structures or self-programming within the machine.

He also suggests a

possible way for realising such automata - by devising the machine in a
hierarchical form, with the higher sections being able to program (teach)
some of the lower ones.

In the mean time, it is pointed out that this

approach could lead to an infinite regression problem.

If a deterministic 'autonomous' or an 'input-less and output-less' automaton
(FIG.4.7a) with a finite number of states is considered, starting from an
initial state will under the influences of its internal inputs either fall into a
stable state or continue changing indefinitely (theoretically); it has also been
shown that such continuous changes will invariably entail cycles.
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FIGURE 4.7.
Now,

if

considered,
envisaged;

the
as

interactions
in

FIG.4.7b,

although,

it

of

an

then

must

be

automaton

much

more

remembered

with

an

complex
that

environment
systems

such

is

may

be

definitions

of

environment and automaton are quite arbitrary, since the environment can be
looked at an automaton and the original automaton as its environment; or the
whole of the automaton/environment could be seen as a single autonomous
automaton.
The environment and/or the automaton may be of a probabilistic nature,
whereby it reacts to the inputs according to some stochastic criterion - each
output has a specific probability of occurrence for every value of the input.
An adaptive interaction of the automaton and the environment can also be
considered, whereby, the environment is able to change the state-structure of
the automaton.

A general automaton/environment learning situation is one in

which an automaton has a finite choice of actions including the option of
'no-action'.

After a choice is made the environment may penalise or reward

the automaton, and this, in turn, modifies the future choice of such actions
in a manner that gradually a more 'favourable' response is attained; in other
words, the automaton is said to be 'learning' from its environment.
'learning'

automata,

the

environment

is

considered

to

be

In most
reacting

instantaneously to the outputs, while the changes in the automaton occur at a
unit interval after the application of input.
'Learning' automata can be categorised into two general distinct groups:
'deterministic', and 'stochastic'.

In each case, a further distinction may be

made, whether the automaton is 'fixed-structure' or 'variable-structure'.
Deterministic 'learning' automata with fixed-structure are those whose state
and output transition functions are deterministic, and although easy to
implement they are rigid in response and their adaptive qualities do not
improve with time.

On the other hand, deterministic 'learning' automata with

variable-structure could improve their learning abilities with exhaustive

,~
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implementation

becomes

extremely impractical and uneconomical.

The behaviour of a stochastic automaton can provide the type of variety
needed in 'learning systems'; and the necessary modification may be achieved
by changing the elements of the
Fixed-structure

stochastic

transition matrices of the aulomaton.

'learning'

automata

are

lhose

which

have

time-invariant stochastic processes determining their transitions; this class of
'learning' automata, with
deterministic in nature.

no los8 of generality,

can

be assumed

to be

The most widely used and the most suitable type of

automata for the modelling of learning is the variable-structure stochastic
type.

These automata have probabilistic transition functions (matrices) which

are updated as the process of learning evolves.

In the following, we will outline some examples of deterministic and
stochastic 'learning' automata, and also briefly discuss the relatively recent
concept of

'fuzzy

logic'

and

the application

of fuzzy-automata

to

the

modelling of 'learning systems'.

(i) - SEQUENTIAL DE'I'.lDfiNISTIC 'LEARNING' AUl'QlATA
Aleksander

(1976,1978)

discusses

the

wrm SIMPLE MlHEY

basis

for

a

EI..»IENTS

deterministic

variable-structure finite 'learning' automaton. A general schematic diagram of
such system is illustrated in FIG.4.8.
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FIGURE 4.8.

A trainable 'learning' automaton.

A distinction is made between 'combinational' and 'sequential' 'learning'
automata, the combinational 'learning' machines are discussed and various
types of decision making and classification schemes outlined; and some basic
elements of

such

systems,

in particular. Rosenblatt's 'perceptrons' are

described - this whole area will be more fully covered in a future section.
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sequential tlearning' automata are devised using some feedback

features from their outputs, they are able to compute and classify various
properties of their input patterns, as in the case of the combinational type
tlearning' automata.
suitable when the

However, these machines are considered to be more
notion of 'training' needs to be incorporated in an

automaton.
The 'learning' automata designed consist of a simple cellular network of
memory elements (RAMs).

Starting from an initial state, the automaton can

be trained to retain a pattern of input which was applied to it.

This trivial

kind of 'learning' can be achieved by activating the "teach" terminals of the
memory elements (RAMs), consequently, the automaton either moves into the
trained state after a unit interval, or, will change into the trained state after
a finite transitory steps, even though the actual training pattern has been
removed.

These automata are tentatively interpreted as being able to

perceive, recognise, remember, learn, and switch their attention.
(ti) - AUTOMATA-THEORETICAL 'LEARNING' IN NEURAL-NETS

Veelenturf

(1981)

adopts

an

automata-theoretical

investigations of learning in neural-nets.

approach

in

his

The described formal deterministic

variable-structure models of growing neural-networks are based on the
consideration of each element as an automaton, rather than a neuron-like
unit.

The 'learning' is achieved by choosing the correct behaviour from a

finite set of examples, this 'learning' process includes the equivalent notions
of memory and generalization or, in his words, the "abstracting of invariant
structures underlying a finite set of examples."
Neural-nets are described as finite automata whose each element has both
excitatory and inhibitory inputs, and can be defined by a neuronal equation
which represents its firing at any time.
Using some neurological evidence, it is argued that the learning process
brings about changes in the input-output behaviour of a net, and accordingly
in the automata-theoretical descriptions - in the form of the state diagram
and the state transition matrix of such learning and growing networks.

The

comparisons and the evaluations of the actual output of a net and the
required output is carried out outside the system.

The learning procedures

used results in the gradual improvement of the automaton's response to
stimuli in some desired way.

Approaches

The

neurological

phenomenon

to

used

Modelliat

as

the

of

Learai DC:

guiding

188

I'art-l

-

principle

is

the

observation that some cortical neurons can detect correlations between the
activities of different sets of fibers, and change their synaptic effectiveness
with correct response.

The described learning strategies translale thhi

observation to the analytical domain of automata-theory, by changing the
weighing values of the links in the state diagram of the automaton.
Two other fundamental assumptions are made.

Firstly, it is contended that

to learn from the correct examples of input-output behaviours, we should only
use the presently applied example to update and modify the automaton, rather
than store al1 correct input-output examples and then simultaneously assess
the information at the end of the learning period - it is thought that the
biological learning process is unlikely to have this second type of data
handling.
Secondly, by arguing against the two extreme learning methods of 'passive
memorization' (i.e., forming a state diagram at each stage which includes all
correct previous examples) and 'enumerative generalization' (i.e., finding a
state diagram at each stage which is the least complicated model fully
representing all correct previous examples), it is concluded that although with
each method we will eventually attain the goal automaton, a more appropriate
strategy would be one which adopts some essential features from both above
extreme procedures; this compromised strategy is called the

t

generalization

memorization method'.
Furthermore, the indications are that neither of the extreme processes are
involved in the neuronal level; since, with the first method, learning would be
limited only to what examples had been confronted previously, and for the
second method, it might become necessary to completely
network at each

stage of learning,

uneconomical and inefficient.

hence

both

rearrange the

strategies

seem

to be

Finally, it is suggested that this generalization

memorization method, tentatively stemming from neurological observations,
will be able to improve the speed of convergence of the learning process.

(iii) - STOCHASTIC AUTOMATA AS MODELS OF 'LEARNING SYSTEMS'
The ideas of stochastic automata have been applied in the implementation
of various 'learning systems', in particular, to 'learning' control systems - Fu
(1970), Glorioso (1975), Thathachar and Oommen (1983).

Similarly, stochastic

automata formulations can be applied to deterministic automata operating in
stochastic environments.

Some techniques have also been devised for the
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differentiation

into

a

deterministic component plus a 'random noise generator'.
Now,

without

actually

going

too

much

into

the

intricacies

of

the

mathematics involved, some of the basic concepts of stochastic 'learning'
automata will be outlined here, particularly as we shall be using some of
these formalizations in the later part of this work.

This outlook is, mostly,

from the control-system sciences point of view, but some psychological
concepts of various learning theories, such as Bush and Mosteller's (1951)
stochastic learning theories, have also been incorporated. In the following we
will be, mainly, dealing with the variable-structure type stochastic 'learning'

automata.
A stochastic automaton can be represented by a quintuple:-

Q

= (I,O,S,G,F).

I, 0, and S being finite sets of inJK.rt.s, outputs, and. states, respectively,

or:I

= {il, ••• , i .. } ,

o

= {01, ••• , 0.) ,

S

= {sl, ... ,Sq).

F and G are the next state and the next outpIt f\mOtions of the form:F:

SXI---->S,

and G: S---->O or G: SXI---->O,

and for every inprt i(n) and state s(n),

considered at

discrete instances

of time, the next state and output are:s(n+1) = F[s(n),i(n)],
In general,

0(n+1) = G[s(n+1)] = G[s(n),i(n)].

the function F is stochastic and the f\mOtion G mayor may not

be stochastic.

For each state-input pair, a probability pkl
to state
pkiJ

S,j

J

of transfer from

state 51

with input k is defined, or more formally:-

= Prob{ s(n+1)=s,; : s(n)=sl, and i(n)=k},

Also, for

any present

state si

the total

for all

i,j = l, ••• ,q.

sum of the probabilities of

transi tions is equal to one, or:
(""""IIq
,:,.,"

pk I J

= 1.

j=1
'!be above is the basic implementation
problem now

is to

try to

of a

stochastic automaton.

'!be

change the entries in the probability matrix of

transition'in such a way to bring about

'leaming'.

'!be general

such a state transition matrix, H, with r inputs is as follows:-

form of
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be fOtmd

transi tion
by simple

matrix
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a
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sequence

matrix multiplication

transi Hon probability matrices Ma ,Ma, , • • •
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..•

•

=
I

state

-

prll,. .,pr ••

I

Furthermore, the
ia ,ib, •..•. can

Modell I ••

..• .• ..•

,

·· · ·· ··

=

\0

I

of inputs

of their state

The output transition matrix can

also be considered in a similar stochastic fashion, however, for simplicity
reasons

the

output

matrix

binary

representing

proposed

be

to

deterministic

for most

For the special simple case of automata with only two

'learning' autanata.
value

is

inputs

of

pmishing

zero

one

and

reinforcement

from

(or

their

penalty)

environment,

"1 "

and "0" representing

reward, the transition matrix M becanes:-

pOll,.

Mo =

· .,pOlq
.

pill,.

,,
• · •
·
pO'I,.
· .,pOq,
I
I

case

of

the

. . . • ,pi"

Mt =

pI'I,.

It can be easily shown that
special

.,pI. ,

general

the

finite

deterministic

automata

are a

automata, with each ptl J being

stochastic

either one or zero, and each row of M having

all but

one of

the elements

equal to zero.
The various stochastic automata/environment configurations are displayed
For

in FIG.4.9.

randan

environments

(FIG.4.9a),

or

deterministic or

stochastic environments (FIG. 4. 9c and FIG. 4. ge) which vary much too quickly
in relation to an automaton's parameter

modifications, only

tentative and

non-optimal strategies have been developed - since such environments do not
have adequate features for making inferences.
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For the fixed deterministic environments of FIG.4.9b, the input of the
automaton is some function C of either its instantaneous output, or the
preceding

output

(depending

on

considered), in other words: i(n)

how

the

= C[o(n)]

environmental

, or

i(n)

reactions

are

= C[0(n-1)].

The relatively slow time varying deterministic environments (FIG.4.9c) can
be considered similar to the previous class of automata, and usually, the same
techniques may be applied.

In both cases, the function C is, generally,

associated with a 'performance evaluation' element, as shown in FIG.4.10.

i
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FIGURE 4.10.

A generalised learning stochastic automata/environment diagram,
showing the evaluation element intermediating between the
automaton and its environment.

The overall measure of the performance of an automaton is given by the
mathematical expectation of the negative reinforcements from the evaluation
element (penalties, punishments), or T.
A measure of learning efficiency has also been introduced, called the
'expediency' which is related to the closeness of the automaton's behaviour to
its optimal performance. Ideally, T

=

Toptiaah and the automaton is said to

have optimal performance.
Now, if the assumption is made that every output of an automaton
produces either a penalty (1) or a reward (0) from its environment; then, for
an automaton with a fixed or slowly varying stochastic environment (FIG.4.9d
and FIG.4.ge), the state
Ok

= G[Si))

Si

which deterministically leads to an output 011: (i.e.,

is said to be able to produce 'punishment' with the probability:h

= Prab{

or in oUler words, h

pmishment

given output

= Prob{ input=1

output=Ok }.

Ok

},

Approacllea '0 "odeill., of
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can be expressed

by:-

For this

special case,

at any

instant of

time the value of T, or the

expected penalty, becanes:-

r"'''''Uq

T

=

\

d~::,". .11

Ak

Prob { output=Ok

}

k=l
Also,if initially the

automaton

attached

equal

probabilities

to its

outputs then:\'''''''H q

Tinitial = l/q

l

Ak

HUliulluH

k=l
And, if T<Tiaitiai then the automaton is said to be 'expedient'.

Next, we consider how adaptation and learning may be manifested in such
systems.

If, the transition of a state

Si

to

S,j

results in an output

Ok

which,

in turn, produces a reward from the environment, then it is reasonable to
increase the probability of such transition occurring in future, and decrease
the probabilities of other transitions from
and all other probabilities Pix (where

Sl:

Sie

Bence, pi.; should be increased

is any state other than s.;) should be

decreased.

The above can constitute a simple mechanism for 'learning' in a stochastic
automaton -

the new transition matrix reflecting the information received

from the environment and the consequent self-improvement of the automaton.
An alternate approach to this problem is to modify the state probabilities

instead of the state transition probabilities -

the

probabilities for

the

automaton to be at each state; similarly. the modification of the input-output
probabilities (i.e., Prob{ Ot:ij }) could substitute the above criterion as the
learning strategy.

In general, the set of parameters 1m} of a matrix should be adjusted to
achieve the 'adapted' or the 'optimal' system structure.
priori information about the nature of vector

If there is no a

(mIt then.

usually, equal

probabilities are assigned to each state of the automaton.

If the performance of an automaton. as mentioned previously, is denoted
by T(m), then we are trying to find T(lDoptiaal).

This search for optimal
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performance can take several forms, depending on the complexity of the
system, and also if the system is free from random fluctuations or not.
There are
algorithms.

two

major classes of 'linear' and

'non-linear'

reinforcement

However, for some complex problems, it becomes too difficult to

devise appropriate analytic techniques, hence the so-called 'on-line' techniques
have been formulated.
Probability

updating

algorithms and

schemes,

as well as

classification, can also be distinguished into two general groups.

the

above

The first

group are the algorithms whose final probability vectors are dependent on the
initial probabilities of the automaton; while, in the
distribution of the limiting

second

group,

the

probabilities are independent of the initial

probabilities - the former being the more desirable feature.
Possibly,

the

simplest learning scheme is the

linear reward-penalty

algorithm. The probabilities of actions (state transitions, input-output, state)
are increased or decreased in a linearly proportional manner, depending on
reward or penalty from the environment.
Here, a simple linear reward-penalty algorithm will be described, the more
generalised non-linear form can also be developed in a similar fashion.
Suppose a stochastic automaton displays an output o(n) at time instant n
from a set of

{OhOZ' ••••••• ,o.};

and also there is a specific probability of PJ =

Prob{ o(n)=o,j } associated with each output o(n) at time n; also,

W;"I'·~nr.

m

~.

l"fi

pj (n)

= 1.

j=l
The interaction of this output with a random environment results in an
input i(n) of either zero (reward) or one (penalty) to the automaton.

Hence,

for each output a penalty probability is defined by:pl,;(n) = Prob{ i(n)=1 : o(n)=o,j },

for all

j

= 1,2,••• ,m.

The environment is thus characterised by a set of penalty probabilities
relating to each output; and hence the 'learning' can be manifested by
updating the output probabilities of the automaton on the basis of its
reinforcing inputs

(either 0 or 1).

distribution of pi,; is unknown.

In the beginning, the probability

And for the 'learning' to be successful, the

ApproacleB

lo

Modelli., of

LearDiD,

-

194

I'arl-l

automaton should ultimately choose the actions which lead to the smaller
values of pi,;.
A measure of the performance of the automaton, as mentioned before, is:r"""'ilm
~

T (n)

l pj
= rt..,,,,,,,,11

(n) pI J

j=l
Or the average penalty received at the instant n.
As before, the automaton is called 'expedient' if T(n)

< T(O);

and is said

to learn 'expediently', if as time tends towards infinity, the expected penalty
is less than T(O).
Finally, a simple probability updating procedure with two parameters

< 1,

A and B
PJ

(n+l)

A

and OJ denoting any output other than OJ, could be as follows:-

= Ap,; (n),
= BpJ (n),
= (I-B) + Bpj (n)
= (l-A) + Apj (n)

o(n)

if
if

o(n)

if

o(n)

if

o(n)

= OJ
= OJ
= OJ
= OJ
A

and

i(n)

and

i(n)

and

i(n)

and

i(n)

=1
=0
=1
=0

The above scheme will ensure that for each penalty the associated action
probabilities are reduced and other action probabilities are increased.
(iv) - FUZZY LOGIC AND FUZZY 'LEARNING' AUTOMATA
The relatively new concepts of 'fuzzy logic' and 'fuzzy sets' have been
applied

in

the

implementation

of various

automata-theoretic

models

of

'learning systems'. Some practical engineering applications of such techniques
have also been envisaged.
The theory of fuzzy logic states that an assertion can have an infinite
numbers of degrees of truth, represented by values between zero and one telling us how sure we are about a proposition such as "he is tall".

This is

different from assigning ordinary probabilistic logical values to assertions,
which tells us what chance there is of having an absolutely true value of an
assertion - in fuzzy logic, there is no absolute certainty about a proposition
being true (i.e., it is only true to some degree).

The concepts of fuzzy logic

have been particularly useful for relative notions such as temperature, height,
size, etc.

Fuzzy sets, loosely equated with the role of adjectives such as
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'very', 'much' and 'below' of ordinary language, can be constructed as the
basic quantifiers of fuzzy logic theory.
The formalization of fuzzy logic was introduced by Zadeh in the middle
1960's as an extension of Boolean logic to real-numbers; some equivalent
concepts of 'AND', 'OR', and 'NOT' operators were also defined for fuzzy
logic.
Zadeh

(1973)

describes the fuzzy approach as a

substitute for

the

quantitative techniques of system analysis; and argues that in view of the
inefficiency of computers in dealing with humanistic systems, possibly, this
new approach could tackle the high degrees of complexity of such systems
better than the conventional techniques.
variables' in

Be defines the so called 'linguistic

place of, or in addition to, numerical variables; and also

characterises the simple relations between such variables by 'fuzzy conditional
statements',

and

the

more

complex

relations

by

'fuzzy

algorithms'.

Furthermore, some 'compositional rules of inference' are devised which govern
the execution of fuzzy algorithms.

The principal use of fuzzy logic concepts

is seen to be in the simulation of the behaviour of ill-defined or complex
systems where precise descriptions are not readily available.
Fuzzy logic

ideas

engineering and A.I.

have

found

some

useful practical applications in

But, it should be pointed out that various philosophical,

theoretical, and practical objections have also been voiced.

For example, it is

argued that the 'context' of an assertion should also be taken into account,
since it may influence and distort the objectivity of a fuzzy logic formulation.
Wee and Fu (1969) formulate a class of fuzzy automata based on Zadeh's
Such fuzzy automata behave in a

fuzzy set concepts.
deterministic

automata;

stochastic automata.

yet,

many

of

their

properties

similar way to
are

identical

to

The inputs, outputs, and internal states of these fuzzy

automata are defined as ordinary sets of finite numbers of points, while, the
state and output transition functions are defined using fuzzy connotations. A
non-supervised
formulation

'learning

system'

of fuzzy automata.

is

proposed

which

is

based

The model is also applied

on

this

to various

engineering problems in pattern classification and control systems, and the
computer simulation of a fuzzy 'learning' automaton undertaken.
Kitajima and Asai (1973), also, describe a fuzzy 'learning' automaton based
on a similar formulation as above. They apply various learning algorithms and
search techniques to the finding of the optimum performance of control
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systems with unknown characteristics. Such variable slructure fuzzy automata
are further investigated by means of computer simulations.

4.5 CYBERNETIC APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS'

Cybernetics originated from an engineering point of view, assimilating
biological systems with electronic or mechanical devices; and al its outset,
was, mainly, involved with tackling control problems in systems.

Later, it

was recognised as an all encompassing discipline, and was closely related to
and overlapped a number of different subjects, including computing-theory,
communications-theory ,

decision-theory,

logic,

biology,

psychology,

and

numerous secondary areas such as linguistics, semantics, medicine, education,
industry, management, economics, physiology, etc.

Later, the interaction of

cybernetics and computers also created many applied disciplines which have
developed in their own right.

Not all cybernetic workers call themselves

"cyberneticians", yet, many of them acknowledge that they are working in the
area of interest covered by the science of Cybernetics.

Cybernetics promised and proposed the idea of having a universal scientific
language for

explaining and

exchanging

various

notions.

However, as

discussed in sections 3.3.5 and 3.6.1 dealing with the development and the
methodologies of this subject, a common analytical language has not been
forthcoming so far.

The various mathematical developments discussed in

chapter three (e.g., set-theory, logic-theory, probability-theory, neural-nels)
\>,Thich are used in the implementation of cybernetic models, in spite of being
quite useful in specific domains, do not show the exactness and the generality
needed in dealing with a wide range of problems.
An important observation about the science of Cybernetics is that for
many purposes it does not distinguish between living and non-living syslems,
and it believes lhat various formal mathematical theories can be effectively
applied to inanimate, biological, and social systems on equal basis.

Ideally,

cybernetics, in explaining the issues of control and communication, would
need a mathematical language analogous to the Newtonian descriptions of the
dynamics of interacting objects. Whereby, such a hypothetical language would
be able to formally predict and explain the behaviour of all directive systems
by using an axiomatic set of rules.

These rules being equally applicable to

the inanimate interactions in machines or systems, the biological processes,
and the behavioural and mental processes of animals.

So far, probably 'logic'

has come closest to this notion of a cybernetic universal language.
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As well as lacking in a unified explanatory language, cybernetics hus also
suffered from the extensiveness of its applications and the ubiquity of its
ideas.

It has been found that the definition of cybernetics can be extended

to cover such a wide field that very few scientific disciplines ure wholely
excluded from it.

The argument being that anything involving the concepts

of 'feedback', 'control', and
cybernetics.

'communication'

qualifies

to be incJuded in

Because of this diversity, many of the cybernetically oriented

subjects have drifted away from the mainstream of cybernetics, and formed
into distinct and independent research fields with no apparent reference to
their originating paradigm or its underlying goals.
The definition of cybernetics has gradually become more imprecise (and
sensationalised at times), and probably as a result, attracted workers from
many diverse disciplines.

It has also become a convenient label for usc by

many interdisciplinary researchers.

But, in general, cyberneticians have

strived towards the forma1ising of observations rather than giving qualitative
explanations;

and

have

been

more

interested

speculative) rather than elaborate working models.

in

'principles'

(sometimes

Furthermore, cybernetics

has managed to unify the frame of reference of the descriptions of the living
and the artificial processes.
The term 'Bionics' has also been introduced referring to the methodology
of applying biological knowledge to engineering problems.

Bionics, as a

discipline, was established in the early 1960's (in the United States), but has
not flourished to a great extent; it has been, mainly, involved in the studies
of systems whose functions were based on or resembled to that of the living
systems, in other words, the imitations of life functions.

Allhough, the

definition of cybernetics encompasses bionics, it has been suggest.ed t.hat
cybernetics is more interested in the studies of living systems by the use of
concepts of inanimate systems, while, bionics is more interested in the studies
and the applications of biological concepts to other syst.ems. However, such a
distinction will not be pursued here and all such models will be discussed in
the context of cybernetics.
According to George (1977): " ••• models, both in hardware and software, are
a vital part of the driving force underlying cybernetics. to

There are, in

general, three basic types of cybernetic models: 'hardware', 'mathematical',
and 'descriptive'; in addition, cybernetic models are characterised by a certain
'efficiency' and 'precision' of application within a particular domain (i.e., they
should be accurate and workable).
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In the following section, we will outline some historical and developmental
aspects of relevant cybernetic models, and discuss some examples in more
detail, in particular, those involving the concepts of 'self-adaptation' and
'learning'.

The cybernetic 'learning systems' included here are those which

because of their particular terminologies, manifestations, or formal notations,
have not been included in the other catagories of our classification of
'learning systems'.

Although, many of the other approaches to 'learning

systems' discussed could be considered as sub-divisions of the cybernetic
approach.

4 .5.1 CYBERNETICS AND 'I1IE KlDELLING OF

nm

BRAIN. BHHAVIOOR AND INTELLIGENCE

The basic underlying assumption of cybernetic ideas is that humans and
animals are essentially kinds of complex machines; and hence, in principle, it
is possible to construct some artificial models which behave in a similar
manner.

This mechanistic behaviouristic view stems from the implicit beliefs

of the sciences of biology and physiological psychology.

The tendencies of

cyberneticians, as behavioural scientists, seem to have been towards one of
the following two general directions:(a) -

Understanding and simulating human and animal behaviour and
underlying mechanisms involved by devising or utilising precise
analytical formalisations.

(b) - Developing and synthesising various systems and machines for specific
tasks which can, usually, outperform humans in some aspect.s.
An attempt to model the brain in its entirety, irrespective of the triviality
of the model components, will be an immensely difficult task.

Hence, all

work in this field has concentrated on specific areas of the brain, or on a
specific principle involved in the nervous syst.em.

Examples are the models of

the 'reticular formation', the 'cerebellum', 'eye-brain systems', Iperception',
lassociative-memory', etc.
The essence of the science of Cybernetics is the concept of information
and it.s implications in systems (i.e., coding, storage, noise, control, feedback,
etc.).

One of the original commitment of cybernetics was to model human

behavioural and cognitive properties using some simple information processing
models of neurons (i.e., neural-nets); this type of modelling did not entail a
precise understanding of the physiology of nerve-cells, but a simple on-off
analogue would be used.

Later, the above conceptualization was also applied

to the syntheses of some specific mechanisms of the brain (e.g., memory
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George (1973) outlines the following as the basic types of

formation).

cybernetic models involving the brain and the behaviour:(1 )

- Models of visual systems.

(2)

- Classification models.

(3)

- Conditional probability, counting and associative models.

(4)

- Information processing models of particular biological systems.

(5)

- Memory storage models.

(6)

- Models of motivational systems.

(7)

- Natural language programming.

(8)

- Inference-making and theorem-proving programs.

(9)

- Models using heuristic methods.

(10) -

Various formal psychological and neuro-physiological theories as models
for learning processes and mechanisms.

(11) -

Analytical, abstract, or
machinery.

hardware

models

based

on

computational

At the outset of science of Cybernetics, Wiener, as well as introducing
ideas such as tfeedback', 'entropy', 'information', and 'stable-state' to the
study of organisms, had drawn parallels between the brains and computers.
The resemblances seen between the computer and the cybernetic view of the
brain are not points of much significance; however. it is assumed that, in
principle, the brain can be synthesised and simulated on computers.
The

various

cybernetic

analogues

of

the

brain

in

the

form

of

switching-networks, neural-nets, finite-automata, digital computers, etc., in
spite of giving a very limited view of the mechanisms of the brain, have made
useful contributions to the understanding of some aspects of the workings of
the nervous-systems.
such

as

In particular, the organizational aspects of the brain,

'classification',

autonomously

defined

'memory

functional

storage',
subsystems

'generalization' ,
of

the

understood much better by the use of above analogies.

brain,

and

other

have

been

But, in cybernetics.

the emphasis has been, mainly, away from the higher 'semantic' and 'symbolic'
representations of inputs and outputs, and more towards the raw analysis of
information.
In the early 1950's, mathematicians such as von-Neumann and Kleene had
proposed that mathematical models could be abstracted from the available
neuro-physiological evidence.

Von-Neumann saw the utility in the two-way

interactions of concepts of 'natural' and 'artificial' organizations, and believed
that the observations in one domain could be beneficial or applicable to the
other. Cybernetics has been. generally, occupied with problems based on such
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endeavours; but, relatively, more emphasis is given to the applications of
artificial criteria to the natural domain.
The

behaviour

of

these

models could

be analyzed

in

their

precise

mathematical domain, however, the task of translating and equuting of these
analytical results to the actual neuronal processes was envisaged as the renl
challenge

of

this

neural-nets

were

approach.

Some McCulloch

discussed

previously,

and

but

Pitts

many

type

other

learning

cybernet.ic

mathematically based models of learning mechanisms have also been devised.
Numerous workers have attempted to apply the concepts of 'feedback' and
'system-t.heory' to the motor control mechanisms of animals and humans.

The

spinal cords are considered as the primary centre for such processes in the
body, but other regions of the nervous systems have a directing or modulating
effect on the activities of the spinal cords.

The motor control systems

identified have, generally, a hierarchical nature of organization.

Similarly,

many researchers have been engaged in the identification of perceptual and
cognitive sub-systems of the higher processes of the nervous systems; and
have devised computer simulations or other descriptive representations of
their models.
The cybernetic approach to the brain studies (as opposed to the A.I.
approach), or according to Arbib (1972) the brain theory approach to the
metaphor of "humans are machines", is heavily reliant on data obtained from
biological and psychological observations. But he sees a definite place for the
'mathematico-deductive' methods of investigations of the brain, alongside the
empirical observations of neurology and psychology. For Arbib the essence of
perception and learning, in the brain or the machine, is the processing of
information

based

on

action-oriented

computations

taking

place

in

'somatotopically' (preserving information) organised networks.
However, some of the mathematical abstractions of the brain mechanisms
seem to be very remote from their 'natural' counterparts. The gap between a
cybernetic model and the subject it is trying to model is hardly surprising,
since, normally, cybernetic tools are used to implement a conjecture which
itself does not accurately represent a phenomenon - for example, in the
neural-net

representations

of

a

neuro-physiological

theory

of learning

mechanisms, such as Rebb's cell assembly theory.
Minsky (1968) acknowledges that the science of Cybernetics is the original
forerunner of the majority of current trends in machine intelligence.

In a
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brief account of the history of machine intelligence, he outlines the course of
the development of the science of Cybernetics; and describes how
introduction

of

general-purpose

computers

resulted

in

the

the

division

of

cybernetics into three main avenues.
Firstly, the
approach

main cybernetic search for

leading

into

the

'self-organizing' systems.

simple basic principles; this

investigations of

the

so called

'minimal'

or

A paradigm of this approach was to devise

collections of, generally, similar components that if arranged in specified
structures and placed in an appropriate environment would eventually behave
in an adaptive fashion, and hopefully display intelligent behaviour.

The

'learning' models classified within this first approach included the vurious
'learning machines', 'adaptive' or 'self-organizing' networks, and 'automatic'
or 'learning' control systems. However, in r-Unsky's view, the results of these
undertakings were disappointing, and the explanations inconclusive, since, the
systems developed worked quite well on simple specific problems but their
performance deteriorated rapidly as the tasks assigned got harder, or the
range of tasks were extended.
Minsky goes on to describe the second and the third directions of the
development of the original cybernetic ideas as: 'cognitive simulation' and
'artificial intelligence', respectively.
simulation

approach

on

the

He is similarly critical of the c:ognitive

basis of its

limitations

complexity and the diversity of human behaviour.
principal

proponents

of

the

A.I.

approach,

he

in

expressing

the

Finally, as one of the
promotes

the

'semantic

information processing' outlook as the most promising route of enquiry;
workers in this field attempt to build intelligent machines without actually
having any prejudice towards biological, simple, or humanoid manifestations.
Most of the "mainstream" A.I. researchers do not consider themselves aH
cyberneticians.

Their 'learning' models almost eXGludes any direct 'learning'

from raw experience, and, mainly, use an external teacher (perhaps with some
exceptions; e.g., Samuel's or Andraea's work).
Many philosophical issues can be raised when discussing the nature of
'intelligence'; including the paradox of "how the brain can study itself". But,
assuming

that

non-biologically
information

the

notion

dependent

received

by

of

'intelligence'

criteria,
an

based

organism,

can
on

then

be

defined

by

certain

the manipulations of
the

original

definition

the
of

'Cybernetics' by Wiener (1948) would imply that the concept of 'intelligence'
. has an important relevance to the science of Cybernetics.

Hence, the
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question "can intelligent machines and systems be made" can be considered at:;
one of the central issues in cybernetics.
The higher temporal capabilities of humans have been the prIncipal subject
of interest for the cybernetically oriented model-builders in disciplines such
as

'computer-sciences',

'pattern-recognition', etc.

'psychology',

'A.I.',

'cognitive

psychology',

Although, some dedicated hardware machines have

been built to simulate various cognitive aspects, in general, these class of
cybernetic models have been based on the electronic digital computers.
'Problem-solving',

'theorem-proving',

'classification',

'discovery',

'decision-making', and 'emotional' properties are some of the major themes in
this area.
At the higher semantic and symbolic processing levels of information,
models

have

been

devised

'question-answering',

which

display

'language-translating',

capabilities

such

as:

'speech-recognition',

'text-reading', 'music-composing', 'story-composing', etc. This class of models
will be discussed in the A.I. section.
It must be pointed out, that although the 'intelligence' shown by some of

these machines is, at times, quite astounding; and even, it can be envisaged
that some such machines will in future pass Turing's criteria for intelligence,
nevertheless, there might not be any actual 'learning' involved in their
processes.
On the other hand, as seen from our analysis of learning so far, the
concept of learning is a very relative notion, depending on context and
performance; and even the simple

register~ng

of a pattern on a photographic

plate can be interpreted as a form of trivial 'learning' of a visual input which
can be reproduced later.

Hence, in a stricter sense, 'learning' machines

should be characterised by features that bear more resemblance to our
common conception of the definition of learning.
An analogy often made in literature when discussing the possible methods
of devising 'intelligent' cybernetic models is the way man has managed to
solve the problem of artificial flight - whereby, the problem was solved by
means other than mimicking the natural wing-flapping behaviour of birds and
insects.

Hence, it is thought that the precise copying of the actual

mechanisms of the brain is a futile task, and only some general principles
which are appropriate to the specific class of models should be included in
the design.
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Historically, it has been the case that once a machine is devised to
achieve a specific human-based task in a proficient and expert manner, and
the ambiguities of a problem is solved, such as the playing of expert games of
'checkers' or 'backgammon', then the behaviour of the machine is no longer
considered 'intelligent'.
If this argument is pursued for the future expert machines which will be

able to display many of the intellectual faculties of humans, then we can
foresee that even the most human-like machines will never be considered as
'intelligent'.

Hence, in that sense, the true 'artificial intelligence' may be

unattainable.
4.5.2 CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' MODELS

The cybernetic approach to 'learning systems' has been striving towards
the 'universalization' rather than the 'specialization' of the principles involved
in the learning process.

This alternative approach can be used as a way of

analyzing

process

the

learning

which

supplements

disciplines

such

as

psychology, ethology, and physiology.
Pask (1963) surveys the field of modelling of learning, and distinguishes
the various types of cybernetic approaches to this problem.

He points out

that cybernetic model-builders have been involved with both psychological
(behaviour

oriented)

and

physiological

(mechanism oriented)

domains of

interest.
The challenge of making true 'learning' machines and systems, which could
ultimately become more intelligent than man, has constantly fascinated and
occupied the minds of cyberneticians.

A variety of cybernetic models have

already been outlined in this chapter; but, because of their particular
characterization of problems or the use of a specific formal language, such
models were discussed in the independent context of their methodology.
The definition of cybernetics, however, covers a much wider range of
models; here, we will attempt to list the typical characteristics of cybernetic
'learning' models in very general terms, without actually referring to specific
classes of 'learning systems' J

and without implying that all cybernetic

'learning' models should necessarily have such features.
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(1)

- Cybernetic techniques are applied to the simpler forms of the learning
process based on the lower levels of the nierarchy of learning in
animals.

(2)

- 'Learning' is, normally, manifested without an external 'teacher' or
'supervisor't and the source of learning is the past experiences.

(3)

- Most cybernetic 'learning' models involve the property of 'feedback';
in other word, they can evaluate their own outputs and recognise their
own mistakes.

(4)

- The \,rincipal questions raised about the elements of a system are
'what and 'why' they achieve something, rather than 'how' they
achieve it or 'what' they represent.

(5)

- Although, natural systems are not exactly duplicated as far as their
mechanisms are concerned, the biological processes often provide the
guiding principles.

(6)

- The comRarisons of the behaviour and the performance of cybernetic
'learning models against biological systems, and the use of 'natural'
terminologies, are quite prevalent.

(7)

- A cybernetic description, normally, involves a formal non-semantic
mathematical langua,lte; generally, entailing a quantification of the
concept of 'informatIOn'.

(8)

- Hardware models are, normallyleconstructable from the abstractions of
a 'learnin~' model, and are of' n used for purposes of demonstration
and experImentation.

(9)

- While, cybernetic 'learning' models are not, generally, based on
computers, there is a widespread use of computers as tools for the
simulation of cybernetic ideas.

(10) - It is believed that the use of simple cybernetic principles of trivial
'learning' models will lead to the abstraction of different and more
complex classes of sy-stems; hence, these principles are thought to be
applicable to many different levels of enquiry.
Another important point which should be emphasised here is that, so far,
there has been no indication that any of the hardware or software cybernetic
'learning' models have had direct influences on the furthering of our
understanding of the natural learning prOcesses or mechanisms; unless, of
course, the 'pure' simulation of these biological phenomena is the objective of
modelling.
The researchers who set out by, initially, incorporating some 'living'
phenomena in their work, usually, get engulfed in the intricacies of their
formalisations or

their hardware constructs; and,

later, only

relatively

insignificant (and sometimes superficial) parallels are made between the
subsequent behaviours of their models and the processes in the natural
domain.

Although, undeniably, this kind of research has contributed a great

deal to some practical disciplines; yet, the cumbersome use of 'living' criteria
for such ends is still difficult to Justify.
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4.5.3 CYBERNETIC MACIDNES AND HARDWARE MODELS
The history of simple counting or calculating machines goes back many
centuries.

The earliest machines were, probably, the ancient Chinese 'abacus'

type devices; later elaborated by early calculating machines, such as those of
Pascal and Leibniz in the 17th century. In the late 18th century, some simple
programmable mechanical machines were also introduced which used a series
of perforated cards as their programs.
Babbage's (1792-1871) calculating machine (Analytical Engine), which was
to be the first truly 'learning machine', was never realised, but his ideas
signified the start of the modern era of computing and logical machinery, and
the search for 'intelligent' machines.
Cybernetic

machines which

could

realise

the

mathematical inferential

nature of a logical formula in some hardware form date back to at least the
early 19th century.

Various examples of such machines are described by

Nemes (1969), mostly capable of solving a specific logical problem; the early
versions were, generally, mechanically operated, but later on, electrical or
electronic components

were also incorporated.

These machines can

be

considered as forerunners of today's electronic computers which can easily be
programmed to solve logical or propositional calculus problems. Another class
of logical machines evolved were mainly concerned with the simplification or
the minimising of logical expressions, or the economical design of switching
circuits.

Some of these machines, in a trivial sense, 'learned' to 'recognise'

classes of inputs, and 'concluded' causal relations from logical truth tables.
The trend in the development of hardware models has been from the basic
fully predictable models which simulate simple theories to the more elaborate
constructions that are not fully deterministic a priori. In the latter stages of
their evolution, the electronic or computer based models have almost totally
dominated this area of science.

The precise behavioural details of complex

hardware models are not, normally, known to their constructors in advance.
Although, even in the case of a simple hardware model, certain interactions
of the machine with its environments might result in some unforeseen
patterns of behaviour.
Various theoretical issues and the possible constructability of different
classes of abstract machines have been investigated
theorists and other

mathematicians~

by many automata

Another issue of importance which must

be recognised here is that all hardware models could, in principle, be
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programmed on a digital computer, with a complete description of the machine
and its environment realised in software by an equivalent computer program.
But, unless some sort of abbreviations of the physical descriptions are used,
great difficulties with the speed and the memory size of the simulation will
be encountered - if the variety and the sheer amount of environmental and
machine information is to be represented accurately.
Machines and robots have been developed that either under the direct
control of a human operator, or in a toy-like imitative fashion, will try to
duplicate

some

motor

functions

of

living

beings.

But,

of cybernetic

importance are those machines which, almost in an autonomous way, show
some simple levels of adaptation and variability, and also bear some relevance
to the natural sysLems.

Hardware models, although interesting phenomena in

their own rights, need to have a high degree of complexity to be of real
interest from the point of view of a psychologist or cognitive scientist.
Many cybernetic hardware machines have also been built to copy various
specific subsystems or properties of living organisms (plants, animals, and
humans).

The

principle

of

'self-reproduction'

and

the

'phylogenetic'

developments of living entities have been simulated by some physical, as well
as abstract, models; examples are the self-reproducing cellular type automata,
introduced

by

von-Neumann.

Other

'purposive',

'goal-directed',

or

'motivational' behavioural simulations, generally, involving the concepts of
'pain-aversion'

and/or

'pleasure-seeking',

have

also

been

carried

out.

Furthermore, the science of 'robotics' has been established as a direct
consequence of the desire to build machines which mimic functions of life.
When assessing a cybernetic hardware model, it is, probably, as important
to enquire the motivations of its designer, and the goals the model is trying
to achieve, as it is to evaluate the complexity and the intricacy of the
model's

behaviour.

A researcher

may

simply want

to incorporate the

'state-of-art' technology in his model, or solve a specific engineering problem;
on the other hand, some workers try to simulate a particular principle, or
display a specific pattern of natural behaviour.

As the attention of cybernetic researchers has been increasingly focusing
on the more complex subjects, there has been a gradual move away from the
construction of hardware models; and software models and computer programs
have been more favoured
economy.

because of their relative ease of design and

Yet, the important instructive and demonstrative qualities of

physical models cannot be denied.
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4.5.4 CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' HARDWARE MACHINES
Cyberneticians believe the conjecture that every aspect of learning, or
other features of intelligence, can, in principle, be precisely described, and
consequently lead to the construction of machines which simulate lhese
descriptions.
As to what are the most important principal characteristics which should
be included in a simple learning-machine.

Firstly, it should have a behaviour

which is nol totally predicted or determined by its designer.

Secondly, lhe

learning-machine should be able to make a 'generalization' or 'inference' on
the basis of the 'frequency', the 'contiguity', or the 'value' of its experiences
- this feature implying a storage of information (or memory) capability, and
also a 'judgement' or 'motivational' facility.

Thirdly, the learning-machine

should, according to its incoming and stored information, take appropriate
actions which will reflect an 'improvement of performance'.
However, the above characterization does not necessarily imply thal a
pre-wired machine with a fixed program will not be able to display the main
features

of

the

learning

process;

a

'randomness' could be incorporated in

'contingency',
lhe

'conditionality',

or

design, which will allow lhe

machine to behave in the desired 'learned' manner.
In practice, the 'learning-machines' that have been designed so far do not
just reiterate the abstract theories imbedded

in their blue-prints, but

genuinely surprise their designers, by the unforeseen capabilities and novelties
of their behaviour - due to their interactions with environment, or other
interferences. In some cases, the interest is directed towards discovering the
full potentialities of the constructed machine, be it to simply prove all
possible theories based on the logical consequences of a set of assumptions
and a set of rules of inference (e.g., 'perceptrons')
Some cybernetic machines, in loosely arranged structures, can in facl
behave in a

learning or adaptive fashion, if placed in an appropriate

environment.

But, although such machines have not resulted in a general

theory of intelligence, nevertheless they have made considerable contributions

to some fields of engineering, control, and the design of feedback regulatory
systems.
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are

predominantly fixed in their actual physical structure, and the modifiability of
natural neuronal mechanisms of the learning process is not, in general,
depicted in such models -

although, if the atomic level of changes are

considered, then it can be argued that there is, in fact, a

structural

modification of the machine or the computer circuit.
Indeed, in future, it may be discovered that the feature of growth and
change are essential characteristics of the structure of any true 'learning'
entity.

However, presently, the 'fixed structure' pre-wired models are

thought to be capable of adequately representing all behaviour displayed by
the 'modifiable structure' or 'growth' models.
(i) - HARDWARE l'DDELS OF SIMPLE INNATE BEHAVIOOR AND OONDITIONING

Nemes

~S

(1969) describes some simple models which were used for the

investigation of the 'process of choice' and 'instinctive behaviour' in animals.
In one example, Luxe's (1920's) simple model of instinctive feeding behaviour
of a protozoan, an electro-mechanical model is outlined which is capable of
showing some properties of learning and remembering according to the
Pavlovian conditioning criteria.
other mechanisms, based on the concept of 'negative feedback control',
have also been devised which by controlling an error function are able to
keep the course of their behaviour within some defined pathways.

An

example of this type of machine was the "Philip dog" (1920's) which, on the
principle of negative feedback from its two photocells, could operate two
motors in such a way as to keep the mechanical dog on track lowards a light
source.
A later version of these primitive machines was Walter's (1950) "Machina
Speculatrix", this machine was capable of demonstrating the interesting
property of 'photo taxis' of animals, in a simple electronic device with few
components; however, it lacked the capability to 'learn'. This tortoise-shaped
electro-mechanical cybernetic machine could randomly move around a room
and if a light source was detected by its photocell, depending on the
intensity of the light, would

steer towards or away from

the light -

simulating the innate reflexive behaviours of an animal which explores its
surroundings and seeks out tfavourable' conditions.

The shell of the

"tortoise" was connected to a touch sensing switch which upon hitting an
obstacle would send the machine into a tsearch' mode.
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The interesting behavioural patterns of these machines were in fact only a
consequence of their

'clever' design features,

and

no real information

processing, in the accepted 'contextual' sense of the word, was carried out.
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FIGURE 4.11.

I

(b)

I

(a) - A

functional block diagram of Machina-Speculatrix's
behaviour; two reflex systems determine all Ule activities
of the machine.
(b) - A block diagram of the functions of Machina-Docilis
showing how the light or the touch reflex could be
conditioned to the sound of the whistle - the 'u' gate
of the 'learning system' fully establishes the connection
S2--->Rl as the number of the coincidences of the two
stimuli exceed a certain limit over a specific period.

A simple block diagram of the reflex reactions of Machina-Speculatrix is
drawn in FIG.4.11(a).

The two stimuli could have priority ordering, whereby,

if both occurred simultaneously, one could override the second stimulus; or

alternately, their responses could oscillate. In Machina-Speculatrix, the touch
input had priority over the light input.
Although, the behaviour of the tortoises were totally deterministic, many
novel and unpredictable manifestations of such machines within different
environments were observed; and various 'natural' interpretations of their
behaviour in terms of 'feeding', 'searching', 'avoiding' J 'hunger', etc. were
elaborated.

In some experiments, even the 'social' interactions of two or

more of these devices, each having a

mounted light source, were also

investigated.
Walter's (1953) 'Cora' (COndition Reflex Analogue) machine was a simple
response

conditioning device.

Be used the

'black

transmission engineers to design this machine.

box' techniques of

Initially, it would only

respond to a light stimulus by flashing a neon tube, however, after the
conditioning was complete, the sound of a whistle (the conditioned stimulus)
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Walter devised his Cora

alone could elicit the flash of the neon tu be.

machine on the basis of the evidence provided from physiological psychology;
but as pointed out by him, at times, many speculations were made regarding
the actual mechanisms of the living brains in terms of the "explicit clarities"
of the model.
Although, no physiological evidence could support such inferences. lIe also
considered that one of the most important issues arising from the design of
the Cora machine was the realization that three types of analogue 'memory'
were seemingly necessary: (a) - a very short 'prolongation' of the effect of
neutral stimulus (iconic memory); (b) -

H

the 'summation' of the combined

effects of several neutral and specific stimuli (STM); (c) - the 'activation and
preservation' over a long period of the conditioned reflex (LTM), this type of
memory is also reinforced by further coincidences of stimuli.
The basic 'strengthening' and 'forgetting' characteristics of a conditioned
reflex were also incorporated, by having a kind of statistical relation between
the number of occurrences of the stimuli S1 and S2, and the establishment of
the association between them.

Hence, the design of the circuits stipulated

that only significant coincidences of these stimuli would enable the stimulus
S2 to evoke the response Rl by itself.
Walter differentiated between the various processes involved and defined
seven distinct operations for the above process.

The electronic circuits built

on such basis consisted of a summing element which after a certain number
of coincident inputs

would

trigger

a

positive

feedback

oscillator;

this

oscillator, representing the establishment of the conditioned reflex, had a
damping component, and its response would eventually die out -

hence,

representing the extinguishing (or forgetting) of the conditioned reflex, unless
additional reinforcement was applied by further training.
The seven operations involved in the manifestation of the conditioning
(associative learning) process in Cora, or according to Walter "the seven steps
from chance to meaning," are shown in FIG.4.12.
At the next logical step, Walter developed another device called "Machina
Docilis"

(teachable), similar to Machina Speculatrix but with the added

circuitry of Cora which enabled it to manifest a simple Pavlovian (classical)
refiex conditioning (or associative learning).

The conditioning of the sound

of a whistle with the ON state of the light or touch detecting sensors could
result in the sound of the whistle alone evoking 'direction seeking' or
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The behaviour of the machine is outlined

by the block diagram of FIG.4.11(b).
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FIGURE 4.12.

S2
R1
The seven stages involved in the establishment of a
conditioned reflex in a Cora machine.

But, as emphasised by their designer, these models were only a low-level
'first approximation' of a single conditioned refiex behaviour, and many of the
'natural' features of conditioning process, such as the 'inhibition' of a
response, were not included in the design.

Hence, any comparisons between

these simple models and living creatures would be purely specuJative.
Walter

(1953) also discusses the feasibility of constructing artificial

nervous systems, and concludes that the building of identical number of
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neuronal mechanisms with appropriate interconnections is an implausible
undertaking.

And also suggests that the elaborations of cerebral functions

are, possibly, derived from the "richness of their interconnections," rather
than the sheer number of units involved.
of a hypothetical simple animal with a

His experimental hardware models
brain having only two cells, yet

capable of showing seven different modes of existence, were a demonstration
of this conjecture.

But, it was foreseen that constructing the more complex

models on such simple principles might lead to instability problems.
Angyan

(1959)

describes

an

analogue

hardware

model,

'Machinu

Reproductrix', based on Walter's models, to demonstrate some aspects of
neuronal adaptation.

This mobile three-wheeled electro-mechanical device

could also simulate the conditioned reflex behaviour of animals, using three
types of inputs.

But, the characteristics of such natural processes were

depicted more accurately in these machines.

The psychological notions of

'habituation', 'generalization', 'spontaneous recovery', and 'neurotic behaviour',
omitted in Waller's Cora machine, were incorporated (in a trivial sense) in
Machina Reproductrix.

However, Angyan saw the principle contribution of

such simple analogues in their usefulness in clarifying various biological and
psychological terminologies.
Another class of conditioning devices have also been devised, primarily for
the purposes of demonstration and teaching in psychological sciences.
example was Hoffman's (1962) 'analogue lab.' -

a simple electronic device

made up of switches, capacitors, resistors and batteries.
a

It could be used as

basic model of simple reflex conditioning mechanisms

response of a dog).

An

(e.g., salivation

The device was found to be able to illustrate or

duplicate many aspects of results obtained from experiments on living animals.
In the 1950's and early 1960's, numerous other researchers endeavoured to
build tortoise-type electro-mechanical, non-computer based, versions of these
machines to simulate instinctive and simple conditioned behaviour of animals
machines.

The more recent computer based examples of such devices (the

'mobile robots') will be discussed in the next chapter in the context of
'learning robots'.
Young (1973) by taking into account various engineering considerations,
describes a 'learning' machine which has a sort of associative memory.

His

basic criteria of the design of such 'learning' machines are: (1) - detecting
and recording of the coincidences between the occurrences of a number of
stimuli; (2) - making some use (deductions and inferences) of these stored
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information; (3) - having a probabilistic basis; (4) - having 'reinforcing' and
'forgetting' characteristics; and (5) - being capable of extension to higher
number input machines.

The frequencies of the occurrences of inputs are

calculated on the 'joint probability' basis, rather than 'conditional probability'
basis of 'learning' machines such as Uttly's - the justification given is the
'economy' in the necessary storage devices.
Based on the above criteria, hardware 'learning' machines called "Astra"
were constructed; these devices were able to show the reflex conditioning of
inputs (photocells) in a similar manner to Walter's Cora machine; however,
they had some additional 'forgetting' and 'inhibition' features.

The Astra

'learning' machines were also simulated on computers, and various industrial
and

engineering applications were envisaged, especially in

the field

of

automation and robotics.
(ii) - CYBERNETIC MAZE-ooLVING AND 'IRIAL &. HlR:R

.~,

MAammS

Attempts to create machines which could imitate other simple aspects of
animals' learning behaviour have also been made.

Ross's (1933) machine and

Wallace's (1952) (computer operated) machine, were both based on the simple
trial and error learning of tram-like creatures, running in a system of tracks;
these machines could find their goals by 'exploring' and 'discovering' the
correct

path

through

'choice points'.

maze-running

machine

is

the

most

But,

probably Shannon's

prominent

example of this

(1951)

type

of

machines.
The

procedure

for

finding

a

maze

can

be

easily

formalised

by

a

mathematical algorithm, and after this stage, it is a simple enough tash: to
construct a

machine which can 'learn'

remembering its previous moves.

to

go

through

a

5x5 maze

by

These machines, in fact, demonstrate the

apparent simplicity of some of the lower types of learning processes; in the
mean time, they do not really lead us to generalizations which are applicable
to the more complex learning behaviours.
Shannon's electro-mechanical "mouse" could find its way round an arbitrary
maze, by seemingly learning through trial and error.

This simple digital

device had obstacle detecting sensors and action-programming and memory
relays which could register the sequence of correct solutions on the basis of
a systematic search. It searched a grid (maze), and 'learned' or 'remembered'
the correct 'pathway' through the maze towards a goal.

Once the solution

was found ('learned'), the 'mouse' could transverse the maze in a few seconds
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It could also show 'forgetting', if the situation was

changed and the solution was no longer applicable.
The algorithm used for search did not contain any random element, every
time the sensory finger hit a partition of the maze it retracted and chose a
predet.ermined

alternate

direction.

llowever,

this

algorithm

fool-proof, and certain mazes could simply not be solved.

was

not

To overcome this

problem, if the goal was not found after a certain number of moves (24), then
the previous solutions were thought to be invalid, and the machine would
restart the "maze-learning process -

this was because the machine had

probably got into a sort of 'neurotic' cyclic loop.
Shannon's

machine

also

had

the

interesting

property

which

if

the

connections to its memory relays were changed, or the sign of the feed back
from the sensory finger was changed, it still managed to operate correctly analogous to the plasticity of some animal neuronal tissues.
Later, Minsky also constructed similar 'learning machines'

(based on

electronic tubes) which could simulate some maze learning capabilities of rats.
Similarly, an electronic maze-learning "mouse" is described by Jacker (1964)
which was operated as a component of a so called 'bionic computer' - a
conglomerate of artificial neurons.

This device was able to find its way

round a maze and also associate various features of the maze with its correct
responses.
(iii) - CYBERNETIC GAME-PLAYING MACHINES
Game-theory, established as an independent discipline by von-Neumann, has
been instrumental in the introduction of some hardware models ,\\'hich were
capable of playing various games.
Even, as early as 1900 simple electro-mechanical devices were built which
could play the particular endings of chess games - by following an algorithmic
strategy.

Later, much more complex fixed-wire

electrical or electronic

machines were introduced which showed a greater diversity and aptitude in
playing complete games of chess, or solving specific class of chess-puzzles.
As well as chess, many other games such as 'checkers',

'Go',

'Nim',

'naughts and crosses', and various board or card games have also been
implemented in hardware models. In some cases (e.g., naughts and crosses), a
precise rigorous mathematical solution has been found for optimising moves,
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but other game-playing machines rely on heuristic (and sometimes 'learning')
criteria.
Although, the majority of cybernetic game-playing machines do not strictly
'learn' from
improving.

their experiences,

their proficiency

has

been continuously

Thus, today, the descendants of the early crude mechanical

devices are able to expertly play games, and outwardly show a high degree of
'intelligence' •
The development of game-theory concepts and, in particular, various search
and evaluation techniques, together with the advent of digital computers, has
resulted in the realization of many specialised game-playing programs (this
area will be covered more fully in later sections).
(iv) - HARDWARE 'LEARNING' MJDElB BASED ON ABS'I'R.Arn'

m

PHYSICAL PRINCmB

Ashby (1952) outlined the process of 'homeostasis' as a simple foundation
for the entire working of the brain.

He also constructed a hardware model

to imitate this biological phenomenon.

The term homeostasis was introduced

by physiologist W.B. Cannon in the early 1930's, meaning the self-regulation
of body functions, or the maintaining of the equilibrium of internal states.
Ash by, in his book "design for a brain ", introduced the analytical notion of
'ultra-stability', based on the mathematical concept of stability, which was
said

to

mathematically

psychological phenomena.

represent

various

homeostatic

physical

and

This book was more concerned with adaptation

than learning, however, he pointed out that his proposed models could display
a rudimentary learning capability.
Ashby's main goal was the copying of the functions of the living brain by
using alternate mathematical criteria. And his underlying contention was that
most human behaviour could be explained in mechanistic terms.
idea of ultra-stability was extended

to design a

Hence, the

'mechanical brain' in

'objective' terms; and based on such criteria, he also proposed a means of
simulating the brain's adaptive and learning qualities. Ashby also described a
hardware

machine

which

was

able

to respond

to

inputs,

and

in

a

self-organizing manner change its behaviour and structure in order to achieve
stability.

This device, the realization of the principle of ultra-stability, was

called the 'Homeostat'.

The adaptive behaviour of the Homeostat was deemed

to be brain-like, and was of special interest to behavioural psychologists.
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The Homeostat consisted of four identical units, constructed from magnets,
coils, switches, potentiometers, and other electro-mechanical components.
Each unit in isolation could be regarded as a simple analogue regulator (or an
analogue computer) with manual variable settings.

The four units, coupled in

an interacting manner, could also be considered as a

multiple-feedback

complex regulator which would either come to rest at an equilibrium, after a
few oscillations, or would continue oscillating indefinitely.

However, these

oscillations could also come to rest if a new appropriate selting was found
manually.
The interesting features of the Homeostat were only displayed when the
control of the settings were performed by the machine itself.
analogous to the learning and adaptive

A process

behaviour of animals could

be

simulated, if a 'random search' of the settings of the Domeostat was carried
out - the pattern of behaviour depending on the initial settings of certain
parameters. If by virtue of this search an equilibrium was attained, then the
machine would stop the search, and only embark on a similar search if some
of its variables were changed.
Of course, this randomness of search is an inefficient way of attaining
stability, since, no information from the previous results of the settings are
utilised.

On the other hand, it simulates the 'inquisitive' nature of a learning

animal's behaviour when it experiments with alternate options - temporary
deviations from the course of a goal-directed behaviour occur, provided such
deviations are in search of a more favourable outcome.
The immensity of number of moves required to find the 'stable-state'
settings of a Homeostat was also recognised by Ashby (1952), and the concept
of 'multi-stable' system introduced to overcome this difficulty.

In FIG.4.13, a

simple diagram of the 'Homeostat' is shown, each unit having inputs from the
other three units.
Ashby (1956) discusses the possibility of constructing systems that are
more intelligent than their designers, and argues that, in principle, it is
possible to devise a so called "intelligence amplifier" which could have many
applications in various socio-economic systems. The concept of ultra-stability
and homeostasis is again suggested as a possible mechanism for designing such
amplifiers; thus, they will be able to attain or maintain their essential
variables within specified goals. The theoretical boundaries of this hypothesis
is also investigated.
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A four unit Homeostat; A, B, C, and D are the manual settings
of the coil currents of the units. The actual physical processes
involved were the changing of currents into the units, the
chan~ing of the polarity of the interconnections, or open
cirCUIting them; but in an cases, the Bomeostat would make
equilibrium-seeKing adjustments.

FIGURE 4.13.

Later on, some Homeostat-type devices were designed for specific practical
applications, such as the controllers for generators or autopilot systems; some
devices which utilised the random selective features of the Homeostat were
also described for the synthesis of certain sociological or ecological systems.
Capehart and Terry (1968) proposed a more generalised version of the
Homeostat for

the application to or the modelling of systems that are

characterised by a random set of parameters, and where the evaluation of an
optimal performance is desired.
design

of the

The modification suggested to the original

Homeostat include the addition of memory and

learning

capabilities, so that the exponential growth of the time required for the
achievement of stable states would be avoided.

The memory could store the

past successful adaptations, and the learning could utilise such adaptations.
Furthermore, based on a first-ordered differential equation which describes
the behaviour of the Bomeostat at any instant, firstly, they simulated the
behaviour of a Homeostat by a computer program; and secondly, using a
simple dual-type (i.e., short/long term divisions) memory and a reinforcement
learning criterion, they devised a more elaborate model and its computer
simulation.
conclusion

The results of these simulation runs were compared, and the
made

that a

significant improvement is achieved

additional properties of memory and/or learning are incorporated.

when

the
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Ultly (1956) used lhe statistical notions of conditional probability, and lhe
mathematical relations of class inclusion, to devise his theoretical 'learning'
machines.

He, also, conslructed two non-mobile hardware models to show

some basic cybernetic principles.

The 'classification' model which depicled

simple aspects of perception will be discussed in lhe pattern recognition
section of lhis chapter.

His 'conditional probability' machine was a device

capable of showing simple 'learning' behaviour, it embodied basic principles
which could be used to develop control mechanisms for industrial purposes.
The

conditional

probability

machine

would

use

lhe

latest

received

information and lhe previously slored information to form a prediction for the
fulure patterns of behaviour.

The nature of this behaviour was nol known

initially, and was organised depending on the frequency and the recency of
the occurrences of events - the more frequently occurring events, and also
the more recently occurring events, were remembered better.
For example, if the event X followed the event Y on every occasion, then
the Prob{ X : Y )

= 1,

will always follow Y.

which meant that, based on the past information, X

Furthermore, Uttly weighed such probabilities in terms

of their recency, so that events happening in the distant past did not have
too much bearing on the behaviour.

The 'patterns' of the occurrences of lhe

inputs of Uttly's machine could be regarded either in parallel (spatially), or in
series (temporally), and the machine can be thought of as simply carrying out
some computations on these patterns.
Another example of an actual hardware conditional probability computer
has been described by Andrew (1959); it was a machine consisting of five
inputs, but machines with arbitrarily large number of inputs could also be
constructed on the same principles.

This machine had 31 similar counting

units which could count the number of incidental occurrences of 2, 3, 4, or 5
inputs.

If the value of a conditional probability exceeded a predetermined

threshold, then an 'inference' was made about the activity related to that
particular conditional probability.

The counts were indicated by the amount

of charge on leaking capacitors, hence, their value was gradually decreased.
This type of conditional probability models bear a close kinship to the
notion of 'expectancy' in psychology, and we can also intuitively see similar
processes at work in humans and animals.

But, as admitted by Uttly. his

machines were a simulation of 'idealised' human behaviour; and it has been
realised that to accurately model a pattern of human behaviour in terms of
conditional probabilities a great deal of elaborations, constraints, and other
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new concepts (e.g., hierarchical ordering) should be introduced to the basic
conditional probability model.

Consequently, it becomes very difficult to

devise complex models of behaviour on such basis, and also the original
principlefl are all but lost in the featured complexities.
George

(1977)

sees

the

principal

shortcoming

of

UUly's

conditional

probability computers in their inability to distinguish between the 'linguistic'
considerations of stimuli and the, so called, 'factual' considerations.

In other

words, the inherent differences which exist between physical symbols and
what they represent.
(v) - anmR HAJUWm CYBERNETIC KDElS INVOLVING LBARNING

m

ADAPl'ATI~

(1969) constructed a cybernetic hardware model which, to some

Pask

extent, depicted the process of growth of nervous tissues. An electrochemical
system, consisting of wire electrodes suspended in an acid solution, could
simulate a chain of increasing and diminishing growth patterns, in the form of
electro-deposition.

Some non-reversible permanent changes could also occur.

This type of model is, however, only an 'analogy', and not a

hardware

realization of Borne mathematical postulate.
Young

(1973)

adopts

a

'cybernetic

construction of 'learning' models.

engineering'

approach

in

the

He constructs electrical analogue circuits

to simulate various properties of nerve cells and their assemblies in a simple
form.

These circuits were able to, in a very trivial sense, by using the

transmission of electrical pulses, depict neuronal propagation of information,
generate rhythmic activities, and simulate closed-loop recirculating type
memory storage systems (which could also be effected by various noise
considerations).

Therefore, simulate a simple neurological basis of learning

and memory.
Mathematical formulations of these rigid engineering models were also
undertaken,

based on some transfer functions.

machines were an extension of this line of research.
have

also

attempted

to

simulate

the

The

"Astra"

'learning'

Many other researchers

neuronal

activities

in

this

electrical-mathematical form.
We must not forget to mention that the hardware neural-net models
outlined, and discussed previously, form an important class of cybernetic
machines.
hardware

Neural-net and logical-net blue prints could

be realised in

(e.g., George, 1961; Stewart, 1959), directly from their logical
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'memory',
could

be

displayed; in such endeavours, the hardware systems were found to be much
easier to construct than to describe the complete behaviour of its equivalent
in logical form.
4.5.5 CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' MODELS AND COMPUTERS

Digital and analogue computing machines with some sort of memory storage
are very important tools for

the cybernetic model-builders.

A digital

computer can easily be programmed to display a typical process of learning or
response conditioning.

Similarly, various learning theories can be simulated

and tested by means of computer programming.

The major difficulty in

programming computers to actually 'learn' from

their experience is the

problem of the 'generalization' of data.
The

cybernetic

designers

of

'learning'

machines are

not,

generally,

interested in the step-by-step imitations of the natural learning process,
specially, in view of the impracticality of storing the large number of possible
variations of behaviour - again, emphasising the importance of the concept of
'generalization' to the learning process.

Now, there are four basic ways that

'intelligent' patterns of behaviour (e.g., learning) could be implemented on
computers:(a) - They can be 'programmed to follow a set of instructions steE-by-step,
and display tile appropriate behaviour, in an open-loop faSnlOn.
(b) - Some form of working (previously conceived) 'intelligence', relating to
the task in hand, can be incorporated within their programs.
(c) - Their programs could be governed by some
instructions which do not guarantee a solution.

tentative

'heuristic'

(d) - They could be programmed on the basis of some general and elementary
principles, not, primarily, devised for a particular class of problems, and
whose final outcomes are not normally predictable.
'Feedback' could be an important but not an essential feature of the last
three catagories.
FIG.4.14,

could

These four basic methods, illustrated schematically in
also

be

associated

with

'simulated',

'algorithmically

determined', 'heuristically determined', and 'minimally determined' behaviours,
respectively.
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A schematic diagram of the four princi{>al methods of
programming a CC?mputer to display interestmg "intelligent"
patterns ofbehavlOur.

Computer programs, in general, can be described as a special class of
cybernetic models. However, because of our particular taxonomy, tlearning' or
tadaptive' computer programs will be discussed in later A.I. sections.

In

this

section we

will attempt to outline

some analytical software

cybernetic models which have tried to embody the notions of learning and
adaptation.

It is clear that simply collecting empirical data and restating

them in a different form, by itself, is not a very fruitful scientific pursuit,
and some general interpretations and integrations of results are necessary.
Descriptive or mathematical models provide a vehicle using which various
deductions can be made and theories can be constructed.

A principal

advantage of the mathematical representations is that a much higher level of
objectivity of terminology can be attained, and logical imprecisions can be
detected much more easily.
The mathematical formalisations used for the modelling of learning have
been quite diverse.

The actual choice of the methodology depending on the

specific application, and the individual worker's background.

The trend in

using mathematical techniques for devising learning or adaptive systems has
spanned from the classical modes of mathematics, such as linear algebraic
equations, to the more symbolic mathematics of modern (abstract) algebra,
such as logic or set-theory.
An often neglected issue in this area has been the translation and the
interpretation of results in one formal descriptive languages in terms of other
terminologies.

Similarly, the relative merits of different techniques in

tackling a particular problem is another important consideration in comparing
mathematical models of the learning process.
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have become

increasingly more reliant on the use of mathematics for understanding various
phenomena.

The two most important conceptual tools, by far, nrc the

statistical probability theory and the digital computers.
Uttly (1956) translated some characteristics of animal behaviour, such

m;

the evoking of the same response by different stimuli, into the mathematical
domains of set-theory and probability-theory.

From such formal basis he

described a machine whose behaviour was similar to those of animals' in a
number of ways; also, the structure of the machine could be identified with
some elements of

the

nervous

systems.

Again, the

simple all-or-none

representation of inputs were adopted, in addition, various other restrictions
were imposed on this abstract model.
The

analytical

machines

he

described

experiment in conditioning a reflex.

could

simulate

a

hypothetical

The basic underlying assumption was

that the incoming data are classified according to resemblances between sets
of input data, rather than the concepts or the phenomena which give rise to
such data.

In support of this premiss, Uttly states "the nervous system is

limited similarly to assessing resemblances between signals in scls of fibers,
not between sets of physical quantities external to this system, and from
which those fibre signals were derived - between internal representations, not
between external 'configurations'."
Uttly's models also typify the trend in the early cybernetic models which,
based on some simple mathematical criterion, promised and predicted a great
deal, but in reality their rigid levels of abstraction did

not allow any

significant developments in devising practical models of interesting qualities.
Mackay

(1956)

discusses the issues involved in designing intelligent

automata, especially, the representation and the limitations of the "universe of
discourse" of an automaton (the field of its activities) is scrutinised.

He

distinguishes two different approaches to constructing such automata, vaguely
reflecting the dichotomy which has developed between the cybernetic and the
A.I. approach in designing 'learning' machines - 'trial and error' versus 'fully
informed'.

Be also proposes a statistical mechanism which could display

'mind-like' behaviours such as learning. Furthermore, he contends that using
such principles any level of abstraction, including 'meta-linguistic' concepts,
could be developed - by simply adaptively considering the regularities of
sensory inputs.

Be concludes that some similarities between his abstract
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formalisations and the actual brain processes could be seen, but they are
inadmissible as evidence for the workings of the brain.
Uttly's 'conditional probability' model and l-1ackay's model were examples
of stochastic models of behaviour, and could be regarded in the same category
as the mathematical descriptions of behaviour and learning in psychology.
Indeed, in a sense, all mathematical learning theories could be regarded as
cybernetic.
The essence of mathematical analysis of the learning proceSB in psychology
is the probability theory; in addition, many related mathematical techniques,
such as Markov chain theory, have also been applied to such investigations.
It is generally thought that Hull's (1943) learning theories signified the

introduction of precise mathematical descriptions of the learning behaviour, on
par with other formalisations used in different physical sciences.

The

principal trend has been, mainly, away from finding a universal mathematical
theory of learning, applicable to all learning situations, and more towards
devising specific theories and techniques for individual learning situations and
paradigms.
But, on the whole, it must be emphasised that most mathematical learning
theories are only the mathematical expression of a verbalised descriptive
theory of learning formulated prior to the construction of the mathematical
abstraction.

However, in some cases, a mathematical model is devised to

explain or fit to data obtained from a set of experiments.

1m example of

this second type of model was Bush and Mosteller's (1951) 'learning' models,
they used probability of outcomes as a measure of behaviour. and attempted

to relate their analytical results to experimental observations on learning, in
particular, to reinforcement (acquisition and extinction) aspects involved in
simple learning experiments.
Another cybernetic theory of behaviour is also proposed by Deutsch (1960).
Deutsch's models are an attempt to put to order the immense amount of
accumulated psychological and neuro-physiological evidence on the subject of
learning.

His theories are 'structural' explanations of behaviour in terms

of

possible, previously postulated, neural mechanisms. He postulates a process by
which learning might occur in organisms, and defines five separate units, as
the principal components of any 'learning system': (a) - an analyzer (input
subsystems), (b) - a link (channel), (c) - a motor system, (d) -an internal
medium, (e) - an environment.

The elements of the system could have three

types of relationships: 'activation', 'inhibition', and 'causing change'.
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basic elements of such models are shown in FIG.4.15 which illustrates the
components of a postulated mechanism of 'need'.

The basic process of 'learning' is defined as the sequential firing of two
analyzers, leading to the formation of links between each other signify

the

establishment

of

associations

between

analyzers.

which
The

manifestation of learning also results in the detachment of some system
elements from analyzers. Similarly, 'extinction' and 'forgetting' are defined in
equivalent terms.
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A simple model for 'need' mechanism, based on Deutsch's
elementary definitions of components and processes involved.

A mechanical device was also constructed to demonstrate a
version of Deutsch's theories.

simplified

The machine consisted of a turtle-type trolley

running in a maze, having touch sensors, and was capable of being remotely
controlled from a central part made up of relays and uni-selectors.

Besides

the instructions received from the control centre, the machine had a set of in
built fixed stimulus-response actions.

The main distinction from the earlier

similar devices, described previously, was that the photo-sensitive sensors
placed around the maze, which told the central part the position of the
machine in the maze, were in fact regarded as part of the system, rather
than elements of the environment.

The machine could learn simple mazes, by

running through the correct path in a 'training' stage. Some properties such
as 'generalization', 'reasoning', 'insight' were also shown in a very limited
sense.

The mechanical trolley was able to demonstrate an interesting variety

and generality of learning behaviour within the context of its simple domain.
Although, Deutsch emphasised that the properties observed are only a
consequence of arrangement of relays, and not those of relays themselves; and
envisaged that such systems could be expanded, without a loss of efficiency,
to demonstrate more complex psychological properties.

Ashby (1967) also develops his ideas on homeostasis within the more
rigorous but abstract framework of set-theory.

Be postulates a basis for

representing all types of adaptive mechanisms, natural or otherwise, by using
a formal "simplification" which is homoeomorphic with our observations - not
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based on intuitive rules of thumbs. The theories and hypothetical mechanisms
proposed, according to Ashby, could embody and demonstrate various notions,
such

as

Shannon's

correlation'.

concept

of

information

or

Sommerhoff's

'directive

However, because of their high degree of abstraction (in search

of a high degree of precision), they have not been used for many practical
modelling purposes.
As outlined in chapter three, many other mathematical developments have
also been used as such cybernetic tools.

In the following, some other

important (historically or otherwise) examples of cybernetic 'learning systems'
which utilise a specific analytical methodology will be discussed.
(i) - GENERAL SYSTEM ~ APPROACH TO CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' l'DDELS

Systems that can autonomously modify and adapt to their environments
(changing

or

'mathematical',

stationary)
'logical',

have

been

'descriptive',

described
etc.

in

a

variety

Cybernetics,

in

of forms,
general,

is

interested in the behavioural and structural studies of such 'self-adapting'
systems, particularly, in those systems related to some aspects of living
organisms.
The general system theory promotes the idea that a
predominantly

mathematical, can

dissimilar fields.

be

applied

body of tools,

to a variety of apparently

Thus, it is an appropriate methodology for studying the

learning process which has applications in diverse SUbjects.

However, the

alternative view of studying the 'differences' between various systems is an
equally valid undertaking.
In general system terms, 'adaptation' and 'learning' represent the processes
of changing control policies through interaction with the environment. Other,
properties such as 'goal-directedness' and 'purposiveness' have also been
attributed to these processes of systems.
'Feed back control systems' or 'servo-systems' are a special class of the
general

adaptive

systems,

involving

the

notion

of closed-loop

control.

'Governors', 'thermostats', and other stability-seeking systems which use
feedback have always been considered as important cybernetic models.

Some

physiological and behavioural sub-systems of living organisms which show
simple goal-seeking or homeostatic characteristics can be included within this
category.

Bence, control theory formalisations have been applied to these

biological and even to some sociological systems.
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For example, cardio-vascular regulations or particular aspects of economic
systems

could

be

modelled

quite

adequately

using

servo-system

type

descriptions, and mathematical techniques such as differential equations. But,
the methodology of control system theory, which involves the finding of a
mathematical definition of a system, or a search for an appropriate ttransfer
function', is not very useful for applying to the more complex biological,
human-based or organizational systems; neither it can faithfully represent
elementary cybernetic principles.
Similarly, the tlearning and adaptive control systems', discussed at the
start of this chapter, are the more complex (and recent) manifestations of the
processes of learning and adaptation in general systems.
Many 'natural' scientists have applied the mathematical concepts of general
systems theory to the domain of their investigations, and, using a cybernetie
outlook, have noticed that many seemingly different systems have various
features in common.

The central problem for the cybernetician, in such

enquiries, is the finding of well-defined behavioural variables and well-defined
relations between them.
Ashby, by introducing the concept of 'ultra-stabilitY't described adaptive
analogue systems which could change and modify according to different
environmental circumstances.

Adaptation (deterministically or by trial and

error), in organisms and machines, was defined as the controlling of tessential
variables' by forcing them to remain within specified limits - through the
manipulation of the environment by outputs.

Ultra-stable systems were,

thereby, defined as systems that were able to reorganise (adapt) themselves to
abrupt changes in their variables and parameters. The abstract models "'hich
he devised, and also the hardware model the 'nomeostat', could depict the
equilibrium-seeking (also called 'purposive' or 'goal-seeking') behaviour of
animals - once the stable-slate was achieved, the searching behaviour would
stop, the particular path to stability being a function of the state of the
system and also the degree of the initial displacements.

An organism's

nervous system was also looked at as a 'multi-stable' system (a system made
up

of

many

ultra-stable

systems)

which interacted

with a

complicated

multi-variable environment.
The underlying criterion used by Ashby, in general system terms, was that
behaviour was considered 'state-determined', or in other words, at any instant
of time, the present state of a system could exactly determine the next step.
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are

based

on

In any case, within the

probabilistic rather than deterministic criteria.

abstract formal framework of systems, Ashby managed to postulate simple
axiomatic

principles

that

could

lead

to

more

complex

and

interesting

subsequent developments.
Gause (1971,1983) proposes a taxonomy of general systems which considers
'adaptation' and 'intelligence' as two separate independent system attributes.
Briefly, a system is said to be adaptive if it is capable of improving with
experience; and is considered intelligent if it is capable of performing a given
task in human-like manner.

The performance of a system is taken to be

describable in terms of a real, single-valued function of system states, time,
and the task in hand. The attributes of adaptability and intelligence are only
considered within the context of specific tasks, and in non-human terms - in
an effort to reduce the ambiguity of the definition of such terms.

Using

these two attributes, a classification of different types of systems is made as
follows:(a) - lInnane-Systems': non-adaptive, unintelli~ent.
performance characteristics (e.g., a slmple
programming system).

Having a non varying
machine or computer

(b) - 'Meretricious-Systems': non-adaptive, intelligent. With a constant level
of performance for a given task (e.g., most chess playing programs).
(c) -

'Homeostatic-Systems': adaptive, intelligent.
Performance oscillating
within certain bounds (e.g., adaptive process control systems).

(d) - 'Learning-Systems': adaptive, intelligent. Long range improvement in
performance as the system interacts with its environment.
Gause further proposes a general blueprint for a cybernetic 'learning
system'

with

mechanisms'

the following two principal components:
which

perceive

the

system's

goal-directed ness or reinforcement; and (2) -

(1)

-

performance

'evaluation
through

'control mechanisms' which

should be able to reduce entropy, maintain variety, and display selective
forgetting.
Pask (1967) discusses a cybernetic model of human cognition by viewing
man as a special kind of control system.

Be postulates a set of criteria

which characterise such a control system; in particular, the human learning
process is analyzed, and the notions developed in terms of general systems
theory are applied to experimental learning and problem solving situations.
Reuver (1978,1980) introduces a conceptual tool-kit for the realization of
the process of learning in the context of general system theory.
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formalisations described is seen appropriate for use in the modelling of real
learning situations in psychology, engineering and sociology.

A general

description of a 'learning system', according to Reuver is:-

"A learning system is a system purposefully adjusting its behaviour to
constant or changing environmental conditions, availing itself of past
experiences.
Past nistory of the behaviour in the environmental
situation is processed in order to find an optimal adaptation.
Information processing is an essential characteristlc of the learning
process."
The notation used is a more elaborate version of the representations of
'learning systems' outlined in the previous sections dealing with 'learning'
control theory and automata theory.

T
X
Y
S
U
Z
P
V

'1

linearly ordered discrc~ter set (time)
input space (set of inputs
output space (set of out
)
state space
decision space
information space
parameter spwe
linearly ordered set of variables, mostly real
numbers

tYl ,Y2 ,Y3 , ••• ,YD {Sl ,S2 ,S3 , ••• ,SJ } {Ul ,1l~ ,\13, ••• ,Uld {l;~1 , Z2 , Z3 , ••• , Zl } {Pi ,1>2 ,1>3 , ••• ,pg} {VI ,V2 ,V3, ••• ,Vh} -

{ •• , "L 1

,

to , t l ,

•

The basic elements are:-

Xl ,X2 ,X3 , ••• ,Xa

Furthermore, a 'learning system' is described in terms of four simpler
components of: 'real system' (an unknown or partially known black box);
'system cell' (a mathematical model of the 'real system'); 'decision cell' (a
mathematical model of a decision maker); and 'learning cell' (a mathematical
model of the learning process) - any 'learning system' should have at least
two of the above four distinct components.

The goal functions and learning

algorithms are also defined in terms of such formalisms.
Finally, various catagories of 'learning systems' are defined according to
the different configurations of the four above basic SUb-systems; and some
specific

examples,

systems'

and

namely

'social

those

learning',

for

'goal learning',

are

investigated

'learning inventory

using

this

conceptual

framework.
Reuver (1980) also extends the notions of his formalization to the studies
of psychological learning theories of Gal'perin - a Soviet psychologist who
had based his theories of behaviour on three distinct level of human action:
(1) - material, (2) - verbal, (3) - mental.

On such foundations, 'action' is

characterised by parameters which specify the 'extent', the 'detail', and the
'efficiency' of behaviour; and any learning is proposed to be directed on a so
called 'orientation basis' (the motivation behind the process).
On

the

whole,

this

type

of

'learning'

models,

by

virtue

of

their

universality, have to contend with an extremely high level of abstraction
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which ilself alienates them from the scopes of the actual applications they
are ultimately intended for - by making them incomprehensible or irrelevanl.
(ii) - INREMATIOO '1'HIDRETICAL APPROACH 'ID CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' H:>DELS

Information

Theory,

which

can

be

considered

as

a

6ubHection

of

Cybernetics, has been developing parallel to the latter. These two disciplines
are

sometimes

grouped

together,

however,

information

theory

is

nol,

generally, involved with control. This discipline, mostly developed in lhe past
three decades, is mainly concerned with various aspects of coding, decoding,
and transmission of signals (and information) within communication channels.
The basic ideas behind the quantification of the amount of information were
founded by Shannon in the late 1940's.

But, Shannon's pure quantitative

approach to 'information' did not take into account the concept of 'meaning'
of acquired information.

Today, information theory has more and more come

to be concerned with the wider qualitative aspects of data as well us the
measurement of various signal capacities.
When the concept of information is used, as a generalised explanutory
language, to describe the dynamic behavioural observations of the world, then
the distinction between the quantity and the meaning of a message (a}so the
ambiguities of such terminologies) is noted much more clearly.
in an analysis of concepts of 'information', 'meaning', and

Elstob (1980).
'knowledge',

stresses the underlying paradoxes and confusions which exist in the usage and
comprehension of such cybernetic ideas.

He proposes a distinction between

'physical-information' and 'semantic-information' based on the differences of
types of behaviour they are associated with - involving some energy transfer
considerations and specific consequential properties of input-outputs.

Using

this distinction, he also discusses the concept of meaning within the contexts
of 'goal-directed' behaviour and 'purposeful systems'.

It is argued that to

convey the meaning of a message we need to involve the semantic component
of information, and also take the behavioural intentionality considerations of
a system into account.
Some simple regulatory processes which use error-control or anticipatory
cause control are intimately related to the quantitative aspects of information.
Ashby (1956) by introducing his law of 'requisite variety' established an
explicit basis for these relationships.
Many of the 'information' related findings of the learning process have
been accomplished by the engineering oriented cyberneticians who considered
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the disparities between the capabilities of man and machine.

Information

entering (or leaving) an adaptive or 'learning system' (natural or artificial) if:;
primarily of the

physical

type,

and

hence the

quantitative aspects of

information theory could be applied at this rudimentary ]cycl.

At the next

level, the manipulations of this raw data in the form of experimentation,
constructing

of various

hypothesis,

and

a

constant feedback

extremely

to apply the

difficult

quantitative

the

Hence, it

previously accumulated knowledge and information takes place.
becomes

from

formnlisations

of

information with any degree of cohesion.
Information

theoretical

concepts

developed

by

Shannon,

such

1:16

'information content', 'channel capacity', 'redundancy', and 'entropy' have all
been applied to some specific aspects of neuronal functioning and brain
mechanisms.

For example, in the language of information theory, 'messages'

in the nervous-system are thought to be 'encoded' and 'transmitted' between
its different elements.

Similarly, if a nerve-cell is considered as a source

emitting information, then its output is the 'action potential' moving along its
axon and regenerated by the subsequent firing of other neurons - hence,
information

is

carried

from one cell to other.

Although,

the

use

of

information theory is sometimes criticised on the grounds that the actual
neuro-physiological mechanisms are not themselves clearly understood yet,
nevertheless, this methodology has been one of the fundamental approaches in
the investigation of memory related aspects of learning.
The usual holistic cybernetic view of the brain is that of the brain as an
information processing system, having large memory storage, and operating on
coded information derived from its environment and from within itself.

This,

of course, implies a level of 'analysis' of the brain's physiology which falls
well short of detailed neurological scrutinies, but, is more specific than the
investigations of electrical wave patterns of the brain (EEGs).
Similarly, in cognitive psychology, a human could be regarded as a channel
of

communication,

if

viewed

from

perceiving and reacting to stimuli.
considers all of the

the

information

theoretical

angle

The novelty of this outlook is that it

set of relevant

stimuli at any time,

rather than

considering individual stimuli for every occasion.
Various aspects of human perceptual capabilities could be studied by using
notions of information theory. Broadbent (1965) discusses some areas of such
applications.

For

example,

the

critical

level of

distinguishing

simple

perceptual stimuli is found to be approximately 2.5 bits of information, or 7+2
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Similarly, the understanding of perceptual stimuli, as well

as being dependent on the physical noise faclors present, are very much
context dependent; and probabilities could

be attached

to the order of

occurrence of events, such as the probability of consequential ordering of
different physical events and sounds, or the chance of certain words following
other words.

Estimates of an average human's memory capacity have also

been calculated using these notions, but its value ranges diversely between
108 -10 1 % bits of information.
Other

quantitative

perception,

signal

investigated.

to

the

characteristics

perception,

and

and

capacities

attention

of

systems

human
have

pattern

also

been

These findings suggest that, in fact, there arc some limitations

human

brain's

perceptual

mechanisms

governed

by

external

informational aspects of inputs, and not internal sensory factors.
As far as the output (or the response) side of such a communications
system is concerned, similar 'information' based analyses of the hrain have
been carried out.

Some temporal aspects of information processing, such as

the rate and the capacity of the brain in reacting to various stimuli, have
been experimentally measured.

These quantitative results, being more exact

and consistent than the ones obtained in the case of perceptual inputs, point
to the fact that human beings are also limited, in some fashion, as far as
their reactions to stimuli is concerned - this limitation being independent of
the information they convey.
The implication of such work on the studies of the learning proeCE,:;; is
that the various information related quantitative changes which occur in the
mappings of stimuli onto responses could be determined as learning progresses.
Yet, the causes or the nature of these changes cannot be explained by
observations based solely on this paradigm.
(iii) - DYNAMIC ~ APPROACH 'ID CYBERNETIC 'I...F.ARNING SYS'lEiS'

The classical mathematical techniques used in describing the behaviour of
systems,

deterministically

differential

equations;

and

or

stochastically,

optimising

most

problems,

involved

the

use

generally, involved

of
the

minimising of specific functions. The basic assumptions were that the number
and the value of variables, the cause-effect relationships, or their probability
distributions were known a-priori.

However, as the complexity of problems

increased, and not all information about a system and its behaviour was
known in advance, then the use of adaptive and learning criteria in the
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solving of problems, such as those encountered in engineering and control,
saw

the

introduction

of

various

mathematical

abstractions.

Dynamic

programming techniques are one of the principal methodologies in such
analyses, they are used as an alternate approach to the classical methods in
dealing with the modelling of adaptive and learning processes. This subject is
closely related to the fields of adaptive and 'learning' control, but has also
found

applications

in

psychology, economics, and

processes are seen to be at work.

biology where

similar

Dynamic programming, basically, involves

the finding of the optimal procedures in a series of observations, working
backwards from a prescribed final stage to the first stage.
From a cybernetic engineering point of view, if the various features of a
system's characteristics are unknown, then estimations of some parameters
could gradually lead to the compilation of a complete knowledge base about
the system - by hierarchically improving the precision of system's description.
Dynamic programming techniques can be used to formulate an optimal policy
for a series of decision choice-stages; the decision could be based on choice
of numbers, expected values, or probability distributions.
A highly abstract mathematical formalization of 'learning systems' is
proposed by Doberkat (1978) who utilises the view of dynamic programming.
He uses a formal framework to show the existence of an optimal strategy in
achieving goals.
'learning

system'

The notions of group and set theory are used to describe a
and

its

processes;

and,

based on

such abstractions,

mathematical models of specific examples of learning, such as classical
conditioning are simulated.
4.5.7 CYBERNETIC IBARN1l«1 PD>ElB BASED 00 '11IE MlDIANllIf3 OF '11IE BRAIN

The notion of direct use of the brain's mechanisms as the basis for
constructing artificial 'learning systems' was adopted by many researchers
prior to the introduction of the science of Cybernetics.

However, it was the

founding of this formal discipline which allowed the widespread hypothesising
of such endeavours, and opened up opportunities for future developments.
The language a cyberentician uses to construct his abstract or physical
nervous system only differs in degree from the so called actual observations
of a neuro-biologist descriptions.

since, they both are different types of conceptual

However, it is hoped that cybernetic models of the functioning

of the brain will, also, eventually lead to a better understanding of the
neuro-biology and neuro-psychology of the brain.
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The neuro-physiological evidence for cybernetic model-builders are very
extensive. Animals' purposive activities have been related to various neuronal
su bstrate.

Many fixed neuronal mechanisms are thought to govern the

biological

functions

or

the

reflexive

innate

modes of

behaviour

(some

purposive behaviours are also controlled by the electrochemical mechanisms of
the body such as the hormones).
The brain, seemingly, in a constant state of activity, has constituent
neurons

which

propagation.

rhythmically discharge, and

induce patterns of impulse

The summation of excitatory and inhibitory impulses of neurons

when exceed a certain threshold value evoke further patterns within cell
assemblies.

The progress of the excitation not being limited from the

'sensory' to the 'central' onto the

'motor' outputs,

but in a

kind of

The generally, accepted postulate for the

bi-directional reverberations.

neuronal basis of learning experience states that the flow of messages along
particular pathways of neurons leaves some kind of facilitation for the future
passage of similar activity along the same neurons.

But, as a whole, the

knowledge is fragmented, imprecise, and mostly speculative.
In addition, while our knowledge of the cognitive processes of the brain
has been constantly improving, the sheer size of the nervous system has
meant

that

the

conceptual

models

(e.g.,

finite-automata,

neural-nets,

control-systems, etc.) cannot, in practice or theory, represent the brain's
higher functions accurately.
Bence, the current 'learning' models based on some aspects of the brain
should all be looked at with a certain degree of skepticism.

This point is

strongly emphasised by Aleksander (1983) in discussing the difficulties of
devising artificial analogues of the brain:"Knowledge of the human brain is currently confined to two fraJile
bridgeheads bordering on a central .,gulf of ignorance. On the one SIde,
neuro-physiology can give a superfIcial picture of the structure of the
brain and offer some educated guesses about its operations; on the
other, psychology provides a variety of hypothesis about its output.
Bow, exactly, the one give rise to the other remains mysterious."
Griffith (1971) gives an elaborate mathematical account of the functioning
of the elements of the brain, and analyses various propagatory aspects of
signal transmission within
randomly

connected

deductions made.

networks of neurons.

neuronal

models are

Furthermore, various

investigated and

mathematical

Similar type of research, defining a mathematical form of

neuronal activity, has been carried out by Caianiello (1967); this work being
mainly directed towards devising pattern-recognition 'learning' devices.

The
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implication of such work to the modelling of cybernetic 'learning systems' is
that it can give some clues as to the possible ways artificial associative
memory systems involving the contiguity of neuronal activity could be devised.
Other hardware (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, chemical) simulations of
the actions of neurons and neuronal systems have been carried out by many
researchers.

Similarly, computer programs and other software mathematical

models have demonstrated

some properties of

nervous

systems.

Some

servo-system type engineering based models of the brain mechanisms (e.g.,
Deutsch's, 1967) have also been designed, involving the use of differential
equations and transfer functions.

The neural and logical nets discussed

previously were also examples of cybernetic models of the brain mechanisms.
A simple method of representing nervous systems in an abstract form is
the use of matrix notation.

Inputs could be depicted by the rows of a matrix

and outputs by its columns, as in FIG.4.16(a).

An inborn reflex action could

be represented by a permanent connection at the junction of the relevant
input and output.

Other

properties such as 'learning', 'conditioning',

'inhibition' J 'forgetting', etc. can all be represented by the formation or the
modification of the strengths of connections between inputs and outputs.

A

great advantage of this type of model is that it can be easily realised by
various hardware devices (e.g., electronic, magnetic).
A well known early example was Steinbach's (1963) "Lernmatrix" which was

based on arrays of magnetic memory cores (similar to those found in early
computer memories).

Other abstract models (e.g., Griffith's, 1971) have used

structural matrices to represent the input-output transformations of the
nervous-system.
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FIGURE 4.16.

I

A matrix representation of associations between m-inputs
and n-outputs; au (fixed or changeable) is the associative
factor between input I, and output OJ
(b) - A Jraphic representatIon of single associations between
pa1rs of independent inputs.
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The associations between any two independent (orthogonal) inputs can alBo
be represented by a matrix notation.

Alternately, as shown in FIG.4.16(b),

inputs can be graphically represented by points (A,B, ••• ) in a 2-dimensional
space with interconnecting lines which depict associations bctween inputs;
furthermore, the strength of association can be shown by the thick ness of the
lines or their number.

Graph-theory has also made somc UBcful eontributions

to this type of analysis.
An example of cybernetic learning model based on graphs is dcseribcd by
Palvolgyi (1982).

He outlines a later version of neural-nct type systems

which can simulate the processes of adaptation and learning.

Such networks

are made up of elements that are either in 'active' or 'passive' state, and
'activity' can be transferred to some neigh bouring points of the graph
according to certain algorithmic rule.

The designer contends that this kind

of abstract cybernetic approach is a useful tool for stud ying various basic
perceptual processes, memory, learning, and thinking.
Although,

there

have

been

many objections

and

criticisms of

these

simplistic views of the brain, yet, by in large, most cybernetic brain models
are based on simple binary-state elements, as depictions of neurons.
ultimate

exactness

analogue)

of

cellular

these

models

type

of

the

of information
nervous-system

processing
will

The

(digital or

depend

on

the

clarifications provided by discoveries in the neuro-physiological sciences.
Another cybernetic approach to the modelling of the brain mechanisms of
learning, along the same lines as neural-net models of the learning process, is
described by Harth (1966).
depict

'thought

processes'.

An attempt is made to devise a formalism to
First,

the

epistemological

problems

are

highlighted, and then a tentative model, heavily reliant on the available
neuro-physiological evidence, is proposed.

The basis of the model is an

artificial abstract neuron, similar to McCulloch and Pitts type element, but,
with an additional randomness incorporated. It also differs from Rosenblatt's
'perceptron' (will be discussed later), especially since it is not designed for
particular cognitive purposes, but, for the simulation of more general aspects
of brain functions.

Matrices similar to that of FIG.4.16(a) are used to depict

the neuronal connections between the elements of the system; and learning is
defined in terms of the changes in the coupling coefficients of such matrices.
Finally, a

computer simulation of this mathematical model of the

mechanism is carried out for systems comprising of few elements.

brain

Various

comparisons and parallels of the results obtained is made with the established
physiological data.
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The nature of memory is one of the most intriguing aspects of brain
studies, and relattvely little is known about its actual mechanisms.

The

establishment of associations between memory traces is one of the brain
processes

which

model-builders.

has

attracted

the

attention

of

many

cyberm~tic

Some examples of the modelling of the memory mechanisms

were discussed in the previous sections dealing with neural and logical
networks - simple models could depict the short and long term characteristics
of the memory.
Computer based models of memory mechanisms have been devised which
simulate some basic types of associative learning.

Generally, inputs are first

stored in a short-term memory, and, later, either lost or transferred to u
long-term storage; some cognitive aspects of 'retrieval' or 'forgetting' is also,
normally, characterised in most of these models.
Drozen
memory.
in

(1970)

proposes

a

layered

mathematical

model

of associative

He sees the principle contribution of the neuronal network models
possibilities

the

they

provide

for

filling

the

gap

between

neuro-physiological and psychological studies of various aspects of living
organisms.

Yet, he envisages possible applications to the problems in A.I.

His model, in its simplest form, consists of three layers of input, associative,
and output elements.

These elements can change autonomously, and can

produce a 'diffused' (distributed) memory.
utilised to characterise this model.

Again the matrix notation is

The algorithm used for the formation of

memory relies on the synaptic weighs of the inputs and outputs - which are
considered

at

discrete

time

intervals.

If

some

inputs

are

stimulated

simultaneously, a kind of correlation is established between the associated
inputs; by adding a kind of short-term (dynamic) memory, a process analogous
to the conditioning of reflexes can be simulated, in the form of a simple
mathematical realization of associative relations.
Booth (1970) describes a simple model for the organization of memory
which is based on the optimal stacking problem of a collection of items (e.g.,
words).

This cybernetic model, also realised in hardware, is an attempt to

suggest a possible way of optimising the access time in memory retrieval
process, but the existence of equiValent psychological or neuro-pbysiological
correlates have not been conclusively established.
The main developments in the area of associative memory modelling have
been directed towards the formation, association, and recognition of 'patterns'
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This type of work will be discussed

more fully in future sections dealing with self-organization and pattern
recognition.
On the whole, cybernetic models of the brain have managed to demonstrate
that the so called 'mentallistic' activities can be displayed by machines and
other

artificial

behaviours

systems.

which

the

The

early

goal-directed,

behavioural

purposeful,

scientists

or

believed

tele()lo~ical

to

be

too

subjective, and hence not precisely definable, have, in fact, been simulated
artificially.

Although, these demonstrations have not actually disproved the

mentallistic

theories

of

teleological

behaviour,

nevertheless,

they

have

managed to broaden the definitions of such properties from the exclusive
realms of 'living'.
4.5.8 AN OVERVIEW OF CYBERNETIC APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS'
The science of Cybernetics has had an undeniable impact on the learning
process in most areas of research.
knowledge

in

many

learning

The immense accumulation of empirical

related

disciplines

has

necessitated

the

introduction of cybernetic models, in particular computer based models, for
the mathematical analysis and ordering of such knowledge.
drawn

special attention to

the

Cybernetics hus

concepts of 'organization',

'information',

'control', 'feedback', 'stability', 'goal-directed ness' within natural systems, and
emphasised that no system can be solely specified by its physical descriptions
alone.
The interdisciplinary nature of cybernetics has also brought a new vitality
into the studies of the learning process; and enabled the scientists from
various disciplines to communicate with each other.

Hence, increasing the

possibility of establishing a unified view of this phenomenon.
During the past 40 years, cyberneticians have been constantly probing the
foundations of scientific enquiries and methodologies, and trying to expand
the scope of various disciplines by introducing concepts not intrinsical1y
obvious from the empiric of observations.

However, cybernetics has evolved

into a subject that primarily gives a particular perspective to problems rather
than providing specific class of solutions.
Wiener's original goals of devising human-like machines, based on the
concepts of information theory and control-theory, and also his suggestion of
building analogous mechanisms to the brain which can self-adapt or learn
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have been, largely, superseded by the exploits of digital computers.

On the

whole, presently, none of these objectives seem to be apt to the problem of
devising intelligent-machinery, or to the furthering of the understanding of
human-intelligence.

IIowever, with a better insight into the workings of the

nervous system, these outlooks might again be favoured at some point in
future.
Today, the science of Cybernetics is regarded with different degrees of
appreciation and extent of usefulness around the world. In the Eastern Block
countries, cybernetics is featured much more extensively in research subjects
(mainly computer related and control engineering applications); but cybernetics
is, probably, defined in a wider sense than the Western understanding of the
science.

In the Western European countries, various aspects of this science

(philosophical, practical, theoretical, etc.) are still seriously investigated;
normally, referring to abstract generalised systems approach to a subject. On
the other hand, in the United States, the rise of subjects such as A.I.,
pattern-recognition,

robotics,

system-theory, and

other

more

specialised

subjects have all but replaced the generalist view of cybernetics in scientific
research

the

primary

feature

of

these

new

subjects

being

their

functionalism.
Before moving on to the more recent trends and approaches in the design
of artificial 'learning systems', the tself-organizing systems' (SOS) approach
",rill be discussed next.

The term self-organization systems is orten used in

conjunction with cybernetics or neural-nets, and sometimes these terms are
used interchangeably.

The SOS approach, however, has managed to arouse

enough interest which justifies its appreciation as a distinct discipline, it has
also lead to the establishment of a specific viewpoint and terminology.

nut

gradually, as in the case of cybernetics, the enthusiasm towards this subject
has also declined.

Particularly, in view of the apparent deadlocks reached

following some concentrated research in this field, and lack of spectacular
results.
4.6 tSELF-QRGANIZING SYSTEMS' APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS'
The notion of self-organization was discussed previously; firstly, as a
concept closely related to adaptation and learning; and secondly, in relation

to specific views of 'learning systems' and machines, such as the control
engineering view.
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According to Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963) the 'self-organizing systems'
(SOS) approach has an intrinsic fascination, and the basic objective of its
workers is the design of intelligent machines which have simple information
processing elements, arranged in a random or organised network, and certain
processes for facilitating or inhibiting their activity.

Andrew (1972), in a survey of the field of SOS, points to the initial
enthusiasm during the 1950's about this subject, and the possibility of it
throwing a good deal of light on the workings of the nervous system.
The peak of popularity of the discipline of SOS was perhaps during the
early 1960's, when many symposia and conferences were held on this topic,
and various researchers presented their work in the context of this newly
formed and promising approach.
The main impetus behind this subject has been the desire of learning more
about

the

nature

of

the

nervous

system,

which

clearly

has

some

self-organizing properties; and hence, by direct implication, the possibility of
constructing similar artificial SOS.
On

the

one

hand,

psychologists,

embryologists,

neuro-physiologists,

sociologists, and workers of other natural sciences such as evolutionary
sciences have been trying to understand the self-organizing principles of
living and

human

based

systems.

On the other hand, mathematicians,

engineers, cyberneticians, computer-scientists, and physical scientists have
attempted to design systems which show some self-organizing properties.
4.6.1 DEFINITIONS OF SELF-oRGANIZING SYSTEMS
The very definition of a self-organizing system has been met with some
controversies.

Von-Forester (1959) and also Ashby (1962) have argued that a

system, in a strict logical sense, cannot really be self-organizing by itself.
The basis of their argument, outlined more formally by Ashby's 'law of
requisite variety'. is that only order in the environment could result in order
or organization in a system.

Bence, a system can only become self-organized

if it is defined with respect to some external source of order; and therefore
the use of this term is only seen to be justified if the interactive component
of the accepted system-environment distinction is regarded as an implicit part
of the system.

, • I

Approacltes to Nodell' a, of

Leara' a, -

Part-I

240

The term "Self-Organizing Systems" was, according to Yovits (1962), first
used by Farley and Clark in 1954, and it was defined as: "a system which
changes its basic structure as a function of its experience and environment."
But, even in the early 1960's the rise of the more modern trends in
'machine learning' had already raised some questions regarding the feasibility
or benefits of using the self-organizing approach in the design of efficient
interesting (intelligent) systems. The principal issues involved are argued by
Selfridge (1962), and it is contended that a great deal of initial organization
(in the form of automated routines or in-built knowledge) is needed to
achieve a truly intelligent machine.
Andrew (1972) proposes an additional proviso to the definition of SOS by
Yovits, which is to incorporate the property of purposiveness within such a
definition. The main difficulties he envisages in devising a rigorous definition
include temporal considerations, storage considerations, and the amount of
initial organization inherent in the system.
Ashby (1962), also, in a fundamental discussion of the principles of SOS,
scrutinises the basic issues in machines and systems, such as: 'organization',
'whole and parts', 'conditionality', 'reducibility', 'communication', and 'good'
or 'bad' organization.

He gives a definition for two catagories of SOS.

First

referring to systems which change from 'parts separated' to 'parts joined',
with no considerations of system utility.

Second definition refers to the

change from 'bad' organization to a 'good' one.

However, he goes on to

qualify this second definition by saying that a system (or machine) can only
be self-organizing if it can be considered as coupled to another system (or
machine), and in view of this contradiction, he suggests that: "the phrase
(self-organization) better allowed to die out."
Another distinction which can be made within the class of SOS is whether
the goals of a system are determined externally, such as in self-organizing
process-controllers, or if they are evolved from within a system following
behavioural interactions with its environment, as in the case of biological
evolution.
Andrew (1978) describes SOS in more general, and presently accepted,
terms: "If the changes which occur in a system, constituting its adaptation,
are sufficiently fundamental, the system is classed as self-organizing."
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4.6.2 LEARNING AND SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS
The concept of self-organization, although not treated in isolation, was
implicitly advocated and had been present in the adaptive and learning models
of many early cyberneticians.
Andrew (1967) discusses two possible general ways by which the property
of self-organization could be manifested in a 'learning system'.

First method

involves the adjusting or adding of parameters to some polynomial control
functions.

The second method involves placing certain constraints on control

actions, by seeking a set of key-points in phase-space and relating the
incoming

information

to

these

key-points,

and

trying

to maintain

the

performance within specific bounds.
The learning capabilities displayed by SOS are primarily the result of their
interactions with their environments; and the intention of their designers is
to emulate, in a sense, the self-organizing features of the nervous system,
while choosing alternate simplified abstract or physical means.

Hence, the

studies of neural plasticity become highly relevant to this approach.

In

addition, other psychological theories of learning and cognition can also be
looked at from the SOS point of view (e.g., Estes, 1959; Rosenblatt, 1959;
Farley, 1959).
4.6.3 PRINCIPLES OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
The concept of 'organization' itself is also subject to some ambiguity.
But, within

the context of self-organization it, generally, refers to the

structural organization in relation with the potentialities for action, and not
the orderly positioning of the physical constituents of a system, such as in
growing crystals.

In other words, it is functional considerations that tell us

if a system is self-organizing, and not physical considerations - this issue can
be traced to the classical distinction between 'form' and 'function'.
Organization of a system, in general, can be separated into the formal
organization that is given a-priori to the system, and the organization that is
acquired adaptively or otherwise following some changes to its initial form.
Andrew (1970) makes a tentative distinction between 'self-organizing' and
'self-optimising' systems.

The former referring to the systems that can

change their own internal connections, and the latter being only able to
change the value of some system parameters.

However, such a distinction is
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Hence, a more precise

definition for this intuitive principle is deemed to be essential.
The primary assumption about a SOS is that it should start from a fairly
low level of organization - but some information about the 'motivational' or
'goal-achievement' aspects could be included in this organization a-priori.

A

further consideration is whether the system utilises its past inputs in the
evaluation of its outputs at any instant of time - and if so, to what extent.
If the complete history of inputs is taken into account, then the problem

becomes one of classification and discrimination of similar situations.
the

exhaustive

classification

enormously difficult task.

of

most

non-trivial

system

Now,

becomes

an

Hence, as seen in the other previously covered

approaches, the focus of problem is switched to designing an efficient
'generalization' technique for the system, so that it is able to make an
'inductive inference'.
Andrew

sees a

possible way of achieving

such

generalization

is

to

incorporate the inherent 'continuity' aspects of inputs (for systems that have
some or all input-outputs continuous) in their discriminative processes; in
other words, to classify and compare patterns of inputs as continuous
functions, rather than as points in Cartesian space.

lIence, he proposes a

procedure for computing output signals in terms of a polynomial function of
inputs; and

the

self-organization of such a

system should involve the

adjustments of the coefficients of this polynomial by the system itself.

Bis

approach to this problem is based on the techniques developed by some
workers in self-optimising control systems, who had devised 'learning filters'
that operated on a similar basis. The scheme works by evaluating coefficients
using a hedony measure, normally in the form of 'error-information'.
The specific algorithm used by Andrew for the adjustment of parameters
utilises the well established statistical techniques of 'regression analysis' which can determine the correlation measures of a

set of data points.

However, in this case, the estimates are evaluated continuously rather than in
discrete steps.
compared

Computer simulations of this system are devised and results

with other

undertaken

into

the

similar

techniques.

extension

of

Further discussions are also

such

ideas

into

the

topic

of

pattern-recognition; and possible methods of analyzing 50S which have no
error-information feedback, or are of a more complex multi-layered nature.
Dalenoort

(1982)

attempts

to outline

essential to processes of self-organization.

few

principles

which

are

seen

Such definitions are devised to
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distinguish SOS from systems based on the current computer paradigm (i.e.,
A.I., cognitive-psychology).

Firstly, tself-organization' is distinguished from

'construction' on the basis of their design particulars - a constructing system,
normally,

needing

a

higher

degree

of

incorporated

intelligence.

Self-organization is said to come about in one of two ways: (a) - by adaptive
evolutionary method, (b) -

by training a system to internally change it.s

structure or knowledge for future better performance.

Other essential

considerations are: the trainer should not know the exact nature of the
results of his actions; the system should have an internal capability to change
its structure - the existence of Ashby's requisite variety is implicitly assumed.
Secondly, to efficiently extract information from an environment it is seen
necessary

to establish correlations

environment (and system).

between

different

variables

of

the

This principle forms one of the basis of the

subject of pattern-recognition.
Thirdly, the distinction between 'data' and 'procedure', which currently
applies to most computer based systems, should not apply to SOS.
particular

development

differentiation.

of

digital

computers

has

necessitated

The

such

a

However, the rich complexity and the high efficiency of

storage and recall of information in the brain can provide many possibilities
to manifest 'structural information storage' in SOS.

Whereby, incoming

information is organised according to the structure of present pathways, and
is, in turn, able to interact with and change these structures.

4.6.4 SELF-ORGANIZATION IN CELLULAR NE'I"hUms OF IDENTICAL EIB1ENTS
One of the principal frameworks for the investigation of the property of
self-organization has been networks of identical elements based on neural-nel
type models, similar to those discussed in the earlier parts of this chapter.
In the following some distinct aspects of self-organizing networks will be
discussed in more detail.

(i) - SELF-ORGANIZATION IN RANDOMLY CONNECTED NETWORKS
As mentioned previously, some workers such as Beurle (1962) and Kauffman
(1969) had investigated the formation and the propagation of some kind of
organization within randomly connected networks.

One of the first attempts

in designing self-organizing learning networks was made by Farley and Clark
(1954).

Of course, numerous McCulloch and Pitt's type mathematical neural
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models were devised prior to them, but mainly involved the modelling of
perceptual mechanisms, and were of a fairly organised pre-fixed structure.
Farley and Clark's (1954) model consisted of a network of non-linear
elements, a segment of which is shown in FIG.4.17(a).

The elements were

connected in a random fashion and each had a threshold value of Ti.

When

an element 'fired' its threshold rose to infinity and. after a refractory period,
exponentially fell back to its normal value.

Furthermore, a 'firing' element

could transmit excitation to all connected elements for a short period after
its excitation.

The model, therefore, could show both 'spatial' and 'temporal'

summation. The pathways themselves had variable attached 'weight' measures
which could determine the efficiency of transmission of excitations between
two elements.

These networks, unlike logical or neural nets, operated on

analogue basis.

Another point to note is the lack of inhibitory inputs, which

is probably a reflection of the state of neurological knowledge at the time.
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A segment of Farley and Clark's self-organizing network
shown in more detail.
An element fires when the
summation of the weighs of its excited inputs exceeds its
threshold value.
(b) - A simple two-input two-output learning self-organizing
network, showing the arbitrary differentiation of systems
elements, denoted by *'s.
(a) -

A simple process of 'learning' could be displayed by the following exercise
- which was also simulated on a digital computer. Arbitrary sets of elements
were defined as the two inputs and the two outputs of the model, as
illustrated in FIG.4.17(b). The state of the, so called "push-pull", output was
determined by the relative number of firing elements in the two output sets.
Now, if it was desired for the inputs to drive the outputs in a specific
predetermined manner, then an algorithm for the modification of weighting
parameters could gradually result in the self-organization of the system into a
state which

would

show the appropriate input-output sequences.
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procedure involved increasing the preceding weights (of active pathways) if
the change was a favourable one, and decreasing them otherwise.

Beurle (1962) also examines some properties of functional organization in
random networks - in an attempt to model some neuro-physiological processes.
Ris devised hypothetical randomly distributed elements are able to make
random connections with other cells, propagate excitations and inhibitions,
and change their sensitivity during a refractory period.

He goes on to

discuss the results obtained (various graphic patterns) from simulations of
such networks, in relation to some basic neural observations, in particular,
the notions of long-term and short-term memory.

(il) - SOME MATHEMATICAL ASPECTS OF SELF-ORGANIZING NETWORKS

Andrew (1972) describes two general principles which could guide the
process of self-organization in multi-layer parameter adjustment-type networks
-

being

distinct and

more universal than other

earlier

self-organizing

networks, such as Rosenblatt's (1962) single-layer simple "perceptrons", or
Selfridge's (1959) "pandemonium" which could operate in two different layers.
The first principle involves the breaking down of the overall goals into
'locally-evaluated' sub-goals, this should be done with particular attention
given to the reduction of signal redundancy in the system.

The second suggestion is the incorporation of special pathways in the
network which can facilitate a, so called, 'significance feedback' to the
elements.

This is because, in the more complex networks, the effect of

weight adjustments of particular pathways on the output are not known
exactly.

Hence, a measure of the sensitivity of the output to activity at each

point is required to determine parameter adjustments at that point.

A simple

mathematical algorithm is suggested, and based on such, computer simulations
of nets of both neuron-like and continuous elements are devised and their
results discussed.
relation

Finally, the significance of such notions are considered in

to the actual neuronal observations, or within the context of

socia-economic systems.
Uttly's (1956) work on systems based on 'classification' and 'conditional
probability' concepts (discussed previously) has a great deal of relevance to
50S, and has influenced many later developments in this field.

Chapman's

(1959) self-organizing classification system was an early example of this type
of models.

It had both of Uttly's classification and conditional probability

properties incorporated within its design.

However, there were two basic

APproacb.a

to

Nodell i ••

of

Lear.i ••

-

246

Parl-l

Firstly, the counting of significant inputs was done before

differences.

classification was achieved, hence the frequency of occurrence determined if
an input was classified.
sets

of

combinations

Secondly, an arbitrary number was imposed on the
of

inputs

that

could

be

classified.

Abstract

cell-networks were also devised on such criteria, arranged in configurations
which displayed the property of self-organization in an adaptive manner; and
were said to 'learn' to recognise patterns in a very trivial sense, using a
simple set of rules - the oper?tions of cells involved analogue processes.
These models had obvious connotations to the plasticity and growth aspects of
the nervous system.
An

electronic

hardware

device

was

also

constructed

whose

storage

pathways consisted of moist cotton fibers, that reduced in conductivity as the
moisture evaporated. This simple hardware was found to exactly duplicate the
predicted logical workings of the abstract system.

However Chapman saw the

real potential of these artifacts in the much larger complex models whose
behaviour exceeds the range of accurate predictions.
Mathematically these models could be represented by matrices of the form
described in the previous section. Links between outputs and inputs could be
denoted by the elements of a matrix, and after each input-output sequence
the

whole of

the

matrix

structure

can

be

modified

to

take

the

new

reinforcements into account.
MacKay (1962) discusses the problems involved in designing 50S in terms
of adjustments of effective topologies for neural-net type systems.

He

outlines some ways which pathways and connections between elements be
modified, on the basis of reinforcement of the 'weight' of causal links, or a
change

in

continuous
operations.

their
or

'conditional

discrete,

and

probabilities'.
could

involve

These
parallel

processes
,as

well

could
as

be

serial,

He goes on to argue that a much greater efficiency could be

achieved if topological organizations of 50S in the time domain could take up
important functional roles - unlike the structure of most computing machinery
where no particular functional significance is attached to the topological
relationships of, for example, its memory cells.

The various aspects of

storage of information in temporal structures of SOS are also discussed, in
terms of hypothetical elements called "coincidence detectors", and compared to
some analogous aspects of neural organization.
Justice and Gervinski (1968), in an investigation of possible functional
equivalence of the process of biological evolution and

self-organization,
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describe a so called 'SOBLN' (Self-Organizing Binary Logic Network) device,
whose functional diagram is shown in FIG.4.18.

A network of elements, called

'statistical switches', organises itself on the basis of probability modifications
occurring as a result of interaction with environmental variables and a 'goal
circuit'.
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A schematic diagram of a tSOBLN' machine.

Th design of this type of self-organizing networks, based on elements and
procedures defined in some mathematical or logical terms, has been one of
the principal trends in SOS.

However, the consistency and the strength of

these

theoretical analyses,

formalisms,

and

their

have

not managed

to

overshadow the weaknesses of their basic criteria and the deficiencies of
their underlying premises.
(iii) - SELF-ooGANIZING NJrnOlKS BASED 00 fDm ASPBCI'S OF THE NERVOOS SYS'1'Ei

A belief in the parsimony of nature will imply that the problem of the
organization of stimuli (and information) in the nervous system has been
solved in the most efficient way, minimising all forms of redundancy.
Information in the nervous system is compressed, generalised, classified
and organised according to processes which are very much in the dark.
Uttly's classification system was a simple hypothesis about such processes,
and he suggested the possibility of finding similar mechanisms in the brain.
Some principal developments of the topic of pattern recognition, to be
discussed in the next chapter, are a direct consequence of the work carried
out on neuron-like self-organizing networks.
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The major thought provoking landmarks in this area were the work of
Hebb and, later on, of Milner on the organization of neural assemblies.

Their

neurologically oriented theories were also complemented by the work of
cognitive psychologists, mainly from the gestalt school, on the various aspects
of perception.
Later manifestation of the property of self-organization within networks of
neuron-like units have been undertaken by some engineering oriented workers.
The type of cells suggested are, normally, the threshold digital elements; and
the tasks involve some form of learning of external patterns or sequences of
external

patterns.

This class of investigations are

closely

related

to

'associative memory', 'recall', and 'concept formation' studies.
Threshold elements, as non-linear models of nerve-cells, have been the
subject

of

many

modelling

information-processing capabilities.

endeavours

which

deploy

But, their non-linear feature has meant

that they are difficult to analyze in very general terms.
discusses

their

self-organizing networks of threshold

Amari (1972)

elements in relation

to

learning and recalling of patterns, and sequences of patterns - again, based
on Bebb's hypothesis on the neural organization during a learning process.
Amari

uses

the

criterion

of

stability

to

define

equilibrium

states

or

state-transitions for the network, and the system is said to learn from its
repeated encounters ",.jth stimuli, hence self-organize itself into stable states.
Once a pattern is remembered as an equilibrium state, then it can be recalled
and reproduced by an associated stimulus. Similarly, if a sequence of patterns
is remembered, a segment of this pattern can act as a 'cue' stimulus and
recall the rest of the sequence.

Furthermore, it is shown that a kind of

generalization of patterns can be achieved, by forming a

representative

pattern for a given set (class) of stimuli.
The analysis are all carried out theoretically.

The formalisms devised

involve defining a mathematical network of elements (having weighting and
threshold values), and also investigating the stability of various stales,
state-transitions, and

state-transition sequences.

The effect of 'noisy'

disturbances on the learning of patterns is also analyzed.

Briefly, the basic

algorithms used for modification entail the increasing of weighting value of
connections of inputs and outputs (or other inputs) that coincide, and the
decreasing of weights if they differ.
Fukushima and Miyake

(1978)

also describe a

network model of the functioning of

self-organizing neural

human associative

memory

which,
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according to its designers, show some of the self-organizing properties of
neural

plasticity.

It

is,

principally,

based

on

the

hypothesis

that

reinforcements of the pathways between two cells occur when the high states
of

their

activities

"Cognitron" ,
computer.

was

a

coincide.

Their

multi-layered

previously

network,

conceived

it was also

model,

simulated

the
on

a

The cognitrons were able to selectively respond to frequently

occurring patterns, after a number of stimulus presentations.

This laler

development of the cognitron model, the 'feedback-type cognitron', included
the

additional

feedback

feature

-

by

making

connections

last-layer cells and some of the front-layer cells.

between

the

A mathematical formal

model was described for this new network, and its computer simulation
undertaken.

Because

of

the

feedback

loop

the

stimulus,

after

their

presentation to the system, continued to recirculate within the network (even
though the inputs were removed).

Hence, after a period of training with

different patterns, the connections are 5elf-organized into desired states,
depending on the characteristics of the externally presented stimulus patterns.
The results of simulations showed that these self-organized associations could
be recalled even if fragmented, noisy, random, or difficult stimulus patterns
were presented to the system - on the basis of best correspondence with
memorised patterns.
4.6.5

J:NFOmoIATION-~CAL

APPROACH TO SELF-rn.GANIZING SYSTEMS

The concepts of information theory have been used to describe the basic
criteria involved in SOS.

For example, it has been established (by Ashby and

Von-Forester) that the information theoretic concept of 'uncertainty' (or
entropy) of information-content, or the variety, of a self-organizing system
should be greater or equal to the uncertainty of the environment it is trying
to control (or the uncertainty of disturbances to its goals) - as a necessary
condition of achieving organization.
Similarly, the 'certainty' of a seli-organizing system should increase as the
system becomes more organised and the probability of response to a particular
input increase.

However, as certainty increases the system becomes more

redundant, and, hence, the 'redundancy' of the seli-organizing system should
increase with time.

Therefore, a specific condition can be imposed on the

rate of change of the 'entropy' functions of SOS.
Von-Forester (1959) proposed, in a strict logical sense, the thesis that:
"There are no such things as self-organizing systems;" and went on to justify
this postulate on the basis of thermodynamic considerations of entropy within
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Other philosophical issues in

relation to this subject were also scrutinised, in particular, the conceptions of
order and reality.
Be, further, proposed a particular measure for torder' involving Shannon's
tredundancy' notions of information.

R

=1

Redundancy is defined by:-

- II/H.

where H/H. is the ratio
information

theoretic

(or the

sense)

to

relative entropy)

the

maximum

of the entropy

entropy

(or

the

(in

maximum

disorder) of a system.
Bence, if H
then R

= O.

= H.,

or in other words the system is in its highest disorder

But, if the elements of the system are arranged such that given

one element the position of the rest are precisely determined, in other words,
there is no uncertainty, then

n becomes zero, and R = 1, implying perfect

order.
Now, the criterion for self-organization becomes:dR

~

>0

,

meaning that

the rate

of change of' redundancy should be positive; and, it

can be deduced that:-

H( dR. ) > n.( dH )

--or-

dt

(1)

The two special cases of equation (1) are:Firstly, when the maximum entropy (Ha) is constant, then:dH

at

<0

,

meaning that the value of entropy should be reducing with time.

Secondly, if the entropy (H) is constant, then:-

dR.

at

>0

,meaning that the maximum entropy should increase with

hence, implying that additional elements should be added

to the

time;
system to

achieve self-organization.
Von-Forester also suggests two general mechanisms which lie at the core
of understanding of 50S; namely, the principles of "order from order" and
"order from noise".
The general information theoretic aspects of self-organization can be
applied to fairly simple combinatorial type systems.

An example is the models

Approaclle.

described by Rapoport (1962).
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He discusses two sets of experiments in

three-person learning groups, on the basis of their self-organizing properties.
The, so called, "parameters of self-organization" are singled out as a melumre
of the performance of the system - indicating the degree to which the system
had managed to organise itself. The learning tasks are comprised of finding u
sequence of associations, or optimising a reward.

The empirical observations

are supplemented by some information theoretic analysis of a mathemutical
model, and the analytical predictions are compared with the actual results.
Some indices and

parameters are extrapolated

determine the learning efficiency of the group.

which

can

quantitatively

Once such parameters are

established, then their relation with respect to the composition of various
groups,

environmental

conditions,

experimental

parameters,

collusion

or

communication between the members of groups, and other controllable or
observable variables could be studied.
Pask (1967) applies Von-Forester's formalised information-theoretic notions
on self-organization to his elaborate cognitive model of human learning, and
discusses the consequences of such analysis with the help of computer
simulations.

His ideas are ext.ended to the domain of teaching and education.

Man, in a general systems context, is also regarded as a self-organizing
system, interacting and learning from its environment.

Even a more int.ricate

and general model of linter-nation' politics and relations has been studied and
simulated by Guetzkow (1962), using the context of SOS.
4.6.6 GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS
There are many different, and sometimes conflicting, conceptions of SOS
which mainly refer to a specific class of system.

Mesarovic (1962) analyses

the SOS from a broad outlook of general systems theory.

The process of

self-organization is seen as an orderly change in a system's structure.

In

addition, some high level examples of SOS in nature (e.g., the human brain)
are only considered as a special type of the general class of all SOS.

The

interdisciplinary feature is seen as a very important aspect of such analysis,
but it is emphasised that widespread careless generalizations should be
avoided, and:

"sos defined in terms of the activities or behaviour of the

general system and not in terms of the specifics of the system under
consideration. "
Mathematical optimization techniques, on the whole, cannot be used on the
general class of system structures that have no orderly relationships, and
mainly apply to functional problems.

Hence, Mesarovic outlines an abstract
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basis for the description of systems that can accommodate the global view of
the property of self-organization - enabling the identification of a behaviour
of a

system as self-organizing, distinct from other properties such as

adaptation and learning.
He also distinguishes two general methods of describing the behaviour of
SOS: (1) - tcausal descriptions', and (2) - 'teleological descriptions'.

The

causal SOS change their structure according to a preprogrammed sct of
input-output relationships, but the teleological SOS change their structure in
an attempt to achieve (or pursue) certain goals.

The latter systems are the

more flexible, and hence can function in a wider range of situations.

The

essential question is, therefore, seen as the design of elaborale and complex
decision-making procedures and strategies to attain a goal more effectively,
which

might

involve

the

changing

of

the

teleological

structure

itsel!.

Mathematical description of such systems are abstracted, and their behaviour
further investigated by studying the computer simulation of analytic models.
4.6.7 AN OVERVIEW OF SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS
Andrew (1967) sees the way forward for the future generations of much
more

complex

computers

lying

in

the

incorporation

of

self-organizing

properties within the fabric of computers; and he anticipates that basic units
of these computers to be of a more complex nature than f'1cCulloch and Pilt's
models of neurons or the threshold logic elements.

Furthermore, in this vain,

he discusses a set of features that all SOS are likely to have, and proposes
some hypothetical elements, namely "wondering correlators", which either
dynamically or statically search for various significant levels of correlation in
the system and then perform particular functions.

The shortcomings of

available experimental models are also discussed, in particular, the lack of a
hardware device for adequate representation of analogue storage.
However, these cybernetically biased views, although intuitive, have not
produced any concrete results in practice, thus far.

Similarly, abstractions

emerging from the topic of 80S have not lead to any fruitful discoveries
about the nervous system.

Probably t

because of the complex way the

inherited (genetic) and the environmental sources of order interact and
influence the organization of the nervous system. Nevertheless, some workers
feel that this approach is still potentially fruitful.
Furthermore, no precise global theories have been devised for the accurate
functional analysis of this criterion.

The formalisms proposed either deal
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with this phenomenon in a very abstract and general sense, or are only
applicable to a specific type or a limited class of systems.
More

recently,

Andrew

(1980)

(also

Dalenoort,

1982)

reviews

the

development of the subject of SOS, and its current status, indicating the
recent apparent abandoning of such an approach is, mainly, due to lack of
disappointing resu1ts (unlike the spectacular achievements of A.I.).

The SOS

are also discussed in the context of 'autopoiesis' (referred to in the previous
chapter), and the autopoietic view is regarded as a possible means of reviving
the interest in SOS studies.
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--------PART-II

5.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is in fact a continuation of the preceding chapter; a fairly
arbitrary division is made here to distinguish the more recent trends in the
modelling of the learning process from the earlier trends labelled by a variety
of

terms

such

as

'cybernetic',

'self-organising

systems',

'neural-net',

'automata-theory', 'control systems', etc. (those outlined in chapter four).
However, the taxonomy pursued in these two chapters does not follow a
precise

historical ordering,

neither does it

have clear cut

boundaries.

Therefore, many of the subjects discussed in this classification span the
entire course of the evolution of the field of artificial 'learning' systems, in
one form or other.

The overlap of domains of research for many of these

approaches has also lead to a complex inter-linking of interests of workers
from different fields.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, generally, most of the topics covered
in Chapter 4 reached the peak of their popularity at some point during the
past four decades, and, on the whole, have had a historical precedence over
those that will be covered in this chapter (which are still extensively' and
progressively researched). Two major approaches to the modelling of learning
will

be

discussed

( specifically

some

here:
of

'Pattern-Recognition'
its

important

and

'Artificial-Intelligence'

subsections:

'concept-learning', 'game-playing' and 'robotics').

'problem-solving' ,

In addition, some other

specialised approaches to learning such as the 'evolutionary-programming', and
the 'educational' approaches will also be brieny considered.
5.1 PATTERN-RECOGNITION APPROACH TO 'EARNING' SYSTEMS
The subject of "Pattern-Recognition" or PR has been referred to previously
in numerous occasions.

But, here, we will attempt to outline a more detailed

and broad account of this topic, and issues involved in relevance to the
learning process.

Many of the topics discussed in the previous sections on

SOS and neural/logical nets have had a great deal of bearing on PR models;
and some of the models described could indeed be categorised as PR models.
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Firstly, it must be emphasised that PR does not solely refer to visual
aspects, and

more

fundamental explicit qualities of percepts and

their

relationships are involved. The process of PR is also so intrinsically involved
with the process of learning that it is hard to imagine any learning situation
where the detection, recognition, or classification of input variances are not
prime concerns.
The discipline of PR came to life as a result of the scientific desire to
find physical counterparts of physiological and mental events.

Yet, the

diversification of its enquiries has even extended to philosophical domains,
such as discussions about the nature and validity of various epistemological
assumptions on perception - usually involving aspects of mind-body problem.
The science of PR has two principal facets; on the one hand, models are
devised for the 'simulation' of relevant psychological properties; on the other
hand, models are devised as 'artificial' counterparts for such properties. Such
a dichotomy was also implicit in our previous approaches, however, it is only
in the case of these more recent trends that the division has become explicit.
The above, apparently arbitrary distinction is hinged on the underlying
intentions and backgrounds of scientific workers interested in the subject. If
their objective is the understanding of the 'natural' aspects of cognition by a
step-by-step imitation of perceptual observations, then they are said to be
engaged in simulation.

But, if they are _occupied with the design of models or

machines that try to achieve the task of PR by, principally, non-biological
means (although some 'natural' considerations may be incorporated), or with
the intention of out-performing humans in particular task-domains, then they
are said to be involved in the artificial aspects of PR.

However, so far, the

majority of PR models designed have involved practical tasks of discriminating
patterns by "artificial" means, and not simulating the wayan animal or human
performs the same task.
A survey of literature on PR reveals the variety of abstract and practical
techniques

that

have

been

adopted

in

solving

these

problems.

The

engineering-oriented system theorists have been engaged in the design of
efficient input-filters for improving a specific performance criterion of a
system.

The -workers interested in machine and computer 'intelligence' have

been trying to· devise
capabilities,

but

not

models that can display some human perceptual

necessarily following

the

same processes.

While,

scientists that have an interest in either simulation or synthesis of animal
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and human PR mechanisms have endeavoured to construct a variety of models
which emulate some such properties.
The science of PR has, also, been distinguished from the more recent topic
of artificial vision (or scene-analysis) by some workers.

Artificial vision is

said to be concerned with structural properties and relationships of idealised
object patterns, while, PR is concerned with identification from raw data.
Yet, ultimately, we could argue that both processes should be incorporated
hand in hand in the true intelligent machines of future.
Similarly,

various

researchers

have

distinguished

PR

problems

from

'pattern-classification' and 'pattern-formation' problems. It is contended that
in PR a set of known classes of patterns normally leads to a classification
rule.

While,

previously

pattern-classification

established

classifying

is
rule

only

to

concerned
some

with

unknown

applying
inputs;

a

and

pattern-formation refers to problems dealing with the identification and
definition of appropriate class sets.
However, here, neither of the above two distinctions will be pursued, and
pattern-recognition and its related processes will be discussed in a broader
context.

Although it must be remembered that problems posed in PR are

quite different from the engineering type problems involved in the design of
automatic character or symbol 'reading' machines, where the principal issues
of concern are the coding of a set of standardised patterns.
The development of the science of PR has been land marked by specific
solutions that, although spectacular in well defined small domains, are mostly
dependant on ad-hoc practical methods.

On the other hand, the more global

solutions to the problem are characterised by mathematical formalisms which,
seemingly, preoccupy their designers with the intricacies of their abstractions
without paying too much

attention

to

practical aspects.

Furthermore,

experience has shown that when the first type, the ad-hoc, techniques are
extended

to

the

more

generalised

situations,

they

are

disappointingly

inadequate.
A classification for the different types of intelligent activities modeled by
PR researchers was, proposed

by Dreyfus

(1972),

which,

in

his

view,

distinguished, although not sharply, the four general areas most PR workers
direct their efforts towards.

These fields are: (1) - 'pattern matching' rigid

responses to fixed templates; (2) - 'algorithmic rule based recognition' of
simple rigid patterns, involving search of feature classes; (3) - 'heuristic
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recognition' of more complex, or noisy, patterns which involve search for
regularities; (4) - 'recognition' of varied and distorted patterns, based on
generalising stimuli, and by having some insight into the meaning or the
relevance of patterns - which usually involves learning from experience or
examples.
Within the previous three decades,

numerous PR sYRtems have

been

developed, tackling varied tasks such as:(a) - Reading of codes, symbols or characters
(b) - Recognition of various objects
(c) - Speech-typewriting
(d) - Voice-recognition, speaker-identification
(e) - Identification of radar, sonar, or EEG signals
(f) - Weather-map analysis

(g) - Finger-print identification
(h) - Chemical analysis of stained tissue slides, blood-cell classification
(i) - Medical diagnosis
(j) - Game-Playing

(k) - Automatic translation and programming
(1) - Industrial process and quality control

The degree of proficiency of a system depending on the number and the
complexity of patterns in its recognition range, and also on the ease of
detecting and defining features of such patterns.
Although, most research in PR has been directed towards the recognition
of visual patterns, a significant amount of work has also been progressing in
the

area

of

'speech-recognition'.

Early

works

on

speech

recognition

approached the problem by trying to first recognise words on the basis of
their phonetic patterns, and then, by using some rules of grammar, recognise
whole sentences, and finally the embedded meanings.

However, it has become

clear that much more complex interactive processes are involved, whereby,
recognition is influenced by a variety of semantic and syntactic factors, and
also environmental cues and clues in a holistic manner.

Currently it is

regarded that the progression of methods developed for simpler type lower
level sub-problems (phonetic recognition techniques) is not a viable route for
finding a solution to the problem of artificial speech recognition.
There are also certain types of PR processes which do not depend on a
specific sensory modality (vision, speech, etc.), such as the recognition of
symptom patterns in a medical diagnosis system, or some geophysical patterns
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However, the fundamental problems of

speech recognition (or other types of recognition), which are of interest to
this thesis, will be covered within the general discussions of the topic of PR
in this section.
5.1.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF PATTERN
Some early workers in cybernetics had

reached

the conclusion that

recognition of patterns was the critical operation in any process of learning.
For example, Walter (1953) embarks on an interesting discussion of 'pattern',
and the important part it plays in every facet of life and development of
scientific enquiry. Pattern, as the 'raw material of order', is defined as: "any
sequence of events in time, or any set of objects in space, distinguishable
from or comparable with another sequence or set. " Its significance as an
intrinsic quality of living is highlighted; and all sciences, in a broad sense,
are said to stem from 'pattern-seeking'.

The developed capabilities of the

nervous system are also seen as the solution provided by evolution in dealing
with the problem of perceiving complex patterns.
A more engineering-oriented definition for 'pattern', given by Glorioso
(1975) as distinct from 'signal', is: "If one has no convenient mathematical
description of the information structures of signals, then they are generally
referred to as patterns.

Also, patterns often take on a multidimensional

nature and are expressed as n-dimensional vectors."
The significance of 'pattern' has also been evident in investigations of the
workings of the brain at the neural level - it is the pattern of inputs to a
neuron which determines its 'firing', and not the excitation/inhibition of
individual inputs.
Hence, the questions of how pattern is formed, classified, preserved,
retrieved, changed, and what it signifies, become central to the investigations
and modelling of the learning process.

In Walter's case, he approached these

questions by trying to analyze and model the patterns of holistic activities of
the brain - in the form of EEG recordings of the brain wave patterns.

5.1.2 PATTERN-RECOGNITION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Evidence from psycho-physiological observations show that animals and
humans can recognise shapes independent of their size, angle, mirror-image,
distance, movement, brightness, colour, incompleteness, and their relative
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The less developed organisms possess inferior perceptual

capabilities, due to the more primitive central processing features of their
nervous systems, and nol the deficiencies of their visual systems. In humans,
visual pattern-recognition and image-processing is carried out by very fast
parallel sensors (estimated at 1()6) that transmit information from the eye to
the brain -

this process is in contrast to the slower and more limited

sequential auditory signal processing achieved by the ear. The visual signals
are further manipulated in the brain by utilising its huge data base of
information.
Some workers have attempted to devise artificial PR models which manifest
a variety of psycho-physiological observations.

As in the case of earlier

neural-net and SOS trends, the theories of learning introduced by Hebb (1949)
have featured prominently in many such endeavours.
Psychologists have, in general, divided the process of recognition into:
'primary-recognition', referring to the process of recording physical attributes
of an object; and 'secondary-recognition', referring to the interpretation rules
imposed or the classifications of sensory data.

Furthermore, other higher

aspects of perception such as 'expectations' and 'beliefs' are assumed to arise
from these two lower levels.

It is also recognised that various motivational

factors influence the process of PR, and that motivational centres are
intricately connected with PR mechanisms -

although, most artificial PR

models do not encompass motivational aspects.
The difficulties encountered in devising artificial PR systems are better
understood when we carefully consider the natural PR systems.

Clearly, the

biological mechanisms present in the nervous system cater for this facility of
animals, and in most cases no conscious or direct effort is made to classify
or recognise an object as a member of a class of similar objects.

However,

the complex interplay between experience, learning and PR (and many other
contextual and linguistic factors)

has hampered

the discovery of exact

postulates about the nature of this process, or the mechanisms involved.
Furthermore, due to the particular nature of most psychological experiments
carried out on PR, which are generally based on logico-linguistic criteria, no
real insight can be obtained into the actual way physical inputs are processed
or utilised within the brain.
As far as a direct connection between the processes of PR and learning in
the psycho-physiological sense is concerned, perhaps only 'habituation' can be
described

in terms of a

crude process of PRe

Whereby, an internal
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representation or a model of a stimulus pattern (or its general class) is
formed and stored within the memory, and subsequent input patterns compared
with it.

Hence, in this sense, we can say that PR is only akin to the

primitive levels of the evolutionary hierarchy of the learning process.
However, PR is today being used as basis for a wide range of 'learning'
models, many of which involve the more complex and higher strata of this
hierarchy - 'learning' of meanings or concepts.
5.1.3 BRAIN. NEURO-PHYSIOLOGY. AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION
The lack of precise knowledge about the workings of the brain, and the
complex nature of problems associated with its analysis, has prompted many
scientists from various disciplines to apply the conjectures of their own
paradigms to the modelling and explaining of the functions of the brain.
Pattern-Recognition

is

one

such

discipline;

an

initial

biological

bias

culminating in models which are more or less non-physiologically oriented has
been the feature of most endeavours of PR workers.
striving

to find

engineering

or

mathematical

There has been a

analogues

of

natural

PR

processes, and also a desire to explain these natural processes in terms of
some engineering or abstract criteria.
Some engineering-oriented workers, having this latter objective. consider
the whole brain as a kind of modular pattern recognizer.

The brain in their

view functions by extracting meaningful patterns of information from the
mass of incoming data, compares these patterns with previously stored
patterns, and

based on the past and present patterns makes intricate

judgments on which internal or external outputs to activate.

Consequently,

this simple explanation of biological reaction mechanism is extended to the
entire hierarchy of intellectual capabilities.

Such scientists see PR to be of

prime importance to all biological organisms, and contend that it is only the
size

or

the

complexity

of

the

memory-storage,

comparing,

or

decision

mechanisms of the PR systems in species which determine the phylogenetic
ordering of intelligence.

At the neuro-physiological level, also, many workers such as McCulloch
and Pitts (1959) have tried to uncover the mechanisms of PR and perception.
They have directed most of their research towards the analysis of neural
information processing, in particular, in the visual systems of humans and
animals (e.g., frogs, cats, monkeys).

These studies have been a valuable

source of information for PR model-builders.

For example, it has been

discovered that certain retinal detectors of these animals are dedicated to
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preprocessing and responding to special types of visual features (e.g., edges,
contrasts, convexities), more or less functioning on a

sort of 'template

matching' criteria.

Rosenblatt's (1959) 'Perception' machine, constructed with photocells and
lights (inputs and outputs), was also able to display some basic qualities of
human vision, and was even able to make simple classifications of inputs.
Many other anatomical studies of simpler visual systems have managed to
reveal some of the mechanisms that extract more basic features involved in
transforming visual information from the eye to the higher processing levels
(as well as showing some general principles of neuronal plasticity and
specificity).

Subsequently, most of these concepts, in a more simplistic form,

have been appearing in various PR schemes.
In addition, numerous engineering oriented scientists have attempted to
apply various hypothetical neuronal models to the problems associated with
PRo

Using analytical neuronal models they have designed systems to emulate

the 'feature extraction' or the 'stimulus discrimination' mechanisms of the
brain of some animals.
Examples are Deutsch's (1967) models of the visual and auditory PR
mechanisms of animals, which use established engineering techniques such as
transformation matrices or functions, information theory, Laplace Transform,
frequency analysis, etc.

Deutsch's line of investigation firstly involved the

understanding of biological processes at work, followed by the application of
known engineering methods in analyzing these processes, and finally the
introduction of a simple hypothetical model, based on arrays of elements
represented by matrices.

These models were capable of recognising simple

patterns, such as the decimal numbers -

the recognition was done by

comparing and correlating features of inputs with sets of test patterns.
Arbib (1972) also approaches the problem of PR from the brain sciences
point of view.

He embarks on his line of argument by first considering the

various hypothesis and discoveries made in the physiological investigations of
visual perception and· visual recognition in animals, in particular that of cats
and frogs.

His principal contention is that perception is 'action oriented',

and goes on to develop analogous artificial models for some perceptual
mechanisms.
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5.1.4 COGNITION, PERCEPTION AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION
The vast amount of research and experiments carried out by cognitive
psychologists in the field of 'perception' has provided an important source of
knowledge for PR workers engaged with such problems.

Discoveries, mainly,

based on human perception have suggested ways which information could be
classified, compared, generalised, organised, stored, retrieved, and in general
perceived.

Much of the general principles used in the construction of PR

computer models have been adopted from these studies, especially from
research on visual-perception - of course, other principles adopted from
various empirical studies have also been incorporated in such models.

Ideas

on 'perceptual cues' and 'clues', and formation of 'belief-structures', are some
of the principal notions incorporated in the work of PR model-builders.
Simply stated, to 'perceive', according to George (1973), is something more
than 'to sense' and less than 'to know'; and while, the defined boundaries of
terms 'perception', 'cognition', and 'learning' are to some degree arbitrary,
such a segmentation has helped the investigation and analysis of behaviour.
George (1986) emphasises that these terms should not be viewed as pieces of
a "jigsaw puzzle" that fit together, but as concepts which overlap in a
somewhat "fuzzy" way.
The

distinction

between

psychological

concepts

of

'cognition'

and

'perception' is vaguely reflected in another dichotomy, "parallel/sequential", in
PRo

If the trivial classification of patterns by, primarily, using information

from the sensory level, the ·cognition", is the objective, then the 'parallel'
methods of PR could provide the appropriate examples.

By contrast, if the

more complex logical and deductive (knowledge level) aspect, the "perception",
is to be emphasised, then the 'sequential' procedures of PR, mainly developed
in the field of A.I., could be cited.

However, it is hard to imagine the

complete PR systems of future solely relying on only one of the above
paradigms.
The close analysis of even

~he

simplest recognition tasks carried out by

man, and the identification of parameters and components of perceptual
processes involved, reveals the daunting difficulty of trying to implement PR
in machines, computers or robots.
Some perceptual laws of organization were outlined and discussed in
chapter two.

Human and animal perceptual systems show many peculiarities

which have been extensively demonstrated by, the so called, perceptual
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Examples, such as those illustrated by Gregory (1966) or Lindsay

and Norman (1972), clearly show that sensory information could be interpreted
'Degradation

in erroneous ways.

of images',

'competing organizations',

'organizations without meaning', 'motion paradoxes', 'sensory aftereffects',
'spatial

and

temporal

illusions',

'impossible

organizations',

and

'context

dependant illusions', are some of the labels used for particular idiosyncrasies
of human visual systcm - which arc, in fact, manifestations of implicit rules
of perception embedded within the neural structures. The main question for a
PR worker is that to what extent these issues are significant to the core of
the PR problem.

This is important since direct physical observations of the

mechanisms involved will not, in general, account for or predict the oddities
observed in perceptual systems.
In spite of a lack of precise explanatory hypothesis, there are strong
evidence which point to the existence of some 'feature extracting' mechanisms
in the brain; and, also, there are indications pointing towards the importance
of issues

such as 'visual cues', 'context', 'expectations', 'meaning', and

'attention' in perceptual recognition processes.
Recently,

some

solid

theories

have

been

developed

in

the

field

of

perception, be it in a narrow sense, in an attempt to explain a number of
above peculiarities and distortions of the human visual and perceptual system.
For example, rules have been proposed which based on simple notions of
convexity, concavity, or relation of faces, edges, and corners of a picture
could decide whether the object is physically "possible" in configuration or
not.

Consequently, these theories are finding their way to the design of

various computer programs dedicated to scene-analysis or PRo
Cognitive studies of the process of PR have, therefore, shown that some
interpretations must be made on the sensory data reaching the brain.

The

rules of these interpretations have been modelled by some computer and A.I.
workers.

One class of models analyze scenes of group of objects or shapes.

For example, Guzman's (1968) model or Winston's (1977) 'block-world' model.
Another class of models try to simulate human cognitive processes, and
provide a medium for testing perceptual observations, an example being Simon
and Feigenbaum's 'Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer' (EPAM).

Generally,

such models are characterised by their dual processing levels; first, an
elementary

specific feature extraction level; followed

by a

more global

concept forming level, in a vaguely analogous manner to the natural PR
processes.
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5.1.5 INTELLIGENT MACHINES AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION

PR has long been considered as one of the central problems in the design
of intelligent machines and programs.

A prime objective of designers of

intelligent machines has been to give machines the capability to communicate
with the outside world, more or less as humans do.

Hence, implying the need

to design vision systems that can 'see' and 'comprehend' the environment
without

the

use

of

specialised

intermediating

switches,

keyboards,

or

transducers.
As explained, PR encompasses a multitude of issues such as perception,
cognition, and abstraction.

This important consideration was acknowledged

right from the outset of development of this subject, as stated by Selfridge
and Neisser (1960): ..... until programs to perceive patterns can be developed,
achievements in mechanical problem-solving will remain isolated technical
triumphs. "
Perhaps, the impressive array of competent yet very specialised models
developed in the computer related and A.I. subjects thus far reflects the
above early skepticism and concern.

Many indications point to an imbalance

between the developments of 'acquisitional' and

'processing' aspects of

intelligent machinery. The net result being that most developed systems only
function proficiently in specialised domains with carefully prepared inputs.
Aleksander (1984) outlines three broad classes for recognition systems
developed for use in intelligent systems or machines.

Briefly, they are:-

(a) -

tpreprogrammed systems': that detect geometric properties (e.g., area,
perimeter, etc.) of objects, and, hence, calculate their iCientity.
Standardization and simplification of images is of prime impqrtance,
therefore!. Jreat attention is given to smoothing and enhancing the
quality 01 unages (from TV-cameras). High speeds of processing are
required for this class of systems.

(b) -

'Adaptive systems': which incor~rate more versatility (but Jess
expertise) into their designs. Tliese systems can, either under the
external supervision of an operator or acting autonomously, interact
with their environments; and, by 'seeing' samples of objects to be
recognised, are able to make a recognition choice when confronted with
an unknown object.

(c) -

'IntelliJrent systems': which can be attributed with some hil(her
intellectual capabilities of humans.. such as language and reasonmg.
The emphases in this class of moaels have been on the formation of
knowledge structures (logical! linguistic), and on the representational
aspects of 'concepts', rather han physical 'images'.

Aleksander also discusses how these three classes of models, having found
their specialised applications in different areas of PR, A.I., expert-system,
etc., could
automation'.

be combined and

utilised in the development of tintelligent
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5.1.6 ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION
PH is one of the principal pillars of the science of 'artificial intelligence',
and its overlaps with logic and language, specially in the realm of perceptual
models, have been some of the central issues in A.I. research.
PH is generally regarded as one of the four principal subdivisions of the
field of A.I. - the other three being 'game-playing', 'language understanding',
and 'problem-solving'. The importance of PR within the science of A.I. is due

to

the

fact

that

most

developments

in

the

latter

subject

(e.g.,

problem-solving, concept-learning, theorem-proving, language-understanding,
etc.) have to deal with some aspects of recognition of patterns; and it is
implicitly assumed that any truly

"intelligent"

system should

have the

important capability of PH as a prerequisite of its operation.
Some examples of conceptual PR models developed by computer-oriented
A.I. workers are those which are able to detect vertices, lines, and surfaces
of input patterns, and identify the structural features of different geometric
forms.

In other cases the programs are based on detecting 'resemblances',

and not absolute 'matching' of patterns to the originals.

In addition, A.I.,

computer vision and PR models which concentrate on the higher level analysis
of feature spaces have also served as frameworks for

testing various

conceptual hypothesis and issues on problem-solving or learning.
At

the

Recognition,

core

of

the

according

field

of

to Raphael

PR

is

(1976),

the

process

of

is one of the

'recognition'.
two principle

approaches involved in 'problem-solving' - the second being 'derivation'. This
distinction (arbitrary and non-fundamental in some sense), in general, hinges
on the relative emphasis given to 'search' and 'logical deduction' aspects
involved.

Examples of each type of process are: the 'recognition' of

characters from a pool of predetermined catagories; and the 'derivation' of
formal proofs for some specialised class of mathematical problems.
A typical scheme for PR ira the science of A.I involves one or more of the
following three stages:(1) -

Sensory image processing: sharpening, noise-reduction, or normalising
input patterns.

(2) - Pattern classification: naming objects, and formulating equivalence
classes.
(3) - Scene-analysis: identifying comwnents of objects, and describing how
these components interrelate and form larger structures.
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A problem which has increasingly come to the forefront of the area of
scene-analysis research is the question of three-dimensional (3-D) vision.
While, in the earlier models, it was thought that a simple two-dimensional
representation of objects could be extended to solve this issue, today, the
complexities of 3-D vision are better understood and appreciated, and such a
simplistic progression of ideas is not considered viable.
In the PH techniques of A.I., classes are normally defined by structural
relationships of a set of features.

For example, the connectivity, proximity,

and orientation of various segments of alphabetical characters are used to
form structural classes in character recognition programs.
Some early scene-analysis programs (e.g., Roberts, 1960) could recognise
simple shapes made up of straight lines, such as boxes, wedges, pyramids, or
any combination of them.

These programs used simple engineering methods,

based on geometric properties of such shapes, to predict the identity of a
new pattern presented to the model, even though in some cases parts of their
outlines were obstructed. Allowances were also made for camera perspectives,
and in some programs the background of the room containing the objects
could be 'recognised' and segregated from the main patterns.
Guzman (1968) (and other workers) employed a more general approach,
sometimes referred to as the 'heuristic approach', in analyzing scenes of
straight-edge objects.

His program would take simple rules based on some

trivial properties of objects such as vertices, edges, or faces; and by testing,
experimenting, and modifying these rules produce a criterion which worked
for some specific class of problems, and, hence, was able to recognise
particular class of objects. Problems of much higher magnitude are, however,
introduced when pictures to be analyzed include curved objects, or have light
and shades, or when the issue of three-dimensional vision is to be considered.
Slagle (1971) had devised an algorithm for finding

so called 'linear

8

evaluation functions', which by acting on feature vectors was able to evaluate
or recognise patterns. He anticipated that these type of functions would have
applications

in

game-playing,

learning,

utility-theory,

automatic

extraction, programming, and other socio-economic systems.

feature

The evaluation

of these functions for any given task was said to simulate learning, in so far
as that it could approximate the process used by an individual, or a consensus
of experts, in carrying out the same task. Various analytical procedures were
proposed for finding a 'good' set of values for the coefficients of these
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function - such techniques were an extension of already well established
methodologies

of

statistical

decision

theory

for

patterns

with

known

distributions.
Bere, it was implicitly assumed that features are readily detected by an
expert pattern-recognizer or problem-solver, and that their expertise could be
realised in terms of a function of these features.

However, for most practical

tasks, this assumption is grossly inadequate, and the traits are either not
identifiable, or
unknown factors.

the procedures

for

decision-making

involve many other

Furthermore, these techniques do not incorporate facilities

for generating and testing novel features, or evaluating new hypothesis.
Bence, the relative lack of progress in these lines of research could be
contributed to the narrowness of its methods, and to some of their underlying
phenomenological assumptions.
Learning a language without perceiving the objects or subjects it is about
would

be a

meaningless task.

The complex interdependence of human

faculties of vision and language has, hence, been depicted in other PR
programs of A.I.

Probably the best example is Winograd's work on 'block

worlds', in the early 1970's.
Later on, the more conceptual, the 'semantic net' type, recognition models
were developed by other workers such as Winston (1977).

These semantic

networks could augment the previous class of models, by interpreting the
results of a scene-analysis program.
The

above

class

of

models,

which

heavily

rely

representations or descriptions of perceived data,
labelled as

the

'top-down'

solutions

to

the

on

have

problem

the

semantic

sometimes been

of

PRo

However,

according to some critics, the top-down preprogrammed rule-based (rules
arrived at heuristically or otherwise) PR approach, despite having some
similarities to the mechanisms of human perception, has many shortcomings.
Their contention is witnessed by the fact that, so far, such models have been
unable to deal adequately with real environments (outside laboratory), and
have usually been confined to recognition tasks involving specific classes of
relatively simple objects with uncluttered backgrounds.

Their proposed

alternative approach to PR, the 'bottom-up', is dependant on the more
fundamental

properties

of

human

and

animal

perceptual

systems,

and

therefore, in principle, should be able to tackle patterns of much higher
complexity.

An underlying feature of systems in this, sometimes called

'adaptive PR', approach is their widespread use of the learning process as a
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normally,

different from the 'serial' algorithmic met.hods of conventional comput.er
oriented researchers, and involve 'parallel' processes - more or less emulating
the sudden simultaneous changes of neuronal stat.es of the brain.
In our continuum of investigations of the area of artificial 'learning'
systems, the higher conceptual PR models will be discussed more fully in the
later section dealing with Artificial-Intelligence.

5.1.7 DESIGNING PATTERN-RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
A simple line of argument will be followed here, whereby, the basic issues
involved in designing PR 'learning' systems, in particular the parane] syst.ems,
will be elaborated step by step.

FIG.5.1. shows schematically t.he principal

components involved in a typical PR system; however, in practice, some stages
may be eliminated.
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A general blue-print for a pattern-recognition system.

(i) - REPRESENTING and ENCODING INPUTS

The question of 'representation' of inputs,

for models which do not

exclusively rely on their raw sensory data, is of prime importance for PR
model-builders.
been

tackled

This issue, sometimes referred to as 'pre-processing', has
by

various

mathematical

techniques

(e.g.,

probabilit.y
distributions, fuzzy-set.s, etc.), as well as some purely descriptive methods.
The elaboration of a particular model and its range of inputs dictate the level
of complexity and the
be considered.

type of representational characteristics that. need to

For example,

whether it is necessary to consider the higher

semantic or cont.extual issues or not.
In designing a simple PR system the first step is to present the input to
the system in its most trivial components.

This is normally done by breaking

up the incoming data into an ordered array of segments.
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of computers, and most neural network models, has meant that information in
the majority of such models is presented in a binary form - giving a sequence
of binary bits as the state of the matrix of input cells.
Moreover, it is normally desireable to reformat or change the initial basic
binary input pattern in the latter stages of preprocessing (for the ease of
subsequent analysis).

Some of the methods used for preprocessing (or

'conditioning') the primary input patterns into a more convenient form are:(1) -

'Enhancing' or 'emphasising' certain characteristics of input data which
are deemed important.

(2) -

'Providing invariances' in spite of minor changes, obstructions,
perspectives, environmental changes, or spatial positions.

(3) -

Reducing the amount of incomin)t information by 'noise suppression',
'normalization' of inputs, 'focussmg', or 'segmentation'.

(4) -

'Reformatting' the inputs, for ease of processing by next stage of the
system.

(ii) - TEMPLATE-MATCHING

Now, the most obvious and intuitive approach for pattern-recognition
would

be

to

previously

compare

stored

the

examples

incoming information with a
(or

more

commonly

called

specific set of
'templates'), and

calculate their similarity to these examples on the basis of their optimal
matching

of

bits.

Bence,

the

simplest

classification and PR is 'template matching'.

of

all

possible

schemes

for

Machines whose designs are

based on this criterion are easiest to build, yet are most susceptible to error.
An arbitrary threshold N can be chosen, above which the correlations
signify a recognised pattern, otherwise, the pattern is either stored as a
'new' template or discarded as 'insignificant' -

here, 'significance' could

either be defined on the basis of frequency of occurrence of inputs, or on
the basis of distinctiveness from previously stored patterns.

A simple

illustration of this scheme is shown in FIG.5.2 (next page).
The process of template-matching can be seen to be present in most PR
models.

Since, even those systems which are based on the more complex

processes of feature-extraction and feature-recognition use template-matching
on portions of their total input patterns at some stage - to locally. identify
the nature of a feature (e.g., edge, point, angle, etc.).
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..

A simple scheme for recognition of patterns presented and
stored as arrays of binary bits.

(iii) - PRESERVING INVARIANCES

In the basic form the above procedure is clearly not going to be very
efficient, since patterns that are similar to the stored templates yet are
rotated or shifted to a slightly different orientation, or enlarged/reduced in
size, will not be recognised as same, because of their poor matching.
Ideally, PR systems should be able to identify objects in spite of their
spatial transformation, partial inputs, or slightly distorted inputs.

As stated

by George (1973), the long term goal of a PR designer is: "the search for a
system that preserves, certain invariances under transformations."

(Be also

points out the clear interdependence of the processes of PR and learning, and
contends that only the utilization of previously acquired information by way
of learning

could

result in an efficient manifestation of the natural

recognition process).
One way of preserving invariances is to carry out various spatial
transformations on the input pattern, and try to c;onvert it to a more
standard form; alternately, all orientations and sizes of an input could be
matched with the templates.

In either case, we can see that an extra level

of processing becomes necessary to reduce the otherwise enormous number of
exhaustive classifications - that would have resulted from individual storin. of
all possible variations.

A commonly used technique for standardization is to

find maximum density areas of a set of patterns, or, alternately, find the
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average values of groups of data points.

Similarly, various mathematical

techniques

of

such

as

transformations

coordinate

systems

or

matrix-transformations could be used as a possible means of realising spatial
variations of a standard pattern.
Standardization of input patterns is particularly useful for technological or
commercial applications involving PR (e.g., character recognition, automated
sorting machines, etc.).
'Smoothing' and 'sharpening' operations, which remove some of the noise
and irregularities from inputs, are very common in most computer vision
systems based on digitization of picture patterns.

Mathematical processes

which entail transformation of zeros and ones of picture arrays have been
scrutinised extensively by numerous workers. In particular, studies involving
"Life"

transformations

have

yielded

some interesting

behaviour of networks of interacting elements.

results about the

The possibilities of using

"Life" transformations as means of achieving standardization have also been
investigated.
In one of the earliest PH models, Selfridge's (1956) computer based model,
the input patterns were formed by an array of sensory elements, arranged in
an

NxM

matrix.

These

primary

inputs

went

through

a

series

of

transformations, in some cases through the same transformation more than
once, to form 'secondary images'.

Three basic transformation operations

resulted in: (a) - an increased uniformity of patterns; (b) - the emphasis of
differences (or contrasts); and (c) - the replacing of relatively isolated sets
of elements by a single element.
and

matched

with

some

stored

The secondary images were, then, compared
set of templates, and

when a

specific

predetermined level of correlation was achieved, a pattern was said to be
recognised.

The most important aspect of this model was the finding of the

correct sequence of the above three basic operations for reaching the
recognizable patterns.

The sequences were initially chosen at random, but

after 'detecting' successful sequences, a 'matrix of transition frequencies' was
biased accordingly.
Culbertson's (1963) PR model, based on a neural-net type representation,
had the capability to 'translate' (shift), 'rotate', 'dilate', 'expand', and 'centre'
the shape of an input image into alternate forms, and then compare these
translated images with previously stored templates.
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(iv) - CLASSIFICATION
'Classification' is one of the fundamental issues of PR, as well as being
one of the most basic and common operations in science.

The ability to make

appropriate classifications is basic to all intelligent behaviour.

Classification,

in a trivial sense, involves taking a 'sample' and naming the 'category' or
'catagories' it belongs.

The most simple case for classification is when

classes are to be assigned on the basis of the values of some quantitative
variables of a particular description space.

For example, in the classification

of height or weight measurements of a group of people.

But, when the

variables are of a subjective, incomplete, or unknown nature, then the task of
classification becomes a much more difficult endeavour.
The way classes are described (or selected) is principally dependant on the
use which will be made of them.
basic task of recognition.

Classification in its simplest form is only a

But, generally, three basic methods are used for

process of classification:(a) -

Selection by a simple direct matching process (e.g., identifying a letter
of alphabet by individually matching with a set of possible examples).

(b) - Utilising some logical information about patterns (e.g., a shape is a
"SQUARE" if it has four equal sides and four right angles).
(c) - Choosing outcomes on the basis of statistical causalities of events (e.I(.,
if event A is followed by B with high degree of probability then A IS
classed causally with B).
In type (a) and (b) classification we can see that samples have to be
defined either by identifying all members or categories, or by defining their
characteristics. In addition, similarities of an input pattern with the members
of these sample spaces have to be evaluated.

Once a novel input has been

confronted, a decision must be made to either include it within a previously
defined category, or to introduce a new category. But, care should be taken

to not increase the number of classes unnecessarily, or have too few classes,
or disturb the entire classification when adding new catagories.
In a broader sense, the process of PR has also been divided into a process
of 'feature-extraction' and a process of 'classification'.

Most methods of

non-trivial feature-extraction are quite ad-hoc, while, for classification a
variety of independent and well developed techniques are available for any
particular type of problem - generally assuming a statistical independence
between features selected. However, this simple division of the process of PR
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becomes quite inadequate for the more complex or contextually dependent
recognition tasks, and a variety of other issues must be considered.
In the exhaustive extreme of classification, as depicted in the simple
example of FIG.5.3(a), all possible inputs are taken into consideration.

Hence,

whenever a particular input symbol (e.g., bd, eh, eghi) is activated, we could
recognise it from our complete classification system.

The obvious futility of

this approach for any non-trivial system suggests that only a selection of
stimuli should be classified and stored, such as in FIG.5.3(b); these inputs
could either

represent the inputs that occur

more frequently,

properties/features that occur regularly in the inputs.

or the

Now, supposing the

more feasible case of the latter, the real task is how to select these
properties so that neither we are, again, confronted with a high number of
trivial classes, nor general features that cannot adequately distinguish
between inputs.

In other words, to efficiently recognise an object we need

to recognise its list of properties/features, but the shortest possible list.

COMPLETE CLASSIFICATION OF ALL INPUTS

=====================================
a b, c, d,
J

cd, •
a be, bed,

aD,

_ _UlOflllmlmIlJUnnlllrT:W':lIIu;m;,

.
.

(a)

NON-EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF
REGULARLY OCCURRING INPUTS
or PROPERTIES (FEATURES)

====================================
a, c
ab , ef, gi

efh, defghi, abefhi
(b)

FIGURE 5.3.

(a) - The exhaustive classification of all possible combinations
of firing on input elements.
(b) - An example of selective classification of sets of firing
elements.

In our example, tab', 'ef', tgi', etc. could represent properties (e.g., size,
colour) of inputs; and for an input such as "ahcef" we could make a
recognition based on which features (tab' and tef') are detected.

However,

the list of features may be extended or reduced based on other frequency
considerations.

For example, if new and consistent features are detected, or

if too few features are defined, or if two features are coincidental on
numerous occasions.
If we, now, look at some possible ways which decisions about the identity

of the class of an object may be reached from the detected features, then we
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could see that, probably, the most promising methods are those which involve
statistical probability considerations based on previous experiences.

These

methods could entail attaching probabilities (or conditional probabilities) to
various features being associated with a particular object.
If a 'learning' is also to be incorporated, then the probability values could

gradually be modified using some 'counting' mechanism which determines the
frequency of successful associations; hence, after sufficient experience, we
could decisively associate the occurrence of a particular feature, or a set of
features, with an object. In other words, given such features, the probability
of

recognition

should

approach

'one'j

but,

normally, in

practice, lower

probability levels than 'one' are considered quite adequate.
Now, if the machine itself is to determine and generate its own pattern
classes (or feature classes) autonomously, then it is imperative that some
measure of utility (or hedony) should be also incorporated within its design so that the system can judge the usefulness of its selected classes.

Where,

again, the statistical and other techniques such as 'cluster analyses' could be
employed to achieve a simple realization of a hedonic measure - spatial or
temporal clustering of sample patterns could indicate possible boundaries for
classification, and groupings defined accordingly.
A problem common to most PR models which use classification of traits or
features, and statistical decision procedures based on this classification, is
that the inherent connectivity of a pattern is not preserved.

Whereby, data

is collected at distinct instances of time, and stored in locations having no
direct spatial relationship or dependence on each other.

While, it would be

more logical not to disturb the information contained in the topological
continuities of input patterns - specially, since evidence from some neural
observations point to this type of preservation of topology of input (although
the input patterns are also diffused non-locally to some extent).
It should be mentioned here that time related elaboration of above ideas

on "classification" and simple "recognition"

(i.e., sequences rather than

individual inputs) yet adds further complications to the probability calculation.
The connection of temporal ordering of events on the basis of a measure of
texpectancy' will be one issue infiuencing the probability modifications of such
PR scheme.

In addition, when the patterns to be recognised are of a more

complex form,

then

problems of

distinction' pose more difficulties.

tsegmentation

of patterns' or

'feature
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and

"feature-extraction" will be further considered here. Patterns presented to a
system are not simply shapes made up of homogeneous points or segments,
but, as in most natural stimuli, normally consist of parts which have varying
amounts of significance.

For example, in the recognition of song patterns in

birds, or in the recognition of symbolic patterns (e.g., numbers or letters) in
humans; specific 'features' I'traits' I'attributes'I'properties' give the majority of
information about a pattern.

These features can characterise a pattern

without actually relying upon the precise point-by-point (which is in fact the
trivial listing of pattern 'features') configuration of the pattern.
The process of defining 'feature classes' for a set of observed patterns is
an arbitrary one, since a variety of different features might be used to
construct pattern sets -

ranging from

individual

points to topological

regularities or various semantic and syntactic characteristics of inputs.

But,

generally, it is the shortest and the most efficient list of features which is of
interest.
Additionally, a PR machine (or program) has a 'most primitive' set of
measurements which it responds to (e.g., binary bits or voltage levels).

Such

measurements do not, normally, have a direct bearing on its feature sets.
Here, if we consider Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety, it can be said that for
implementing an adequate recognition

process the variety in the 'most

primitive measurement set' should be greater or equal to the variety of the
feature set involved in the task.
Therefore, now, helped by clues from natural observations, and other
parsimony considerations, we can improve our previous PR model to one that
recognises 'features' of patterns rather than their exact shapes.
There are two principal ways these features could be detected, generated.
or extracted and subsequently utilised in the system. Firstly, the system can,
in a sort. of self-organising manner, generate its own features and decision
procedures.
previous

For example, a random network (such as those discussed in the

chapter)

by

reinforcing

its

pathways

on

the

basis

of

some

performance criterion could determine its significant features. This method is
probably the most ideal way of selecting features; yet. so far. models devised
on such basis have not shown a significant degree of complexity or expertise.
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Secondly, the designer or the programmer could using introspection define
all the adequate features of the model, a priori. In this method very little or
no real 'learning' takes place and the performance of the systcm will remain
rigid, yet the system will invariably perform much better and faster, and will
start with a high degree of proficiency from the outset.
In practice, however, the systems designed are a compromise betwecn the
above two extremes - mixing versatility with efficiency.
are

defined

from

the

analysis

of

some

sample

Typically, features

patterns,

using

part

introspection and part investigation of sample properties.
Here, we will attempt to elaborate on three principal schemes that have
been developed for the analyses of features in various PR systems:(a) - At the most primitive level of input measurement (i.e •• the binary coding
of patterns) features are assumed to be subsets of the basic binary patterns.
The primary objective, here, is to define a useful set of such subsets.
In FIG.5.4(a), a 9x9 binary array of cells (sensors) is illustrated, each
element either being in '0' or '1' state.

If alphabetic characters are to be

classified. then, typical 3x3 sets of points (features), such as those shown in
FIG.5.4(b), can be used as possible elements for building each character - any
character could be defined as a union of some feature subsets.

1
~

000000000
001111100
001000000
001000000
001111100
001000000
001000000
001000000
000000000

1

FIGURE 5.4.

(a)

l

!
1.

'~F'lo1m 3 ntI!II"P'

100
010
001

000
111
000

100
100
100

(b)

(a)- An example of a 9x9 matrix of binary elements used for
representation of characters in a PR machine.
(b)
Tiiree typical examples of features observed in various
characters - many other anEled or straight line segments
could also be used as possible features of the pattern.

Methods used for extracting this type of features depend on determining
local regularities of patterns. Mathematically, the problem can be represented
by binary matrices and analyzed by Boolean Algebra techniques.

However.

because of the difficulties involved in solving Boolean equations. the more
successful developments in this area have. mainly. utilised alternate heuristic
feature detection methods.
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A type of heuristic feature detection was used in Uhr and Vossler's (1963)
PR model, which was concerned with the problem of recognition of 25x25
binary patterns involving simple 2-dimensional pictures.

Arrays of 5x5 bit

configurations were selected as features, on the basis of their frequency of
occurrence. Thus, a vector of such arrays could describe a particular pattern;
and simple clustering algorithms could determine the category (class) of an
unknown pattern (if any).

In addition, these feature sets could be modified,

and a sort of 'learning' (or "generation") of new features, and 'forgetting' (or
"elimination") of little used features was said to be manifested - based on the
extent

of

utilizations

of features.

The

system,

indeed, outperformed

human-subjects in discriminating tasks where patterns were of unfamiliar,
abstract, random, or non-meaningful nature.

Yet, it was not as competent in

recognising other range of patterns, for example, different faces, letters or
numbers.
Other

techniques

have also been developed

in this area.

A more

formalised approach to the above problem was proposed by Nilsson (1965) and
co-workers which involved the use of set theory concepts and operations.
The similarity of patterns were decided on the basis of their set theoretic
commonality of features (or "masks").
(b) - A second distinct approach to the problem of feature extraction is that
taken by engineering-oriented workers who, sometimes, regard their field to
be

a

branch

of applied

mathematics.

Here,

patterns or objects are

represented in terms of a set of basic (or primitive) measurements, which is
normally denoted by a weighted combination of some basic features.

The

problem, now, becomes one of analyzing and determining various parameters
and variables of feature (or 'factor') spaces. Methods used in this approach,
usually, referred to as the 'multi-variable factor analysis' approach involve
topics

such

as

'parameter-estimation',

'matrix-algebra',

and

'statistical

correlation analysis'.
Therefore, if we consider patterns as vectors in an n-dimensional space,
then the recognition problem is the finding of regions of this vector space
identified with particular class of patterns.

Alternately, a process of PR can

be described by a mapping from 'pattern-space' to 'decision-space', as:fllhl. .IM ....- . . . . . . . . ..... IItlUW........... l u. . ."""ltfUtm•••

- ! l -..........-jI...... _...
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The optimum mapping being one which has the minimum probability of
error.

However, treating such problems as a simple mapping by statistical

decision methods is extremely cumbersome.

Hence, in practice, this type of

mapping is divided, quite arbitrarily, into sub-mappings, resulting in a loss of
some sort of information at each stage of division.
following diagram.

This is shown in the

The observation made is that these distinctions are not

universally applicable to all PR models.
Representational
sub-mapping

I("""'' ".......""."...' ',,...

Classifying
sub-mapping

r""'p'EATURE" ""~ ,~"
~....", .•.,,,,,,,. SPACE 1""'"'~i'''1

r"""REPRE'S'ENTAT'I'ON'AL''''''''~,

t', ".. "" ...... """""".,, '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''t

OBJECT-SPACE

Feature-extracting
sub-mapping

I"""''';;''''''''

SPACE

.

SPACE

~

Loss of
non-contributing
features

~

Loss of
non-frequently
occurring classes

Most formal analysis of PR systems assume that a large class of features,
which contain the necessary data for classification, are known a priori.

The

number of features could be reduced to a manageable size by: discarding the
'poor' features; selecting the 'good' features; or combining (generally linearly)
a number of features into a single new feature.

Techniques such as 'contour

tracing' could be deployed to detect and extract features from input images
or patterns.

The algodlhms used can detect lines, edges, etc. on the basis of

the contrast of input picture pigments.
Similarly, the mathematical techniques of 'fourier analysis' have been used

to define intensity functions of patterns, and have been used in some
recognition problems of 2-dimensional images (Glorioso, 1975).

The result of

such transformations, and other similar techniques, is to redescribe patterns
into

a

much

more

simplified

form,

while

retaining

some

essential

characteristics, and hence facilitate the use of well established formulas.
Particular
mathematical
feature-spaces

difficulties
feature
for

have

evaluation
various

PR

been

I

~ I....... .....". ." , " ..". ~. .. ".." ,,'.'" .

II L.". . "................."-"'."'"""' ...."' .....,,.1

Loss of resolution, or
structural, physical,
semantic information

"DE'c'IsioN"'~

confronted

methods
systems.

which
Some

in

devising

can

yield

restrictions

genera)
optimal
on

the

'independence' or 'normality' of features have helped to simplify the problem
in certain cases, and have resulted in fairly generalised solutions.

But, on

the whole, feature extraction methods are only defined for a particular class
of problem in hand.
(c) - Thirdly, pattern-features could be detected and defined on the basis of
criteria outside the immediate specifics of their physical forms.

On the one

hand, the designer of a PR system, using his expertise and intuition could
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devise a powerful, yet very specialised, method for dealing with a particular
class of problem (e.g., in classifying a .group of patterns such as those
obtained on a chemical spectrograph).

Here, no general techniques could be

specified, and it is up to the individual designer to use his knowledge, and
information about the characteristics of patterns under scrutiny, and propose
an ad-hoc solution - the mathematical or other properties of patterns are
used to simplify the task of feature detection or extraction.

Many examples

of these techniques can be found in the A.I. related work on PRo

On the

other hand, in the classification problems which involve semantic or syntactic
elements different, and usually non-mathematical, feature-extraction methods
are used. Here, feature-extraction is concerned with 'structural (grammatical)
descriptions' of patterns, 'meanings', and 'relationships' between patterns.
Such methods will be elaborated more in the A.I. section.
(vi) - PARALLEL vS. SERIAL OPERATIONS and PROCESSES
Assuming the essential features of a set of patterns are known, then there
are two fundamental ways of comparing and matching incoming patterns with
these stored features: (a) - 'sequential processing', (b) - 'parallel processing'.
These two methods are outlined in the schematic examples of FIG.5.5.

./"\

~

,I

/'

\~

l

\

/\

/

.....'.."". . "'~,/
..,......,,< FEA TURE'\,I "",,,",,,...,,,,,,,,:'I FEATURE\ )--_., •
INPUT
'\ A
/ ...mni' '(
B
/
~""
_ ....,..,.,.

',~/

/

NO

"\

/

~

YES,n"

)

,/

/
\
['' '.,.'' ' .'"' ' ' ' ' ' '.' ' ' ' ' '.' '00'··1
FEATURE .')......."........"'.,,"''' RECOGNISED

•

-'I;

S
...

YES

I

I

,,,,,,"",,,,,~, AS PATTERN
NO
Pa

..

'bl.... ltI~ItIt ........... I1 ..................11

YES

NO!.

[RECoGNISED~
P2

~~~cg~~Hi~"'1
Pa-l

'AS PATTERN

-~

ImI ......,.,..;....,......... '"U

(a)

..'.....".~'...."""[ FEATURE
A

. . ._ ' . '. . .000000000_,"'

':.~;~~':~U~E

t

-,-B
AI

J--

.. .

111

,"~,

I

GATE

1

•
.

._'J

NO_NO._ _
RECOGNISED

'"',....",.0\1-,....,.,..,," AS PATTERN
P

n.........................u _

1

---;-~ DEgI~foN-}
. ~~OG~
2
AS PATTERN

r--.iI -to

-..,...,.................
I' • . • •
I' . . • .

_

. .
• .

t'__

, -fl. -."L"iSiON]
.,

J

1=r......

•
--0+

P.

•
.

••
• .

II_nu••n..

.

.

.

•

.

•

.

I
DECISION
~~~EAIURE ~ ~=======1~__G_~_T_E__~~~--~~~C~~¥!i!~
(b)

FIGURE 5.5.

(a) - An example of a sequential recognizer of patterns PI....P ••
(b) - An example of an equivalent pariillel PR system.
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The sequential PR system tests each feature in turn, and the results
determine the next steps.

This is more or less the basis for the operation of

most computers and machines in general.

Parallel PR systems, on the other

hand, function seemingly the way animals and humans handle information.
The historical course of development of PR models began with the design
of

simple

parallel

systems,

involving

statistical

analysis of Boolean

or

Euclidean classifications of patterns, fonowed by serial systems which used
sequential sampling methods.

Later, these models lead to the introduction of

computer-recognition (and vision) systems, based on structural descriptions
and sequential classification/recognition techniques.
The particular advantages of parallel processes to sequential processes are
their higher immunity to noise, distortion and error.
the

possibility

of

attaching

adjustable

Another advantage is

weighting

factors

to

parallel

connections, whereby, slight adjustments could be made to the functioning of
a system without disturbing the totality of its behaviour too much.

While, in

serial systems such small adjustments could lead to drastic variations in
system behaviour.

The implications of this final

point is that gradual

modifications and 'learning' could be incorporated much more easily in parallel
systems - either by the system itself, or by changes brought about by an
external operator (designer, programmer).
In

addition,

for

any

given

parallel

decision

process, an

equivalent

sequential system could be designed with fewer steps; but, the speed of
computation will, normally, be much higher in the parallel system.

However,

it has been found that the reverse is not true, and there are sequential
procedures which do not have parallel equivalents.
Parallel

classification

systems

could

be,

normally,

represented

by

mathematical equations; but the serial decision procedures suffer from a
greater complexity and, unlike their parallel counterparts, are much more
cumbersome

to

analyze

quantified representation.

mathematically,

and

describe

their

formalised

The serial classification rules are, often, in the

form of sequences of conditional functions or probabilities, and, thus, can
normally be only illustrated by a graphic 'decision tree' - as in the example
of FIG.5.6.

The criterion used for selecting the best rule could depend on

notions such as the shortest path through the graph, or the least features
used.
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No

class Y

An example of a simple classifying rule (shown by the graph)
for implementing the following problem:class X
class Y

=
=

'ABC'
'APM'

'ABF', 'BRM', 'LGM' , 'AFT' }
'RBK', 'MTO', 'MPK' , 'MTA' }

limited sense, notions analogous to those used in formalisms of

In a

parallel systems have been defined for sequential systems to simplify their
mathematical analysis.
'classes',

Concepts such as 'description spaces', 'samples',

'classification rules', and

examples.

Similarly,

statistical

'classification probabilities' are

techniques,

such

as

'Bayesian

some

decision

procedures', originally developed for parallel systems, have also been applied
to sequential systems.

Another important and widely used analytical tool for

use in sequential type systems is 'dynamic programming'.
The various mathematical procedures that have been developed in the
sequential PR approach

are far less dependant on

successive adaptive

modifications of their classification rule, hence show far less 'learning'.

This

is, mainly, due to a lack of concrete general 'convergence' theorems, similar
to those devised for parallel systems.

Thus, unless a

serial system is

convertible to an equivalent parallel system, or has a small finite sample size,
no general conclusions about a 'learning procedure' can be made.

In other

words, we could not find out whether a serial 'learning' algorithm converges

to an optimal limit or not, therefore only specific ad-hoc solutions could be
found.
Aleksander (1983) discusses the advantages of parallel hardware PR models
on the basis of two principal arguments.

Firstly, due to speed and capacity

limitations it would be impractical to implement serial algorithms on present
day computers (other than for very basic systems). Secondly, on the strength
of similarities of parallel approach to some biological mechanisms of the
brain.

As an exponent of the, so called, 'bottom-up' view of PR he also

attributes the relative lack of success of this, historically precedent, paradigm
to the inappropriateness of supporting technological hardware devices.
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5.1.8 MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES IN PATTERN-RECOGNITION
The interest of mathematicians and engineers towards PR was aroused in
the late 1950's, particularly, in the area of automatic character recognition.
The early endeavours were, mainly, occupied with ways of classifying input
patterns of systems, and their devised early models (some hardware) basically
tried to mimic natural vision mechanisms using clues from neuro-physiological
studies.
Gradually a divergence from the main course of PR was established.

An

abstract mathematical PR related topic was developed which, generally, dealt
with the property of automatic classification within the framework of formal
(mainly

statistical)

systems.

This field

is

sometimes

considered

as

a

su bsection of computer sciences, however, its workers pursue research lines
different (much more abstract) from those followed

by computer scientists.

For the mathematically-oriented researcher in PR the problem is normally
reduced to one of classifying vectors or points in multi-dimensional spaces not the analysis of actual forms of patterns or images.

Many aspects of such

work are related to the classical techniques of control and systems theory
involving multi-variable analysis.
Another diversification of statistical methods has been to devise systems
whose classification rules are not determined from fixed samples of patterns.
This class of problems are sometimes referred to as 'machine learning' or
'adaptive PR', and are closely related
(discussed in chapter 4).

to the adaptive control systems

Here, the sample size is taken to be infinity, and

the classification rule is continuously updated using successive approximations.
The algorithms used are normally called the 'learning rules', and their
'stability',

'convergence',

consideration.

These

and

'goodness'

'learning'

characteristics

algorithms

have

been

are
used

of

prime
in

the

implementation of some neural-net type systems - the best known example
being the 'perceptron' (outlined elsewhere in detail).

Various mathematical

treatments and developments of such algorithms have been undertaken by
numerous workers, for example, Nilsson (1965) or Minsky and Papart (1969).
Typically, first, formalisms are developed for simple linear systems, and later
generalised to higher order classifications, non-linear, or non-Euclidean
systems.
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Again, whether the psychological notions of 'learning' are emulated by
Yet, it is a truism that most of their

such models or not is debatable.

designers strive for such an objective.
(i) - PROBABILITY THEORY AND PR

In current A.I.-oriented models of PR the use of probability theory is,
mainly, limited to the manipulating and representing of uncertain information
in game-playing or problem-solving situations.
the

engineering

approach

the

However, in the neural-net or

mathematical

concepts

and

theories

of

probability play a much more central role, and, often, probabilistic criteria
constitute the essence of techniques used.

In particular, when the outcome

of uncertain events is to be defined or approximated, or when it is desired to
establish correlations of various hypotheses and events for a given set of
evidence.
One of the theories that has been extensively employed for finding such
correlations is 'Bayes' theorem'.

Bayes' theorem provides a methodology for

calculating the validity of hypotheses (events) for a given set of observed
events.

Bayes' theorem is based on the concepts of conditional probability,

and it has also found applications in some A.I. programs for recognifdng
patterns in terms of previously observed characteristics.
~idespread

applications

of

this

theorem

are

found

in

But, the more
the

lower-level

classification (PR) models which use the trivial significances of input patterns.
The basic form of Bayes' theorem has also been elaborated and modified for
various complex or specialised problems, and in some cases other techniques
of probability theory have been used in conjunction.
In addition, mathematical concepts such as "conditional probability" are
used in 'Bayesian inference methods' to devise 'decision procedures'.

In the

more classical statistical approaches if the appropriate probabilities are not
available,

using

information

from

samples

of

data

and

some

tentative

probability distribution functions, some parameter-estimation techniques can
avail the value of probabilities of encountering a particular pattern (or class)
from a class of patterns with specific features.

(ii) - STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES IN PR
As in the case of most other approaches to learning covered in chapter
four, statistical methods form an important and integral part of pattern
recognition techniques.

Indeed, in some cases, the work of analytical PH
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researchers have been categorised within the body of mathematical discipline
of statistics and measurement theory.

The basic criteria of the statistical

approach to PR are that an object can be wholly represented and defined by
a set of features, and that such features should be known before the process
of classification could take place.
The formalisms devised for these type of models are based on describing
patterns (or objects) as points in a multidimensional Euclidian Space, whose
axis

constitute

scalars

for

particular

features.

Ideas

of

proximity,

categorization, or reorientation of patterns are treated in terms of distances,
regions, or transformations of such description spaces.
The principal objective of a mathematical feature-extracting system is to
generate an n-dimensional vector from the input patterns it encounters. This
vector should be able to adequately 'characterise' the patterns that are to be
recognised.

However,

characterization

has

the intuitive and

so far

vague

been manifested

manner

leads us

by which

this

to believe

that

feature-extraction should be regarded as one of the most complex aspects of
the process of PRo
In general, the process of feature-extraction could be manifested in two
basically distinct ways:(a) - 'Logically' extracted features: the designer includes features he deems
to oe important.
(b) - 'Statistically' extracted features: a sample of pre-classified patterns, or
continuous input data, are used to change or supplement the existing
feature list.
A mathematical elaboration of classification of inputs can be made in
terms of features.

Each class could be represented by a function Cit a

weighted sum of a set of features {fl,fz,fa••• }.

Such functions could be of

form:-

Where,

Wi,j

represent the weights attributed to each feature

f~.

The value of

weights could be positive, zero, or negative, identifying the degree of
significance or hinderance of that particular trait to the class Cl.
Once a feature-set is selected, then the problem of classification can be
mathematically tackled by a variety of formal statistical or decision theoretic
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These methods, normally, involve either the minimising of an 'error

function' or the maximising of a
knowledge

of the

'discrimination function'.

probabilities of occurrence

But, a prior

of classes, and

also

the

conditional probabilities of features (or feature vectors) is required. However,
in most PR problems such data are not known in advance, or are incompletely
known.

Therefore, various techniques have been developed to estimate the

values of these probabilities and their distributions, and hence enable the
application of well established formal classification met.hods to a particular
problem.
Techniques covered in t.he 'adaptive control systems' section of Chapter 4
are very similar to these estimation methods of PRo

Samples of data can be

used to gradually 'learn' the values of certain parameters of a probability or
density

function

Bayes

theorems

providing

the

principal

theoretical

groundwork for such techniques.
Alternately, when no clear functional
probability

density,

then

other

general

form

can be assumed about a

statistical

procedures,

such as

'least-square' or 'nearest-neighbour' techniques could be employed to estimate
the density.

However, here, a much larger set of samples and data points are

necessary.
The need for this large number of samples can be reduced by introducing
the, so called, 'adaptive classification procedures'. These techniques could be
applied to various forms of distributions of pattern occurrences; and can,
normally, yield an optimal classification rule after a series of weighting factor
modifications (which use specific reinforcing or error-correcting criteria).

A

disadvantage of these techniques is that after the optimal classifier is derived
from the analysis of a particular set of samples, then there is no guarantee
that in the real mode of operation its performance will be optimal.

The

formalisms involved have been investigated by workers such as Rosenblatt
(1962) and Nilsson (1965).
Irrespective of the method used for classification, it ,,'ould be very
desireable to construct machines (or programs) that could define their own
classes.
features

Classes could be defined by self-adjusting the parameters of simple
(i.e.,

fi'S).

This

feature

is

commonly

referred

to

as

'unsupervised-learning' or 'learning without a teacher'; and is. normally,
incorporated in designs where many analyses of samples are necessary to
discover the underlying consistent traits.
deal of prior information should

still

However, it is found that a good

be incorporated in such systems.
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Similarly, the issue of 'overlap' of classes has been a point of particular
interest when designing algorithms for classification.
There are many ways of designing the •classifier , of a statistical PR
system.

Such 'decision mechanisms' are discussed by Vigilone (1970) in a

survey of applicstions of PR technology.

A typical configuration of a PR

system is considered, as illustrated in FIG.5.7. Bere, the case for a two-class
problem is shown - additional response units could be incorporated for
multiple class problems.
After a pattern is pre-processed and represented to the feature detectors,
then their outputs (bi'S) are denoted by:1

if the j-th pattern contains the i-th feature

= o

b (j)

. .. . . . .-f,

otherwise

bl (j
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A schematic illustration of a typical PR decision structure from
the engineering point of view.

FIGURE 5.7.

Now, the response of a linear response unit for an input j could be
defined by:~'''lIn

D( j)

=

1

, if

o
Where

Wi'S

if

./

L....Ii=l

Wi

hi (j) - T

~ n WI hi
L. i =l

(j)

_ T

>

0

<

0

are the adjustable weighting factors, and T is a decision

threshold value.
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There are also many techniques for the modification and updating of
weighting factors (wi's).

Viglione embarks on a comparative sludy of some

such methods, namely: 'Forced Learning', 'Error Correction', 'Bayes Weighl6',
'Iterative Design', and 'HADALINE'.

Furthermore, the application

or

these

different ways of achieving the decision function are discussed in various
practical problems, such as the analysis of EEG wave forms or fmtellile
photographs, and their relative merits investigated.
Another formal approach, distincl from lhose menlioned so far, has been
proposed which uses lhe concepts of 'sequential decision lheory' to find lhe
classification rule or feature-space.

Here, the principal difference is lhat

decisions are taken on the basis of continuous evaluations of confronted data,
and not a sample set.

Both 'forward' and 'backward' sequential tcchniqueR,

such as dynamic programming, have been utilised for

featur(~

selection and

classification purposes.
The above techniques are predominantly designed for 'linear' problems,
hence, the idea of 'linear-separability' of classes is of importance; however,
various other techniques have been developed to transform a non-linear type
problem into problems containing linear classes.
other analytic tools such as 'decision theory' and 'filler lheory' have also
been ulilised in dealing with the probabilities of occurrence of eventR, and in
minimising errors between the actual responses and lhe desired responses of
PR systems.
Finally, some theoretical solutions based on a compound decision theory
have been put forward, to deal with the contextual aspects of recognition omitted in the simpler isolated PR problems.
On the whole, although the above formal techniques have added a valuable
general theoretical dimension to the science of PR, nevertheless, in reality
most

research in this field

is

directed

towards

practical

ad-hoc

(and

non-global) solutions.
(iii) - INFORMATION THEORY AND PR

"Information" received from the primary levels of a PR process can also
form the basis for PR models.

Whereby, quantitative aspects of information

contained within patterns is investigated using formalisms and techniques of

Approacbes

information theory.

\0

Hodelll DC

o.

LearDi DC

-

.ar\-I.

288

Some methods deal with the raw data, others deal with

feature spaces.
Rapoport (1955) analyses a neural-net type PR system in terms of some
information-theoretic concepts. Various hypothesis are proposed regarding the
way information is transmitted and transferred from retinal receptors to the
brain.

Similarly, the plausibility of different criteria for the transmission of

messages during the process of recognition is investigated.
5.1.9 EXAMPLES OF PATI'ERN-RE(X)GNlSING K>DmB INVOLVING 'LEARNING'
The three main components of any PR process are: (a) - the 'description'
or 'representation' of objects (or their classes) to be recognised; (b) - the
'classification-rule'; and (c) - the nature of 'prior information' supplied to the
model (e.g., sample patterns, priming of parameters).
An important observation made about the majority of PR models devised so
far is that they are more concerned about the process of 'recognition' than
'learning to recognise'.

Now, if a process of 'learning' was to be manifested

in any such system, then all or some of the above three components could be
involved.

But, more often than not it is only the modifications of the

'classifying-rule'
implementing

which

some

is

the

'learning'

target

or

of

the

'adaptability'

designers
aspects.

interested
General1y,

in
a

performance or error evaluation function determines how successful the
'learning' is.

The classification-rule changes are governed by the previous

results of system/environment interaction.

Either a 'specific memory' of

occurrences is kept, or 'statistical recordings' of occurrences (the average or
typical cases) are used to update each tentative classification-rule.
An interesting case is when no direct error feedback from the environment
is used for the modification, in such a case, it is assumed that the in built
classification-rule of the system is correct, and only minor adjustments are
made on the basis of some averaging of inputs; this type of 'learning' is
commonly referred to as 'unsupervised learning process'.

Other notions

introduced in the area of rule modification are: 'convergence', 'optimality',
'computational complexity', etc.

These terms, evolved from within the more

analytical studies of the subject of PR, and refer to the attributes of the
various algorithms involved.
In the following sections some particular examples of PR models where
'learning' is a prominent feature will be discussed in more detail.
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(i) - PANDEMONIUM

One of the earliest 'learning' PR models, using the parallel principle, was
Selfridge's (1960) "Pandemonium" system. Pandemonium was a computer based
system which specified a sequence of events needed for a feature analysis of
different pattern.

For example, in recognising ten different hand-written

characters. It could apparently 'learn' how to associate various features and
patterns.

Yet, it could not deal with the problem of spatial transformations

of a pattern.
Pandemonium was made up of a hierarchy of relatively autonomous units,
the so called "demons".

At the lowest level, 'data demons' would encode the

input information and pass them on to the 'computational demons', these, in
turn, detected and combined features in patterns (for some simple systems it
would be possible to exclude the computational demons).

At a higher level,

'cognitive demons', one for each class of pattern, would indicate the relative
likeness of an incoming pattern to different stored classes.

Finally, at the

topmost level, a 'decision demon' would give the final choice of the system
for a given input pattern.

A

ch matic representation of this hierarchy is

shown in FIG.5.S.
III~I

: : : : : : : : ~: : : :=': : : :-': : : : : : : : :> ID~~6~sj. "....~~-.) g~~b~s
j:'lm....lllllllwll.. tullUlII.lIlll!

:lIINUnl1l. .UltWlImsua,

:::'•.

~ ---.~::~~~""-"""""~--~: ~[.:~~!~::~)/ / t~:6~M~

DEMONS ~"".'."'''''' DEMONS

.I~:

[IUIIIIC
....ol.IIIGIII'ItNWIlIl.IIII!I~
-""7" DEMONS
i
'''_'w.''''.

G":~~:::::l \'I:ii~~~:i-"·o·i-I-·:::"~·
DEMONS ,........."..... ~

~NI~VN~:~ F~RO·:~-;R~MA·~ ~:T;I~ ~oAN~ 1',~ ,.~,·7~J,.·~,'..,l'. ..: -,A ~,~.~.::,:.IX
m . :_, (,£. .~
. . .~s
. In'---a.;(~~~~
. -C--.~]/,r
.. /
"

..

..

".M"

CHO I CE OF
PATTERN

,,__

DEMON

-_ .._-_..

(input patterns)
FIGURE 5.8. A schematic representation of different levels involved in a
typical 'Pandemonium' system.
The Pandemonium, as a 'learning' machine, using a feedback from its
environment makes adjustments to the connections between its 'demons', so
that a

better performance could

be obtained from

the

machine.

The

evaluation of performance could either be done by the degree of some goal
achievement, or judged by an external 'teacher' or •supervisor' •
Techniques used by Selfridge to realise these adjustments entailed definina
functions of the form:-

~
~J

•

Wl

J dJ
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where Di is the output of i-th cognitive demon and is determined by the
weighted sum of outputs of all computational demons, the d/s.

Similarly, the

'worth " the Wj, of the j-th computational demon to the whole system is
determined by:-

Once the weights were adjusted to a relatively successful Bet of values
(using various algorithms, some described in chapter 4), it was possible to
eliminate the 'low-worth' demons, or genera.te other new demons.

The two

following possible schemes were suggested by Selfridge for generating new
computational demons, both involving some modifications of some existing
demons:(a) - 'Conjugation method': combining two 'high-worth' demons.
(b) - 'Mutated fission method': forming new demons which are similar but not
identical to the 'high-worth' demons.
At the first stage of a ten character recognition pandemonium program,
inputs were presented on a 32x32-cell matrix; in the second stage, the
patterns were smoothed-out, and then presented to the feature recognising
sub-system.

Some features, deemed to be significant by the designers, such

as the number of intersections or the length of different edges, were initially
stored in the program.
The initial 'learning' phase of the Pandemonium involved presenting various
known inputs to the

system and evaluating the relative frequency of

occurrence of different features.

A look-up table was formed which could

give the probability distribution of outputs in terms of the defined features.
Later, if an unknown input was fed into the computer, the system could test
for each of the features, and depending on features detected it could guess
the character with the highest probability of matching.
For this simple task domain the program was able to perform the task of
recognising ten characters with a respectable efficiency (10% worst than a
human reader).

Bowever, as conceded by Selfridge himself, the design of a

comprehensive pattern recognition system would pose problems of many higher
orders of magnitude. In particular, the problems of: separating or segmenting
inputs into individual identifiable parts; devising systems that generate their
own test features; and also introducing different levels of 'learning' to such

Approacbes

to

ModelliDI!

01

LearDIDg

systems, so that, as information is transferred from

-

Pari-II

291

sensory to higher

semantic and syntactic centres various refinements and improvementfi could be
manifested.
(ii) - PERCEPTRONS

Probably the best known class of models within the PR approach m'o the
so called 'perceptrons', initially introduced by Rosenblatt (1958).

T'erceptrons

could be regarded as descendants of early neural-nets, since u continuum of
ideas is apparent, and also their representational notions are doseh" related.
Perceptrons were, like Pandemoniums, parallel feature detection sy stems with
some

'learning' capabilities.

Rosenblatt's contention was to introduce a

general purpose functional model of behaviour which did not dellend heavily
on structural topologies, or specific logical realization of a system's function;
instead, he was, mainly, concerned with lhe organizational properties of
systems.
A simple perceptron refers to a class of network type models that could
be characterised by: a 'stimulus-unit', an 'association-unit', a 'response-unit',
and a 'variable interaction matrix' which depended on the past activity of the
network.

This matrix is sometimes called the 'st.ructure matrix', and gives

the stales of coupling coefficients belween pairs of units. Also, both stimulus
and response units can generate 'internal' as wen as 'external' signals.
Furthermore, various specific conditions could be imposed on the type, the
strength, and the signal transmission characteristics of connections between
different units.

Transmission of signals along a path of a network can be

affected by the 'value' of the connection and its 'transmission time'.
Other
Examples

more
are

elaborate forms
'experimental

connected to a

of perceptrons

perceptron

systems'

have

also

(which

reinforcement control system); and

been

are

devised.

perceptrons

the more generalised

perceptrons, the so caned 'universal perceplrons'.
In addition, developments based on perceptrons have resulted in the
introduction of various solid formal concepts such as 'linear PR systems' or
'threshold-logic systems' - constructed, respectively, on the primary units of
'teature-recognisers' and

'threshold-logic elements'.

These

mathematical

concepts and their applications have been extensively investigated, both in
abstract form, and also in specially designed hardware (analogue computer)
devices.
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(iii) - WISARD
Aleksander

(1983)

and

other

engineering-oricnted

elaborated a PR systcm over the years.
which

has also been realiscd

have

The basis of their parallcl model,

in hardware, is the RAH

Mcmory) unit of computer storagc systems.
simple analogues of neurons, and

co-workers

(Random ACCCf>H

The RAHs are considered us

various aspects of their operation is

compared with a rudimentary view of neuronal firings or non-firings, and
synaptic changes.
The simplest realization of this type of model is in its, so called, 'single
layer net' configuration of RAMs elemcnts.

Automatic visual

no interconnections bctwecn the RAH

PR is one area which

could, according

Alcksandcr, cxploit this type of system to its fun potential.

10

The basis of

funclioning of lhese single layer nets is to change the con1ents of a memory
address, and later when that particular address is read, the existence of a 'I'
on the output would be equated with 'seeing' ('recognising') the pattern
corresponding to the digital code of that address.

Elaborations of this basic

design idea, involving larger number of elements, could be carried out whereby, more varied and complex responses could be elicited.
A more detailed analysis of the ways 'recognition' could be carried out by
RAMs shows that combinatorial explosion will inhibit the design of systems
that are solely based on single RAMs identifying each distinct pattern (of
acceptable resolution).

Hence, ways should be found to limit the storage

requirements, yet enabling the system to deal with small variations and
distortions of a basic pattern adequately.
Aleksander describes the, so called, tn-tuple' method of segmenting the
array of patterns into distinct areas, each segment being associated with a
single RAf.I.

The system is 'trained' to recognise different variations of

individual segments, as a particular pattern is moved/distorted from its 'ideal'
orientation.

Furthermore, a generalization is introduced by defining the final

recognition decision choicc on the basis of a statistical consensus of segments
recognised. A surprising versatility is manifested in the system by thc adding
of the above properties, and many 'novel' and 'untaught' patterns can be
recognised with a high degree of success - a kind of 'universal' of a pattern
is said to have been created.

However, it was found that this segmentation

of patterns could not be carried out to extremes, since gradually ambiguities
would creep into the system, and although in the 'saturation' state of one
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RAM per element of the pattern the capacity of storage will be at minimal,
the discrimination will be very poor.

Bence, a compromise should be made

between the number of RAMs, the size of storage capacity, and the degree of
recognition accuracy.
An interesting feature of this model is the way it has managed to emulate
Bome biological properties of visual mechanisms.

For example, in experiments

on cats, it was established (by Bubel and Wiesel, and others) that some areas
in the visual cortex are dedicated to detecting horizontal or vertical patterns,
and they are only partially active in the intermediate angles.
An 8x8 artificial system made up of sixteen 2x2 segments is trained to
recognise vertical or horizontal patterns of the form illustrated in FIG.5.9(a).
Upon confronting a pattern similar to FIG.5.9(b) it will show the uncertainty
of its equivalent natural system - 11 of 16 segments are detected for the
'horizontal', and 11 of 16 segments detected for 'vertical' (each segment is a
2x2 array).
One of 16
""_on
2x2
discriminating

segments (RAMS)

(a)

FIGURE 5.9.

(b)

(a) - Two examples of 16 different perfect horizontal (8) and
vertical (8) patterns used to train the system.
(b) - An example of intermediate pattern.

A problem is also envisaged if the segmentation of picture results in a set
of discriminating arrays which all become active for two (or more) different
training patterns (i.e., patterns having the same building blocks). Here, again,
by observing the way connections between the receptors in the eye and the
visual cortex seem to be randomly established a similar principle is deployed
to randomly separate the array into groups of elements, rather than organised
divisions.

The result is, opposite to expectations, to enable the system

operate in a more organised and superior fashion.
This 'bottom-up' parallel approach to PR resulted in models which were
very impractical to simulate on computers for any reasonably large number of
elements.

Hence, in the early 1980's, Aleksander and colleagues built (at

Brunei University) a hardware model based on the above general blueprint.
The model is a

512x512

resolution

machine called WISARD, the earlier
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versions of which, the MINERVA machine and the JANSYS program, were
built during the early 1970's.

Wisard is capable of discriminating between

different patterns (e.g., faces) after an initial training phase which involves
feeding various configurations of a pattern to the machine.
Aleksandcr (1983) also discusses the possibility of devising more intelligent
type machines. He predicts that such machines could be created by combining
the above single-layer type PR systems, that are powerful in discriminating or
generalising patterns, with 'learning' automata, that are capable of inductively
'learning' state transition rules - using some form of feedback.

It is also

envisaged that autonomous machines could be designed that are not 'laught',
but directly interact with their environments. Introducing 'feedback' to such
systems could result in the strengthening of distinctions made between various
patterns (subjects of discrimination); and, also, it can be said that a sort of
'short-term memory' has been manifested - by signals persisting within the
system, even in the absence of their source.
Furthermore, by defining the response of a system in terms of a mixture
of its present and previously occurred inputs it can be said that now the
model has a non-trivial 'state-structure', and, hence, it can be thought of as
a rather more complex type of 'automaton'.
By implementing (hypothetically or practically) these new ideas in the
basic WISARD machine, its designers have been able to bring more complex
dimensions into its behaviour. Images could be memorised and recalled, simple
associations between patterns could be established, and new schemes could be
devised

for

storing

these

images

and

associations.

A

single

large

discriminator is deemed to be able to carry out the job of 'learning', for
example, the associations of names and objects; and can even carry out
generalizations, such as relating a variety of different expressions to a
particular face.

Moreover, by adding feedback, sequence of patterns could be

'learned, whereby, giving one segment of a sequence to the machine as a cue,
the whole of the pattern could
WISARD

is

given

some

~e

capabilities

recalled.
for

In its most advanced form,

control

of

its

environment,

in

particular, the control of its 'eye' (camera) movement.
However, it must be pointed out that this model and its particular design
features (feedback, etc.) have basically been developed to tackle a class of
practical PR problems in a more proficient manner, and, therefore, references
to incidental similarities with the natural recognition systems, or other higher
level explanations, should be appraised cautiously.
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(iv) - OTHER NETWORK-BASED MODELS

The work of neural-net and logical-net modelers was a prime impetus
behind the design of many PR systems; and the mathematica] analysiR and
synthesis of logical threshold elements and functions lead to the introduction
of analytic celJuJar systems, parts of which were modifiable for recognition
purposes.
Various network-based models have been developed, either in abstract or
in

hardware

(mainly

electronic),

to emulate some PR capabilities.

For

example, George (1973) discusses a hypothetical general model for perception
(visual) which could be based on neural networks.

Various schemes are

proposed as to how the specific characteristics of human visua] system
(colour-vision, etc.) could be manifested in such models.
Rosenblatt in the early 1960's developed his hardware 'Perception' machine,
modelling

the

basic

workings

of

the

human

visual

system.

A simple

conglomeration of input, output and associative cells together with adjustable
weighting elements was able to 'learn' to recognise very basic patterns, by
following three general rules of:(a) - increasing weights of non-active cells for incorrect recognitions
(b) - decreasing weights of active elements for incorrect recognitions
(c) - making no changes for correct recognitions
Culbertson's (1963) simple image processing model was also based on
neural-nets. His model could recognise trivial shapes (e.g., squares, triangles)
by a process of matching with a standard template of these patterns.
input

pattern

transformations
enabled

the

received
(i.e.,

by

the

'retina'

'linear', 'dilation',

comparison

of

the

of

the

'expansion',

unknown

input

system
and

pattern

underwent

'rotation'),
with

The
this

different

configurations of standardized templates.
In pandemonium and perceptron the emphasis was on adjusting the weights
of a predetermined set of feature detectors.

An alternate method, originally

proposed by Uhr and Vossler (1963), was to look for 'good' features which
could give rise to a suitable weighting rule.

They devised a PR system that

could develop its own features, by generating and testing the validity of new
features on the basis of its discriminating value.

It was, thus, possible to
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generate some useful and novel features which even the designers of the
system had not anticipated.
The

feature-extraction

process

of

Uhr

discussed in section 5.1.7.(e)-i) entailed
unknown

pattern

with

a

and

Vossler's

model

scanning along and

'feature-detecting

operator',

and

'rnatchings' with this operator at each region of pattern.

(briefly

across

the

determining

The operat.ors

themselves were selected/generated by experiments.

A 'learning sc.heme' waR

devised at the classification stage of the process.

Whereby, a 'heuristic'

method modified

(on hedonic basis) weights of feature vectors for each

'pattern-class', using a

'difference-score'

(i.e., similarity to a

previously stored patterns) for an unknown input.

range of

This well elaborated

functioning PH system established a very high standard for the category of
models it represented, yet in spite of its 'learning' capabilities was only able
to operate on a limited and simple range of isolated patternR.
Other classes of models, based on the neural-net and logical-net models of
chapter

four,

have

also

been

developed

to

depict

various

processing aspects of the process of PR in the brain.

information

Their designers,

normally, characterise neurons as on/off devices connected by 'weighted
synapsis', and arranged in certain conglomerations (networks). An interesting
and powerful feature of these networks is that, by changing their synaptic
'weights, the behaviour of the system could be modified in a useful way, and,
in some cases, 'learning' is said to be manifested.
In the 1960's, numerous researchers were involved in the elaboration of'
such logical PR network systems.

For example, Singer (1961) proposes an

electronic model for a 'learning' character recognition system, based on the
human visual processes.

The emphasis is on implementing a size invariance

for the patterns of an object, as the angle of view or distance from an
The technique used involves introducing a mathematical

object changes.
lattice

in

the form

of a

matrix

of polar

transformations of input patterns take place.

coordinates, upon

which

the

Various forms of alpha-numeric

characters are tested in typical recognition tasks - whereby, the number of
coincidences of outward transformations of an initially 'centred' patterns with
previously established templates determine the class of a pattern.
A wide class of abstract PR models are also labelled as 'adjustable-weight
majority logic' systems.

These systems (perceptrons being some special

examples) are designed on the basic premise that their inputs should be
connected

to

the

system

through

adjustable

weighting

factors.

The
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recognition of patterns is achieved by running the system (or machine)
through a distinct 'training' phase, where adjustments and reinforcements of
weights are carried out, generally by human operators.

The procedures

involved should ensure a convergence to a final trained state in a finite
number of steps; however, the existence of such procedures is a prerequisite

to its convergence analysis.

The separation of 'training' and 'operating'

modes of such PR models 1. as limited their potential; and, unlike the natural
recognition systems where the inter-linked processes of training and operation
are continuously active, their adaptability is rigid, and only ensures adequate
performance for fixed environments.
An early version of such systems was the 'Adaline' (ADAptive LINear
Element) based networks, introduced by Wid row (1962, 1973).

Adalines were

fundamentally different from the basic neural elements proposed previously.
Each unit in a single layer Adaline network, as depicted in FIG.5.10., had
independent weight adjustment provisions for its inputs to the threshold
section.

Basic Adalines were constructed in hardware and also implemented

on digital computers.

The weights were modified, either continuously or in

discrete steps, according to some performance criterion.

In the hardware

models these adjustments were done by electro-chemical means, however, later
other models used alternate electrical means for modification.

¢

(in~:t:,~_ _ _

(output)

10 --4>+--'0
./
./

FIGURE 5.10.

Diagram for an tAd aline' element having the threshold value T.

For a more functionally complete configuration a two level unit, the so
called 'Madaline' (Multiple ADAptive LINear Element), was developed; yet, the
adjustments were only directed towards the first level -

here, the close

similarity of these systems and some SOS or logical-net systems (discussed
earlier) should be recognised.
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parallel

networks using inherently serial or sequential machines and computers were
magnified many folds, and posed much complications.

In particular, mnny

limitations of perceptron type devices were exposed by an exhaustive and
thorough analytical investigation of the paradigm by Minsky and Papert (1969)
in the late 1960's, which resulted in a significant recession of interest along
these particular lines.

Studies of

the

behaviour of 'cellular-automata', as

a

sub-section

automata-theory, have been a useful source of theoretical ideas for
designers of network type PH systems.

of
the

This discipline has provided some

important insights into the computational powers and limitations of networks
in general; and has also greatly helped the designers of parallel comput.ers
and machines.

A cellular-automata can be defined as any collection of cells

(or elements) arranged and interconnected in some regular organization (in
two or more dimension).

A simple example of a cellular-automaton (also

mentioned previously) is the realization of "LIFE" transformations which has
been investigated by various workers.

Von-Neumann's 'self-reproducing'

automaton was another example of these machines, and many of its concepts
have been used in various modelling exercises (both mathematically and in
hardware).

Arbib's

cellular abstract machines could

also display

many

interesting computational capabilities.

(v) - STATISTICAL/MATHEMATICAL 'LEARNING' PR MODELS

Mendel and McLaren (1970) discuss various aspects of the application of
the learning process in PR systems.

'Learning' is said to take place when the

system's past experience can effect an improvement in performance.
implies

that for

a

given

decision a

feedback

of information

'performance' of the system should have taken place.
are

classified

as

'parametric'

or

'non-supervised', 'on-line' or toff-line'.

This

about the

'Learning' PH systems

'non-parametric',

'supervised'

OJ'

Various 'learning algorithms' are

considered, especially those related to some mathematical learning theories
developed in psychology.

The principle of reinforcement is incorporated in

the design of a class of algorithms, the so called 'reinforcement-learning
algorithms', and applied to different PR problems.
probability of occurrence of outcomes could

It is found that the

be updated favourably

by

changing the values of decision parameters (or certain other parameters) of
the 'classifier' on basis of a reinforcement criterion.
algorithms could be applied to feature-selection.

Similarly, reinforcement
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'goal-seeking'

systems, and various system-environment-interaction assumptions or other
issues (e.g., 'linearity', 'memory', etc.) are discussed.

Comparisons are made

between such systems and 'learning control systems' (discussed in Chapter 4);
and also many equivalences are established between the elements of a
proposed 'reinforcement-learning' PR system (using a stochastic automaton
model) and the elements of psychological stochastic learning theory.

5.1.10 AN OVERVIEW OF PATTERN-RECOGNITION APPROACH
On the whole, the discipline of PR has been characterised by three
distinct approaches.

The distinctions approximately reflect the three major

developmental periods of this subject, as signified by the relative popularity
of each viewpoint within the past three decades.

These approaches are:-

(1) -

'The neural ap.proach': characterised by pattern-matching models which
are effective 10 rigid and exact dom81ns, yet, are very inflexible and
impervious to small variations of inputs.

(2) -

'The engineering approach': an elaboration of neural approach which
involves defining rurther characteristics of input patterns. Various
mathematical methods and combinatorial techniques are developed and
utilised.

(3) -

'The A.I. approach': models in this more recent and flexible approach
are, mainly, concerned with definition of featurestaand description of
remtionshlps of features. TheT are, generally, re ted to some human
cognitive processes, and thell' desi,ners try to incorporate some
perceptual notions such as 'knowledge , 'meaning', 'understimding', etc.
mto their desifns. However, learning from experience is not featured
to the extent i was considered in the earlier paradigms.

Many scientists have voiced their criticism over the engineering only or
abstract only view of this subject. The stalemate confronted, when pursuing
a too narrow an approach, is the main witness for their argument.

It is also

felt that possibly more fruitful, and universally applicable, results would be
obtained if first the nature of the process of PR could be better understood
in humans and animals.
As far as the human PR is involved, in spite of a great deal of work on
the subject, it is still not clear yet how this process is exactly manifested, or
what its underlying mechanisms are, and many of the principal/questions
raised in the early days of this science have still not been answered
adequately.
In a critique of the current trends of A.I., Dreyfus (1972) rejects any
similarity between the way, presently, humans and

machines

recognise

patterns, and attributes the slowness of progress in this field to ignoring such
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In his view, PR models which perform their tasks on the basis

normalization of inputs,

by

means of

transformations;

detection

of

discriminatative features, by means of a decision tree-search or a statistical
choice procedure; or recognition of resemblances; cannot be equated with
human perceptual mechanisms.

He also speculates on the nature of some

properties which characterise human PR, and proposes that:"Any

[artificial]

system

which

can

equal

human

performance,

must

therefore, be able to
(1) - Distinguish the essential from the inessential features of a particular
instance of a pattern;
(2) -

Use cues which remain on the fringes of consciousness;

(3) -

Take account of the context;

(4) -

Perceive the individual as typical, i.e., situate the individual with
respect to a paradigm case. II

Efficient technological tools for PR which do the actual sensing of the
outline of an object have been available for some three decades - mainly in
the

form

of

hardware

devices

which

translate

an

image

(obtained

by

TV-cameras or otherwise) into an array of firing or non-firing elements.
Many computer or robot-vision systems have also been developed within
the past two decades, and the prospect of extensive industrial application has
put a great deal of emphasis on research in this subject.

In recent years,

researchers on PR in partnership with workers in Robotics have introduced a
new specialised dimension to machine recognition. However, models devised in
this principally industry-oriented area are quite distinct from the earlier
endeavours of PR workers.
Hence, while the progress of the technological side of the research, that
of designing sensory mechanisms or faster and more powerful computers, has
been very spectacular, research on the inference making aspects, which
involves the information processing level, has not shown the same degree of
achievement.

The main endeavour is, therefore , to devise an appropriate

general classification

system· to operate on available data obtained

by

hardware peripherals.
Today, the initial optimism of computer scientists have been substituted by
an appreciation of the complexities of the problem.

Some of the principal

difficulties and stumbling blocks encountered are: (a) - devising appropriate
algorithms for three-dimensional vision; (b) -

separating and classifying

different objects in a scene; (c) - preserving the constancy of size of an

Approaclies
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In addition, some proposed sophisticated

algorithms for real-time scene-analysis require computing speeds and data
in excess of present computers to function

handling capabilities far
non-trivial environments.

in

The use of inherent 'continuities' of patterns is

one possible way of limiting the need for such extensive computing power.

When assessing the performance of a

PR model, the consideration of

'meaning' and 'intentionality' aspects incorporated within the design of the
system is extremely important.

We should determine how much the system is

capable of 'understanding' -

whether it operates blindly according to a

preprogrammed

set

of

rules,

or

works

towards

a

"pecific

'objective'.

Similarly, we should enquire if it makes 'generalizations' or 'inferences' (if
any) on its experiences.

Many important issues have also been raised by considering distinctions
between 'serial' and 'paranel' processes. Although parallel processes could be
simulated (but more slowly) by sequential machines, such as digital computers,
recently, a great deal of attention has been focused on the design of parallel
computers and machines. Typical reasons cited by designers of such machines
are: the limitations of serial machines; and also the desire to incorporate and
simulate

some

aspects

of

parallel

biological

neural

systems

(such

as

redundancy), which are deemed to possess the optimal forms of information
processing capabilities.

The various parallel PR models elaborated so far have shown that, indeed,
machines

could

be

built

to

display

some

consequence of their particular structure.

facets

where

intelligence

as

a

In particular, they could have the

added capability of learning from experience.
machines of A.I.

of

systems involving

Unlike most preprogrammed

'learning' either

rely on

the

'learning' of sequences of patterns or the rules which bring about such
patterns. In this light, such PR machines (and systems) should be regarded as
challenging alternatives to the algorithmically based models that presently
dominate the field of machine intelligence.

However, the paranel PR models (based on networks) which function quite
proficiently in single-layer configurations, dedicated to simple recognition
tasks, have not been very successful when extended to higher order layering
- where there is feedback and interconnection between elements.

The main

reason is that the complexity of tasks, and the processes, which these higher
order systems are trying to convey are of a different degree of sophistication.
Most proposed

higher-layer

solutions

have,

hence,

involved

limiting or
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defining new constraints on the range of acceptable patterns, or adding extra
structural features to conform to a particular design specification.

Thus,

suggesting that, perhaps, models which are originally designed for achieving
simple engineering objectives, or are solely based on particular simplistic
hardware configuration, will not provide an adequate vehicle for representing
complex 'learning' PH processes - their potential will be too limited.
5.2 'I1IE ARTIFICIAL-IN1'ELLlGENCB or "'!UP-DOWN" APID:lAaI

ro 'J...BARNING'

SYS"I'EHS

In this section we will attempt to survey the approaches to the modelling
of learning from the, so called, "top down" view of the subject.

This trend

of enquiry, which is generally accepted as the most recent, is normally
labelled as the 'Artificial-Intelligence' (A.I.) approach; but, in some instances,
also referred to as the 'Information-Processing' or the 'Machine-Intelligence',
approach.

A dominant (and distinguishing) feature of all models devised in

this area has been the importance of role of computers in their manifestation
and representation.

In fact, if disciplines such as A.I. were devoid of their

'computer angle', then, it would be difficult to differentiate between many of
its research fields and some areas of disciplines such as cognitive-psychology.
Although, in some of the following specialised subjects, such as the
'evolutionary programming' approach, the 'connectionist' approach, or some
cited examples of generalised models of learning, a kind of "bottom up"
tendency is prevalent. Nevertheless, because of their predominant reliance on
the use of computers in design, and the relative recency of their appearance,
these topics are all included within this final categorization of 'learning'
systems.

But, they should really be regarded in more independent terms;

even, in some instances a closer kinship with our other previously covered
paradigms could be established.
Additionally,

because

of

the

diametric

distinctions

in

emphasis and

approach from the rudimentary cybernetic undertones of our thesis, here, the
A.I. 'learning' models, will be discussed and analyzed fleetingly - without
scrutinising their various underlying concerns, or typical examples, to a great
extent.

However, the large collection of literatures and papers cited in the

reference

section of our thesis can

provide

details of many

research

endeavours on this type of 'learning' models.
5.2.1 THE SCIENCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

In some of our previous chapters, we discussed different aspects of the
discipline of A.I.; indicated its characteristics; and considered some typical
examples of its work.
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The discipline of A.I. ,is usually derined as t.he science of 'int.elligent.'
behaviour by automata and comput.ers for the purposes of study and simulation
of human intelligence, or construction of bigger and betler automata.

The

principal techniques used in A.I. are 'introspection' and 'intuition'.

The

various mathematical and computing techniques used are, generally, considered
as

secondary

in

importance,

and

non-fundamental

t.o

t.he

met.hodolog).

Philosophy, Linguistics, and Cognitive Psychology have been some of t.he
major contribut.ors to A.I.
Ever since its introduct.ion, the subject of A.I. has ent.ertained a great. deal
of self-analyses and self-criticisms regarding its 'validity', 'just.ification', and
'practicality'.

The principal phenomenological difficulty of A.I. is that there

is no clear cut definition of intelligence (human or otherwise).

The normal

resolution of this difficult 'analysis' task has been to breakdown t.he notion
of intelligence

to some more manageable component.s; and

redefine

the

problem in t.erms of concepts such as 'problem-solving', 'theorem-proving', or
some other currently pursued subtopic of A.I.

Yet, paradoxically, it is also

possible to envisage all these secondary notions in t.erms of 'non-intelligent.'
behaviour, as attested by a variet.y of 'clever' programs of today.

1t is also

true to say that although great many questions are asked about. t.he nature of
intelligence, nevertheless, not many researchers dwell upon the viability of
equivalence of an 'intelligent' and 'non-intelligent' behaviours.
Computers are made to exhibit more and more complex tasks, yet, once the
exact means of achieving t.hese tasks are known they are no longer given
attributes such as 'creative', 'thinking', 'free-will', etc.

However, unless all

t.hese attributes are defined precisely, or machines could be construct.ed which
can exactly imitate all human mental processes, this dilemma will continue.
Today's endeavours in A.I. are mostly directed towards particular task
domains.

Models devised, normally, have some aspect of human cognition

incorporated within them; and the realization and manipulation of such models
occupy A.I. scientists to a much greater degree than 'pure' analytical studies.
However, the actual synthesis of 'intelligence' was not the primary impetus of
this paradigm; but, it was a desire for a better understanding of the human
mental functions which initially instigated the scientific quest in the field of
A.I. - hence, its kinship with cognitive-psychology.
5.2.2 COGNITIVE-PSYCHOLOGY and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Cognitive psychology is a very broad subject, covering disparate areas,
which at times make it very. difficult to represent its views uniquely.
"Intelligence" and "cognition" are also considered as closely related notions;
and, hence, by and large, the task of simulation of cognitive processes is
taken up by A.I. researchers involved in such aspects.
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In cognitive psychology the human brain is vaguely regarded as a kind of
"information-processing

machine"

elements such as 'sensory
'central processing' unit.

(more

or

less

like

a

computer);

with

receptors', 'effectors', 'memory store', and a
As we have seen previously, "perception" and

"memory" are two of the central pillars of. cognitive studies.

Hence, the

majority of the cognitive models of human learning have revolved around
these two issues.

Particularly, the concepts of 'Long Term Memory', 'Short

Term Memory', or 'Working Memory' have been utilised in many such models.
Prineipal concerns of cognitive psychologists have been the ways which
memory is organised during the learning process, and the strategies used for
storing data - not the actual recording of data.

For example, the information

accumulated in LTM (regarded as main source of learning) is categorised into:
(a) - 'Sensory-Perceptual' knowledge, which contains information extracted
from sensory inputs; (b) - 'Procedural' knowledge, which contains sets of
rules, or stimulus-response rules of association; and

(c) -

'Propositional'

beliefs, which contain value judgements or beliefs about subjective truths.
In cognitive psychology the general view is that relationships are more
important than individual elements; and that cognitive mechanisms are a kind
of filters on percepts.

The notion of "perception" is referred to as the

process of interpreting the stimuli encountered by sensory systems from the
environment.

Additionally, cognitive psychologists define the process of

"learning" in terms of changes brought about in the cognitive systems; and
consider the system's structure (not its elements) to be the critical agent in
bringing about such changes.
Simulation models of human learning which involve 'memory formation'
have been devised both for the developmental stages of the growth of a child,
and a]so for the adult state of humans.

The investigations of these models

have, normally, featured aspects of memory such as 'forgetting', 'recall',
'rehearsal', 'information coding', etc.
The nature of architectural principles of human mind, and the investigation
of similarities (and differences) of such structural organizations with their
artificial counterparts in abstractions, programs or machines are other major
issues in cognitive psychology.

Some workers have attempted to explain the

various cognitive processes in a unifying fashion, contending that there are
equivalent principles at work.

However, others have proposed the so called

"modularity hypothesis" in explaining various facets of cognition; whereby,
each cognitive function is contended to be governed by distinct principles.
For example, workers such as Chomsky or Marr have tried to theorize about
the faculties of 'language', 'reasoning', 'problem-solving', or 'vision' in an
independent and externalised manner.
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5.2.3 'NATURAL' vs. 'ARTIFICIAL' ASPECTS OF INTELLIGENCE
Two basic fundamental assumptions are made in A.I.

Firstly, the faculty

of human "intelligence" is regarded as an 'universal' phenomenon, independent
of culture or individual variations.

Secondly, it is assumed that we know

enough about this natural process to consider its simulation.

However, both

assumptions can be said to be over-optimistic simplifications.
At the beginning, a proficient chess-playing program was considered as
'intelligent'.

But, today, the common view is that once a program manages to

achieve its goal then it no longer is seen as 'intelligent'.
was

simply

defined

on

the

basis

of

apparent

If "intelligence"

similarities

with

human

intelligence (as is the case in 'Turing test for intelligence'), then, it could be
argued that each instance of such exhibited trait in a machine is only a case
of mimicry.

Yet, diametrically, it could be argued that any dissimilarity with

human inte1ligence could be detected, measured, and hence incorporated in
such machines; leading to the narrowing of the gap between the 'natural' and
the 'artificial' manifestations of intelligence.
An

important

deterministic

theoretical

automatic

discovery

formal

equivalent Turing machine".

system

by

Turing

whatever,

was

there

that:
exist

"For
a

any

formally

The implications of this theory was that no

automatic system can do anything that Turing machines can not do, and also
that the Turing machine is the only automatic system we would ever need.
In the same abstract sense, COdel's theorem, which states that: "In any
sufficiently powerful logical system statements can be formulated which can
neither be proved nor disproved within the system, unless the system is
inconsistent", has been cited as an argument against the
constructing

truly

'intelligent'

learning

encountering inherent inconsistencies.

systems

or

possibility of

artifacts,

without

Yet, many workers in the field of

"machine intelligence" have rejected this type of reasoning on bases of two
arguments; firstly, human intellectual powers themselves are not free from
fundamental errors or inconsistencies; and secondly, it would be possible to
eonstruct 'open' artificial systems to which such objections would not apply.
The above arguments and counter-arguments are typical of the disciplines
which involve the modelling of 'natural' aspects of human mental faculties,
such as learning or intelligence - course of their developments characterised
by numerous mind/body or man/machine controversies and debates.

Here, we

will not attempt to linger upon the controversies and arguments which the
meaning and the definitions of "intelligence" has brought about.

Since, this

kind of philosophical altercations about human mental attributes sometimes
regresses towards highly ambiguous debates, and will not be scrutinised
deeply.

The notion of intelligence and its facets (e.g., learning) will be
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considered as natural properties of living animals, whose descriptions (at some
level) are the bases for their implementations in artificial systems.
5.2.4 COMPUTERS and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Computer is the principal tool used in A.I., because it is currently the only
usable logical manipulative system.

Ever since its introduction, the computer

has been attributed with 'living' characteristics, and often the scope of its
potential misjudged.

As an 'infant progeny' of technology, questions are

asked about the possibilities of its future developments.

What will happen

when this 'infant' grows up? Will future computers be our masters or slaves?
At what stage in its development can we regard them as 'intelligent'?
History has shown that every 20 years the computing power has increased
by a factor of 1000; and while their future technical enhancements have been
consistently underrated, their scope of capabilities have been overrated. It is
generally envisaged

that within the next 40-50 years truly 'intelligent'

('thinking') computers can be built which are able to compete with humans,
and

solve

many

of

their

intellectual

problems.

These

'intelligent'

or

'super-intelligent' computers will, probably, not be thinking as the humans do,
and might have very little in common with us; but, indeed, it is possible to
imagine a coexistence with such machines.

Although, the actual pathways of

these developments are not clear, and most research is currently focussed on
digital

computers;

scrutinised.

nevertheless,

some

alternate

possibilities

are

also

For example, self-reproducing computer architectures have been

investigated; or parallel processing structures, that do not rely on absolute
computing powers but on the intricacy of their connections developed.
computers are presently in their fifth-generation, with blue prints of their
next two generations already sketched.

The essence of today's 'intelligent'

computers is in the way they are able to use a data-base of information (or
rules) in conjunction with an inference program, and interact with a human
operator.
'translate',

Some
etc.

are

able

to

'talk',

'voice-operate',

'read',

'diagnose',

Others employ alternate computing architectures

(e.g.,

parallel) or languages (e.g., LISP, PROLOG, STRIPS, PLANNER) as a more
efficient way of dealing with particular problem domains.

In any case,

normally, the questions posed about the level of 'intelligence' of a computer
program, such as a chess playing program, should be redirected towards its
level of 'performance'.

Since, it is the evaluation of the performance of the

program which signifies whether it is behaving intelligently or not.
Additionally, many attempts have been made to 'simulate' the various
aspects of intelligence and learning on computers.

For example, Friedman

(1967) describes an elaborate computer simulation of instinctive behaviour,
based on traditional psychological theories; Findler and McKinzie (1969) apply
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a general computer simulation technique to a wide range of goal-secking
biological phenomena, such as learning and self-preservation; Kent's (1978)
work

concentrates

on

the

computer

modelling

of

the

brain's

neural

mechanisms; and Albus's (1979) .computer models try to depict the cognitive
functions of the brain.
5.2.5 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Considerable work has been done in the fields of A.I. and cognitive
psychology on the problem of representing knowledge.
common

methods

relationships.

is

to

represent

knowledge

in

One of the most

terms of 'propositional'

However, work has also been progressing on other modes of

knowledge representation, such as 'linear ordedng' or 'categorization'.
Some knowledge representation tasks rely on computing or A.I. high level
languages (e.g., PASCAL, LISP, PROLOG).

However, many of the cognitive

structural models use "production systems" for organising their knowledge
bases.

Production systems have also long been advocated as a suitable

medium

for

modelling

learning.

For

example,

in acquisition of skills,

language, or in development of reasoning. Additionally, many algorithms have
been devised for extracting rules from data, some by organizing information
to recognize patterns; others by more formal means of reasoning or induction.
One of the knowledge intensive fields of A.I. which has attracted some
learning related research, and is deemed to benefit. enormously il 'learning'
was to be incorporat.ed within its programs, is the area of 'Expert Systems'.
Expert systems are currently limited

because

the process of extracting

appropriate knowledge is the arduous task of their programmersi and also
because their knowledge bases, normally, do not change (and improve) with
experience, unless, their human operators add new information to them.

A

recent trend in expert systems has been to develope 'learning' programs that
are able to opel'ate on a data-base and "grow" richer in context.

Typical

elements of such programs are: a 'descriptive language'; an 'interpreter'; an
'associative memory'; a 'generalization procedure'; and a 'learning strategy'.
5.2.6 SCENE-ANALYSIS (PATTERN-RECOGNITION)
Various 'scene-analysis' models have been devised in A.I. to deal with
quite

complex

Objectives

real

situations,

specially,

in

limited

problem

domains.

ot such endeavours have been to find the 'existence', the

'description', the 'orientation', or the 'position' of an object of interest in a
natural background.

The more global objective of defining 'real-world scene

analysis strategies' has, also, been pursued.

Yet, in reality, many 'general'

aspects are sacrificed so that working models could be devised; and applied to
practical problems of 'detection', 'location', or 'navigation'.

Appl'o~clle.

&0

Nodeill.,

0'

L.~I'.I.,

-

•• 1'&-11

An example of this type of model is described by Bullock (1976).
a generalized theoretical scene-analysis strategy is applied
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Whereby,

to the more

specific problem of finding an object in an outdoor scene, by identifying its
position and orientation. The necessary trade off and simplifications required
for such a task is discussed, and various experimental results scrutinised. In
this model the features are analyzed in three levels: 'point' (pixel intensity),
'local features' (lines, edges), and 'global' (shape descriptions).

Additionally,

some well established 'feature-extraction' techniques are utilised in the model.
The two principal approaches to the problem of 'feature-extraction' are:
the 'statistical/mathematical' approach, and the 'structural' approach.

In

statistical feature-extraction, normally, a mathematical performance measure
evaluates whether a particular feature should be selected or not. These type
of features may not have a real physical meaning, yet, they represent an
efficient and computable set of attributes of patterns.

Such techniques are

particularly suited for 'noisy' patterns, or when no obvious organisation is
present in the pattern.

However, there are, also, many difficulties associated

with such techniques.

For example, the 'availability', the 'number', or the

'quality' of samples used during a 'learning' phase severely effect the choice
of features selected.

Similarly, there are various problems involved in

segmenting images into parts; or devising nonoverlap ping independent features.
On the other hand, the 'structural' feature-extraction preserves all the
richness of contextual information, and uses the close topological relationships
of parts of a pattern, or various prior knowledge, in the task of selecting
features.

The weakness of this approach lies in the absence of generalised

mathematical techniques for abstracting structural features.

Therefore, it is,

by and large, the intuition of the designers of such systems which governs
the choice of features, from the endless list of possible contextual features of
a set of patterns.

Chen (1976) discusses the relative merits of the above two

techniques, and argues the case for a mixed (structural plus statistical)
feature-extraction system, which is contrary to most current efforts.
5.2.7 LEARNING and ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCB
A typical view of learning from the A.I. perspective is expressed by Arbib
(1970) in his analogy of computers and brains:-

"We can gain much insight into the process of learning if we think of past
experience as providing a re,Pertoire of programs of activity, which become
umts out of which new routmes are to be fashioned by further learning even higher order routines may then become the units of later learning."
In behavioural sciences, such as psychology, learning or adaptation are
regarded as a kind of fundamental perpetuating force which give rise to all
behaviour, more or less, as the sub-atomic forces are regarded in physics.
However, when we look at the direction which current computer l"elated
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research, such as A.I., has taken we see that the prominence of this central
phenomenon has been lost.

No longer it is deemed necessary to look at

behaviour the way it manifests itself in nature, starting from a raw state and
gradually developing to its fully fledged form - using experience, education,
instruction and introspection on its course of development.
In

these

new

paradigms

'knowledge'

itself,

and

not

become the domain which has attracted

the
the

way

it

is

'acquired',

has

majority of

research.

This tendency is in support of the belief that the scrutiny of

knowledge structure is a less cumbersome endeavour than finding out how it
was formed.

The metaphor we can compare

to here is

to look at the

structural organization of leaves and branches of a fully grown tree and try
to predict its future changes on such basis, without considering its botanical
mechanisms and developmental processes.

In any case, the complexities

encountered in trying to tackle the structural knowledge on its own, even at
a simple logical common-sense level, impels us to believe that the isolation of
'knowledge' and 'learning', and their separate analysis, is not a viable premise
for the task of understanding and investigation of human and animal learning
processes.

Although, the main reason for the apparent slowness of progress

in designing machines that can act 'intelligently' is the complexity of the
task.

Nevertheless, recently, even some of the proponents of A.I. have come

to appreciate the need for reactivation of 'learning' as a central research
topic - Schank (1983).
The process of learning has been categorized in numerous ways by workers
in the subject of A.I.

These classifications, in some sense arbitrary, have

involved distinguishing between 'rote learning' (e.g., learning by memorization,
or mimicking), 'learning by example' (e.g., a scene-analysis program learning
from samples), 'learning by being told' (e.g., a natural language program
making inferences on a knowledge base, or extracting 'meanings'), 'learning
by doing' (e.g., a game playing program learning from its previous mistakes),
'learning by analogy' etc.
A.I. or information-processing models of simple learning behaviours (mainly
in animals), such as 'conditioning' or 'trial-and-error' learning can easily be
implemented.

The precision or these type of 'simulations' can, indeed, be

increased, by elaborating the model into one which depicts the empirical
observations more faithfully.

Yet, workers in A.I. are seldom interested in

the simple modalities of the learning process outside the human domain.

Cognitive psychologists were occupied with devising models of human
learning processes long before the advent of computers brought the A.I. and
information-processing models to the forefront of this paradigm.
variety of

Later, a

A.r. computer based models were devised to exhibit BOme higher
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'learning' capabilities within particular domains (e.g., language, expert-systems,
problem-solving, etc.).

Similarly, various hardware models were elaborated to

display some 'learning'.

But, always a crucial question has been asked:

whether such systems are 'inteIUgent' or just 'clever'.
Some of the early hardware systems· bordered closely with 'adaptive
control' concepts, and the 'learning' interpretation, mainly, depended on the
descriptive level the model was looked at.

However, the later hardware

models (e.g., robots, turtles) were designed in conjunction with the knowledge
base of a computer, and could show much more advance 'learning' capabilities.
Although, 'learning' models in A.I. display a wide range of interesting
behaviours, nevertheless, they almost universally are dependant on a "teacher"
or

"guiding"

external element.

Firstly,

to evaluate

their actions;

and

secondly, to provide procedures for development or initiation of 'learning'.
Very few are in the natural sense oriented by basic 'drives' or 'needs'; even
the 'goals' defined are, generally, non-elementary, and closely relate to the
task in hand in an ad-hoc fashion.

In a sense, their artificial portrayal of

'intelligence' or 'learning' will be only significant to a subjective human
observer, having no connotations for the machine domain.

In the following

the various sub-divisions of A.I. will be outlined in a summary form.

The

emphasis will be governed by the relevance to our underlying fundamental
cybernetic bias of the thesis.

5.2.8 GENERALISED 'LEARNING' MODELS IN A.I.
Here, we will briefly describe some A.I. work which do not concentrate on
particular facets of intelligence or learning, but, provide a framework for
analysis and simulation; or a methodology for synthesis, of much broader
range of processes and behaviours.
Friedberg (1958, 1959) describes a learning procedure used in a computer
program, and attempts various experimental implementations.
However,
this program was more akin to the previously discussed cybernetic learning
systems; and its approach was general and non-task dependant.
Hormann (1962,
learning; '~sks',
discussed Ul a
addressed as an

1964) also describes an abstract scheme for machine
'proble~s' and ot,her' aspects of the ~l~arning' sys~em are
generalized fashton.
But, a specifiC problem IS also
illustrative case.

Andreae (1964 ... ) (and co-workers) is one of the principal researchers in
the field of 'machine learning', but his approach has not followed the
mainstream of A.I., and has been, generally, treading an interdisciplinary
line.
Ris comprehensive coverage of the subject has traversed an
evolutionary developmental path. Ranging from very abstract attempts at
the unification of concepts at learning machines, to elaborate discussions
ot underlying philosophical issues, to p,ractical implementation problems.
The initial endeavour in design of a learning' automaton involved the
construction of a simple mechanical tortoise. His general purpose learning
scheme STELLA, was based on 'pain-pleasure' reinforcements; and was
realized by a hard-wire machine. Later, a symbolic manipulative dimension
(a monologue) was added; and various conceptualizations, abstractions,
theoretical-analysis, and computer simulations were undertaken. Further'
developments Ot thIS model was the PURR-PUSS learning machine, which
could ~earn' by a teacher specifying patterns and act~ons, yet, it was still
based on rudimentary learnIng criteria. The software deVIsed were tested
for various task classes, including robot problem solving.

Approacbell

'0

Moclell •• ,

of

Lear.i.,

-

311

Part-II

5.2.9 GAME-PLAYING
Turing

(1953)

had

suggested

that

games

were

prime

domains

for

experimentation on design principles in the quest for intelligent machinery.
Some of the consequent models 'devised have, in fact, demonstrated (with or
without 'learning') how close they come to our definition of intelligent
activity - chess or checkers playing programs.
Cybernetic machines and artifacts which display interesting 'game-playing'
characteristics have been constructed for many centuries.

Yet, it was the

advent of computers which changed the emphasis from pure 'mimicking' of
game playing behaviour to the mechanization of underlying thought processes.
In some instances, the mental skills required for the playing of simple
games, such as noughts and crosses, can optimally be programmed into a
computer. But, for less trivial games, like chess or checkers, a higher degree
of elaboration is necessary, to depict the 'planning' and 'reflective' aspects of
the human thinking.

The game-playing programs and machines developed

within the past few decades have managed to accomplish a high degree of
proficiency in their particular task domains, some achieving competence
standards comparable to an expert player.
One of the most prominent, and best thought out, early game-playing
programs was Samuel's (1959, 1960) 'checker-playing' program.

This program

was able to display an intriguing 'learning' behaviour, and develope an expert
performance level.

Yet, its 'learning' was confined to parameter adjustments

of some mathematical functions - following the trend of other contemporary
work on adaptive control techniques.

Also, a great deal of expertise and

knowledge was primed within the 'non-learned' initial state of the program.
Samuel (1959) used an ingenious method for optimising the performance of
his checker-playing program.

Whereby, two similar programs were able to

play each other, and upon three successive defeats a program would undergo
a set of (fairly arbitrary) changes; hence, gradually converging towards its
optimal performance.
complex

systems

However, some later work has shown that for more

neither

the

existence of

such

a

convergence

can

be

guaranteed, nor, the utility or efficiency of such techniques can be justified.
Samuel's

checker-playing

program

involved

many

executive

or

house-keeping routines, but, its 'learning' features were incorporated within
two

'rote-learning' and

'generalization-learning'

routines.

Rote-learning

routines were used to store, organize, and evaluate past incidences; and
generalization routines were used for choosing heuristics, and making weight
adjustments.
an

The 'utility' or the 'worth' of actions were chosen on basis of

"evaluation-function"

(a

multi

variable

polynomial

with

adjustable

coefficients) which indicated the 'value' of a specific move in terms of a
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This type of function, expressing the 'value' in a single

or multi-dimensional manner, has been a feature of many later game-playing,
problem-solving, or heuristic-search programs. A comparative study of various
'evaluation' and 'learning'

proc~dures

is undertaken by Griffith (1974).

Another aspect of game-playing programs, such as Samuel's, is the 'search
techniques' used for 'forward' or 'backward' analysis of possible alternate
moves. The usual means of representation is in a "tree" format, each 'branch'
indicating the choice of action, leading to 'nodes' where the evaluations of
utility of actions is made.

The task is to find the 'best' sequence of moves.

For this purpose, a wide range of mathematical procedures, such as "pruning"
or "minimax" have been developed.

A broad analysis of the techniques used

in game-playing programs is carried out by Marsland and Rushton (1974).
Yet, from our point of view the principal interest is the examination of
the 'learning' aspects of this type of programs.

The limited 'universe' of a

game provides many advantages for a worker interested in tackling the
problem of learning in machines.

Firstly, games such as checkers, GO, or

chess involve astronomically high possibility of movements (estimated at 1040
for

checkers),

which

implies

that

deterministic

practically employed for their analysis.

techniques

cannot

be

Secondly, they have a set of definite

'goals' and 'rules' which determines their behaviour. Thirdly, they can easily
be programmed within a computer.

Finally, they are widely familiar, and a

good background of knowledge exists to verify the usefulness of their models.
But, at the same time, the limitations of the game domains can lead to
restrictions on the type of learning which can be investigated.
A survey of the work done in this area shows that, in fact, only few

game-playing programs involve modifiable 'learning' or 'adaptive' components.
Some 'rote-learning' or 'generalization' procedures developed in game-playing
programs have also been applied to other real or abstract problem domains;
for example, in solving control problems.
as "games against nature".

Such tasks are sometimes described

Games are also excellent domains for utilising one

of the principal tools of A.I., namely 'heuristics'.

5.2.10 PROBLEM-SOLVING
Many 'Problem-Solving' programs have been devised in other fields of A.I.
(e.g., robotics); but, here, we will discuss some of the more prominent
'generalised' problem-solving techniques developed in this paradigm.
Newell and Simon (1959, 1972) describe their 'General-Problem-Solver'
(GPS) program which uses 'means-ends analysis' and various 'heuristic'
techniques; in essence, based on human problem solving faculty. However,
their system is general enough to be applied to other task domains.
Doran (1968.. 1969,1970) develops a simulation proJ(ram for a simple
automaton-environment system; and also devises varIOUS algorithms and
procedures which would enable the automaton, called the Graph Traverser
to display 'problem solving', 'planning' and 'generalization' features.
'
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Winograd's (1973) work on understanding natural language included a
problem solving sub-system that was able to proficiently carry out many
tasks within its limited domain. Yet, its techniques were general enough
to be applied more widely.
Fikef!.! Hart and Nilsson (1972) devillo:ped a well thought out methodology,
STRIpS, for solving problems.. partIcularly for use in robot ~roblem
domains such as fin<ling boxes In a room environment. Later, the learning
and problem-solving schemes used were elaborated..l and ap.Elied in broader
contexts. Examples of such work are: Siklossf. &. ureussi (1973); Sacerdoti
(1973); Stepankova &. Havel (1976); and Baner Ji &. Ernst (1977).
5.2.11 KNOWLEDGE-DIRECTED CONCEPT/PATTERN/LANGUAGE LEARNING
A large proportion of contemporary A.I. research covers the problems
associated with searching, analyzing, structuring and organizing of 'formal' or
'linguistic' knowledge bases; also, the majority of recent 'machine learning'
work is, seemingly, directed towards these cognitive levels.

However, since

the class of learning processes targeted are at the top of the hierarchy of
learning, unlike the domain of interest of our cybernetic approach, we will
only engage in a brief discussion here.
Broadly speaking, symbolic description or representation can be viewed at
five levels: 'message' (strings of words with no structure); 'syntax' (grammar
or structure); 'memory' (formal notions of accessibility and organization);
'belief'

(conclusions and

Various

knowledge

inferences); and

structures

place

'external'

different

(SUbjectivity)

emphasis

on

level.

'language',

'uniformity', 'consistency', 'labelling', 'accessibility', 'partitioning', 'growth', or
'change'.

Some of the principal methods of such representations are: 'Plans';

'Scripts';

'Frames',

'Logical Nets',

'Semantic

Nets';

'Production Systems';

'Predicate Calculus'; or other specialized representational languages.
Numerous Programs have been devised to work on a special class of
data-basis and problem domain; and to 'extract', 'form' or 'learn' concepts.
Similarly, 'language learning' programs have been designed to operate on
semantic type knowledge basis.
concepts could be formulated.

There are three principal methods by which
Firstly, by 'analysis', which involves applying

existing concepts to events and processes in a new situation (customizing).
Secondly, by tinduction', which means hypothesising about new concepts on
basis of older concepts which are inadequate. Thirdly, by 'generation', which
involves creating new concepts from more fundamental notions.
Some examples of research in this field are: Buchanan's (1978, 1985)
DENDRAL, META-DENDRAL and MYCIN systems for, explaining empirical data
and medical consultation; Soloway &. Riseman (1977), Winston et al (1983),
Torrance (1984), Connell &. Brady (1985), and Phelps &. Musgrove's (1986)
knowledge-based

'pattern recognition' or 'description learning'

Winograd

Brown

(1973),

syslems;

(1975), Akama &. Ichikawa (1979), and Gause &.

Rogers' (1983) [Kellerman,1972), knowledge-based 'language-understanding',
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'language-learning', or 'question-answer' systems; and Hayes (1970), and
Kochen's (1974) abstract 'learning' and 'problem solving' systems.
Finally, even a higher level of analysis of information contained within a
data-base is undertaken in the' 'Theorem Proving' or 'Automatic Deduction'
research areas of A.I.; which involve drawing conclusions from a body of
knowledge
methods.

represented

by logical statements, using deductive

inference

This line of enquiry which was initiated from the original work of

Newell and Simon (1959) into "Logic Theorist" has developed into many
different application domains, such as 'logic programming'.

5.2.12 ROBOTICS
The introduction of term "robotics" is generally attributed to Czech play
writer Karl Capek (term "robot" is a derivation of Czech word for 'workers').
During the past few decades, many unconstrained speCUlations of robots and
their capabilities have been put forward
cinematographers.
realise

these

by science-fiction writers and

But, only when the advent of digital computers helped to

artifacts

for

limitations fully appreciated.

scientific

or

industrial

purposes

was

their

Nevertheless, the science of robotics has

suffered, perhaps irreparably, from the wild flights of imaginations which
render most scientific achievements in this field as' mundane or predictable,
when compared to those seen or read in science-fiction films or books.
Various early cybernetic machines and robots have already been discussed
in our thesis.

But, during the past few years, many impressive achievements

have also been attained in the science of 'robotics'.

Intelligent robots, now,

use powerful 'processing', 'manipulative', and 'vision' systems for perceiving
and acting upon their environments; and, hence, have been utilized for solving
many real-time practical problems. Some robots also use speech 'synthesis' or
'recognition' systems for ease of communication with their human operators.
Similarly, many educational or experimental robots have been designed in
various research establishments.
been

developed

in

A state-of-art snooker playing robot has

Bristol University,

which

ingredients of industrial robotics research.

incorporates

many of

the

Other 'walking' or 'hoping'

robots, or 'mobile robot vehicles' have also been devised, and many aspects of
control or dynamic characteristics of locomotion investigated theoretically.
Another area of

robotics research

is

'transportation robots'

and

their

networking control systems, for use in industrial manufacturing/warehousing.
Some of the principal application areas of robot research are those which
involve hazardous and inaccessible environments, or monotonous and laborious
tasks.

For example, robots are widely used in industrial assembly plants,

space research, oceanic research, nuclear-plants, or security applications.
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A trend in robotics which is of most interest to us, and which has also
been gradually becoming more utilised in industry, is the fusion of A.I.
schemes with hardware robot realizations.

The prevailing approach of the

researchers involved with this ~roblem (inherited from early cyberneticians)
has been to construct 'mobile robots' for experimentation, verification, or
demonstration of some hypothesis. Although, some 'hand-eye' configuration of
manipulative vision systems have also been used.
Some research in robotics has clear biological undertones; and not only it
is obvious that their protagonist's ideas originate from some natural sciences,
but, in fact, one of their stated aims is the better understanding of the
human and animal processes.

Examples of this type of work are Friedman's

(1969), Koplowitz and Noton's (1972), Kent's (1978), Filo's (1979), and Albus's
(1979) models; in each case, robot 'learning' or 'intelligence' is discussed in
terms of its equivalent biological underlying considerations.
engineering and A.I. techniques are also utilised in the work.

Yet, various
A related area

which explicitly declares this interlinking of natural and engineering concepts
is the science of "bionics" - briefiy discussed in an earlier chapter.
(i) - EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENTAL MOBILE ROBOTS

In next chapter we will discuss our mobile experimental robot which was
built as an exercise in designing a cybernetic 'learning' model.

However,

here, we will attempt to enumerate some similar hardware design endeavours,
in each case describing briefiy the main facets of exercise:Rosen and Nilsson (1967) describe a mobile robot equipped with a TV
camera and a simple retractable arm.
The software Implementations
involve a hierarchy of computer programs which can solve. simple problems,
and devise 'plans'. Also, some scene analysis capabilities, and simulations
of its environment are incorporated.
Raphael (1968) describes one of the earliest, and best known experimental
robot exercises, the Stanford Research Institute mobile robot vehicle (also
referred to as SHAKEY). This model had an on-board TV camera and was
connected by cable to a computer.
Various software developments
involving different high level lanlf':1ages and A.I. techniQ.ues, were devise(l
to demonstrate some obstacle aVOidance or problem solVing behaviours.
Lewis and Bejczy (1973) discuss the planning considerations in the design
of an elaborate autonomous roving [y~e robot with a manipulator arm such as those used in space missions. Principal software concerns are the
control of the arm, and the navigation of the robot.
Smith (1973) describes a basic implementation of a three-wheeled robot
model, equipped with a sonar sensor and in radio-contact with a computer.
He also outlines some executive control problems of the design.
Heiserman (1976); Loofbourrow (1978); Gupton (1979\ [separate works]
describe detailed accounts for construction of 'turtle type robots, with
various electronic features (e.g., sonar, lil{ht-sensing, computer-control),
that could be used for simple experimentation (e.g., tracking).
Hollis (1977) describes a mobile robot equipped with a clasping mani'pulator
and a simple image sensor. He, alsol discusses some underlying deSign and
control aspects of such models; ana outlines a 'charger-seeking' program.
Allen and Rossetti (1978) describe a fairly sophisticated mobile light
seeking robot connected with a PDP-ll computer, which is able to track a
light source while avoiding obstacles by use of a sonar detector.
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Marc, Julliere and Place (1980, 1981) describe a computer controlled mobile
robot with a simple manipulator, a tactile sensory system" and an intra red
position measurement mechanIsm.
They also descrlDe the software
Implementations, and schemes used for navigating and guiding the robot.
Moravec (1982) describes a three-wheeled mobile robot equipped with a TV
camera, and later to deploy some A.I. scheme (e.g., 'productIOn systems').
In addition to the above hardware designs many researchers have been
involved with developments based on mobile experimental robots with emphasis
on the software aspects, examples are:Nilsson (1969) describes some A.I. procedures devised for implementation of
'problem-solvin$' tasks in mobile robots, using "Q-A tecliniques"· also
outlines and dIscusses some other higher issues in designin~ inte\ligenl
mobile automata, such as 'theorem-proving', 'perception' and modelling'.
Lasker (1974) engaies in a theoretical discussion of the 'theory of mobile
automata'; formulatmg an algebraic notation for the representation of
robot movements and trajectories in its environment.
Chan and Phillips (1975)· Miller (1977); Thompson (977); Giralt et ale
1979); Moravec (l979,198~); Shih (l982); Witkowski (1983); Thorpe (1984)
in separate work\ describe research on various theoretical and software
acets ot the vrob em of navi~ation of mobile robots. The principal topics
involved are: robot control', robot stabilit y '\ 'obstacle avoidance', 'range
detection', 'sonar signal analy'"sis', 'visua
mapving', 'simulation of
environment', 'search techniques', 'path planning', decision procedures',
and 'parallel route-planning algoritllms'.

~

Coles et ale (1975) devise a problem-solvin~ pro~ram (in FORTRAN) for a
computer controlled mobile r060t, which uses deciSIon-analysis' procedures.
Rushby et al (1975) describe a simple computer controlled mobile robot
equipped with a plotting pen and confined to a limited environment; and
was devised to manifest the PURR-PUSS generalized 'learning scneme'
introduced by Andreae 0972,1976). This worlt pursues a "non-engineering"
approach, in essence different from most other A.I.{robotics exercises; and
is concerned with the more fundamental aspects 0 machine intelligence.
Bond c\ Mott (1978,1981) describe research based on a computer controlled
mobile robot, involving experimentation and development of a software
language that can be used to implement a 'learning system' - established
A.I. techniques and languages are utilized (e.g., SCHEMAs; PLANNER).
Iijima et a1. (1981); Elfes and Talukdar (1983); Prender,ast
[separate works] aescribe and discuss various 'locomotIon'
routines, 'control systems' I and 'specialised robot-control
languages' which are used in conjunction with mobile robot

et ale (1984~
and 'control
programming
research.

Kanayama (1983) describes a mobile robot control technique ('concurrent
programming') which enables various tasks to be performed simultaneously,
for use in perceptual recognition problems in such machines.
Laumond (1983) describes a methodology for providing a mobile robot with
'learning' capabilities. Two aspects of 'concept learning' and 'procedure
learning by generalization' are tackled. Most of the matllematics used are
adopted trom graph-theory. The 'learning' mobile robot is able to improve
its navigation8.l capabilities by modelling and analysis ot its environment.

( ii) - anmR HXAHPLES OF RBJrIai RBSEAIDI RELBVANl'

ro

'LBARNING'

Many other research fields of the science of robotics have also been
pursuing the objective ot designing 'intelligent robots'. In the following some
of the areas which have some relevance to the problem of modelling of
learning will be outlined, and brieny described:(a) -

COMPUTER SIMULATIONS OF ROBOTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS:
Some workers such as Nilsson and Rap'hael (1967): Uhr and Kochen
(1969): Jacoba and Kiefer (1973); Uragami et ale (19'('6); Webster (1978);
Heiserman (1981); and Rosenberg and Rowat (1981) have been involvea
in designing simple robot-environment (or organism-world) abstractions.
Sevel"a1 mathema~ical techniques are used for depicting physical laws,
and representing interactions.
These models are either used lor
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experimentation or validation of various hypothesis; or, simply, they are
exercises in 'simulation' of a physical robot. Normally, the robot and
its environment are represented on the computer screen by very
simJ,.>listic images, and various 'obstacles' or 'boxes' placed within the
envIronment; also, 'tasks' are defined in terms of movements or
rearrangements of these boxes. Examples of issues tackled, using some
A.I. techniques (e.g. LISP, Fuzzy-LOgic), are 'navigation', 'obstacle
avoidance', 'random-walk', 'spatlal perception', 'aaaptation', 'habit
formation', 'pattern recognItion, 'purposive action', or SImple 'learning'.
(b) - MAZE SOLVING ROBOTS: The early 'maze-running' cybernetic machines
(e.g., Shannon's mechanical mouse) were intriguing artifacts.
Even,
today this class of problem-solving robots attract much attention,
although, not always from established scientific circles -{early contests
are hela amongst the designers of micro-controlle
maze-solving
machines. ExamThesl of the more serious analysis of such problems are
Stanfield's (197
SImulations of maze-solving on computers" or Allen
and Allen's (1 79) discussions of maze traversIng algorithms.
Maze-solving is also one of the main problems tackled by LOGO
programs and their 'turtle' robots.

am. PLANNING AND GBNERALIZATIOO IN HOBJrICS:
"PLANNER" -'programming language was developed by Hewitt (1969) as a
'deductive rogical system' which could best 6e used for manipulating,
problem-solving or theorem-proving in robots.
Various goals are
established or dismissed, USIng a hierarchical control structure in
conjunction with a set or assertions (statements). Many researchers
have, hence, developed 'planning systems' or 'generalization systems'
based on PLANNER, or other variations (e.g., STRIPS PROLOG) for
different classes of robots. For example, Nagata et ale (1973); Siklossy
and Dreussi (1973); Kuzin et ale (1975); Hayes (l975}, and Ferguson
(1981) discuss such techniques in the context of specifIC task domains.

(e) - "PLANNER" ROOCtr LANGUAGE

(d) -

ROBOTS IN UNKNOWN OR PARTIALLY KNOWN ENVIRONMENTS: The
control and manoeuvering of robots in unknown or partially known
environments are problem areas of robotics which have attracted a lot
of 'learning-related' issues.
One solution is to use established
mathematical procedures, such as 'dynamic-programming', for solving
these control problems. Yet... some workers, for exampfe Keckler and
Larson (1970) or Friedman (19"17), have propqsed and discussed alternate
'heuristIc' methods in formulating 'learning' or 'inference' systems.

5.2.13 TEACIDNG MACmNES
Although "teaching machines" are included within our A.I. (information
processing) categorization of the 'learning' systems, nevertheless, they are a
fairly

independent area of research, normally associated with education.

Principally, these teaching machines and systems are used in conjunction with
some sort of "programmed learning", as tools for assisting learning, or
evaluating progress. Yet, in spite of their early promise, these machines have
not had a major impact on the educational system.

The most elaborate, only,

having few controllable parameters, and involving simple hardware/software.
An early example of teaching machines is described by Hoffman (1962),
which was a simple device to be used as a supplementary tool in training
behavioural scientists.

Similarly, Pask (1970) discusses the mechanization of

teaching from a broad cybernetic systems point of view, and in an elaborate
survey of the field outlines some computer assisted instruction schemes.
The programming language LOGO was specifically designed, by S. Papert,
for educational purposes; and has round popularity amongst the teaching
establishments from a

varied range of cultural backgrounds.

LOGO is

intended to be a compact experimental framework for teaching the concepts
and

skills

or

analytical

and

heuristic

thinking.

One

aspect

of

the
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developments of this programming language has been the introduction ot a
complementary hardware realization, namely, the simple 'turtle' robot.

These

robots are only regarded as an extension of the notions used in LOGO; and
they are considered as valuable .tools for developing problem-solving or other
perceptual skills of children.

Feurzeig .and Lukas (1974) discuss various

aspects of use of LOGO and 'turtles' as programmable teaching machines.
5.2.14 EVOLUTIONARY-PROGRAMMING
We have previously discussed the kinship of the processes of evolutionary
adaptation and learning. Various early cybernetic models (e.g. Pask,1962) had
tried to depict the process of evolution through certain developmental stages.
More recently, some A.I. researchers, in attempting to synthesis intelligence,
have chosen the 'evolutionary programming' approach. This distinct avenue is
away from the mainstream research of A.I., and aims to achieve artiticial
intelligence through the computer simulation of the process of evolution.
Their protagonists cite various inadequacies of traditional A.I. methods in
dealing with certain classification tasks, or in tackling a range of problems
'globally'. The basic technique is to abstract processes which can 'reproduce'
with 'mutations' amongst the new 'population'; and, also, by using a process
similar to 'natural selection', can evolve many generations of such 'organisms'.
Fogel et a1. (1966) describe some attempts in the simulation of the process
of evolution.

Holland (1970) develops a mathematical basis for the analysis of

such adaptive systems, which uses 'adaptive algorithm' in searching for 'good'
solutions.

Hand (1979) describes a simple computer simulation of organismic

evolution.

Schaffer &: Grefenstette (1985); Davis (1985); Frey (1986); and

Schrodt (1986) describe various research work based on Holland's 'adaptive
algorithm' I'classifier', and 'genetic algorithms'; also discuss the concepts of
'learning', 'problem solving' and other related issues in such implementations.
5.2.15 CONNECTIONISM
In the p1.St few

years, once

more the

notions of

neural networks have

come to the forefront of the science of machine-intelligence.

'Ibis type of

research initiated from the 'neural-net' models of l't:lCul.loch and Pitts; and
later 'logical-nets',
models tackled

the

conglaoeration

of

'Self-Qrganizing Systems', and 'pattern recognition'
notion

of

identical

constructing

interconnected

lnter-disciplinary researchers had been

, intelligent'
elements.

occupied

with

automata from

Meanwhile, other
developing various

COIIIPlter models ba.sed. on 'associative memory' (Kohonen, 1977; Hinton, 1981;

Palm, 1982; Barto, 1981;
these subjects

Drozen, 1970).

However,

the Plpularity

of all

had been wan..ing for a.l.most two decades; and it was only the
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computers' (and

other technological progress) which signified a revival of this approach.
The

new,

'connectionist',

discussed earlier.
are evident

discipline

fundamentally same as those

Yet, the influence of various A.!. related developnents

in this area.

The principal. contention is still to depict the

brain's mechanisms in

some

neuronal

Learning

networks.

way,

'recognition' or other tasks
Examples of

is

work in

simulating

massive

pu-allelism of

has featured greatly in connectionism, and.

have

this area

the

been

tackled

by

various researchers.

can be found in: Hinton, 1981; Palm, 1982;

KOhonen, 1984; Feldman, 1985; Flynn, 1985; Shaw, 1985; Kibler, 1985.
5.2.16 AN OVERVIEW OF 'llIE A. I. APmOACH

ro

'mE KDELLING OF LEARNING

The various 'Learning' programs developed in this paradigm, and their
associated robot realizations, display some interesting (and clever) behavioural
learning patterns.

Yet, there are some ideas expressed, or concepts and

procedures defined, in their simple system/environment configurations that
could have no real physical significance or sense for the model itself.
Additionally, since there are no natural correlates of the learning behaviours
observed, exact inferences cannot be made about any aspect of the natural
learning process from this type of synthesis of learning.

The only definitive

conclusions made about the efficiency, accuracy, or complexity of the model
will be confined to the particular physical or abstract implementation.
Additionally, most work in A.I. take certain primitive underlying logical
organizations for granted. For example, the structured logical basis of digital
computers or algorithms.

Yet, when we look at the gradual developmental

stages that the neural mechanisms of natural intelligence and learning have
passes through, then, a phenomenological question becomes pertinent: could
we truly expect to realize 'machine intelligence' if we bypass this apparently
fundamental property of life, namely 'self-organization' trom randomness, and
attempt to 'synthesise' intelligence from well-structured beginnings.
When

we

look

at

the

resulting

entanglements

of various

robot or

computer-based machines (e.g., vision-systems) in confronting the natural
environment, or when the deep mathematical obscurities of some abstractions
of a so called 'natural' process is observed, then a need for a rethink
(refocus/reappraisal) of the problem becomes more evident.

Today's robots

and 'intelligent' programs seem to be on a path of ever increasing complexity;
taster and technologically more advanced devices are utilised, and seemingly
clever (yet ad-hoc) methods used in conjunction with large data bases to
manifest proficient programs.

A machine which has the capability to start

learning from 'zero' or 'little' knowledge is the logical answer.
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6.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter once again we turn our attention to cybernetic models as
tools for synthesis and simulation of learning. In particular, we focus on the
problem which, as explained initially, was the root motive for our broad
investigation of the field of learning; namely the design of a general purpose
cybernetic model for manifestation of simple 'learning', which could also be
used as an experimentation tool on various learning schemes.
We have, in fact, traversed a full circle. Starting from a practical specific
problem, it was found that, to truly appreciate the underlying fundamental
considerations and issues involved, a much broader perspective was necessary.
Specially, in view of the rigid and unitary approach of ahaoat all research
into deslgn of 'learning systems', it was deemed iJIlportant to look ,t every
poaaible aspect of learning. Bence, we embarked on an extensive scrutiny and
discusaion of the many facets of the ubiquitous phenomenon of learning.
Now, we return,

~,

to our

or~

problem equipped with a clearer

understanding and a more qualified evaluation of its various aspects.
In the first part of this chapter
hardware modeL

We'

will attempt to briefly outline' our

The principal intention wU1 be to point out the general

considerations involved in the design of the particular Imdel, and also the
whole class of this type of models.
will

not

be

emuained

deeply,

Specific technical features of the model
neither

wiD

the

subsequent

software

developments be described beyond their generalised flow-charta.
In the second part of this chapter a more subjective rmalysis of the topic
of our interest will be undertaken.

Discussions wU1 revolve around the

general problem of devising simple 'learning systems' and various important
related issues involved, keeping in mind many of the diverse subjects covered
previously.

Additionally, the blue-print and elements of some hypothetical

'learning schemes' will be proposed and scrutinised, particularly in the context
of our hardware model.
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The principal aim is to systematically approach the problem of design of
simple cybernetic type 'learning'

~els,

which have been appearing in various

research fields as aids for demonstration or explanation within the past 3-4
decades.

The case for designing "hardware" models as an aid for experimentation,
demonstration and better understanding of abstract theories or ideas was
argued in the first chapter.
physical

realizations

were

SubsequenUy, various other aspects of such
discussed,

and

many examples of hardware

cybernetic or robotic 'learning' models were cited and examined in Chapters 4
and 5.

In some instances it was also seen that a particular hardware

configuration or device was, in fact, either the starting point for the desian
of a 'learning' system, or dominated over the software aspects; in a sense,
the 'physical' features of these models overwhelmed all its later developments.
I

The degree to which the two aspects of 'simulation' and 'synthesis' have
featured in the hardware models discussed so far have been quite varied.
But, generally, the historically precedent physical models have been more
involved" in simulation of a particular learning trait; and the mor, recent
models, with their enhanced processing capabilities, have inclined towards
designs

which. try

to

synthesise

a

'learning'

behaviour

using

some

non-physiologically based criterion.
Although, it must be emphasised that the distinction of these two features
in modem is 'not very clear cut, and an -intricate 1Dixing of simulation' and
synthesis is often seen in 'learning' models.

Whether, a hardware model is

trying to solve a 'maze finding' problem in the human fashion (simulation), or
it is involved in an 'artificial' portrayal of problem solving behaviour
(synthesis) are kinds of questions which can only be answered by considering
the details of the design,

the level of description, and

intentionalities of the model's designer.

the aims or

Hence, such characterizations are

often subject to interpretations, and are to some extent arbitrary.
Moreover, to make good use of 'simulation', it is necessary to have a
certain degree of knowledge of the organizational aspects of the structure of
a system and details of its mechanisms.

Therefore, it is not surprising that

in view of the complexity of underlying neural functions involved in learning,
and a lack of precise neurophysiological postulates about learning, all
attempts at its simulation should involve tentative synthetic criteria.
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design

was

how

to

manifest

the

model/environment configuration, as represented schematically by FIG.S.1 in
its most general form.

Once the boundaries of a model are fixed within an

environment, then the outputs can be defined in terms of changes that are
brought about to the environment, or movements which are made by the
model; and, conversely, inputs can be defined in accordance to the percepts
that the model makes of its environment, or the physical influences that are
impinged upon it.

Of course, the subjectivity of such definitions must be

appreciated; since, at any instant of time, the machine may be affecting its
environment in a variety of ways; and also is being influenced by numerous
inputs.
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FIGURE S.l.

U

A general configuration of Model/Environment.

Now, the objective was to devise a hardware device capable of modelling
the simple modalities of the learning process, as that which might be
displayed

by a

hypothetical organism with

basic sensors and effectors

interacting with its environment. Additionally, the design of the machine was
not to include any task-oriented consideration; in other words, it was not to
be designed for displaying or achieving a preconceived pattern of behaviour which might have limited the r.hoice of approach to its later programming.
Various alternatives were investigated. The "environment" could be either
fixed or changeable.

A fixed environment can be used for simplicity and

convenience to match some particularities of the machine, or limit the amount
of inputs to the device.

For example, a confined box with simple contours,

or a meshed surface which could indicate the coordinates of the moving
device, could be considered as a possible simple non-varying environment for
the model.
However, in view of the general interactive way which the model was to
realize the process of learning, it was decided

that the richness and
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changeability inherent in a normal physical environment (the laboratory)
would indeed be a desirable attribute.

Any limitation on the amount of

perceived information by the machine would be imposed by the choice of its
inputs.
other desired features of the "model" were considered. If a 'learning' was

to be observed, and evaluated, then it was necessary that some controllable
dynamism should be built into the model - a static model, or a model which
modifies itself by virtue of simple thermodynamic exchanges could not convey
any learning.

Again, since the machine was to be used for the synthesis of

basic learning criteria, then 'movements' rather than 'manipulative actions'
were deemed to be more appropriate as outputs for the model.

The system

was to have the potential to even determine its own primitive goals, and any
a-priori inclusion of specific patterns of action (innate behaviours), or use of
manipulators which would require previously defined routines for operation,
would hinder a true manifestation of rudimentary goal-determination.
Hence, it was decided that a free roving mobile robot be constructed as
the 'body' of the model.

A specific environment for its operation, as

previously mentioned, could be devised.

For instance, grid type surfaces

similar to the examples illustrated in FIG.6.2 could convey the x-y position of
the robot.
y'
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Three examples of intersecting the floor surface for monitoring
the position of the robot.

Yet, these methods of determining the position of the robot in relation to

its surroundings had the disadvantage of needing a lot of mathematical
preprocessing, and subsequently lost all (or most) information contained in the
connectivities of their physical world.
Other methods of 'perceiving' the environment were investigated, such as
using TV-cameras, intra-red detectors, C.C.D.'s (Charge Coupled Devices),
Photo-diodes, Sonar, etc.
necessary

for

the

model

Eventually, it was decided that it would not be
to

realize

its

spatial

coordinate

environment, since this itself is a higher order learning stage.

within

an
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Hence, a simple ultrasonic method for obstacle sensing was adopted, for
reasons of simplicity and economy.

The sonar devise could either be located

in the environment, tracking the position of the robot from the emissions of
a beacon signal. Or, it could be incorporated within the machine, showing its
distance from various obstacles in its periphery in one or several directions
(as depicted in FIG.6.3).
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(b)

(a)

FIGURE 6.3.

Two possible methods for
ultrasonic detection of
environment: (a) - Multidirectional; (b) - Unidirectional.

the

It was contended that for the level of analysis of the process of learning

we were interested in, and for

the realization of primitive criteria of

learning, a single narrow beam sonar located at the front of the robot would
be more appropriate (and sufficient).

Any fundamental issue explainable by

the omni-directional sensing of the environment could also be explained,
although in simpler terms, by the unidirectional sensing.

After all, an

identical compound map of the environment could be obtained by the simpler
sensing

device

if only

the

robot

made

a

36()0

rotational

scan of its

environment around its central axis (which was possible); only the process
would be a lot slower.
Of cou 'se, it must be appreciated that this type of one-dimensional
perception of the environment will give a far less precise indication of the
relative position of the robot than a
process.

two or three dimensional sensing

The environment will be seen in a

much more immediate and

changeable fashion, and, hence, decisions for actions have to be taken on
such bases.

Examples of this type of environment sensing is abundant in

nature, and many simple animals manage to deal with various significant
changes in their surroundings adequately using a single monocular input
(chemical, electrical, tactile, olfactory, sonar, visual).

The differences from

the higher order sensing methods are only highlighted when a comparison is
made by an external observer.

It can be said that a kind of hierarchy of 'environment perception' exists

as far as the actual physical inputs to a robot within an environment (as
below) is concerned - this is indicated in the ordering of FIG.6.4.
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order of perceptual complexity
FIGURE 6.4.

A representation of the hierarchy of p?ssible methods for the
phYSIcal sensing of the environment and its changes.

An important premise of this unidirectional design feature was the need to

define a 'front' for the robot.
significances

should

This non-homogeneity implies that higher

be attributed

orientation of the robot's body.

to the inputs/outputs at a

specific

In other words, if the machine only 'sees'

its forward direction then environmental changes occurring at its front should
be

much

more

'significant'

than

one

at

its

rear;

similarly,

'forward'

movements should be more 'consequential' than movements in other directions.
This issue may be considered as trivial, nevertheless, in our desire to
incorporate minimal machine-specific features in the design it has to be
further pondered upon.

A solution would have been to build the robot

completely symmetrically, using a single wide-angle sonar detector (or several
detectors around the periphery) which could give a nondirectional sense of
the nearest object to the robot; and also incorporating the capability to move
in all directions from any point without the rotation of the 'body'.

Yet, the

ambiguity involved in such a diffused evenness of percept (and action)
impelled designing the model in a 'forward-biased' fashion.

The observation

of an almost universal asymmetry in the organization of sense organs in all
species,

even

in

the

very

basic

unicellular

organisms,

was

a

strong

corroborating evidence towards the inclusion of such a non-uniformity in the
design.
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The sonar range sensor designed could indicate linearly the distance of the
nearest object to the front of the robot at approximately its own floor height
up to 5-meters quite accurately (±I-cm error) with a 7-digit binary code.
Additionally, eight touch sensors uniformly located around the perimeter of
the chassis, and also a single centrally positioned shock-sensor, represented
further 9-digits of binary input to the system.
Outputs were, in turn, defined by the direction and speed instructions to
the single steering/drive wheel of the robot. Eight possible speeds (3-binary
digits), sixteen possible angles for steering (4-binary digits), and one spare
binary digit comprised the 8-bit output of the model.

The robot could now

be regarded as a system with following input/output configuration:

8-bit touch sensors
••i","unIll1ll1llflUlllllllllllltrrttflllllllllllllnlllll,l'
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INPUTS

OUTPUTS

The information perceived by the mobile robot should now be sent to and
instructions received from a computer.

The choice was between a cable link

or some form of wireless transmission of data (radio waves, ultrasonic,
infrared, etc.).

The cable connection could involve using special multi-way

swivel connectors; or multiplexing the signal, and hence using a pair of wires
for transmission.

Yet, since an on-board power source was used the

entanglements of the cable could pose problems in a long term free operation
of the model.

Therefore, a two-way radio link with appropriate error

checking circuitry was designed for computer control and communication.
Nevertheless, a multiplexed cable link option and use of remote a power
source was also incorporated.
A question which is frequently asked by outside observers of such
developments is that why not simulate the same robot on the computer screen
rather than constructing it in hardware, specially in view of many advanced
graphic capabilities of modern computers.

Although, such simulations have

indeed been undertaken by various workers (Webster, 1978), there are
numerous shortcomings - of course, unless the objective is to devise a simple
idealised robot/environment visual simulation.
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Firstly, no present day computer, or for that matter in a foreseeable
future, can faithfully simulate the rich complexity and unpredictability of the
"natural" environment.

Whereby, the senses are in a constant bombardment

by a variety of parallel stimulations and natural forces; the depth, colour,
contrasts, texture and all other physical influences of the real world have to
be calculated.

Even then many novel or unexpected events happen in the

physical surroundings which cannot be predetermined in the simulation.
Secondly, the interaction of the robot itself with the environment seldom
follows an exact predetermined path, and hence not only it would be difficult
to simulate all dynamic trajectories or movements of the robot but almost
impossible to predict all unexpected eventualities of its interactions.
6.1.2 SPECIFIC DESIGN FEATURES OF THE MOBILE ROBOT

In the following we will briefly outline the specific mechanical, electrical,
electronic, and computer-interface features of our hardware model.

Pointing

out any particulars of design which might be of interest to the wider aspects
of our discussions.
(i) - MECHANICAL FEATURES OF THE MOBILE ROBOT

The steering and drive mechanisms of the mobile robot were assembled on
a circular chassis, as illustrated in FIG.6.5.

The front wheel was used for

both steering and drive, and appropriate step-down gearing mechanisms
incorporated.

The two rear wheels were free running castors allowing a high

degree of manoeuvreability.

drive
motor

steering
motor

---" I-~

~
drive motor
FIGURE 6.5.

.-. . . . ._. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. _. . . _-.. .

CD

large
aring for
rotating drive
motor assembly
Three perspectives of drive and steering mechanisms of the
robot.
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Additionally, eight mechanical touch switches were designed to detect any
physical contact made by the robot with its surrounding objects. These were
spring loaded metal contacts spaced equally around the periphery of the main
chassis.

Also, a pendulum type shock switch (sensitivity adjustable) was

constructed and placed in the centre of the robot's body, whose activation
would signify a vigorous collision or tilting.

These inputs are illustrated in

FIG.6.6.
switch

FIGURE 6.6.

The position of eight touch switches and the shock switch.

(ii) - BLBCTRICAL FEATURES OF THE MOBILB ROBOT

The normal power source for the robot was two 12-volts rechargeable
lead-acid batteries connected in parallel, supplying power for approximately
four hours of continuous operation when fully charged. Appropriate charging,
regulating, protection and monitoring circuitry were devised and built.

In

addition, an on-board power regulator could supply the necessary +5 and +12
smooth voltage levels.

This regulator circuitry was also able to use an

external power source (rather than the batteries) as input - connected to the
robot via an umbilical cable.

The general electrical features of the robot are

outlined in FIG.6.7.
operation mode selector switch
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'::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::R:::::O::::B:::'::O::'::T'-":::[:=::~;::::::=::::~:::::::::4-!

·~ r. .
IIi" . ri

rIftMllllIItIIlN....IHINIW.......'.,IlI..... mnulH..

llldulll

'r

II
II'
11

i

fl'

I

2 x 12 - V

~

"W'

ij""'"..,.."'''''''''''''''''''''''......,''''' ""II

h

"'·~~6tT-AG'E'"·"REGULAT'i·ON"""&""'J,,"~

t,.":..~~!,~,~,;,.:..?,~",, . ~.EI~'~"~"~,,:~,:;"'''''''''''''~
f,.J!I~':~

ri:::::~:::::::::':::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~~::::::::::::.:::::::;:::::::::::::::::::::::;"~
nn'
!
!l"
,..
, . '" .... .... ." II
i!

HlIIQlIU' SW ITCH UIIIl:llllllm:i. i.:ma"QUI::::::::::'::;"j
.n~u",D
1 IIU.IIIIIUMmruttnltllllllllf.!"l1li
!!
L::::~:.
~I:I

tr~r.:~~0'i:~~~""·"'~""'p,,r·,"mCHA~G!R'""'''~ I
t."",,,,",,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,.,.,,n

·,\t·
III" ItInll'Utll'll IIIUI'I" 11'IIT'W"lI

:1'

BATTER I ES'

l

;;

1\

,._..............'!i"...

~g~r~~ii~~fle

! external power

!
iI

MAINS

source cable

:1

!l

'

ch~~~~er::jer

~g~~~o~u~g~{
:. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : .: : : :'.
[I

i :

l_..:=:.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:~::::::::::::::::::::::~:::~:~::::::::::::::::::::::~:::~~:3:~:::::::::::::::::::::LI
FIGURE 6.7.

1"1

~."~"":".:",~",l.~,.~.,,.:, . ~...i:

Schematic diagram of main electrical design features.
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(iii) - ELECTRONIC FEATURES OF THE MOBILE ROBOT

There were three main areas of design involving electronic control of the
hardware of the mobile robot, and electronic communication of information:
(a)

-

Motor Control;

(b)

-

Ultrasonic Range Detection; and

Organization, Checking, and Transmission.

(c)

-

Data

The principal components of the

mobile robot and its control system are illustrated in FIG.6.8.
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The basic components of the mobile robot system.

(a) - Motor Control
Two identical precision stepper motors were used for both steering and
driving the robot.

The use of stepper motors would obviate the need for

devising feed back mechanisms to monitor speed or direction.

Each stepper

motor would be driven by a power circuitry which received a 'clocking' and
also a 'direction' signal from its appropriate logic circuit.

For each clock

pulse the shaft of the motor rotates by 7.5 degrees in the direction specified
by the polarity of tdirection' input.
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Once the 3-bits of speed and 4-bits of direction instructions are received
and verified by the robot, then the logic control circuits translate these data
to appropriate number of clock pulses and direction of shaft rotation for the
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The rules for translations of the 7-bit output command,

indicated below, are outlined in FIG.6.9.
4-bit
direction
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.1·

0111 (7)

= 1000 ( 8 )

/

Reverse direction
for drive wheel
(c)

(b)

FIGURE 6.9.

{a} - The format of an output instruction to the mobile robot.
b - The translation codes for various direction commands.
c - The translation code for seven different speed commands,
and one zero direction (forward) calibration command.

The direction instructions received (from the computer or control box)
could

be interpreted by the robot in two different modes, which were

selectable by a switch.

Either, the steering wheel would rotate in relative

terms to its present setting.

For example, rotating

9()0

to the right when a

steering signal 0100 (4) was received, and taking no action when 0000 signal
received.

Alternately, the change of direction could be based on absolute

terms in relation to the robot's body.

Bere, it was necessary to calibrate the

steering mechanism for forward (zero) direction. Bence, using a small magnet
and a reed-relay a feedback system was devised which upon the receipt of
speed-signal 7 (SISaSa

=

111) would halt the robot and =:t{U"t a routine of

zero-direction-calibration. This procedure could be repeated during the robot
operation every 10-15 minutes to ensure that the selected directions remain
accurate, and errors would not be accumulated.

Another hardware design

feature was the ability to change the steering wheel to a new direction using
the shortest arc of rotation.
The drive circuitry could enable the selection of six different speeds
(including zero-speed) in a single direction, although, a variable speed facility
was not deemed to be as crucial as a high directional variability feature.
Additionally, the speed control clock pulse frequency was also adjustable.
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(b) - Ultrasonic Range Detector
The ultrasonic range detector is outlined in FIG.6.10. It could measure the
distance of nearest object from the front of the robot at approximately floor
level by detecting the shift between a transmitted pulse of ultrasonic wave
and its returned refiection.

Various pulse widths, cycle widths, frequencies,

and controls were hardware adjustable to suit specific operational conditions.
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A diagram of the Range Detector system and its main controls,
showing a representation of transmitted/received waveforms.

Each detection cycle, typically of order of 150 milli-seconds, could be
either

initiated

independently

by

a

clock,

or

governed

by

the

main

communications cycle of robot's data transmission system (details in following
section).
(c) - Data Organization. Checking and '!'rJUlsmission
Information collected by the mobile robot about its environment (also the
movement instructions received) had to be serially transmitted (and received)
before interfacing to the computer.

For this purpose a control box was

constructed which as well as relaying and processing the data housed the
power supply, the manual control panel, and also the monitoring displays.
The 8-bit output and the 16-bit input data were transferred between the
control box and the mobile robot using a pair of identical 27-MHz radio
transceivers (same data could also be transferred by cable).

BEST COpy
AVAILABLE
TEXT IN ORIGINAL IS
CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF
THE PAGE
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After an output instruction was received by the robot, first the number of
~ary"

bits and their parity would be checked, and if verified the data

accepted as correct.

Then, the robot input data would be transmitted to the

control box, going through similar verification or rejection processes.
example of a

An

typical transmission cycle approximately lasting 350-ms is

depicted in FIG.6.ll.
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FIGURE 6.11.
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An illustration of phases of a typical data transmission cycle.

Output 10110010 is transmitted from the control box)...and input
10010011 ... received, using Pulse-Width Modulation wWM).

(iv) - THE COMPUTER INTERFACE

A high density 64-bit interface expansion card was used to connect the
PDP-11 digital computer to the control box.

This interface allowed 64 lines

of input (or output data) be read (or written) in parallel into the computer.
It also had the interrupt facility, whereby information could be read only

when required, hence saving on computer processing times.
The 16-bit robot-input and 8-bit robot-output lines of the control box
were connected to the above interface ports.

Additionally, a hardware 16-bit

binary clock was designed and connected to one of the ports.

This clock
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could be reset and initialized at the start of an experiment, hence keeping
track of the lapsed time, up to approximately six hours - a software designed
clock could, more or less, perform the same task, but less economically.

6.1.3 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MOBILE ROBOT

The initial software programs developed after the completion and testing
of the hardware design were mainly for the purposes of demonstration and
investigation of the potentialities of the model.
At the lowest level, various utility routines were devised for: processing
the output/input signals and checking

their validity;

setting operating

conditions and initializing the system; or visually monitoring the states

of

the mobile robot on the computer screen.

At the next higher level, which can be thought of as the reflexive-action
domain of the robot, certain deterministic procedures were formulated to
enable the machine display specific behavioural patterns.

These procedures

could either be used as components of a more elaborate 'learning' program,
or, alternately, used as an integral part of a learning scheme itself (e.g., in
simulating refiex conditioning).

The inclusion of such "innate" behavioural repertoire not only posed
challenging questions in trying to enable our perceptually simple model to
display some fairly complex actions; but, also, provided interesting insights
into the specific input/output characteristics of the model, and the limitations
which the scope of percepts or actions (universe of discourse) can impose on
a design.

In addition, these refiexive processes could ensure the smooth

operation of the robot ever long durations, in particular, if trapped or
entangled in its surroundL'"lg
Although,
fundamental

as

mentioned

'learning'

irregularitie~.

previously,

issues

in

we

are

machines

directiveness of behaviour at the outset.

principally

which

interested

incorporate

in

minimal

Nevertheless, the analysis of these

algorithmic emissions of the machine should greatly assist us in devising
'learning' schemes, later.

Whereby, behavioural patterns similar in nature to

these algorithmic behaviours could be "acquired" - using the model's own
experiences and
designer.

inference

systems,

rather

than,he

intelligence of

its

Hence, these rule based sub- programs, which will be briefly

outlined in the following, should provide good yardsticks for the level of
complexity ot 'learned' behaviours we may expect from our model.
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(a) - Sub-Program to "TRAVERSE PARTICULAR TRAJECTORIES"
This was a simple program written to demonstrate intricate and interesting
behavioural emissions from the robot, as its speed and direction output
settings were changed according to certain rules.

In one example, the value

of various parameters of two time dependant polynomials would determine the
type of function/trajectory the output variations would follow.

The general

form of these polynomials were:
SPEED(t) = A + Bxt + Cxt2 + DxV
DIRECTION(t) = K + Lxt + Mxtz +

(A, B, C, ••• are constants)
Nxt3 •

(K, L, M, ••• are constants)

Because of the limited speed/direction values possible (speed

= {O, ••• ,15}),

direction

=

{O, ••• ,6},

a modular measure of the SPEED/DIRECTION (in their

appropriate ranges) values were used for steering and driving the robot (i.e.,
SPEED(16) =-SPEED(O), SPEED(17) =-SPEED(1), ••• ).
(b) - Sub-Program to "RETREAT AFTER COLLISION"
If one or more of the touch switches around the periphery of the mobile

robot were activated, then the 'retreat' procedures of this program would
steer the machine in a direction away from the activated contact switches.
When only one switch is closed, a simple mathematical relation could give the
retreat direction.

But, for two or more switch contacts the extremes of the

contacted points on the circumference had to be identified, then the retreat
angle calculated accordingly.

A general flow-chart of the processes involved

is ou tlined in the following:
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CONTINUE

(c) - Sub-Program to "MANOEUVER AFTER SHOCK-SWITCH ACTIVATION"
A similar sub-routine to the 'touch reaction' was devised to deal with the
activation of the 'shock' switch, which indicated that either the robot was on
an uneven/slanted surface or it was being agitated vigorously. In either case
a set of evasive actions were formulated, illustrated by the flow-chart below,
to deal with such eventualities.
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(d) - Sub-Program to "SCAN SURROUNDINGS AND FIND LONGEST RANGE"
This program allowed the robot upon nearing an obstacle (distance less
than a critical preset range, Rc:) go into a routine of 3600 scanning of its
surroundings, and once the direction of maximum distance was established
would steer in that particular direction. In operation, this sub-program alone
was capable of navigating the mobile robot around the room without collisions
indefinitely.

A radar-type

display

of

the

scanning

process

was

also

incorporated within the program, showing a simplified map of the room on the
computer terminal.

The scheme is illustrated in the following flow-chart.

(e) - Integrated Programs for Robot Operation
The above four Bub-programs were combined with other subroutines and
operational procedures in various integrated complex programs. Two examples
are outlined in the flow-chart illustrations below.

The program-(i) would

steer the machine around the room in straight direction as long as the sonar
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Once within critical range,

the direction and speed (Se is the speed at Rc) would gradually start to
ehange according to the criteria specified in the flow-chart boxes, steering
the

robot away

from

obstacles and

avoiding collisions.

Similarly, the

program-(ii) would steer the robot in the same manner outside the critical
zone, however, once inside the critical range it would go into a scanning
mode and find the longest sonar direction.

The normal operation could be

interrupted by shock or touch activation, the zero-direction calibration, or
keyboard override •
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6.2 DESIGNING A 'LEARNING' PROGRAM FOR THE MOBILE ROBOT

Having investigated in the previous section some possible schemes which
enabled our model to display interesting behavioural characteristics, now, we
can attempt to devise 'learning' programs which will try to aim for a similar
level of operational complexity.
The essence of our algorithmic programs could be summed up by few lines
of mathematical expressions which determined speed/direction (outputs) as
functions of range/touch/shock (inputs) and time.

Hence, a learning program
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similar
For

example, elementary objectives of the 'learning' model could be to " AVOID
COLLISIONS" or to "ROVE IN A ROOM KEEPING CERTAIN DISTANCE FROM
OBSTACLES".
In the following first we will try to highlight and discuss some of the
principal issues involved in designing such 'learning' programs, then we will
attempt to outline the details of one scheme for our specific hardware model.
6.2.1 "TIME" AS AN INPUT TO THE MODEL
An important question should be addressed here, and that is the function
of "TIME" variable in the schemes we have devised so far, and by inference,
its significance to our later discussions - although, a deep analysis of the
role of "time" in such modelling problems is outside the scope of our enquiry.
In our specific model a measure of time is not expressly perceived by the
robot, but time is regarded as an input which affects the environment and the
model in a parallel fashion.

The independent clocking mechanism manages the

coordination of the whole system, facilitating ease of analysis and control of
various aspects of the operation.
It is contended that the inclusion of 'time' as a primary input is not an
essentiality for such basic 'learning' systems. Firstly, 'learning' can be based
on a simple spatial (rather than temporal) contiguity of events.
Secondly, it can be envisaged that some sort of temporal consequentiality
of events may be used for 'learning' without explicitly referring to the
element of external time as a

clocking. mechanism.

Here, 'changes' or

'differences' of percepts may be used to represent an ordering of significant
stimuli during the process of learning.

However, in this case, it is assumed

that stimuli perceived follow each other within reasonable periods of time. In
other words, the detected environmental changes should be meaningful for the
system, and time scales of external changes should relate to internal time
scale of changes.
Thirdly, a different physical parameter of the model itself could represent
an independent sequential scaling of events, either in step with external time
(although out of phase), or with its own gradation.
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6.2.2 TELEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Another important aspect of our design is the teleological (directiveness)
considerations.

In Chapter-2 the psychological and physiological contexts of

related concepts were examined, and also in Chapter-3 we discussed such
topics in their general systems context.

But, here, we will focus on the

teleological issues involved in designing the more specific class of cybernetic
simple 'learning' models.
(i) - GOALS and GOAL-DIRECTED BEBAVIOUR

Many of human and animal activities, and almost all their learned or
adaptive

behaviours,

are

unquestionably

goal-directed

in

nature;

and

descriptions of learning processes in their biological domains invariably
contain some directive concepts such as goals, intentions, motives or purpose.
Yet, the successful translation of these concepts to the artificial domain of
machines or systems, where no real sense of 'purposiveness' or 'intentionality'
can be expressed, requires some careful consideration.
In biological systems it has been shown that specific neural mechanisms
govern the motivational and drive aspects of basic patterns of behaviour, and
also indications point to the involvement of physiological factors (hormones,
chemicals, etc.) in the determination of higher purposive behaviours.

On the

other hand, in artificially constructed systems all such teleological notions are
defined on subjective basis by external designers, and are generally seen as
properties of the 'behaviour' of the system (not its construct).

However, in

spite of this fundamental difference, many workers have attempted to devise
global definitions for goal-directed behaviour, applicable to both natural and
artificial systems.
In the following

diagram

(FIG.6.12)

the various levels of teleological

activity as a general system property, related examples, and also schematic
representations of their processes indicating types of goals and behavioural
pathways are outlined in a tentative classification.

Although, it must be

mentioned that there is no consensus about the categorization or definitions
of teleological behaviours amongst scientific workers from different disciplines
(e.g., cybernetics, philosophy, A.I., psychology, etc.).

For example, the first

category of our classification in FIG.6.12 (the equilibrium-seeking/reflexive
behaviour) is sometimes not considered as a

goal-directed type activity.

However, they are included in our taxonomy in an attempt to construct a
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broad framework, and also to demonstrate a developmental or evolutionary
continuum from the simplest to the most complex modes of behaviour •
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possible taxonomy for the various levels of teleological
betiaviours and systems, together with appropriate exam pres.

A

The examples of the first three levels of goal-directed ness as defined in
the hierarchy of FIG.6.12 are quite abundant in nature, their teleology being
implicit in the simple consequence of their physical actions, but the higher
types of goal-directed ness are only seen in the more advanced animals capable
of some mental processing or abstraction.

In humans it has become clear
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that the lower levels of hierarchy of goals serve the higher levels in
determining goal-directed ness.
Aside from the first category of our teleological taxonomy the process of
learning could be involved in the formation of all other types of goal-directed
behaviour.

In addition, the more complex modes of teleology, in particular

those involving heuristic concepts, could entail some anticipatory aspects,
such as 'expectations' and 'predictions'.

These notions inevitably require a

higher processing and conceptual level which can somehow internally model
the consequence of actions, overseeing the development of goal-directed
behaviour.
An example of different characterizations of teleological processes is
proposed by Ackoff and Emery (1972) in defining 'Purposeful Systems'; which
are defined as systems that are able to change or select their goals under
constant environmental conditions, and are also able to adopt different
functional means to achieve the same goal.
and

Their 'ends', 'goals', 'objectives',

'ideals' being equivalent to the 'specific-goals', 'well-defined-goals',

'ill-defined-goals', and 'target-goals' of our categorization of FIG.6.12.
(ii) - DEFINING GOALS

The task of defining and setting goals in cybernetic systems that are
characterised by an input/output/internal-processing configuration, such as our
model, could be carried out in four principal ways:
(a) - At the most basic level, the 'goals' of the machine are unknown at the
outset, and the model itself gradually starts to develope its own goals
following a process of interaction with its environment.

Either, procedures

designed into the system will enable the machine to extract goals from of its
interactions.

Or, the system can start with near random or very primitive

behavioural characteristics and approach a more complex form of behaviour.
However, in both cases some initial organization is deemed to be necessary,
since it is inconceivable that without any a priori physical biases or imposed
general operational constraints, such as aiming towards the attainment of
instability /stability /change/equilibrium, the model would be able to randomly
extract useful goals from its interactions with environment.

The various

entropic analysis of systems (e.g., the law of requisite variety) attest to this
need for Home initial organizational order.
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(b) - More specific, yet all encompassing, goals could be incorporated within
the model at the outset.

These goals have to be maintained, achieved, aimed,

or kept within certain limits during the operation of the system.

'Hedonic'

principals (pain-pleasure, reward-punishment, etc.) can be considered as simple
expressions of this type of goals.

In our particular model an example of this

method of goal setting is:
"WHEN TOL'CH SWITCHES ARE ACTIVE" ""''''''''''''''''i;' PAIN and
"WHEN TOUCH SWITCHES ARE NON-ACTIVE" "'''''''''''''''''h' PLEASURE
"WHEN RANGE LARGER THAN CRITICAL RANGE"

FAVOURABLE

'''''''''''''''''''''il'

The above simple goal criteria alone have the potential to direct the
development of the activities of the model, following some 'learning' phase,
towards 'obstacle-avoidance' type behaviour.
(c)

-

A compound

pronouncement

of

the

desirable

target

events,

as

extrapolated by the designer, could be used as goals. Such goals could either
be

a

sequence

of

the

more

fundamental

type-(b)

goals;

or,

a

logical/mathematical combination of type-(b) goals - whose pursuit should
"algorithmically" result in the desired end pattern of behaviour. For example,
in the case of our mobile robot we may have goal events defined as:
"WIlEN ACTIVATIOO OF mE

SIKa{

sms<E IS FOLl..QflID BY

rom

SENSCES"; or

"WHEN SCJ<lAR RANGE IS ZImO AND FOONT 'n«> 'lUJCH SBNSCm ARE ACTIVE".

(d) - The designer of the system, using introspection, could determine that a
certain

sequential/mathematical/logical

relationships

between

inputs

an i

outputs would be conducive to bringing about the desired behavioural pattern,
without actually knowing the exact steps for attaining the objective.

In our

particular model examples of this "heuristic" type goal events could be:

''WIlEN mE HDl1.m OF RANGE AND SPEIID IS LESS 'IHAN A CDBl'ANT 1["; or
"WIlEN ALL TaXll SWITCHES ARE INACTnh F<E TIMB T AND SPEED

~

0".

(iii) - DRIVE AND MOTIVATION

Most of animals' simple drive mechanisms have action which typically can
be represented by the following generalised response curve:

t

dr i

DRIVE Variable (e.g., thirst, hunger)

v: ~ ~ ~ _1_J ------- :'-:;-';-;';---~-~-:-=iiiiill"-"IIaI"'''''''~

delay in "need" system
feedback mechanism
NEED Variable
(e.g., water,food)

_ _. . . . . . . ._ _ _

+""'~lm::;;;lIfII"lf:t..'amIIU'l1tnlllIUl'".II.u'"IIIIUIIII"'IHIIIII"1II/UIIIUIIIIIU,i/UIIfIllI,MII;IIIIUIIII'I'"'",UmIfIlUI.iUUllmllllllftlolllltU""lIrllmIU:fUlltlu:'m"'UII:I:nlZ:I.I.:u;.l~I'
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sensitization, boredom,

attention, distraction, time, etc. cOuld affect an animal's motivational aspects,
and reduce or increase the drive accordingly (this is equivalent to changing
the skewness of the curve in the previous diagram).
There is, also, a complex interaction between the various drive and need
mechanisms of an animal and some higher hedonic centers, which indicate the
severity of other more global variables.

These hedonic mechanisms could be

considered as 'reward-punishment' centers, or alternately, more fundamentally,
as 'pain-pleasure' centers.
In the context of elementary 'survival', the 'pain' mechanisms are those
which signal undesirable inputs or outputs, and stop the organism from
exceeding various critical limits of its physical capabilities.
'pleasure' mechanisms consolidate and

enfo~

Conversely,

the IDOBt utilitarian, efficient,

or desirable modes of action; or try to sustain pleasurable experiences.

For

simple physically quantifiable stimuli (also for some complex or abstract
stimUli) the function of a pain-pleasure mechanism can be typic8ny depicted
by following illustration:

PLEASURE

Pleasurable
Region

Physical Variable

(e.'.J temp., pressure,

br1gntness, loudness)
I --~--~~---------optimal comfort
stimulus value-

..

PAIN
Bere, 'motivaUon' can be loosely defined as an aversion from painful or
attracUon towards pleasurable stimuli; and 'drive' can be considered to be
proportional to the degree of such aversive or attracting forces.
Of course, as before, different interference factors could change the shape

of a

pain-pleasure curve, or cause a shift in its x-y axis.

Similarly,

compound, conflicting, or competing pain-pleasure mechanisms can result in a
much more intricate curve shapes, which have various nodes and troughs, or
have sharp transitions from pain to pleasure areas.
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In some observations of animal behaviour in nature (e.g., sea-gulls) it has
been established that coincident
mechanisms

(maternal vs. escape)

is

to

of various conflictin.r innate drive

results in an intermittent non-stable

The normal solution to this problem provided by

response from the animal.
evolution

a~tivation

develope a

hierarchical. order

for

various motivational

variables.

Now, we shall discuss how to go about choosing hedonic principals for
simple 'learning' models such as our experimental mobile robot.
In our argument we shall consider a simple hypothetical organism in an
environment which exerts ph7sical or information-baaed inputs upon it, as
indicated below:
l/P( 1)

.

------~:~I

inputs

I/P(2)

O/P( 1)

~I--------~:

ORGANISM
...- - - - - . . . . . .

outputs
O/P(2)

BNVIRONMBNT
Now, • 'lets suppoee that the organism starts from a non-goal-directed

random behaviour.

Then, we (as external observers) notice that one of the

inputs, say 1/P(1), which can represent "hunger" should be f0110wed b7 a
specific output, say 0/P(2), which could represent "intake of food".

In our

judgement this sequence of events should increase the chances of survival for
the organism.

In other words, it is desirable that an association should be

estabHahed between I/P(l) and 0/P(2).

~.

Of course, not every pairing of aaaociations will make sense, and both

external causalities of events and, also, internal connectivities of the
structure of the or.ranism have to be taken into account.

For instance, if

0/P(1) represented "sleep" then the association of 1/P(1) and 0/P(1) (hunger

and sleep) would not be a very positive one (normally).
Bence, it is clear that unless the organism goes through the whole lfBIDut
of evolutionary development, involving genetic mutations and natural selection,
then such useful associations cannot come about from within a random system
that has no way of assessing the relevance of inputs to outputs or vice versa.
Therefore, for any autonomously 'learning' system some internal measure of
utility of actions is considered as necessary, even in systems that need to
'learn' simple associations.

••• ',a' a••
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The designer of a machine equivalent to the above hypothetical organism,
which is required to 'learn' a simple rule of association, can either explicitly
include the desired connections between inputs and outputs (e.g., I/P(1) and
O/P(2» within the design; or, alternately, can incorporate means by which the
machine could discover such associations by chance, by search, or by
following specific procedures. However, since we are interested in "acquiring"
these associations, then we would like to include the capability of evaluating
useful input-output sequences within the model.

For example, the activation

of some 'favourable internal states' could indicate that the machine should try
to reinforce/repeat/reexperience the immediately preceding events.

Dedicated

'pain-pleasure'

centers are

mechanisms for directing learning.

probably

the

simplest

hedonic

Yet, the dilemma exists that the very

notions of "pain" or "pleasure" themselves have to

~

learned by a particular

artificial system, on the basis of the contributions they make to its 'survival'
(in a simi1ar fashion to the natural organisms), and therefore an even more
fundamental measure of hedony should be chosen. However, this relCression in
manifesting ever more simple hedonic principals cannot be reaolved, unless we
revert back to phylogenetica1ly determined pain-pleasure centers.
A search for the most trivial hedonic system possible for machines could,
therefore, on the one hand, result in a pair of very trivial internal indicators;
and, on the other hand, at even a more fundamental level, yield hedonic
indicators that are simply expressed in terms of the system's inputs and
outputs.

In our particular model the simplest pain-pleasure mechanism

envisaged is to define a specific digit of the input code as the indicator of
pain/pleasure (I.e, PAIN=O, PLBASURE=l)~'
The above discussions point to the fact that hedonic principles themselves
can be developed during the process of learning and interactive experience.
Bence, in design they should be modifiable in nature, and possibly involve
some aort of hierarchy.
Now, having decided to incorporate a simple hedonic system into the
model, then the various 'goals' of a self-goal-determining 'learning' system
can be defined on the basis of the activations of its 'pleasure' centers and
suppressions of its 'pain' centers.

In a sense, the teleological behaviour

'learned' by the use of pain-pleasure mechanisms will not be so much
"directed" by 'goals', as in the case of externally set goals, but will involve
"searching" for goal events which the model can subsequently aim for.

In
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FIG.6.l3 these two opposing methods of setting goals and the role of
'pain-pleasure' centers is illustrated.

{
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(a) - bterna1ly set goals, (b) - Internall7 set goals.

For our particular mobile robot it was decided that rather than designinar
specific goal/drive centers, whose inputs were to be maintained within

appropriate limits, the aoaI events would simply be defined in terms of
conditions set upon one or a combination of inputs and/or outputs.
In some simiJar experimental exercises, to convey an artificial sense of a
'need' mechanism in the robot, special inputs such as battery level indicators
are incorporated which is deemed to 'motivate' the machine towards searchinar
for a

battery~harger

outlet.

Although, drive and need mechanisms are· well

investigated attributes of animal behaviour, seeminar17 involved in every aspect
of their learning, nevertheless, this superficial inclusion of an artificial
'sense' of a 'need' in the design, by express reference to motivational inputs,
was not found to be conducive to our elementary approach to the modelling

of the learning process.
Bence, no attempt is made to explicitly manifest 'survival' or other
animal-specific aspects into the model.

However, concepts such as drive and

motivation can be later defined as composite higher order functions of the
more basic hedonic parameters.

For example, if "utility" (pleasure) in the

model was defined as:"KEEPING RANGE AT MAXIMUM AND SPEED AT I",

then, starting from a random pattern of behaviour, the robot's behaviour
should converge towards movements in the centre of the room after a period

• ••••• 1 • • • Cl'b.~ •• l i c
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of appropriate 'learning' - this being equivalent to explicitly stating a 'need'
for the robot to stay in the middle of the room.

Although, the exact

consequence of such goal-seeking operations will not be obvious for many
combinations of inputs and outputs at the outset; neither a 'convergence'
towards a final 'learned' pattern of behaviour can be guaranteed.
6.2.3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Previously, we have referred to epistemological or knowledge related
aspects of the learning process as one of its most important integral
considerations, specially, when investigating the acquisitional aspects of
learning.

Knowledge and learning are implicitly connected, since when an

organism improves/changes some facet of its behaviour through learning, it
clearly has gained additional knowledge about itself or its environment.

.

Firstly, it must be emphasised that the acope of learning and knowledge
acquisition even for an entity as simple as our model is almost limitless.

To

illustrate this point, the eight touch-switches, the shock-switch, and the
~=2Ja

seven-bit range input can provide

different patterns of input;

and the three-bit speed and four-bit direction outputs provide
different- output combinations.

It we

were simply to consider

associations between single inputs and outputs, then there are
possibilities.

2ax2.=2'
direct

2'z2u=21a

Added to this are the temporal or combinatorial possibilities of

associations between sets of inputs and outputs. Bence, it is conceivable that
a great deal of knowledge, only bounded by the size of storage, can be
represented and accumulated by our simple modeL
The scanning program devised earlier was an example of the high level
knowledge

representation

possible

by

the

mobUe

robot,

whereby

a

2-dimenaional map of the room was composed by appropriate programming of
the robot.

Many other conceptUalizations are indeed possible; of course, the

level of such conceptualizations, which should also be compatible with the
sensory complexity of the model, need to be described at the beginning of a
modelling exercise, and objectives pinpointed.
The analysis of the nature and organization of knowledge is one of the
important aspects of epistemology of learning, which in humans concerns
issues

such

as

the

content

of

thoughts,

discriminatory factors, imaginations, etc.

concepts,

mental-images,

These analyses also involve the

investigation of rules, operations and laws which underline such phenomena.
The above issues form the core of many philosophical deliberations, and have
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instigated various diametric standpoints amongst workers of learning related
fields (e.g., empiricism vs. rationalism). In earlier chapters of this thesis such
issues were discussed to some extent, particularly in sections dealing with
cognitive studies of learning.
If we suppose that an organism after undergoing a specific experience

endures a change in its knowledge state - as a result of some external
input/information, or as a consequence of observations made on the results of
its responses, or following some internal processes, or some other method.
Then, there are various important considerations that have to be taken into
account.
Firstly, what was the level of the knowledge at the outset of learning.
The organism can start from zero or very Httle knowledge and gradually build
up (learn) a composite picture of its operational domain.

It can alao start

.

with a priming of certain parameters, and upon confronting a particular
experience develope specific patterns of knowledge rules. Alternately, at the
most

knowledge-intensive

stratum,

all

appHcable

knowledge

can

be

incorporated within the system at the start, and only refinements and
omissions made to its organization after a period of operation.
Secondly, how can we know that knowledge has been acquired or changed
within the organism.

Here, the answer Has in evaluating a certain facet of

the organism's behaviour or its "performance", before and after a specific
experience.

By judging certain responses, an "inference" can be made that

learning caused a certain change in knowledge. In a way, knowledge could be
thought of as an entity lying dormant within an animal, and is only. activated
when the attainment of some goal is desired.

The organism may 'know' how

to do many tasks, but, unless it is properly motivated it may not perform the
task.

Bence, the clear distinction between "learning" and "performance"

should be appreciated.
Thirdly, what is the nature of the knowledge that an orpnism has, and
how can it be represented.

This could involve a variety of different forms.

In its simplest manifestation, the implicit physical interconnection between
inputs and outputs could represent knowledge.

Yet, from our previous

discussions we may speculate that to convey any interesting learning features
a

second representational meta-level is desirable.

In this higher level,

probably, the simplest form of knowledge representation is the mere recording
of events, which can be a representation of combinations of input and output
sequences, or a sort of 'copy' of the 'image' of temporal connectivities of

·e •• , ••• ,

inputs and/or outputs.
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Many other more complex conceptualizations are also

possible for representing knowledge and its rules. Examples are: 'parameters
in algebraic expressions', 'decision trees', 'graphs and networks', 'formal
grammars',

tproduction

rules',

'frames

and

schemas' ,

or

other

linguistic/mathematica1/10gica1/conceptual expressions.
The work in the discipline of A.I., specially in some of its branches such
as 'expert-systems', is highly pivotal on the issue of representing knowledge;
and there have been impressive developments in these areas within the past
few years, particularly in commercial knowledge-based systems.

Most of the

effort has been directed towards the efficient collecting, storing, and utilizing
of information by computers.

For example, decision trees, classifiers or

various rule-based systems can manifest the knowled.re involved in a task
domain; and programming languages (e.g., LISP, PROLOG) have been developed
to manipulate these knowled.re bases.

However, learning or acquisition of

.
formation,

knowledge is not, generally, emphasised in these fields.
"top-down" approaches to knowled.re

In general, in these

only 'inferences' are made

upon the knowledge-structure - although in some instances new rules may be

'extracted'•
On the other hand, in the "bottom-up" disciplines, such as connectivism or
pattern-recognition,

the

interest

representations of knowledge.

is

;

focussed

on

the

more

trivial

Rather than describe objects and relations in

terms of their underlying rules or hi.rher level linguistic characteristics, their
elements or basic features are identified.

Therefore, more fundamental

criteria are used to accumulate knowledge about the experiences of an
organism - by compiling descriptions of objects and events in. terms of
subsets of more simpler entities.
Bere, in our model, due to our particular cybernetic incHnation to the
JDOCIeDing

of

ledrning,

conceptualigtion and

we

will

not

representation of

include

the

knowledge.

higher

strata

of

The level of the

complexity of the model, its perceptive powers, and its behavioural 'learning'
potentialities indicates that we should try to devise knowledge representation
schemes which rely on simple consequences of inputs and outputs. Bence, the
major concern should be the organization and restructuring of this knowledge
base stored in the 'memory' of the system. We should also try to incorporate

almost no, or minimal, prior knowledge into the system, enabling the model to
build up a perception of the world around it in a progressive manner - even
managing to develope its own goals.
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6.2.4 MEMORY and GENERALIZATION
The faculty of 'memory', which can be defined as the capability to retain
and recall past experiences, has been discussed in previous chapters of this
thesis.

In Chapter 2 the cognitive

aspect~

of memory were scrutinized by

outlining its characteristics and hypothesising about its various facets of
formation,

retention,

recall,

consolidation,

decline,

and

utilization.

Additionally, in the various 'learning' models discussed a memory-element of
some sort was either implicitly or explicitly present.

Here, we shall attempt

to discuss such features in relation to our simple cybernetic model.
The most trivial form of recording a 'memory' of an external event is to
make a permanent or temporary physical impression of that event.

For

example, a finger-print mark or the oscillations of a tunina-fork both indicate
that a certain event occurred in the past. Althouah. certain animal coanitive
systems (e.g., imprintina, iconic-memory) apparenUy exhibit this type of
memory formation/retention characteristics.

The

real

interest tor

the

modelers of the learnina process. actually. lies in the more complex forms of
memory. which convey information in a more accessible and modifiable form.
Yet, it must be pointed out that if the non-trivial view ot memory is
adopted, then the presence of a memory element is not a necessity tor all
'learning' models.

For example, simple 'learning' systems can be enviaaaed

which forae connections or associations between inputs and outputs, by
modifying connection weights or creating new c;onnections on basis of current
percepts.

Criteria used can be the instantaneous conu.uity of events, or

modifications ·of some mathematical funcj.ipn (e••• , conditional pro~bi1ities)
for each recurrence of inputs.
For an inquisitive cybernetic modeler of tlearnina' SyatelDS, clearly, lookina
simply at the external behaviour of the system or the procellBing of internal
signals alone will not yield any results of much interest.

Rence, some level

of interaction of a model and its environment in the form ot internal
abstraction of external world is desirable; using which the model can make
inferences, solve problems. and even hypothesise about its interactions with
the environment.

The knowledae-base which will provide the necessary

framework for this abstraction can be contained within the memory of the
system; and the simplest method envisaged tor representing this type ot
knowledge in memory is to merely record that output 0 occurred tollowina
the occurrence of input I.
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Now, to investigate a simple memory function further, lets consider a
hypothetical system that has input 1={Il,I.,••• } and output O={OI,Oa, ••• }, and
starts from a completely random 1-->0 transformations.

The system has a

simple goal mechanism in the form of pain-pleasure centers, and also has
unlimited storage capacity.
The system, illustrated in FIG.6.14, commences operation by first reading
an input II and choosing randomly an output 01 from the table of 1->0
transformations (initially equally distributed).

The transformation tables

indicate the probability distributions for various outputs for any given input.
Next, the goal evaluator will indicate whether the 'pain' or 'pleasure' centre
has been activated, and a value <*={ I=pleasure , O=pain } will be attributed

to that particular Ia-->Ol pairing. If this pairing is already recorded in the
infinite memory of the system (in one or several instances), then its previous
~

values are looked up and modifications made to the selection probabilities

.

(Le., their distribution) of the 1 - ) 0 traftsformation table - accordiDa to
some criteria based on current and past If08l values.

However, if the

sequence of the 1 - ) 0 is novel, then the pairing together with its If08l
value is simply stored in the aeJDOrY.

I
I
I

READ
INPUT II

l
.0
I
TRANSFORMATION
TABLE
(initially random)

I

-l

~

SELECT
OUTPUT 0,

-l
READ GOAL
VALUE Gk
.OJ
for II

.

MODIFY
I
.0
TRANSFORMATION
TABLE
ACCORDING TO
SOME CRITERIA

.

INFINITE
MEMORY

I

Il--+01.......al
Il--+O• .......a'
I.--+O • .......al.
I.--+Ol.......al
• • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • •
•
• • •

·
··

·

~

IS
II -+0,
NEW
?
Y

N

LOOK UP Gil
IN MEMORY
i"

STORE AS NEW
1--+0--+0
SEQUENCE

FIGURE 6.14. A simple idealised hypothetical 'learning' system with unlimited
memory.
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This simple scheme will in theory enable the model to 'learn' any existing
desirable associations between inputs and outputs after an arbitrary period of
operation.

Similarly, using equivalent procedures, desirable reJationships of

output-->input pairings or sequences of inputs and/or outputs could also be
discovered.

Of course, all such learning is conditional upon

the very

existence of favourable underlying causality of inputs and outputs, and in
many instances no convergence (or useful outcomes) may result - even after
very long periods of operation.
The principal limitations and disadvantages of such idealised learning
models are: firstly, the immense amount of storage capacity which might be
required; and secondly, the time consuming nature of the processes involved
in recaJUng, scanning and comparing events with stored past experiences;
particuJarly, for compound sequences of inputs and outputs.

Today's

computers (digital, analogue, or parallel) are not really equipped to deal with
such complexities for any non trivial 'learning'
system of interest which
,
operates on these basis.

It is also not envisaged that future technoJodcal

progress in computing IDIICbinery will promote this type of ezbauative
approach to the modellina of learmn..
Therefore, measures have to be taken to limit the IDKJUnt of stored
~

information in the ..,..,ry.

Various criteria can be used to do this.

For

eDmlple, we can record only 1->0 relations which bring about a positive
~

event (pleasure). But, perhaps, the beat indications can be found in the

discoveries made _

to how the brain's equivalent limiting functions are

performed in nature.
Seemingly, me..,ry mechanisms in animals and humans retain the trace of
a

particuJar event for varying periods of time, depending on variou.

underlying significance factors (e.g., motivation, attention).

Two principal

components, the 'short-term' and the 'long-term', are identified in natural
memory mechanisms; enabling unused or irrelevant information to be discarded
or replaced.

In artificial models of 'memory' systems, aIao, ai.flar principle.

can be employed.

Normally, three principal criteria are used to lDBDiteat

'forgetting' in artificial systems, which are 'utility',

'qa'

and 'relevance'.

Extreme care should, however, be taken so that earlier information is not
overwritten by new information which somehow might be dependant on the
earlier information.
Additionally, groupings of information are apparently made in the brain, by
forming 'generalizations' of primary percepts; and, at a higher level, inputs
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are classified and heuristics formed to obviate the need for looking at every
permutation of events and their significances.
The generalization of stimuli (inputs) is a characteristic of all learning
processes in animals, and
perceptual mechanisms.

also a

prominent feature of many of their

The generalization process ensures that a response

can be evoked by a broad range of stimuli which are appropriately similar to
the stimulus already encountered by the organism. Yet, the critical levels of
similarity at which two stimuli evoke' the same response may vary for
different animals, and also are dependant on the specific type of learning; in
many cases, this range of similarity itself is refined by the animal during its
learning process.

In behavioural psychology the two types of generalization

(non-learned and learned) are distinguished as 'primary' and 'secondary'
generalization.
In our hypothetical learning model of

FIG~6.14

.

a generalization could mean

redefining .roups of inputs as a new 'generalized' input.
three

sequences

Il->Ol->Gl,

Ia-->Ol->Gl,

represented by a new sequence IUD)-)Ol-)Gl.

For example, the

I.-->Ol->Gt

could

be

Alternately, some sort ot

Jogical or mathematical reJationship could be discovered or hypothesised,

which would enable a more parsimonious expression ot events which elicit the
positive goals.

8.2.5 'LBARNING' SCIIBMBS FOR SIMPLB CYBBRNBTIC MODBLS
Bavin. looked at some periphery issues and considerations deemed
bDportant to· our level ot investigation. ot the learning procesa and. its
modellin..

We can now elaborate more on the way a working 'learnin.'

system can be devised.
But, perhaps it is worth reiterating that our intentions in the scrutiny ot
learning are all directed towards its global and fundamental features.

Bence,

no particuJar pattern of behaviour (skill) is of special interest. Neither, shall
we attempt to engaae in discussions of higher 'mental' aspects of learning,
such as consciousness, self-awareness, meaning, understanding, etc.
The idea is to try to define a limited but concise model, with limited
scope of activities and task potentials, engaged within an environment that
can exert a set of defined inputs upon it.

The model should start with

almost no external knowledge, aside trom general directiveness information,
and gradually 'learn' some interesting (non-trivial) behavioural patterns from

••• 1 •• 1 • • •

its interactions with the environment.
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The question is posed, whether a

consistent closed system could be built which exhibits the fundamental
characteristics

of

the

learning

process,

such

88

'unpredictability' ,

'repeatability', 'self-improvement', 'permanence', 'generalization', 'recognition',
'recall', 'forgetting', 'relearning', etc.;
learning could be developed.

a~d

also whether a

hierarchy of

Although, not necessarily copying the empirics

of equivalent natural processes.
A look at other generalized attempts at the field of the modelling of the
learning process reveals that, in the main, either their designers quickly
abandon the global aspects of their supposedly all-encompassing endeavour,
and focus on a particular task oriented domain; or, the vagueness of their
abstractions,

and

the

intricacies

of

mathematics

involved,

makes

no

accommodation for any coherent practical realization - of course, there are
some exceptions (e.g., Andreae's 'learning' systems).
We have already discussed

SODle

of the' fundamental features common to

moat learning which we would Uke to incorporate in our model, such

88

'elementary goals', 'pain-pleasure reinforcement', 'short-term' and Ilona-term'
memory, 'generalization', and a 'knowledge-structure'.

Nen, we have to

decide whether our JDOdel will be a kind: of 'child-model' with no (or very
Httle) prior knowledae; whether, it should start from a riaid knowledae
structure and become more general purpose, or vice-versa; and whether,
associations should be 'created' during learnina, or simply 'refined'. Also, the
extent of randomness incorporated into the system at the outset, to enable
the JDOdel discover novel or unpredictable patterns of behaviour should be
contemplated•.
Some other important considerations are whether the environment or the
domain of learning should be

'fixed'

or 'chanaeable', in the chanaeable case a

more critical evaluaUon mechanism should be designed.

SimUarly, the extent

of external contributions made by a 'supervisor' or 'teacher' durina the
process of learning should be considered
Before we describe the details of one such 'learning' program, in the
following, a simple ascending order of various types of simple learning will be
proposed and discussed. The hypothetical "system" illustrated is considered to
be a conglomeration of an array of input and an array of output cells,
whereupon, associations could be established following a 'learning' phase.
Bere, the object of exercise is to identify and highlight the principal
pathways of information exchange in a progressive manner:-

••• 1 ,al a,
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(a) - In the most trivial case, the connections are prewired, and there is no
change in the associative connections between Inputs and outputs during
the operations of the system. As in the case of innate mechanisms or
refleXIve behaviours of animals.

"'·.·. _ ·. ·. · .·. . ·. . . ·]
rn
ENVIRONMENT

~~=>+~ ~=>+
_~

..""'&hII

(b) - lnitia1ly_

there are no connections (or there are onI;!" pm:tial
connections)" but after a period of time and going through a 'learning'
phase some aeterministic or stochastic associations are established by a
simple process of perceiving certain cue inputs. An example oJ this
type of learning in nature is "imprinting" in birds.

ENVIRONMENT
Input

..

·.

**
*
**

** ------...
Output
**

t

I
I

J

LEARNING
ELEMENT

(c) - Initially there are no connections between the inputs and outputs, but
now the system has a feedback loop from its outpu~.1 and can evaluate
its actions.
Bence, after a 'learnirur' pbasi, tile sr.stelll' learns
associations based on some measure of U\ilify (or hedony •

ENVIRONMENT
Input

... ***
**
I

• • • •
• • • •
• •

t

·

~

~

LEARNING
BLBMBNT

***
**.

Output

..

L

I

(d) - Internal mechanisms euable the s7stem to store a memor.7 of previous
input-9U~~t sequ.ences, and initiate actions on basis of present and
past SlID
ezpenences.

ENVIRONMENT
Input

.... **
***

····
····
····
t

** Output
** =--==--...
*

LEARNING ELEMENT

[~i~Yj]
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Certain internal faculties allows the system to make abstractions about
its external world, and hence make predictions or establish expectations
about events and their conaequences at some time in future. This is
essentially the capability of conceptualizing a model of the external
world.

(e) -

** . . . . **

'--r=1""'---~

..

LEARNING ELEMENT

I[
!

6.2.6 NI

~

MEMOR!j

IMODELLING OF;I
ENVIRONMENT

c:. A 'urA&NDIl'

PIIXIWI

g

1111 !lJtDlIlDIJI"

,

In Chapter-3 (section 3.4) we outlined and discussed the elements of a
generalised 'learning' system.

A representation of the principal components

of such a system is illustrated in FIG.6.15.

DISCOVERY
ELEMBNT

I

PLANNING
ELEMENT

.
c boice

.....

I

I
~

Inputs

of
FILTBRING
BLEMBNT

lIP
(input)

t

GENERALIZATION
ELEMBNT

l

LBARNING
BLEMENT

.....

I

t
MEMORY
ELEMBNT

I

.

"-

EXBCUTIVB
ELEMBNT

t

EVALUATION
ELEMENT

I

OIP

(0 utput)

I
I

FIGURE 6.15. The eight major components of a generalized 'learning'system.
In the remainder of this chapter we will outline a specific example of a
'learning' program which can be used in conjunction with our hardware modeL
Although, the majority of the elements of the generalised 'learning' system of

FIG.6.15 will be implemented in our proposed system, nevertheless, due to our
level of approach some higher order features, such as 'planning', are omitted.
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When we come to decide what to include in a 'learning' program choices
are, indeed, enormous. We can

in~rporate

a variety of concepts developed in

behavioural and cognitive studies of learning; and also we can employ
numerous techniques put forward by worker in learning related areas of
disciplines such as A.I., P.R., Control

Syst~ms,

Cybernetics, etc.

If the objective is to devise a program to simulate the simpler forms of

adaptive behaviour in animals, for example, "habituation" or "conditioning",
then

the task is fairly straight forward.

Firstly, a list of refiexive

behaviours can be defined, specifying how a particular stimulus elicits a
response.

Secondly, criteria can be formulated for modifying these refiexive

associations,

or

forging

mathematical/loJrical rules.

new

associations,

according

to

specific

For instance, temporal contiguity of events could

form the basis for such modifications in an exercise to simulate tirst order
conditioning.

Additionally, a simple evaluation unit may be desirable for

.elaborate

keeping track of previous successful incidence of events.
can also lead to the reaUution of more

other refinements

models, which simulate

actual laboratory observations of lower forms of learning behaviour much
more realistically, and in more detail.
In our foUowing proposed 'learning' program we will attempt to devise a
scheme that will try to synthesise higher modalities of learning

~haviour.

The target of exercise is not the instinctive or basic refiexive type adaptive
modifications of behaviour, but those categories of learning as defined in
psychology by 'Trial A. Error Learning' or 'Associative Learning'.
OUr starting point in design will ,be .to externally as....n gOQla pt, the
system.

Previously, we have discussed various aspects of teleological

behaviour and goal-selection in this chapter, however, in the absence of
underlying instigating forces, simi1ar to those found in nature (e.g., evolution,
bioloJrical need mechanisms), we will not argue the case for 'utility' of actions
from the point of view of the model itself.

In other words, we will not

reason why a certain goal seeking behaviour is "good" or "necessary" for the
machine, or why the system "needs" to take a certain course of action.

The

goals will be set by an external observer, they are of the primary type of the
hierarchy of goals discussed earlier (section 6.2.2(ii», and do not immediately
convey the type of behaviour (if any) they hope to induce.
Some general conditions set by the experimenter will be the goals which
the model will try to maintain (or avoid).

Although, even this type of goals

can be randomly selected by the machine itself. But, again another externally

D•• l •• l . ,
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set higher order evaluation system is necessary to judge the relative merits of
the internally set goals - and

rec~.lrssion

of argument will continue.

Thus, for a simple manifestation of teleology, the goals of the model can
be defined by setting conditions upon one or any combination of inputs
and/or outputs.

Even for our simple mobile robot the permutation of the

choices based on the 16-bit input and the 8-bit output is enormous.

Bence,

for further simplification we can make the goal states independent of outputs
of the robot - action (output) dependant goals are in principal similar to our
simpler input only dependant goals, and can be incorporated within a later
elaboration of the 'learning' program.
For example, if a 16-bit input was represented as:8-bit touch sensors
"

liP

7-bit range

(""

"

shock-switch

'"'-1

.........

/

= Iw[!!][!!][!!][!!]wW[!!j[wW~~~~~~
Then, a goal G for the system can be defined as: "the sustainin.. of an
input with active bits (i.e., "l's") at specified digits" "pleasurable" or "attractive" goals.

go

o

itt

,.

,.

g.

Is

I.

in the case of

In other words:-

17

g,

I.

Ih

0

111

1

112

'1

31h.

'1

s

= ImmmmmmmmqJmcpm~Eoml
~the

l

Significant goal bits ("l's")

In the case of "painful" or "aversive" goals having "O's" at specified digits

of input -will be the desirable objective of· the system.

Yet, the &'OBI will be

said to be activated only when the undesirable (painful) events occur - when
"1 's" occur at specified digits of input.
Every time all of the significant bits of the goal are at state "1", we can
say that the goal is totally satisfied.

Accordingly, partial activation of such

bits can signify a lower degree of goal attainment.
Bence, a measure of 'goal attainment' can be defined by:

\,15

Delree of Goal Attainment

=

A

=

l...

IJ IJ

where

o <A

i 15.

J =0

Next, we have to consider how experiences (inputs) of the model are
registered and stored in its memory. Initially, the mobile robot is assumed to

De ••••••• a CFber.eU c • Lear •••• '

..ode.

358

be randomly roving in its environment, receiving inputs from its surroundings
at a regular clock interval T.

Similarly, outputs of the machine are also

updated at the same clocking intervals.
The interdependence of outputs and inputs is the issue of prime concern
here, since, if a causality of response and stimulus is established, then we
could simply arrange to select appropriate actions for attaining maximum
goels.

Such a dependance could take one of three forms.

outputs

are

found

to

be

wholly

dependant

Either inputs and

deterministically;

or

partially Istochastically dependanti or completely independent upon each other.
The discovery of any deterministic or stochastic associations between
inputs and outputs will, indeed, mean that the control which is incidental
with

the process of learning has been established.

However, in real

situations, the problem is much more 'Complex, and such direct dependencies
are very rare or difficult to pinpoint or define.
,

Normally, it is the temporal

or spatial sequencing or contiguity of a series of inputs and outputs which is
the crucial factor in signifying causality.
The robot starting from a totally random behaviour should, upon the
incidence of goal events, be able to extract from interactions with the
environment whether there is any dependance between its actions and
percepts; hence, modify its behaviour towards sustainin« the

~

events; and

also specify and record such dependencies tor future utilization.

The

'learning' scheme described here will try to achieve these objectives.
At the beginning ot the exercise, each' input state Ia can lead to _y' one

ot 2"

= 128 outputs

(21

=8

speed choices and 24

=16 direction choices) with

equal probability:-

= 1/128)
1010101 01010101

Output=o

101010101010111

Output=1

(initially all Probabilities
Prob {( o/p=O) II. }

•

1.0

II

=

I.

1

II

111

....
....

Prob {(a/p=1)/I.}

.....
.....
...

•

·......
·......
·......

• ••••••••• «=" ...... ,. c · .......... '

...

The initial random distribution can be interpreted in two ways.

•
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We can

either say that for a given input the 128 outputs have an equal probability
distribution:-

I.

of
Byte

::~:~::::=:::~::::::~::::::::~.:::..;.

Or, we can say that for input Ii each of the seven bits of output has
probability 1/2 of being "1":Prob(O/P)

1/'1- I -1- I -1- I -1- I

====,.,.

Ii

o

1

I

3

•

S

Value of
Output Bit

•

•

Now, either method of depicting the pro~bility distributions of outputs for

a given input can be used, depending on various design considerations, and
also on the computer storage limitations.

But, the important issue here is the

criterion which should be used for updating and modifying probabilities as the
experiment progresses.
After each attainment of the desired level of goal event, the probability
distribution of the immediately preceding occurrences is adjusted. Increasinc
the probability of the most recent output and decreasing the probability of all
other outputs. This process of successive modification of probabilities should
increase the expectation of goal events, provided there is an underlying
causality' between outputs and inputs.·
However, if no improvement is observed in the model's performance, and a
converafence cannot be detected in the output probability distribution curves,
then,

we

can

conclude

that

a

single

layer analysis of input-output

relationships is not adequate for our problem.
scrutiny is necessary.

Rence, a deeper level of

In other words, longer sequences of inputs-outputs

(three or higher) should be looked at, and same probability adjustment
procedures repeated for the more elaborate combined inputs.
Additionally, the critical values of goal attainment could also be adjusted
to improve the performance of the system - a lower level of goal (pleasurable

or

painful)

attainment

(A)

can

modification phase of the program.

signify

the

activation

of

probability

Both the variation of depth of look-back and the change of critical goal
attainment level will be dynamically adjustable.

Whereby, if after a number

of input cycles no pronounced improvement is seen in performance, or no goal
states are confronted, then appropriate modifications is made to the depth of
analysis or

the

degree of goal attainment.

Conversely, if very fast

fiuctuations of performance are observed, or goal states are constantly
activated, then the inverse changes to above can be made.
Various practical considerations impels us to set certain constraints on the
amount of information stored for analysis in the memory of the system.
Firstly, not every single occurrence of input-output sequence will be stored,
but only those which precede the instances of goal (painfuVpleasurable)
activation.

Nevertheless, a 'Short-Term-Memory' (S.T.M) will hold a record of

a prescribed number (k) of

input~tput

sequences.

Secondly, once sianificant events are stpred in the 'Lonat-Term-Memor7'
(L.T.M.) of the system, then the L.T.M. memory structure can go throu"h
various processes of reor.ranization:(a) - If an inp'ut (or a sequence of input-outp.ut) is not re~ted over a
number (1) ot clock intervals, then it is 'deleted' from the L.T.M. as
being an isolated case, or for being irrelevanL
(b) - If'· groups of different inputs converge towards the BBJDe output
distribution pI1.ttern, then more 'generalIzed' new groupinats of inputs
can be defjned.
(c) -

Inverse of the above process, whereby, a compound input (or "roup of
inputs) is 'divided' into indiVidual in~uts (or inDaller sub-"roups) - as
the need arises to focus on a particuuar input.

The process of searching through the contents of the L.T.M., and
th~

incoming information with... .previously stored data, is
. another
.'
potentially time consumin" phase of the 'learnin,,' program - which could

comparing

create a processing bottleneck.

A solution considered is to translate the

binary data of the L.T .M. into 'analogue' form, and hence use the much faster
analogue-comparator hardware available to search through the contents of the
memory.

This solution is particularl7 useful when looking up 'sequences' of

input-outputs rather than sin"le inputs.
Once a previously stored output probabilit7 distribution is discovered in
the L.T.M., then the modification of such probabilities can be carried out in a
number of ways. The specific procedure used is, normally, considered as the
core feature of a 'learning' program.
wiD be outlined here.

An eDllDple of these modification rules
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distribution function Pu(O/P).
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probability

output will have an equal probability of

1/128 to be selected:P{ (o/p=O)/li) = 1/128, P{ (o/p=1 )/II} = 1/128 , • • • , P{ (o/p=127)/II} = 1/128
r~w.~127

'..
./" P{(o/p=j)/II} = 1 •

and also,

nU"lllnln
j

=0

Now, using a random generator, suppose 0/p=74 was selected, and at next
incidence of clock pulse it is noticed that a goal state with attainment value
a (0

5. a 5. 15) is perceived. We look back at preceding input, which was II,

and reinforce the probability of occurrence of 0/p=74; at the same time
reducing the probabilities of all other outputs occurrin., given input Ia.
If the probability of occurrence of each output for a given input is
represented by a 7-bit binary number

(rep~Benting

128 different values), and

the output itself identified by another 7-bit binary number. Then, one way of
digitally storing the output diatribution functions P;a(O/P) in the L.T.M. ia to
only asaiJrn probability values to those outputs which have been reinforced in
the

past;

since all other outputs

probabilities.

wm.

have equal and

complementary

Bence, the entry in L.T .M. could simply entail:P{(0/p=74)/I.}

II

=

1/128 + F(a)

,

where, F(a) is an incremental function depending on goal attainment value a.
SiJDi]arly, all other output
P{(o/p=.m)/I,I}

= {1 -

(0/~74)

probabilities, given input I., will be:-

(1/128 + F(a»}/127 ,

where, m is any output other than 74.

However, these probabilities need DOt

be stored in the L.T .M. of the system, and can simply be worked out at the

output selection staJre of the program when required.
Compound output probabilities (Le., two or more outputs with reinforced
probability values) can also be dealt with in a aiJDi1ar fashion.
such cases the mathematics involved will be more compIeL

Obviously, in

Yet, to simpUty

the probability adjustment procedures we can choose to only reduce the
probabilities of outputs that have not contributed to .oa1 attainment up to
that point, leaving other previously reinforced output probabilities unaffected.
In the following diagram (FIG.6.16) the 'learning' program we have outHned
here is illustrated in chart form, with brief expJanationa of its different
functional elements.

We have also indicated that the manifestation of BOme

higher aspects of learning, such as 'expectancy', 'generalization', 'heuristic
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formation', 'theorem proving', or 'model building' can all be directed towards
the data which will be gradually built up in the L.T.M. of the system.
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FIGURE 6.16. A block diagram of the tentative '1earnina'

2rop-amuJl;poaect.

The prograaa can enable the mobile robot wtiich ini
starts
with -r8ndom-' - aetivitr,--' -discover ('tearil)input:-output
aaaociations us~ extAf.rDall7 aet Jroa1 attaimilent and output
modification criteria.
Input" in tlie above d~ refers to
both single ~uts or compound ~uences of inputs and
outputs. P(O/PI's are output probability distributions.
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6.3 SUllllARY OONCLUSIOIS

or atAPTII AIm S<III

POSSIBILITIII

FOB JlUR1'IIIR PUBSUIT

In this chapter we discussed the many issues and considerations that can
arise in the design of simple 'learning' models, in particular those that we
have categorized as 'cybernetic~.

We also embarked on the analysis and

description of one such exercise in more detail, starting from the design stage

to full implementation, concluding with a proposal for the implementation of a
'learning' program within the 'body' of the model.

In following concluding

notes of the chapter we will first enumerate the system elements which were
highlighted as the principal components of all cybernetic 'learning' models.
As a more speculative postscript, we will also briefiy consider the kind of
hypothetical formalism

which could

provide a

possible vehicle for

the

universal manifestation of learning in models. Indicating whether some of the
well established mathematical methodologies such as the 'group theory' can be
used to develope this elusive formalism.

Finally, some areas of mathematics,

will be advocated as promising avenues for further pursuit.
(i) -

One of the central goals of this thesis was the identification of the

fundamentals of 'learning' models. In our coverage of the various approaches

to

the

task

of

modelling

of

learning

we

were

confronted

by

classifications, terminologies, depths of analysis, and formalism.

many

In many

instances the same concept or process was referred to by different labels. At
other times the levels of analysis were so disparate that no direct correlates
or relevances could be established between their descriptive languages.
Nevertheless, the recurrence of some principal elements has been evident
within all 'learning'
conclusion

models discussed, in one form or other.

we can identify

six central components as

the

very

So, in
basic

requirement of all (non-trivial) 'learning' systems. While reminding ourselves
of the intricate and varied manner these components are manifested or are
interrelated, the six elements are as follows:THE INPUT ELEMENT: Incorporates all sensory input ,rocesses, filtering,
decoding of information, and generally making sense 0 the external world.
THE ASSOCIATION ELEMENT:
Incorporates processes which determine
how connections are established between inputs and outputs, entropy
(organization) increasing processes, or the processes which bring_about the
changes or improvements in' the system.
'Learning' itself can be
consfilered as an implicit facet of this element's function.
THE EVALUATION ELEMENT:
Incorporate all teleological processes, the
setting of goals and assessment of their attainment.
THE MEMORY ELEMENT: IncorP9rates processes related to the storing of
external and internal events; and their subsequent recall, distortion, decay,
or interfeltepce.
Th\s ele.,ent has ~enerally been cnaracterised by a
duality of short-term and long-term memory.
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THE GENERALIZATION ELEMENT:
Is closely related to the 'association'
and the 'memory' elements; and incorporates processes which enhance the
efficiency of the system"'1:?: extend the capabilities of the system into
higher levels. Concej)tu . tion or theorizing can be considered as some
of the advanced manifestations of this elemenl;.
-

THE OUTPUT ELEMENT:
Incorporates the final decision J>rocesses
involved in selecting appropriate responses for the 'learning system.
Including all stochastic or deterministic executive processes.

(ii) - One of the prevailing characteristics of cybernetic models has been

their

reliance on

some form of abstract tool,

normally

borrowed from

well-established branches of mathematics (e.g., control-theory, conditionalprobability, stability, etc.).

It is also true to say that in some instances

original mathematical elaborations have been made, or even completely new
abstract language and framework devised. Hence, we can say that cybernetics
does not have a distinct methodology as other traditional sciences; and the
decline of cybernetics within the past decade could be partly attributed to
the lack of a formal language for an adequate expression of intuitive ideas
that so many workers from diverse fields of science were able to articulate
within its boundaries.
Some pioneers of cybernetics, such as Ashby, indeed tried to formulate
abstract frameworks for the "cybernetic" analyses of problems.

But, by

tradition cybernetic is a subject involved directly with real world problems,
and two main shortcomings became evident in such efforts.

Either, the

techniques were too rigid and hence narrow in application; or, they were
extremely vague conceptualizations and inapplicable in reality.

Paradoxically,

the most successful techniques were branched away from the mainstream of
cybernetics, and evolved into new disciplines which seldom acknowledge their
cybernetic heritage.
Here, we shall attempt to speculate on what kind of unifying cybernetic
axiomatic system would be needed for the realiv,ation of a true cybernetic
language.

In particular, for our purpose ot designing cybernetic 'learning'

models.
At the core ot mathematics lies the concept of natural number system, and
the linear progression of the magnitude of a number (real or integer) as we
move along the single dimensional axis trom minus to plus infinity.

Over the

centuries many powerful classical theoretical frameworks, such as euclidian
geometry or probability theory, have been developed which rely on this
implicit relationship of magnitude of numbers (i.e., the number 6 baa an
implicit magnitudal relationship to the number 2, represented by a number 3).

..
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also

incorporate other fundamental measures within their building blocks, namely,
the notions of 'set' and 'truth'.

Although, the natural number systems still

remains an inseparable component of their infrastructure.

Similarly, in dealing with other more specific domains, higher mathematical
abstractions have been devised which do not directly refer to the concept of
natural

numbers

at

their

micro-level.

The

numerous

mathematical

methodologies used in A. I. and cognitive sciences are of this group.
The question to be posed from the cybernetic perspective is whether
another elemental basis can be abstracted on par with the 'natural number
system' which could be more appropriate to the task of emulating mental
processes.

Now, instead of numbers relating implicitly to each other by

"magnitude" they can have "associative connections".
The comprehension and the realization of such a system at the higher
semantic level is a fairly straightforward task.

For example, in a semantic

network, we can give labels to various items such as "chairs", "tables",
"desks"; and simply from a definition "items of furniture" we can see an
inherent relationship amongst these distinct labels which does not change

to

according

which

combination

of

labels

are

considered

together.

Furthermore, other inferences can be made about these labels, such as what
material they are made from.

Mathematically these conceptualizations can be

represented by different means.

For example, a multi-dimensional vector

whose elements represent different 'features' could be defined.
However, for the systems which are based on the more rudimentary
criteria (i.e., pattern-recognition, neural-nets, connectionist, or other cellular
systems) the normal method of abstracting associative connections is to either
formulate

complicated

equations,

or

to

devise

ad

hoc

coding

systems.

Moreover, in many realizations of such models the associations of elements
are expressed in terms of physical/structural properties and other hardware
specifics of the system which are invariably very difficult to analyze
mathematically.

If an associative axiomatic basis was available, then indeed the problem
which

was

addressed

to

in

the

P.R.

section

of

the

'preservation of invariances', would be a trivial one.

Chapter-5,

the

Since now every

element of the system would implicitly carry information about its neigbouring

...
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elements.

But, as to what the specifics of this so called tassociative number

system' should be, we can only speculate in a vague manner.
An area of mathematics whose study could provide interesting insights into
how a concise framework of theories can be developed using rudimentary
non-numerical basis is the 'group-theory'.

In group-theory operations and

theories are defined in terms of elements of 'sets' (collections of items)
rather than numbers.

Although, in practice the majority of problems tackled

by group-theory are those which use sets of numbers.

In any case, it would

be an interesting challenge to investigate the possibilities of utilization of
'group theory' as a framework for manifesting simple cybernetic 'learning'
. systems.
As mentioned previously, the majority of formalisms developed in current
areas of A.I. are ad hoc problem-oriented techniques.

In other rudimentary

'parallel 'approaches of today such as P.R., neural-nets or connectionist
although the level of investigation is more generalized and fundamental,
nevertheless, abstractions devised are fairly conventional and use techniques
which are by and large domain-dependant.
Recently

a

new

and

non-conventional

approach

to

the

problem

mathematical expression of thought processes has been proposed by
workers

in

Principally,

Oxford

University

their

ideas

(Deutsch,

originate

1985;

from

the

Penrose,

of

SODle

1986,1987,1988).

conceptualizations

of

'quantum-theory'; also, many of their arguments are developed on the basis of
the findings of quantum-theory, by drawing parallels with quantum concepts.
Their basic contention is that using such concepts alternate non-algorithmic
computing procedures can be devised for the analysis of mental events.
These procedures are neither stochastic nor heuristically based.

Although

most of the work in this field is highly theoretical and deals with aspects of
computability of such procedures (as in the context of Turing machines), some
of its adherents (e.g., Deutsch,l986) have proposed hypothetical designs for
'quantum computers' and 'Universal quantum computers', which are deemed to
be

much

more

efficient

computational

devices

than

the

conventional

processors in tackling 'parallel' problems - such as the intellectual functions.
This fresh outlook is also a promising avenue for further research into the
problem of design of a possible mathematical abstraction to be globally
utilised in 'learning' systems, and one which is more akin to the underlying
mechanisms of the brain.
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CONCLUSIONS
7.0 INTRODUCTION
In this final concluding chapter of our thesis we will begin by a brief
review of the areas covered in previous chapters, followed by a generalized
discussion of some of the principal issues that have come to the forefront of
our enquiry.

We will also argue the case for the broad perspective of this

work; and promote the rudimentary cybernetic approach to the problem of
modelling of learning, while attempting to speculate on some fruitful course
of future pursuits in this field.

7.1 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THESIS
Firstly, we set the historical and the philosophical background which led
to today's diverse variety of learning-related subjects. Next, we outlined the
dominant issues, disciplines, problems, dichotomies, definitions, and approaches
involved in the investigations of the learning process; focussing on the main
topic of our interest, namely, the modelling of learning and the design of
simple cybernetic hardware 'learning' models.
Later, a more detailed study of the 'pure' empirical aspects of learning
was embarked.

The three major approaches were 'behavioural', 'cognitive',

and 'brain studies'.

The principal methods of analyses and domains of

research were discussed; and various definitions, discoveries, and theories
formulated

within each approach scrutinized.

Additionally, some other

periphery approaches to the study of learning, such as 'evolutionary', 'social',
'educational', and 'developmental' were identified; and various categorizations
and taxonomies of the learning process (and behaviour) were outlined.
Next, the attention was turned on the modelling of learning.

A 'natural'

vs. 'artificial' distinction was pursued for the way that such problems are
approached - which basically reflects the difference between 'simulation' and
'synthesis'. The tools and techniques used for representation and analysis of
learning models were surveyed; some of the abstractions (mathematical or
other) used for realization of these models were also considered; and some
notions propagated from explorations of such abstractions were discussed.
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Workers in many secondary disciplines have, also, used the phenomenon of
learning in devising working models, utilizing techniques and formalism
particular to their discipline.

A broad study of the distinct approaches to

such synthesis problems was made, following loosely the historical precedence
of subjects involved.

Typical examples of work in each field were cited, the

principal exponents identified, and central points of contention highlighted.
Finally, the specific hardware/software project undertaken as an "exercise
in construction of an autonomous cybernetic 'learning' model was described,
and the main considerations involved in the design of the whole class of
similar endeavours discussed.

7.2 "LEARNING": A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON
Learning is a very broad and multi-faceted concept, which if taken in its
wide adaptive context embraces a diverse range of observations in the living
world.

To illustrate this point, some form of 'learning' or 'adaptive' process

is thought to be involved in the following accounts:The young of an animal is unable to carry out a task.
of development it is able to.
-

Yet, after a period

A species of animals cannot, seemingly\ do a task.
Yet, after few
generations they attain the capability of aoing that task.
An animal. is reacting in a certain way to a stimulus.

reacts differently.

Yet, later on it

-

An adult animal cannot perform a task.
the task quite proficiently.

Yet, after a while it carries out

-

A person does not recognize a pattern. Yet, at Dext confrontation it does.
A mental connection does not exist between concepts.
time it is created.
An object cannot be labelled with a name.
established.

Yet, after some

Yet, later a linguistic label is

Further, To appreciate the role that "learning" plays in biological lite, in
the following we will attempt to tentatively delineate its attribution to the
development of an organism's neural structure, while considering some other
influencing and governing factors.

The hypothetical organism (illustrated in

FIG. 7.1) begins life with part of its nervous system organised into specific
structures which allows the organism to display its range of innate and
refiexive behaviours.

During its lifetime, the organism is affected by

numerous 'external' influences, which, in turn, result in the reorganization of
its neural structure. 'Internal' (temporal).proceSBeS, also, lead to other neural
reorganizations.

Moreover, interactions between externally and internally

induced order brings about even more changes in neural structure. Now. the
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learning process is seen to be acting at all three levels of reorganizations of
nerve structure. Which further demonstrates the ubiquity of this phenomenon,
and the reason behind the complexity and the diversity of its explanations.
i
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FIGURE 7.1. A ~t:fs~ied representation of stages of develop~nt of ~
orgs sm s neur81 structure to highlight the role of learning,
with an indication of principal infiuencing/ governing factors.
7.2.1 LEVELS AND IIITIIODS OF IlIVISTlGATIOR
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The question, foremost in our mind at the start of our enquiry, was
whether we had good working knowledge ot natural learning processes,
behaviours, and mechanisms.

So that, equipped with such knowledge, we

could pass judgement on the various modelling attempts from different
scientific corners in trying to simu1ate or synthesise the learning process
within the boundaries of their own paradigm.,
To acknowledge the multiplicity of layers of investigations ot learning, let
us consider a simple learning situation.

For example, a human subject

engaged in a cognitive experimentation on learning, such as learning to
associate pictures and names, can be looked at.

Although, it is now the

undisputed beliet that all changes occurring during a learning experience is

registered

and,

hence, can only originate from

the

nervous

systems.

Nevertheless, the effects of such changes can be observed in a variety of
manners:We can look at the molecular or sub-molecular changes occurring in the
subject's nervous system.

We can investigate the chemical, physiological, or

electrical changes which result amongst the neurons.

We can holistically

study the chemical, physiological, or electrical changes coming about in
groups of neurons, regions of the nervous system or its totality.

We can

theorize about the organizational cognitive aspects of the brain, and hence
try to explain the changes in terms of our theories.

We can construct

various abstract or physical models to synthesise or simuJate the appropriate
neural processes.
subject.

We can examine the external behavioural changes of the

We can devise hypothesis based on these external behavioural

observations. We can investigate that particular observation in the context of
several other identical or similar observations.

We can attempt to design

hardware or software models which can simulate the behaviour of the subject.
We can ask the subject to linguistically describe the changes he experiences.
Finally, we can investigate the

broader

phylogenetic, onthogenetic, or

philosophical aspects of our learning experiment.
Therefore, the scope of investigations of the phenomenon of learning is
astonishingly intricate and multi-layered.
application cover a

Furthermore, the domains of its

very wide spectrum; encompassing humans, animals,

machines, abstract systems, computer programs, etc.
Similarly, the theories proposed in the various expJanatory planes have
been

different

manifestation,

in
such

programming, etc.

character;
as,

and

have

mathematical,

involved

descriptive,

assorted
physical,

modes

of

computer

The degrees of 'applicability', 'generality', 'precision',

'complexity', 'predictability', and 'objectivity' of these theories have, also,
been diverse.

Some compromising precision to enable a wider scope of

application; yet, normally, a resulting vagueness makes the validation of the
theory or its disproof very difficult.

others by narrowing down the

definitions, and increasing the objectivity, usually by use of abstract
formalisms, are able to devise theories that are precise, but only applicable to
certain

problem

domains.

Here,

the

ever

increasing

elaborations

of

abstractions is such that after a while the initial objectives are, seemingly,
lost by an engrossment in the theoretical details of analysis; and the whole
field becomes very inaccessible from outside.

It we regard the sciences of learning as a whole, then there are many

areas

of

vagueness,

contradiction,

controversy,

cross-definition,

and

inconsistency. However, this is hardly surprising due to the intricacy of the
phenomenon

under

observation;

and

the

diversity

of

backgrounds,

methodologies, descriptive languages, prejudices, and preferences of the
workers involved in its investigation.
Previously, in Chapter-I, we had outlined the connectivity of the numerous
disciplines directly or indirectly involved with the study of learning in a
"tree" format.

But, for a person entering into this subject, perhaps a better

metaphor would be a "maze" of corridors, some interconnected; but, mostly
having a singular pathway, with only occasional glimpses into other avenues through windows stained with a particular bias.

The workers within each

field not only pursue the objectives of their own paradigm, but spend effort
on trying to trivialize or discredit alternate views.

Once, a unilateral

blinkered view of the subject is adopted, then progress within its course of
development, normally, distances the subject away from other related topics;
leading to either further specialization, or extreme complexity of abstraction.
Indeed, for a prospective researcher on the topic ot learning and its
modelling who intends to survey the subject there are no exact maps for the
above described maze of corridors. Only indications of its nodes, and partial
portrayal of interconnections or proximities.

Hence, it was deemed vital, as

one of the objectives of this thesis, to outline a broad perspective of the
whole

topic

without

a

particular

prejudice;

collaborative research are not compromised.

so

that,

possibilities

of

Next, we will summarize our

conclusions about the principal modes of study of the learning phenomenon.
(i) - BRAIN-SCIENCES &. NEUROLOGICAL STUDIES

The Brain Sciences approach to the studies

ot learning involves the

investigation of the electrochemical activity and the physiology of the brain.
Many important contributions have been made to the understanding of the
nature of information transfer in nervous systems, the effects of localised
brain damage on learning, and also the discovery of various functional
contributiol&~

of brain regions to the process of learning. Yet, Brain Studies

have, generally, steered away from holistic conceptualizations about the
process of learning.

An

analogy which can

be

made, to stress the

shortcomings of this approach to the problem, is to compare the task with an
attempt to discovet.: the workings of a motor car engine by either listening to
sounds emitted from it, or analyzing individual components or small areas of
the engine in isolation.

There are two principal under17inlt criteria in the studies of the nervous
system.

The 'reductionist' view which contends that isolated studies of

components of the brain could help to build up a complete picture; hence, its
proponents engage in the study of individual or groups of neurons, or try to
characterize specific regions of the brain.

While, the 'holistic' view refutes

reductionism, and sees the brain as a kind of receptor (similar to a television
set) of external information and knowledge; also, a great proportion of our
percepts are considered to be dependant on external 'order' and 'causal
relationships', hence, the 'knowledge' which is conveyed cannot be inferred by
any sort of neurological investigations of the brain.
However, it is a truism that workers in brain sciences unanimously accept
that there is, so far, no clear understanding of neuronal. processes at work
during the learning process.

Hence, no solid global explanations have been

put forward; but, only isolated analytical principals proposed, as glimpses into
the complex overlapping systems at work•.

(ii) - PSYCHOLOGICAL

&;

BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES

The disciplines of behavioural and physiological psychology hold the
heritage of the scientific scrutinies of learning; and have contributed a great

.

deal to the main body of knowledge about the phenomenon of learning.

The

data collected, based mainly on experiments on animals, where controllability
and repeatability were the principal concerns, and theories formulated on such
data, have been the primary source of reference for the modelers of the
learning process.

Yet, by its very nature, psychology has not managed to

sever itself from empirical results.

Generally, different types or aspects of

learning are investigated independently, without adopting a holistic view of
the subject and trying to interconnect or relate topics.
Similarly, in devising learning theories only particular areas of learning are
targeted, and no unifying proposals are made ·which can describe learning as a
functional entity that can progressively manifest itself in different forms.
The weaknesses of such discontinuities have been particularly highlighted
when various fundamental notions are applied to thuman learning', which
traditionally has not been the principal domain of investigation, due to
practical or ethical reasons.
The way that learning is, typically, investigated in these sciences is to
define certain quantifiable aspects of a behavioural pattern and use it to
monitor performance; and, hence, hypothesise or organise all observations
around such definitions.

This texternal' view of the learning process has
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meant that there is very little hypothesising about the underlying mechanisms
involved.
Although, some learning-related psychological concepts, such as 'drive',
'motivation', 'attention', 'memory', etc., show some direct correlations with
certain neural substrate; nevertheless, most generalised theories proposed have
many shortcomings and inconsistencies, and are constantly being refined on
basis of new evidence - the principal obstacle being the task of integration
of various concepts.
(iii) - COGNITIVE STUDIES

The workers in cognitive psychology have been concerned with the study
of learning primarily in the domain of humans.

The investigations of the

cognitive scientists (and later on the A.I. scientists) have involved modelling
and simulation of higher aspects of human learning, such as 'problem solving'
or 'theorem proving'.

This "top-down" paradigm approaches the problem by

trying to breakdown the totality of the solution, which is normally taken to
be

known

at the

beginning

(intuitively), into smaller components.

A

technique employed at many instances is to divide the goals into sub-goals.
However, this methodology has been inadequate in dealing with simpler
learning situations where elementary goals direct the learning process using
'experiences', and where knowledge is progressively 'accumulated' from simple
principles - here, the contrast between the direction of approach of two
diametric ttop-down' and 'bottom-up' trends is again emphasised.
The cognitive study of human learning, with the predominant involvement
of 'language' and 'subjective thought', has reintroduced the philosophical
dimension as a central facet of enquiry.

While, the philosophical concerns,

having instigated the whole chain of scientific scrutinies of the subject of
learning,

had been demoted to a

much less significant position in the

behavioural and neurological studies of learning.

7.2.2 THE CONTINUITIBS AND THE IIIERARCJIIBS OF LBARHING
The categorizations of the learning process bas assisted the scientific
scrutiny of the subject. NevertheleBB, some workers have recognised various
continuities amongst the different modes of the learning process, and have
tried to define learning in terms of a hierarchy; while, others have attempted

to explain its processes from a unitary point of view.

Even, the commonality

of the origin of 'instincts' and learning behaviour have been argued, despite
having clear differences in underlying neural mechanisms (i.e., instincts
imbedded in DNA genetic coding, learning contained in neural organization).

.
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If a continuum was established across the diverse range of learning
phenomena observed in nature, whereby, complex modalities of learning could
be explained from the simpler ones; implying that the learning differences

seen

amongst animals

are only

"degrees"

of their

underlying

neural

endowments, and not fundamental "jumps". Then, it' is conceivable that rules
or principals could be described, analogous to the evolutionary laws of
'natural selection', for building up the hierarchy of learning processes.
An important issue raised in the above scenario is whether neurons or

their equivalent abstractions are the only medium for the manifestation of
learning in the true sense.

Since, given rules to elaborate the whole gamut

of learning from basic elements, the task of 'externalization' of 'learning'
from its natural domain would be much simpler.

The next step would be to

devise a global tlearning operator', which could also be effectively applied to
the artificial domains of machines or computers - for realizing any of the
layers of the learning hierarchy, ranging from simple learning seen in
unicellular organisms to human learning, and perhaps beyond.
The phylogenetic (or evolutionary) studies of the leaning process is one of
the subjects which does try to establish a continuity between different strata
of its hierarchy, and

narrow down the distinctions.

Certain laws of

'perception' (e.g., significance of high pitched BOUnd as danger) can be
observed amongst a diverse range of species, even those which are not
phylogenetica1ly closely related. Although, these similarities can be explained
in terms of evolutionary selection processes, nevertheless, it does not obscure
the fact that there is an underlying external commonality involved, governed
by the causalities of the physical surroundings.
The commonality of the external world, genetic kinship of species, and
various empirical observations have prompted workers in this field

to

speculate that the progression of learning from its simple modalities to its
higher complex forms goes through specific stages in nature.

Implying that

the functional hierarchy of learning observed within an animal corresponds to
the order of the evolutionary development of learning within species; the
order of complexity of learning processes seen

alDOl)

gst different species; and

the onthogenetic sequence of learning seen during the growth of an animal.
In our earlier analysis of learning we also drew some

generalized

comparisons between the processes of "learning" and "evolution", in a very
fundamental way - equating some of the underlying aspects 'of each process in
a broad sense.

It was, indeed, observations of this nature which instigated

the wide perspective of this thesis.

A tentative evolutionary ordering of adaptive behaviour is schematically
outlined in FIG.7 .2. The final outcome of the development of different types
of reaction mechanism is indicated by examples in the final column. Each
hierarchical level has a particular characteristic, novel in essence, but, not
reducible to or deducible from those preceding it.
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FIGURE 7.2. A possible schematic model for the evolutionary hierarchy
involved in the develoJ»ment of learning in organisms. Each
stage compliments preVIOUS stages and contains all the earlier
t~s of adaptations. The final co\umn outlines some examples
of -behaviour developed at each leveL
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7.3 THE MODELLING OF LEARNING

As we have seen, although the volume of knowledge accumulated on the
topic of learning is indeed massive, nevertheless, our real understanding of its
underlying proce.Jses is fairly limited; and, hence, the theories and hypothesis
proposed are speculative, fragmented, and at best isolated to a particular
aspect or definition of the learning process.
The path of modelling of learning was adopted by many researchers as an
aid to its better understanding, a tool for experimentation, or a method for
verification of theories.

The initial. endeavours were mainly attempts at

simulating some 'natural' aspect of the learning, phenomenon,

but, the

development of this methodology has seen a gradual permeation of its notions
into 'artificial' domains, where synthesis of learning is the prime objective.
Of course, an overriding and pivotal question has always been present, and

that is whether the learning process is an implicit quality of "life", and,
hence, should not really be applied to non-biological form.

It is, indeed,

sometimes implausible or impractical to translate certain features of learning
which are clearly biologically oriented to the artificial domain.

However,

there are other characterizations of learning which could be manifested
artificially in a

different, or even a

more efficient, form, only if the

biological constraints were severed.
An inherent problem of designing 'artificial learning systems' also lies in
the tools which are used in such exercises.

Computers, machines and

mathematical abstractions are different from brains in fundamental ways, yet,
we regularly attribute them with human and animal values and expect them to
behave in 'natural' ways.

If we compare a simple process of learning, say in

a child, to that in a computer we can see that, first and foremost, there is
structural 'growth' and 'development' in the organization of the brain of the
child, while the only changes occurring in a computer are in its program.
Although, it must be pointed out that this issue is subject to interpretation,
and various researchers either see an isomorphic relationship between
neuro-physiological changes and programming changes, or the learning in a
child is analyzed at the more abstract 'knowledge' level where similarities can
be drawn between 'mental states' and 'states of a computer program'.
A characteristic observation on some learning models in fields such as
brain-studies, psychology, cybernetics, A.I., P.R. is that their designers,
although initially start off by a generalized study or theoretical analysis of a
particular mode of learning, are too willing to hurriedly apply concepts

defined for their machines, abstractions, or computer programs to human
learning, without considering the underlying implications carefully.

Another

problem, also, arises when mathematical abstractions are exploded into areas
of complexity and vagueness.

Both these hasty elaborations are adverse

distractions from the original objectives.
The task of designing a 'learning' model is, generally, approached from a
previously fixed view point.

A worker, competent in the formalism of his

particular field, attempts to incorporate some adaptive or learning criterion in
the design of a

modeL

The elaborations of the model could involve

mathematical (or other) techniques which are normally employed in that
discipline (e.g., use of statistical techniques in psychology).

Furthermore, it

is intended that the immediate applications and usage of such 'learning'
models should be found within the discipline itself.

Hence, very few

modelling exercises on learning approach the problem from a neutral 'pure'
stand point, which would allow the study of the subject independently,
without reliance on a specific domain of application or methodology.
Examples of 'learning' models surveyed in this work have been very varied.
They have ranged from 'black box' type system models; descriptive models;
abstract or machine simulations of learning processes; to computer programs
and mathematical formalisms for synthesising learning, using deterministic,
stochastic, heuristic, or algorithmic techniques.
In 'learning control systems' the 'behaviour' of a system was either totally
or partially known, but the 'structure' was, normally, less known or unknown.
After identifying significant inputs and outputs of the system, a 'learning'
technique was used to discover a structure which would give rise to an
appropriate system behaviour.

Two principal criteria were used.

Either,

internal connections were deemed to be present, and simply their strength
was 'adjusted' (increased/decreased); or, the connections were 'created' on
basis of BOme associations.
In

state-space,

automata

theoretical,

or

BOme

other

mathematical

realizations of 'learning' systems the behaviour was normally specified by
functions or rules which were not inherently obvious from the particular
structure of its representation or form selected

the behaviour was, normally,

(intuitively/scientifically/arbitrarily)

on

basis

of

some

utility

consideration. This aspect sharply contrasts the natural learning mechanisms,
which singularly determine behaviour.

.

I

...
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The neural-nets, the self-organizing systems, the pattern-recognition, and
the connectionist approach to the modelling of learning were all closely
related in terms of their underlying objectives, and also methodologies.

The

central point of contention in these reductionist views of the subject was
that by designing networks of, mainly, identical elements, and using simple
principles, it was possible to devise complete systems that behaved in a
complex manner.

More or less, imitating the way nature has, through the

process on evolution, managed to manifest learning.

An important question

which was explicitly raised by these modes of investigations of learning was
that if we have a particular system structure, displaying a pattern of external
behaviour, and we intend to modify its behaviour, then, is it better to
physically restructure the underlying organization of its elements, or try to
modify the functional behaviour of each element - and what are the relative
advantages.
The A.I. approach to the modelling of learning did not involve designing
systems with inherent learning capabilities; but, principally involved devising
computer programs which could 'synthesise' learning in some form - and not
necessarily including 'natural' correlates.
use a

The common methodology was to

'knowledge base' of well developed ideas, and try to 'learn' (or

discover) some features or implicit rules of the knowledge base by certain
reorganizations of its structure.

Also, a prominent feature of such models

was their reliance upon an external 'teacher' or 'guide' for evaluating and
directing their actions for maximum utility.
7.3.1 TBI RUDIIIDl'ARY CYBIBBITIC APPIOACII1'O 1'111 JlQl)ILLIIG

or

LlA8NIIG

There have been many attempts in the past 3-4 decades to devise
cybernetic experimental 'learning' models.

However, with the exception of

very few, mostly have either concentrated on a narrow path of application or
have involved some non-qualified speculation.

Hence, it was one of the

principal aims of this thesis to provide a broad framework for a systematic
analysis of the problem - pinpointing the controversial areas, and highlighting
the main issues involved.
A common feature of most cybernetic 'learning' models is their reliance on
some form of mathematical formalism for representation and analysis of the
behaviour of the model.

Yet, to be able to display interesting learning

capabilities, such as problem solving or concept learning, some designers have
also

incorporated

the

facility

of abstracting

the

environment as

welL

Whereupon, the model is able to manipulate the 'knowledge' gained through
its experiences, and make deductions by experimenting on the "model" of the
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real world rather than going through the actual steps themselves. The need
for such a higher 'mental modelling' level becomes evident when we consider
various learning situations in humans (or higher primates).

For example, in

trying to learn to solve a problem, different possibilities are examined within
the mental framework of the problem and appropriate inductions made.
The

approach

adopted

in

the

design

of

our

own

'learning'

hardware/software model, and by implication promoted as a fruitful course of
investigation, was the rudimentary approach. The main advantages of such an
approach

to the modelling of learning are the simplicity and relative

objectivity of definitions; limitations of output-input interactions; economy on
the processing resources; and the possibility of implementing fundamental
notions observed in the natural domain of learning.

Conversely, the

disadvantages are that their achievements are normally uninteresting, and such
models are incapable of performing any complex tasks.
The first step of the design was to define the particular type or the class
of problems that the model was expected to solve.

For example, was it

suppose to learn to 'play games', 'solve equations', 'analyze graphs', 'perform
tasks', 'refine skills', or in the extreme be a generalised 'learning machine'.
Our learning model could be categorized in the final 'generalized' grouping.
However, the model could also be used for various classes of problem-solving
experiments, or for the verification of simple learning theories.
The model designed was not intended for simulation of human learning.
However, since it is the understanding and hopefully duplication of such
higher forms of learning which is the final objective of all such research
endeavours, some· accommodation was made for the incorporation of certain
important higher cognitive notions, such as S.T.M., L.T.M., recall, forgetting,
generalization, etc. into the primitive modeL

Although, these elaborations

were only made after considering the fundamental features of the basic model
first.
The main challenge was to design a closed analytical model that can
exhibit some learning within a limited universe of percepts and actions.
should

be

interaction.
and

able

It

to fully exploit all possibilities of model-environment

Also, without, actually, replicating in detail the characteristics

peculiarities

of

natural

learning

processes,

it should

be able

to

demonstrate simple rules of knowledge reorganization which resemble patterns
of 'recall', 'recognition', 'forgetting', etc. Additionally, th~ model should have
a potential for elaboration into higher levels, depicting the hierarchy observed
amongst natural learning processes.

The theoretical analyses of computing machinery have shown that, in
principal, all Turing machines are capable of representing all patterns of
behaviour expressible mathematically.

Our proposed simple 'learning' model

could, indeed, be also regarded as a Turing machine (with the addition of an
unlimited memory); and, hence, theoretically could depict any pattern of
behaviour.

Yet, in practice, we must determine the appropriate level of

complexity that the structure of a machine or system demands.

In the same

way that the human brain is not only utilised for dealing with trivial
variations of percepts.
Further

tes~ents

for the appropriateness of behaviour and structure

come from the evolutionary studies of the brain and behaviour.

Fossil (and

other) evidence indicate that neural potentialities were actually present before
a species began displaying a certain pattern of behaviour, or exhibit BOme
skills.

For example, the acquisition of flight by birds was preceded by the

development of the required brain regions in their corteL

Similarly, the

manipulative and linguistic capabilities of man only followed the development
of appropriate neural substrate.

The apparent immense overcapacity and

redundancy of the brain mechanisms is another clue into the way the process
of evolution has been tackling this matter.
Therefore, we concluded that a model designed to 'learn' a task should
have the potentiality for learning that type of task in the first place.
case

of

our

simple

mobile

robot,

these

potentialities

were

In the
initially

investigated. The "behaviour", the "goals", and the "tasks" of the model were
all simply defined in terms of its inputs and outputs; however, trom the

sizable range of possibilities only those were chosen which signified an
interesting feature, or conveyed a

meaning, to us as human observers.

Indeed, it would have been an interesting exercise to investigate the type of
behaviour that such a simple model would itself develope, it it starts from
completely random beginnings, and also chooses its teleological criterion
randomly, without interference from external programmer/instructor.·
Another choice had to be made as to what level of 'intelligence' should be
implanted into the model at the beginning.

Whether, the model was to start

from a totally random behaviour and approach more directive behaviour; or, a
lot of information was to be pre-programmed into the model, enabling a
proficient behaviour from the start.

In many similar exercises an intermix of

these

Yet, sometimes falsely the system is

two extremes is evident.

attributed as starting from random behaviour, whUe it is only 'programed' to
behave as such.

At other times, a model's directiveness is implicit from its

physical construct, and care should be taken in attributing concepts such as
memory, etc. to elements of these systems.

In our particular 'learning' model

the minimal initial level of knowledge was aimed for, and the directiveness of
action was determined by simple hedonic criteria (set externally).
Other

important

considerations

were

the

level of external

guidance

provided by a 'teacher' (instructor); and the choice of search techniques used
for finding solutions - whether 'exhaustive'"random'"parallel"'serial' or other
techniques were to be employed for comparing information and discovering
associations.
7.4

AN

OVERVIEW

Today, we see that workers from numerous disciplines engage in research
topics which involve "learning".

The prevailing opinions dominant within a

discipline are, in fact, the culmination of years of complex development and
filtering of ideas within that discipline, and other branches of related
scientific fields. Yet, the individual worker embarking on research, generally,
does not consider the lineage of the subject, and simply occupies himself with
specific problems posed from a

particular perspective.

Therefore, it is

common that at some point of the development of his work due to the
narrowness of approach, and a lack of appreciation of the width and the
depth of the subject and its heritage, he is confronted with ambiguities, holes
of knowledge, or inconsistencies.
The special nature of the subject of our scrutiny has meant that, unlike
other classical fields of science, the avenues chosen for its investigation are
not fully exploited before a new, and fundamentally different, line of enquiry
becomes dominant.

Progress is being made in most areas involved with the

simulation and synthesis of learning in a

parallel fashion, the pace of

development being governed by trends (and fashions) as much as by other
underlying

technological factors or empirical discoveries.

Hence, it is

important that an awareness of the 'genesis' of the subject of learning should
be maintained; and from time to time the previously tried (and seemingly
dismissed)

avenu~s

revisited in the light of newly acquired knowledge or

technological tools.
The cybernetic approach to the modelling of learning is an example of this
type of partially traversed pathway of investigation, whereby, its high point
of popularity was, perhaps, reached more than two decades ago.

This

approach, both, as an intuitive mode of enquiry, and also as a precise formal
methodology providing an objective framework of analysis, promises future
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Nevertheless, it is believed

that until an accompanying mathematical formalism which can depict the
concept of 'association' is not formulated (more or less the way real numbers
express the notion of 'linear relation'), true cybernetic 'learning' model
cannot be fully realized.
In final analysis, although, our very broad approach to the problem of the
modelling of learning, covering a multitude of subjects, has not furnished us
with precise indications of the most fruitful lines of pursuit; or, yielded
accurate 'global' judgements, without being too general; or, in fact, served to
strengthen any convictions. Nevertheless, this wide perspective has immensely
increased our knowledge, understanding, and the objectivity of the subject;
and has been instrumental in loosening some preconceptions and prejudices
about the potentialities of various approaches, by exposing their shortcomings
and clarifying many underlying issues. Perhaps, the only definitive conclusion
we can make is the reaffirmation of the complexity of the task, and the
acknowledgment of the inadequacy of our understanding of the details of
natural learning processes and their mechanisms.

i

REFERENCES

& REFERENCES
-------------------------------------------------

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackof~

R.L. and Emery, F.E. (1972):
un Purposeful Systems. Travistock.

Agrawala, A.K. and Kanal, L.N. (1983):
Perceptron. Enc~clopedia of Computer Science and Engineering, Ralston, A.
and Reilly, E.D. (Eds.).
Akama, K. and Ichikawa, A. (1979):
A Basic Mode/ for Learning Systems.

Proceedings of the 6th IJCAI, 1979.

Albus, J. (1979):
A MOdel of the Brain for Robot Control.
(4-Parts).

BYTE, June-September 1979,

Alcock, J. (1975):
Animal Behaviour: An Evolutionary Approach.

Sinauer Associates.

Aleksander, I. (1970):
Some Ps~chologica1 Properties of Digital Learning Nets.
Journal of Man-Machine Studies, volume 2.
Aleksander, I. (1971):
Microcircuit Learning Computers.

International

Mills and Boon.

Aleksander, I. and Hanna, F.K. (1976):
Automata Theory: An Engineering Approach.

Edward Arnold.

Aleksander, I and Stonham, T.J. (1978):
A Guide to Pattern Recognition Using Random Access Memories.
Memorandum, N/R/064, BruneI University, Department of
Engineering.
Aleksander:t I. (1978):
The Human Machine.

Technical
Electrical

Georgi Publishing.

Aleksander, I. (1980):
Whatever Happened to Cybernetics?
Technical Memorandum,
Brune) University, Department .of Electrical Engineering.

N/S/l03,

Aleksander, I. and Burnett, P. (1983):
Reinventing Man. Penguin.
Aleksander, I. (1984J:
Designing Tnte ligent Systems: An Introduction.
Allen, S.A. and Rossetti, T. (1978):
On Building a Lignt-Seeking Robot Mechanism.
Allen, S. and Allen... S.A. (1979):
Simple Maze rraverSal Algorithms.

Kogan Page.
BYTE, August 1978.

BYTE, June 1979.

Amarel, S. (1970):
Problem Solving and Decision Making by Computer: An Overview.
Cognition: a Multiple View, Garvin, P.L. (Ed.), 1970, Spartan Books.
Amari, S. (1972):
Dearning Patterns and Pattern Sequences by Self-Organising NeLs
ThreshOld Elements. IEEE Transactions on Computers, November' 1972.
Amari, S. (1977):
Neural Theory" of Association
Cybernetics, Volume-26.
Anderson, J.R. (1984):
Cognitive Psych%g)'.
Andreae J.B. (1964):
Sl'EU.A: A Schem(~ for
Congress, 1964.

and

Concept-Formation.

of

Biological

Artificial Intelligence, Volume-23.
IJ

I.earning Machine.

Proceedings of the 2nd IFAC

REFERENCES -

Andreae, J.B. (1969):
Learning Machines: A Unified View.
Encyclopedia
Information and Control, Meetham, A.R. (Ed.), 1969.
Andreae J.B. and Cashin, P.M. (1969):
A Learning Machine with Monologue.
Studies, Volume-I.

of

ii

Linguistics,

International Journal of Man-Machine

Andreae, J.B. (1972):
The STELLA Learning Machine.
Man-Machine Studies Report UC-DSE/l,
University of Cantertiury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Andreae, J.B. and Cleary, J.G. (1976):
A New Mechanism for a Brain.
Studies, Volume-8.

International Journal of Man-Machine

Andreae, J.B. (1977):
Thinking with the Teachable Machine.

Academic.

Andreae, P.M. (1977):
A Teachable Machine in the Real World.
Man-Machine Studies Report
UC-DSE/ll, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Andreae, P.M. and Andreae, J.B. (1978):
A Teachable Machine in the Real
Man-Machine Studies, Volume-10.

World.

International

Journal

of

Andreae, J.B. (1979):
. .
Muscles for Thought. Man-Machme StudIes Report UC-DSE/15, University
of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Andreae, J.B. (1983):
Design of a Conscious Robot.
Man-Machine Studies Report UC-DSE/22,
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Andrew, A.M. (1958):
Machines Which Learn.

The New Scientist, November 1958.

Andrew, A.M. (1959):
The Conditional Probability Computer. Proceedings of the Symposium on
Mechanization of Thought Processes (II).
Andrew, A.M. (1967):
Learning Systems. Automaton Theory and Learning Systems, Stewart, D.J.
(Ed.), Academic Press, 1967.
Andrew, A.M. (1970):
Statistical Theory and
Volume-I, Rose, J. (Ed.).

Self-Organization.

Progress

of

Cybernetics,

Andrew, A.M. (1972):
Significance Feed back and Redundancy Reduction in Self-Organizin'f.
Networks.
Advances in Cybernetics and Systems Research, Volume- ,
Pichler, F. and Trappl, R. (Eds.).
Andrew A.M. (1975\:
W~y Robotics~ Kybernetes, Volume-4, 1975.
Andrew, A.M. (1978):
Learning in Networks with Minimal Disruil!ron. Progress in Cybernetics and
Systems Research (III), Trappl, R. and
. , G.J. (Eds.).
Andrew, A.M. (1980):
Autopoiesis and Self-Organization. Progress in Cybernetics and Systems
Research, Volume-eVIl), Pichler, F.R. ana Banika, F.de.P. (Eds.).
Andrew, A.M. (1983):
Artificial Intelligence.

Abacus Press.

Angyan A.J. (1959):
MACIDNA REPRODUCATRIX: An Analogue Model to Demonstrate some
AsP!Jcts of Neural Ada1?tation.
Proceedings of the Symposium on
Mechanization of Thought Processes (II).
Anzai, Y. and Simon, B.A. ~1979):
.
The Theory of Learmng by DoIng.
Inc.

. .
The Amerlcan Psychological Association,

Arbib, M.A. (1966):
Simple Self-Reproducing Universal Automata.
Volume-9.

Information and Control,

REFERENCES -

Arbib M.A. (1969):

Theories of Abstract Automata.

Prentice-Hall.

Arbib, M.A. (1970):

Cognition - A C}'bernetic Approach.

Cognition: a Multiple View, Garvin,

P.L. (Ed.), 1970, Spartan BooKs.
Arbib M.A. (1972):

The Metaphorical Brain: An Introduction
In telligence and Brain Theory. Wiley.

to Cybernetics as Artificial

Armer P. (1960):

Attitudes Toward Intelligent Machines.
Computers and
Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J. (Eds.), 1963, McGraw-Hill.

Ashby W.R. (1952):
Design for a Brain.

iii

Thought,

Wiley.

Ashby W.R. (1956):

13esign for an Intelligence-Amplifier. Automata Studies, Shannon, C.E. and
McCarthy, J. (Eds.), Princeton University Press.

Ashby W.R. (1956):

An IntrOduction to Cybernetics.

Wiley.

Ashby, W.R. (1956):

SeU-RegulatJon and Requisite Variety. Systems Thinking, Emery, F.E. (Ed.),

Penguin, 1969.
Ashby, W.R. (1959):

A Simple Computer for Demonstrating Behaviour.
Proceedings of the
Symposium on Mechanization of Thouglit Processes (II).

Ashby W.R. (1960):

Adaptahon in the Multistable System.

Penguin, 1969.

Systems Thinking, Emery, F.E. (Ed.),

Ashby, W.R. (1962):

Principles 01 the Self-Organizing System. Principles of Self-Organization,
Von Forester, H. and Zopf, W. (Eas.), 1962, Pergamon Press.

Ashby, W.R. (1967):

The Set Theory of Mechanism and Homeostasis. Automaton Theory and
Learning Systems, Stewart, D.J. (Ed.), 1967, Academic Press.

Atkinson, R.C., Bower, G.B. and Crothers} E.J. (1965):

Introduction to Mathematical LearnIng Theory.

Bagley, J.D. J1970):

A Para igm for Artificial Intelligence.

Rose, J. (Ed.).

Wiley.

Progress of Cybernetics, Volume-2,

Baner~1

R. and Mesarovic1 M.D. (Eds.) (1970):
in
Operations
Research
and
Mathematical
Springer-Verlag, 1970.

Tbeoretical Approacnes to Non-Numerical Problem Solving.

Lecture Notes
Systems,
Vo]ume-28,

Banerji, R.B. (1976):

A Data Structure Which Can Learn Simple ProlIrams from Examples of
Input-Output. Pattern Recognition and Artificiar Intelligence, Chen, C.H.
(Ed.), 1976, Academic Press.

Banerji, R.B. (1977):

A Compl¥:/son of Three Problem-Solving Methods.

IJCAI, 1977.

.

Proceedings of the 5th

Barto, A.G., Sutton, R.S. and Brouwer:" P.S. (1981):

Associative Search network: A Neinforcement Learning Associative Memory.

Biological Cybernetics, Volume-40.
Barto, A.G. (1984):

Simulation Experiments with Goal-Seeking Adaptive Elements. University of
Amherst, Massachusetts, Department of Compul.er and Information Science.

Beck, A.B.W. (1967):

Words and Waves.

World University Library.

Belets~ii~

V.V., Kiraanova.. T.S. and Tchudinov, P.S. (1975):
Walking Control ana Dynamics of Systems with Two Legs.

the 4tl1 IJCAI, 1975.

Proceedings of

Bellman, R. (1964):

Dynamic Programming, Learning.. and Adaptive Prr?Pesl(.

Information S-ciences (lst), Tou,

J.

and Wilcox, R.H. {Eds.}.

Bellman, R. (1978):

•

Artificw InteJ.ligence: Can Computers Think?

I

Computer and

Boyd and Fraser.

Beurle R.L. (1962):

IJunctioilal
Organization
in
Random
Networks.
Principles
of
Self-Organization, Von Forester, R. & Zopf, W. (Eds.), Pergamon Press-62.

Biermann, A.W., Fairfield, J.R. and Beres, T.R. (1982):
Signature Table Systems and Learrung. IOE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics, Volume-l2.
Bobrowski, L. (1982):

Rules of Formmg Receptive Fields of Formal Neurons During Unsupervised
Learning Processes. Biological Cybernetics, Volume-43.

Bobrowski, L. (1984):
Supervised and Unsupervised LearninJ{ Algorithms in Formal Neurons.
Cybernetic Systems: Recogniti0l!t. Learmng, Self-Organisation, Caianiello,
E.R. and Musso, G. (Eds.), l.984, wiley.
Bond, A.R. and Mott, D.H. (19'18):
Learning in a Mobile Robot.
Artificial Intelligence Group Report No. 102,
Queen Kary College, London University.
Bond, A.R. and Mott, D.H. (1981):

Learning of Sensory-Motor Schemas in a Mobile Robot.

7th IJCAI, 1981.

Proceedings of the

Booth, A.D. (1970):

Cybernetics and Information: A Simple, Sfllf-Drganhing
Progress of Cybernetics, Volume-2, Rose, J. (Ed.), 1970.

Boulding, LE. (1978):

EcOdyntJllJJcs: A New Theory of Social Behavior.

Dowden, M.A. (1977):

Artificial InteJ.ligence and Natural Man.

Bower~

Automaton.

Sage Publications.

Harvester Press.

G.R. and lIilgard, E.R. (1981):
Prentice-RalL

l'heories of Learning.

Bozinovski,,_ S. (1982):

A Sea-Learning System Using Secondary Reinforcement.

Systems Research, Trappl, R. (Ed.), 1982.

Cybernetica and

Broadbent, D.E. (1965):
Applications of Information Theory and Decision Theory to
Perception and Reaction. Progress iil Brain Research, Volume-17.

Human

Brown, D.J.R. (1975):

Application of Concept Formation Techniques to the Learning of a
Linear Language. Progress of Cybernetics and Systems Research, Vo1:2.

An

Buchanan, B.G." Mitchell, T.M., Smith, R.G. and Johnson", C.R. (1978):
Models or Learning Systems.
Encyclopedia or Computer Science and
Technology, V-ll, Belzer, J., Holzman, A. & Kent, A. (Eds.), Marcel Dekker.
Budden, F.J., (1972):

Tne FascJnation of Groups.

Cambridge University Press, 1972-

Bundy A. (1983):
The Computer Modelling of Mathematical Reasoning.

Academic Press.

Bund~.J

A., BogJay, BoD.bRowe, J. and Plotkin, G. (1984):
How to Get a Ph. • in M. Artificial Intelliirence: Tools

Techniques, and
Applications, O'Shea, T. and Eisenstadt, M. (l~ds.), 1984, Harper and Row.

Bundy, A. (1985):
Discovery and Reasoning in Mathematics.
Burks A.W. (Ed.) (1970):

Essays on CenuJar Automata.

Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI.

University of Illinois Press, 1970.

Buah, R.R. and Mosteller.. F. (1951):

A Mathematical Moael for Simple Learning. The Psychological Review, V-58.

Bush, RoR. and Mosteller", F. (1955):

Stochastic Models ror Learnhlg.

Butler J.A. V. t1976):

Wlley.

Modern Biology and Its Human Implications.

Hodder and Stoughton.

RIPlalNelS

v

Caianiello, E.R. (Ed.) (1967):
Neural Networks. Springer-Verlag.
Cajaniello, E.R., De-Luca, A. and Ricciardi (1961):
Neural Networks: Reverberations, Co.(Jstan~ ot Motion, General Behaviour.
Neural Networks, Caianiello, E.R. (Ed.), 1967), Springer-Verlag.
Cataniello, BoR. and Musso, G. (Bda.) (1984):
Cybernetic Systems: Recognition, Learning, Selt-organisation.

Wiley.

Cape~

B.L. and Terry: R.A. (1968):
DilI1tal Simulation 01 the Homeostat Modified to Show Memory and Learning.
IEEE Transactions on Systems Science &: Cybernetics July 1968.

Chan, D.F. and Phillips, S.R. (1975):
ROBANOV: A Range-Based Robot Navigation and Obstacle Avoidance
Algorithm. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Sept-1975.
ChaPmaI!J B.L.M. (1959):
A ::;e11'-Organizing Classil'ication S;ystem.

CybernetiC&, Volume-2.

Chen, C.B. (1976):
On Statistical and Structural Feature Extraction. Pattern Recognition and
Artificial Intelligence, Chen, C.B. (Ed.), 1976, Academic Press.
Chen, C.B. (Ed.) (1976):
Pattern Recognition and Arti1'icial Intellillence.
Cin, M.D. (975):
Modifiable Automata and Learning.

Academic Press.

.
Prog. m Cyb. &: Systems Research, V-2.

Cohen P.R. and Feigenbaum, B.A. (Bds.) (1982):
The Handbook of ArtiL'icial Intelligence (Volume-III).

Kaufmann.

Coles, L.S., Rabb, A.M., Sinclair, P.L. Smith, M.B... Sobe~1 R.R. (1975):
Decislon Arialysis tor an Ezperimental Robot Witn UnreliB.ble Sensor&
Proceedings of the 4th YCAI, "1975.
Conant. R.C. (1969):
The Irdormation Transfer Required in Rellulator;y Proces&
Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, Volume-SSC-5.
Connel, J.B. and Bradl", Me (1985):
Learning Shape Description&
Corcoran, D.W.J. (1971):
Pattern Recognition.

IEEE

Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI, 1985.

Penguin.

§fI4tHfJ.JhcSlY'PJiemgence. Recreational Computing, Volume-7, Numbers 4 I: 5.
Culbertson, J. T. (1956):
Some Uneconomical Robots.
Automata Studies
Shannon, C E
d
McCarthy, J. (Eds.), Princeton University Press.
'
•• an
Culbertson, .1.T. (1963):
The Minds of Robots.

University of Illinois Press.

Davis, L (1985):
Applying Adaptive Algorithms to Bpistatic Domain&

Prac. of the 9th IJCAI.

Da1enoort, G.J. (1982):
Visual Pattern Reco1l...nition by Neural Networks, Theoretical Considerations
and a Simulation ~riment.
Progress in Cybernetics and Systems
Research, Volume-eVIl, Pichler, F.R. and Trappl, & (Eds.).
Dethier, V.G. and Ste~ E. (1910):
AiIimal Behavior. ~ntfce-Hau..
Deutsch, D. (1985):
Quantum Theory. the Church-Turlnll Principle and the Universal Quantum
Computer. Proceedings of Royal SoCiety London, A 400, 1985.
Deutsch, J.A. (1960):
The Structu.r&l Basis of Behaviour.
Deutsch, s. (1967):
MoClels of the Nervous Systems.

Cambridge University Press.

Wiley.

Dickinson A. and Boakes, R.A. (Ed.) (1979):
Mec1uUJisms of Learning & Motivation: A Memorial to J.Konorski.
Distefano, .1•.1. (1967):
Feedback and Control S;ystems.

McGraw-Hill.

Erlbaum.

aEFEaEICEI -

vi

. ))bon, J.L and Slagle, J.R. (1983):
. , Robotics. Encyclo.P.8dia of Comp'uter Science and Engineering (2nd Ed.),
~Raldon, A. and Reilly, E.D. (Eds.).
Doberkat, E.E. (1978):
Some Investigl)tions of Learning b~ Means or Dynamic Programming.
Progress in Cl'bernetics and Systems Research, Volume-(IV), Trappl, R. ana
Pask, G. (Eds.).
Doran~J.E. (1968):

rimentB with a Pleasure-Seeking Automaton.
Machine Intelligence,
Vo ume-3, Meltzer, B. and Michie, D. (Eds.), Edinburgh University Press.

Doran... J.E. (1969):
yJanning and Generalization in an Automaton/Environment System. Machine
Intelligence" Volume-4, Meltzer, B. and Michie, D. (Eds.), Edinburgh
University t'ress.
DoranL J.E. (1970):
planning and Robotics. Machine Intelligence, Volume-5, Meltzer, B. and
Michie, D. (Eds.), Edinburgh University Jrress.
Dreyfus, B.L. (1967):
Jihy Computers must have Bodies in order to be Intelligent.
MetaphysICS, September 1967.
Dreyfus, B.L. (1972):
Jihat Computers Can't Do: A Critique or Artificial Reason.
Drozen, V. (1970):
A MatlJematica1 Model or Associative Memory.
Volume-I, Rose, J. (Ed.).

Review of

Harper &. Row.

Progress of Cybernetics,

Duda, R.O. (1970):

Elements of pattern Recognition.
Adaptive, Learning, and Pattern
Recognition Systems: Theory and Applications, Mendel, J.M. and Fu, K.S.
(Eds.), 1970, Academic Press.

Bl-Fattah, Y.M. and Foulard, C. (1978):
Cr.bernetics of Learnmg.
Lecture Notes in Control and Information
Sciences, Volume-9, BalaKrishnan, A.V. and Thoma, M. (Eds.), 1978.
BItes, A. and Talukdar, S.N. (1983):
A Distributed Control System ror the CMU Rover.

Proc. of the 8th lJCAI.

Elithorn A. and Jones, D. (Eds.) (1973):
AriificiaJ and Human Tbinliing. San Francisco.
BlstobJ C.M. (1978):
A Cybernetic Analo~e ror Human Behavior.
Systems Research, Volume-(IV).

Progress in Cybernetics and

BlstobJ C.M. (1980):
.lnrormatio1)1 Meaning and Knowledge. Progress in Cybernetics and Systems
Research, volume-(VII), Pichler, FdL and Banika, F.P. (Eds.).
Blstob..1 C.M. (1982):
"I'be Formal and tbe Physical.
Bmery...l F.B. (Ed.) (1969):

:;ystems Tbin'Jdnll.

Cyb. &. Systems Research, Trappl, R. (Ed).

Penguin.

Bates, W.L (1959):
The Statisti'cal Al!proacb to LearnimI Theory.
S. (Ed.), Volume-~, McGraw-Bill, 1959.

A Study of a Science, Koch,

Bates, W.L (1959):
Statisti'cal Models for Recall and Recognition or Stimulus Patterns by Human
Observers. Self Organising Systems: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary
Conference, 1959, Yovita, M.C. and Cameron, S. (Eds.), Pergamon Press.

BateB, W.L and Neimark, B.D. CBds.) (1967):
Stimulus Sampling Theory. Holden-Day.
Parley B.G. and Clarkj} W.A. (1954):
rsimulation of Se '-Organizing Systems by Distital Computer. Transactions of
IRE, PGIT 4, 1954.
ParleYJ B.G. (1959~:
:;eU-OrganiZln/l Models ror Learned Perception. Self Organising S~stems'
Proceedings oT an Interdisciplinary Conference, 1959,Yovits, M.C. and
cameron, s. (Eds.), Pergamon Press.

Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J. (Eds.) (1963):
Computers and Thought. McGraw-Hill.
Feigenbaum E.A. and McCorduck, P. (1984):
The Fifth Generation Artificial Intelligence
Challenge to the World. Addison-Wesley.

and

Japanese

Computer

Feldman, J.A. (1985):
Connections: Massive Parallelism in Natural .I Artificial Intelligence.

BYTE.

Ferguson R. (1981):
PROLOG: A Step Toward the Ultimate Computer Language. BYTE, Nov-1981.
Fernald, L.D. and Fernald, P.S. (1978):
Introduction to Psychology. Houghton Mifflin.
Feurzeig, W. and Lukas, G. (1974):
A Programmable Robot lor Teaching. Advances in Cybernetics and Systems,
Volume-2, Rose, J. (Ed.), 1974.
Fikes, R.E., Bart, P.E. and Nilsson.. N.J. (1972):
Some New Directions in Rooot Problem Solving.
Machine Intelligence,
Volume-7, Meltzer, B. A. Michie, D. (Eds.), Edinburgh University Press.
Fikes, R.E. and Nilsson, N.J. (1972):
STRIPS: A New Al!ProaciJ to the Application 01 Theorem Proving to Problem
Solving. Artificial Intelligence, VOlume-2, 1971.
Fikes, R.E., Bart, P.E. and Nilsson, N.J. (1972):
Learning cI Executing Genertilized Robot Plans.

Fila, A. (1979):
Designing a Robot from Nature.

Artificial Intelligence, V-3.

BYTE, February-March (2 Parts) 1979.

Findler, N.V. and McKinzie, W.R. (1969):
Computer Simulation of a Self-Preserving and Learning Organism.
of Mathematical Biophysics, Volume-31.

Bulletin

Findler, N.V. (1969):
Some New Approaches to Machine Learning. IEEE Transactions on Systems
Science and Cybernetics, Volume-SSC-5, 1969.
Findler, N.V. (1983):
Artificial Intelligence. Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Engineering
(2nd Ed.), Ralston, A. and Reilly, E.D. (Eds.).
Fischer, P.C. (1983):
Turing Machine. Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Engineering (2nd
Ed.), Ralston, A. and Reilly, E.D. (Eds.,.
Flynn A.M. and Barrist J.G (1985):
'kecognition AlgorIthms for the Connection Machine.

Proc of the 9th IJCAI.

Fogel, L.J'1 Owens, A.J. and Walsh, M.J. (1966):
Artiflcial Intelligence Through Simulated EVt'}ution.

Wiley.

Ford, N. (1987):
How Machines 'l'hink.

John Wiley A. Sons.

Forsyth, R. (Ed.) (1984):
Bxpert Systems: Principles and Case Studies.

Chapman and Hall.

Freitas, ReA., Bealy, T.J. and Long, J.E. (1981):
Ailvanced Automation for Space Missions. Proceedings of the 7th IJCAI.
Friedberg, R.M. (1958):
A Learning Machine: Part I.

IBM Journal, January 1958.

Friedberg, R.M., Dunham, B. and Nortl!, J.B. (1959):
A Learning Machine: Part II. IBM Journal, July 1959.
Friedman, L •. (1967):
Tnstinctive Behaviour cI its Computer Synthesis.
Friedman, L. (1969):
Robot Control Strategy.

Proceedings of the 1st IJCAI, t 969.

Friedman, L. (1977):
Robot Learning and Error Correction.
Frude... N. (1984):
lohe Robot Heritage.

Behavioural Science, V-12.

Proceedings of the 5th IJCAI-1977.

Century Publishing.

:-- -_.--:--,--

--:.-:

--

Pu, LS. (1970):
Statistical Pattern Recognition.
Adafitive, Learning
and Pattern
Recognition Systems: Theory and Applica ions, Mendel, J.M. and Fu, K.S.
(Eds.), 1970, Academic Press.

Po, LS. (1970):
Stochastlc Automata as Models of learning Systems.

Adaptive, Learning
and Pattern Recognition Systems: Theory and Applications, Mendel, J .M. an~
Fu, K.S. (Eds.), flJ70, Academic Press.

Pu, LS. (1970):
Learnin¥ Control Systems - Review and Outlook.
AutomatIc Control, April 1970.

IEEE Transactions on

Pu, LS. (1971):
Learning Control Systems and Intelligent Control Systems: An Intersection
of Artiricial IntellJgence and Automatic Control.
IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, February 1971.
Fu, K.S. and Tou, J.T. (Eds.) (1973):
Learning Systems and Intelligent Robots.

Plenum Press.

Fukushima K. and Miyake, S. (1978):
A SeY-Organizing Neural Network with a Function of Associative Memory:
Feedback-Type Cognitron. Biological Cybernetics, Volume-28.
Fu, L.M. and Buchanan, B.G. (1985):
Learning Intermediate Concepts in Constructing a Hierarchical Knowledge
Base. Proceedings of the 9Ui IJCAI, 1985.
Garvin, P.L. (Ed.) (1970):
Cognition: a Multiple View.

Spartan Books.

Gause,. D.C. (1971):
New Considerations in Adaptive Programming Systems.
Congress on Cybernetics, 1971.

Sixth International

GauseL D.C. and Rogers, G. (t983):
'
uybernetics and ArtiJ'icial Intelligence.
Cybernetics:
Applications, Trappl, R. (Ed.), 1983, Hemisphere Publishing.

Theory

George, F.B. (1967):
Learning, Language and Computers.
Automaton Theory and
Systems, Stewart,D.J. (Ed.), 1967, Academic Press.

and

Learning

George, F.B. and Stewart, D.J. (1967):
Computer Programming and Learning Theory.
Automaton Theory and
Learning Systems, Stewart, D.J. (Ed.), 1967, Academic Press.
George, F.B. (1971):
Cybernetics. Hodder and Stoughton.
George, F.B. (1972):
Cybernetics and Automata Theory.
Department, BruneI University.
George~

F.B. (1973,1961):
Tne Brmn as a Computer.

Internal

Monograph,

Cybernetics

Pergamon Press.

George" F.B. (1977):
Tne FoundatJons of Cybernetics.

Gordon and Breach.

George, F.B. (1986):
ArtiJ'icial Intelligence - Its Philosophy & Neural Context.

Gordon &. Breach.

Gill, S.
(1~b5~n·:t·
I
th e
P rac t·cal
Ut·1·
t·
fL
·
POSSJ iIi Jes
Jor
J
11%8 lon
0
earnJng
Processes.
Proceedings of the Symposium on Mechanization of Thought Processes-II.
Gilstrap, L.O. and Lee, R.J. (1960):
Learning machines. Bionics Symposium (1st): Living Prototypes - The Key
to New Technology, Steele, E.J. (Ed.), 1960.
Giralt, ~'J Sobek, R. and Chatila, R. (1979):
A Multi-Level Planning ana NBvigBtlOn System for a Mobile Robot;
Approach to mLARE. Proceedings of the 6th IJCAl, 1979.
Glorioso, RoM. P975):
Engineermg Cybernetics.

Prentice-Hall.

Gregory, R.L. (966):
Eye and Brain. World University Library.

/t, First

REFERENCES

Griffith, J.S. (1971):
Mathematical Neurobiolog,,: An Introduction
nervous system. AcademIc Press.

-

ix

to the Mathematics of the

Griffith, A.K. (1974):
A Comparison and Evaluation of Three Machine Learning Procedures as
Applied to the Game of Checkers. Artificial Intelligence, Volume-5.
Guetzkow, H. (1962):
Inter-Nation Simulation: An Ex.ample of A Self-Organizing System.
Self-Organizing Systems, Yovits, M.C., Jacobi, G.T. and Golostein, G.D.
(Eds.). 1962, Spartan Bex>ks.
Gupton, J.A. (1979):
TBlk to a Turtle.

BYTE, June 1979.

Guzman. A. (1968):
Decomposition of a Visual Scene into Bodies.
Compu-ter Conference, 1968.

Proceedings of the Fall Joint

Band, D. (1978):
Pattern Recognition: The Ultimate Challenge.
July 1978.

Personal Computer World,

Band, D.J. (1979):
Evolutionarr Programming: An Intelligent Answer?
World, Apri 1979.

Personal Computer

Barmon, L.D. (1961):
Studies With Artificial Neurons: Properties and Functions of an Artificial
Neuron. Kybernetik, Volume-I, 1961.
Barmon, L.D. (1962):
Natural and Artificial SynaRses.
Self-Organizing Systems, Yovits, M.C.,
Jacobi. G.T. and Golostein, G.D. (Eds.), 1962, Spartan Bex>ks.
Barth" E.M. (1966):
l1rain Models and Thought Processes.
(Ed.), 1966.

Automata Theory, Caianiello. E.R.

BatoriJ,. T. (1970):
un the Fundamental Notion of Cybernetics.
Volume-I, Rose, J. (Ed.), 1970.
Baugeland J .H. (1985):
Art'ii1cial Intelligence: The Very Idea.

Progress of Cybernetics,

MIT Press.

Hayes!.. P.J. (1970):
HObotolqgic. Machine Intlelligence, Volume-5. Meltzer, B. and Michie, D.
(Eds.), EC:Jinburgh University Press.
Bayes, P.J. (1975):
A Representation for Robot Plans.
Bayes P. (1978):
Trends in Artificial Intelligence.
Studies, Volume-l0.
Bebb, D.O. (1949):
The Organu:ation of Behavior.
Heisermal.l, D.L. (1976):
Buila Your Own Working Robot.

Proceedings of the 4th IJCAI, 1975.
International .Tournal of Man-Machine

Wiley.
Foulsham-TAB.

Heiserman, D.L. (1981):
RobOt Intelligence••• with Experiments.

TAB Bex>ks.

Bendel R.J. (1979):
Mathematical Learning Theory: A Formalized, Axiomatic, Abstract Approach.
Information and Control. Volume-41.
Bewit~

C. (1969):
pLANNER: A Language for Proving Theorems in Robots.
1st IJCAI. 1969.

Proceedings of the

Bilgard, E.R. and Marquis, D.G. (1940):
Conditioning and Learning. Appleton-Cenlury-Crofts.
Hinton..l G.E. and Anderson, J.A. (Eds.) (1981):
yarallel Models 01 Associative Memory. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

REFERENCES

Hinton, G.E. (1985):
Learning in Parallel Networks.

X

BYTE, April 1985.

Hoffman, B.S. (1962):
The Analogue Lab: A New Kind of Teaching Device.
Volume-17.

American Psychologist,

Bolland, J.B. (1970):
Outline for a Logical Theory of Adaptive Systems.
Essays on Cellular
Automata, Burks, A.W. (Ed.), University of Illinois Press, 1970.
Hollis, R. (1977):
NEWT: A Mobile, Cognitive Robot.

BYTE, June 1977.

Hormann, A.M. (1962):
Programs for Machine Learning (Part-I).
Hormann, A. (1964):
How a Computer System can Learn.

IEEE Spectrum, July 1964.

Bormann, A.M. (1964):
Programs for Machine Learning (Part-II).
Hull, C.L. (1943):
Principles of Behavior.
Hunt, E.B. (1975):
Artificial Intelligence.

Information and Control, V-5.

Information and Control, V-7.

Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Academic Press.

Hyden B. (1970):
The Question of a Molecular Basis for the Memory Trace.
Memory, Pribram, K.H. and Broadbent, D.E. (Eds.).
Iijima, J., Kanayama, Y. and Yuta, S. (1981):
A Locomotion Control System for Mobile Robots.
IJCAI, 1981.
Inoue B. (1985):
Building a Bridge Between AI and Robotics.
Jacker C. (1964):
Man, Memory and Machines.

Biology of

Proceedings of the 7th

Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI.

MacMillan.

Jacobs W. (1970):
Help Stamp Out Program minI{. Proceedings of the 4th Systems SymPQsium
at Case Western Reserve Umversity, Bener ji, R.B. &. Mesarovic, M.D. (Eds.).
Jacobs W. and Kiefer L M. U973):
Hobot Decisions Hased on Maximizing Utility.

Proceedings of the 3rd IJCAI.

Justice A. and Gervinski (1968):
':SOBLN".
Mathematical Thinking in Behavioral Sciences: Rending from
Scientific American, Messick, D.M. (Ed.), 1968, W.II. Freeman.
Kanayama, Y. (1983):
Concurrent Programming of Intelligent Robots.

Proc. of the 8th IJCAI.

Kauffman, S.A. (1969),:
.
Metabolic StabIlity and Epigenesis in Randomly Constructed Genetic Nets.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume-22.
Keckler, W.G. and Larson, R.E. (1970):
Control of a Robot In Partially Unknown Environment.
Kent, E.W. (1978):
The Brains of Men and Machines.
KiblerJ. D.P. (985):
I'arallelism In AI Programs.

Automatica, Vol-6.

BYTE, January-April (1 Parts) 1978.

Proceedings oC the 9th IJCAI, 1985.

Kiehn, RoM. (1919):
Artificial Intelligence and Entropy.

BYTE, June 1979.

Kitagawa, T. (1973):
Biorobots for Simulation Studies of I,earning and Intelligent Controls.
Learning Systems and Intelligent Robots, Fu, K.S. and Tou, J.T. (I<~ds.), 1973,
Plenum Press.
Kitajima, S. and Asai, K. (1973):
A Method of Learning Control Varying Search Domain by Fuzzx. Automata.
Learning Systems and Intelligent Robots, Fu, K.S. and Tou, J.T. (Eds.), 1973,
Plenum Press.

Inf'UILIiCES

-

Xl

Kleene S.C. (1956):
Representation of Events in Nerve Nets and Finite Automnta. Automata
Studies, Shannon, C.E. and McCarthy, J. (Eds.), 1956, Princeton University
Press.
Klir, J. and Valach, M. (1967):
Cybernetic Modelling. Iliffe Books.

Klix, F. (Ed.) (1979):
Human and Artificial Intelligence.

North-Holland Publishing.

Kochen, M. (1974):
Representations and Algorithms
Intelligence, Volume-5.

for

Cognitive

Artificial

Kodraloff, Y. and Ganascia, J.G. (1984):
Learning as a Non-Deterministic but Exact Logical Process. In The Mind
and the Machine: Philosophical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, Torrance,
S.B. (Ed.), 1984, Ellis Horwood.
Koffman, E.B. (1968):
Learning Games Through Pattern Recognition.
Systems Science and Cybernetics, Volume-SSC-4.
Kohonen, T. (1972):
Correlation Matrix Memories.

IEEE

Transactions on

IEEE Transactions on Computers, Vol:C-21.

Kohonen, T. (1977):
Associative Memory: A system-Theoretical Approach.

Springer-Verlag.

Kohonen T. (1984):
SeY-Organized Formation of Feature Maps.
Cybernetic Systems:
Recognition., Learning, Self-Organisation, Ca18niello, E.R. and Musso, G.
(Eds.), 198'1, Wiley.
Kolokouris~

A.T. (1986):
Machme Learning.

BYTE, November 1986.

Koplowitz} J. and Nolon, D. (1973):
Motlvation System for a Robot.
Cybernetics, July 1973.

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and

Krushinsky, L.V. (1965):
Solution of Elementary Logical Problems by Animals on
Extrapolation. Progress in Brain Research, Volume-17.

the Basis of'

KrYl°S'0~~Y'j;r~1'Z!~

in Building Mathematical Models of Behaviour.
International Congress on Cybernetics, 1973.

Kuzin E.S. t Pozdyak, G.E. and Fominykh (1975):
Planmng the Activity of Robot with Artificial Intelligence.
the 4th IJCAI, 1975.

Seventh

Proceedings of

Kvitashvili, A. (1970):
Cross-ConnectlOn Neuron Network Learning and Self-Learning Ability.
Progress of Cybernetics, Volume-I, Rose, J. (Ed.), 1974.
Langley, P. and Carbonell, G. (1984):
Approaches
to Machine
Learning.
Report
Carnegie-Mellon University, The Robotics Institute.

No.

CMU-CS-84-108,

Lasker, G.E. (974):
Tnreshold Automata. Advances in Cybernetics and Systems, Volume-2, Rose,
J. (Ed.), 1974.
Lasker G.E. (1974):
Theory of Mobile Automata.
Volume-2, Rose, J. (Ed.), 1974.

Advances

in

Cybernetics and

Systems,

Laumond J.P. (1983):
Mo;}el Structuring and Concept Recognition: Two Aspects of Learning for a
Mobile Robot. Proceedings of the 8th IJCAI, 1983.
Lee, W. (1971):
Decision Theory and Human Behavior.

Wiley.

Leiman A.L. and Christian, C.N. (1973):
E}ectrophysiological Analysis of Learning and Memory.
Basis oT Memory, Deutscll, J.A. (Ed.).

The Physiological

IIEn:U:NClS

Lenat B. (1977):

The Ubiquity of Discovery.

-

xi

i

Proceedings of the 5th IJCAJ, 1977.

Lerner, A.Ya. (1972):

Fundamentals of Cybernetics.

Chapman and Hall.

Levine, G. and Burke, C.J. (1972):

Mathematical Model Techniques for Learning Theories.

Lewist-., R.A. and Bejczy, A.K. (1973):

rlanning Considerations for a Roving Robot with Arm.

3rd IJCAI, 1973.

Lewis, R.A. and Johnson, A.R. }1977):

A Scanning Laser Range inder for a Robotic Vehicle.

Academic Press.
Proceedings of the

Proceedings of the

5th IJCAI, 1977.
Lewis T.G. (1980):

What Computers Cannot Do.

BYTE, January 1980.

Lewis J. (Ed.) (1974):

Beyond Chance and Necessity: A Critical Inquiry into Professor Jacques
Monod's 'Chance and Necessity'. Garnswne Press.

Lindsay, P.B. and Norman, D.A. (1972):
Human Information Processmg. Academic Press.
Locker, A. and Coulter" N.A. (1975):

An Outline of Teleogemc Systems Theory.

Progress in Cybernetics and

Systems Research, Volume-2.
Lofgren, L. (1982):

Excerpts

from

the Autology of Learning.

Research, Trappl, R. (Ed.), 1982.

Loofbourrow, T. (1978):
How to Build a Computer-Controlled Robot.
Luria, A.R. (1973):

The Working Brain.

Cybernetics

and

Systems

Hayden.

Penguin.

MacKa,-, D.M. (1956):

The Epistemological Problem for Automata.
Automata Studies, Shannon,
C.E. and McCarthy, J. (Eds.), Princeton University Press.

MacKay, D.M. (1962):

Self-Organization in the Time Domain.
Self-Organizing Systems, Yovits,
M.C., Jacobi, G.T. and Golostein, G.D. (Eds.), 1962, Spartan Books.

Mago, G.A. and Locker, A. (1975):
Towards a MathematiciJl Model of Goal Generation.
and Systems Research, Volume-2.
Malik, R. (1973):

Why Build Robots.

Progress in Cybernetics

The New Scientist, March 1973.

Manaster, A.B. (1975):

Completeness, Compactness and
Mathematical Logic. Prentice-Hall.

Undecidability:

Marce, L., Julliere, M., Place, H. and Perrichot, H. (1980):

A Semi-Autonomous Remote Controned Mobile Robot.

December 1980.

An

Introduction

to

The Industrial Robot,

Marce, L., Julliere, M. and Place, H. (1981):

An Autonomous Computer-Controlled Vehicle.
Proceedings of the 1st
International Conference on Automated Guided Vehicle Systems. Jun-1981.

Marler, P. and Hamilton, W.J. (1966):

Mechanisms of Ammal Behavior.

Wiley.

Marsland, T.A. and Rushton, P.G. (1974):

A

Study

of

Techniques

lor

Game-Playing

Programs.

Cybernetics and Systems, Volume-I, Rose, J. (Ed.), 1974.

Advances

in

Maturana, H.H., Varela, F.G. and Uribe, R. (1974):
Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems, its Characterization and
Model. BioSystems, Volume-5.
Mays, W. (1970):

Philosophy and Cybernetics.
(Ed.).

Progress of Cybernetics, Volume-I, Rose, J.

RE.·ERt:NCES

McCorduck, P. (1977):
History of Artificial Intelligence.
McCorduck} P. (1979):
Machmes Who Think.

w.n.

-

xiii

Proceedings of the 5th IJCAI-1977.

Freeman.

McCulloch, W.S. and Pitts, W. (1943):
A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity.
Mathematical Biophysics, Volume-5.

Bulletin of

McCulloch, W.S. and Pitts W. (1947):
How We Know About Universals: The Perception of Auditory F.md VisulJl
forms. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, Volume-9.
McCulloch, W.S. (1959):
The Reliability of Biological Systems. Self Organising Systems: Proceedings
of an Interdisciplinary Conference, 1959, Yovits, M.C. and Cameron, S.
(Eds.), Pergamon Press.
McCulloch, W.S., Pitts, W.B., Lettvin .. J.Y. and Maturana, B.R. (1959):
What the Fro~'s Eye Tells tne Frog's Brain.
Proceedings of the IRE,
Volume-47, 1959.
McMurtry, G.J. (1970):
Adaptive Optimization Procedures.
Adaptive, Learning, and Pattern
Recognition Systems: Theory and Applications, Mendel, J.M. and Fu, K.S.
(Eds.), 1970, Academic Press.
Mednick, S.A., Pollio, B.R. and Loftus, E.F. (1973):
Learning. Prentice-Hall.
Meieran, B.B. and Gelhaus, F.E. (1986):
Robotics: A Technology on the March.
April 1986.

Nuclear Engineering International,

Meitus V.Y. (1970):
Robots with Memory': Structure and Simulation.
Volume-2, Rose, J. (Ed.).
Mendel, J.M. and Fu, K.S. (Eds.) (1970):
Adaptive" Learning, and Pattern
App]icatlOns. Academic Press.

Recognition

Progress of Cybernetics,

Systems:

Theory

and

Mendel, J.M. and McLaren, R.W. (1970):
Reinforcement-Learmng Control and Pattern Recognition Systems. Adaptive,
Learning! and Pattern Recognition Systems: Theory and Applications,
Mendel, .I.M. and Fu, K.S. (Eds.), 1970, Academic Press.
Mesarovic, M.D. (1962):
On Self Organizational Systems.
Self-Or..Kanizing Systems, Yovits, M.C.,
Jacobi, G.T. and Golostein, G.D. (Eds.), 1962, Spartan Books.
Messick, D.M. (1968) (Ed.):
MathematJCa1 Thinking in
American. w.n. Freeman.

Behavioral Sciences: Rending from

Scientific

Michalski R.S. Carbonell J.G. and Mitchell, T.M. (Eds.) (1983):
Mactine learning: The Artificial Intelligence Approach. Tioga Pu blishing.
Michalski, R.S., Carbonelh J.G. and Mitchell, (1983):
An Overview of Nachine Learning.
Machine Learning: The Artificial
Intelligence A3>p-roach, Michalski, R.S., Carbonell, J.G. and Mitchell, T.M.
(Eds.), Tioga Publishing, 1983.
Michie, D. (1968):
Machines that Play and Plan.
Michie D. (1974):
3n Machine Intelligence.

Science Journal, October 1968.

Edinburgh University Press.

Michie D. (Ed.) (1982):
Introductory Readings in Expert Systems.
Michie, D. (Ed.) (1982):
Machine Intelligence and Related Topics.
Michie D. and Johnson, R. (1984):
The Creative Computer. Penguin Books.

Gordon & Breach.
Gordon and Breach.

R t; t" t: R t; N ta: 5

Millar, P.B. (1971):
On Defining the Intelligence of Behaviour and Machines.
the 2nd IJCAI, 1971.

-

X

iv

Proceedings of

MillerL S.L. and Orgel, L.E. (Eds.) (1974):
"l'he Origins of Life on Earth. Prentice-Hall.
Miller, J .A. (1977):
Autonomous Guidance and Control of a Roving Robot.
5th IJCAJ, 1977.
Milner.J. P.M. (1957):
"l'he Cell Assembly: Mark 11.

Proceedings of the

Psychological Review, Vo]ume-64.

Milner, P.M. (1959):
Learning in Neural Systems. Self Organising Systems: Proceedings of an
Interdisciplinary Conference, 1959, Yovits, M.C. and Cameron, s. (gds.),
Pergamon Press.
Minsky M. (1961):
Sleps Toward Artificial Intelligence. Computers and Thought, Feigenbaum,
E.A. and Feldman, J. (Eds.), 1963, McGraw-Hill.
Minsky, M. (Ed.) (1968):
Semantic 1nformation Processing.

MIT Press.

Minsky, M. and Pa~rt, S. (1969):
Perceptrons. MIT Press.
Mitchell, T.M. (1983):
Learning and Problem Solving.

Proceedings of the 8th IJCAI, 1983.

Moravec, B.P. (1979):
Visual Mapping by a Robot Rover.
Moravec, B.P. (1981):
Rover Visual Obstacle Avoidance.

Proceedings of the 6th JJCAJ, 1979.
Proceedings of the 7th IJCAJ, 1981.

Moravec, B.P. (1982):
Stabilitr of Automatic Guidance for a Mobile Robot.
Nationa Conference on A.I., 1982.
Mott, D.B. (1981):
Sensory-Motor Learning in a Mobile Robot.
London, Queen Mary College, 1981.
Munn, N.L. (1971):
The Evolution of the Human Mind.

Ph.D. Thesis, University of

Houghton Mifflin.

Nagata, T., Yamazaki, M. and Tsukamoto..! M. (1973):
Robot Planning System Based on J:-'roblem Solvers.
IJCAI, 1973.
Nemes T. (1969):
Cybernetic Machines.

Proceedings of the

Proceedings of the 3rd

Gordon and Breach.

Newell-t A., Shaw~ J.C. and Simon, B.A. (1958):
uhess-PlaJ71,ng Programs and the Problem of Complexity. Computers and
Thought, Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J. (Eds.), 1963, McGraw-Hill.
Newell, A., Shaw, J.C. and Simon'L B.A. (1959):
A Variety of Intelligent
earning in a General Problem Solver.
Self
Organising Systems: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference, 1959,
Yovits, M.C. and Cameron, S. (Eds.), Pergamon Press.
Newell A. and Simon, B.A. (1972):
Human Problem Solving. Prentice-Hall.
Nillson, N.J. (1965):
Learning Machines.

McGraw-Bill.

Nilsson, N.J. and Raphael, B. (1967):
Preliminary Design of an Intelligent Robot.
Computer and Information
Sciences, Volume-(II), Tou, J.T. (Ed.). Academy Press.
Nilsson, N.J. (1969):
A Mobile Automaton: An Application of Artificial Intelligence Techniques.
Proceedings of the 1st IJCAI, 1969.
Nillson, N.J. (1971):
Problem-Solving Methods in Artificial Intelligence.

McGraw-Hill.

RIFIRINCIS -

Nillson, N.J. (1980):

•

Tioga Press.

Principles 01 Artificial Intelligence.

Norman, D.A. (1982):

Learning anil Memory.

Freeman.

Nowakowska. M. (1976):
The

Modern

xv

Origins of! the

Congress on Cybernetics, 1976.

Term

"Cybernetics".

Eight International

Oestricher, H.L. and Moore, D.R. (Eds.) (1968):
Bionics Symposium 1966: Cybernetic Problems in Bionics.

Gordon It Breach.

Open University (1971l:

.
.
SCience Foundation Course (Unit 19),
Pentz, M.J. (Gen. Ed.), The Open University Press.
Evolution and Natural Selection.

Open University (1972):

Biological Bases of Behaviour (Units 1-4, 11-13 and 16-17).

Rose, P.R.

(Gen. Ed.), The Open University Press.

Open Universit)7: (1978):

Cognitive Psychology (units 3-4 and 22-28).

O'shea, T. and Eisenstadt, M. (Eds.) (1984):
Artificial Intelligence - Tools and Technique&

The Open University Press.
Harper It Row.

Optner, S.L. (Ed.) (J973):
.
System AnalysIS. Pengum.
Palfi, A.F. (1976):

Controlling a Robot Ilr. PURR-PUSfb a Teachable Machine.
Man-Machine
Studies Report UC-DSE/9, Univ. of Ganterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

Palfi, A.F. (1977):

RetiJ. Tome "Body" and "World" lor PURR-PUSS. Man-Machine Studies
Report UC-DSE/10, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

A

Palm, G. (1982):

Neural Assemblies: An Alternative Approach to A.I.

PalvoiJ(yi, L. (1982):

Network Modelling 01 Learning.

Springer-Verlag.

Cyb. &. Systems Research, Trappl, R. (Ed).

Paritsisl N.C. and Stewart, D.J. (1982):
Aaal!tational Problems in Natural InteJJ.igent Systems with Changft.s in
EnVIrOnmental Variety. Cybernetic Systems Research, Trappl, R. (Ed.).
Partridge, D. (1985):

Input-ElCPflCtation

Discrepapcy

Reduction:

Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI, 1985.

Pask, A.G.S. (1962):
A

A

Ubiquitous

Mechanism.

Proposed Evolutionary ( Mod.eL

Forester, H. and Zopf,

w.

Principles of Self-Organization, Von
Eds.). 1962. Pergamon Press.

Pask, A.G.S. (1963):

A Discussion of the Cybernetics of Learning Behaviour.

Research. Volume-15, 1963.

Progress in Brain

Pask, .A.G.S. (1967):
Man as a System That Needs to Learn. Automaton Theory and Learning
Systems, Stewart, D.J. (Ed.), 1967, Academic Press.
pask, A.G.S. (1969):

t.he t;ybernetics 01 Behaviour and Cognition ED:ending the Meaning of

Goal.

Internal Monograph, Cybernetics Department, Brunei

Pask, .A.G.S. (1970):

Cognitive ~,tem&

pask, A.1i.S. (1970):

Universi~y.

.
Cognition: a Multiple View, Garvin, P.L. (Ed.), Spartan.

Learning & Teaching System&

Penrose} L.S. (1968):
Se I-Reproducing Machines.

Survey of Cyb., Rose, J. (Ed), Butterworths.

Scientific American, Volume-200, 1959.

Penrose, R. and Isham. C.J. (Eds.) (1986):
Quantum Concepts in Space and ~Time.

Clarendon Press, 1986.

Penrose, R. (1987):

Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology.
Proceedings of the 11th
International Wittgenstein Symposium, Austria. H.P.T., 1987.

Penrose, R. (1988):

. ,

On the Physics and Mathematics of Thought.

Oxford University Press.

.lrl.INCI8 -

Phelps R.I. and Musgrove, P.B. (1986):
Knowledge

Representation

for

Basic

Visual

xvi

Artificial

Categories.

Intelligence &. Its Applications. Cohn, A.G. &. Thomas, J.R (Eds). 1986, Wiley.

pjage~h~· J~~~1~J7}~telligence

Penguin.

in the Child.

Pitrat, J. (1976):

A ProgrlUlJ for Learning to PIaZ Chess. Pattern Recognition and Artificial
Intelligence, Chen, C.H. (Ed.), 1976, Academic Press.

Popp1estone, R.J. (1969):

FREDDY in TorJand.
Machine Intelliaence, Volume-4, Meltzer. B. and
Michie, D. (Eds.), Edinburgh University ""Press.

Porter, B.W. and Kibler, D.F. (1985):
A Comyarison of AnalYtic and Experimental Goal Regression for Machine
Learnmg. Proceedings of the 9th -UCAI, 1985.

Postman, L. and Keppel, G. (Bds.) (1969):
Verbal Learning and Memory.

Powe~,

W. T. (1978):

Tne Nature

of Robots.

Penguin.

BYTE, June 1978.

Prendergast, D., Slade, B. and Winkle.s" _No_ (1984):
A General-Purpose Robot-Gontrol lMUlguage.

Pribram, LH. (Ed.) (969):
Perception and Action.

BYTE, January 1984.

.
Pengum.

Raibert, M. (1977):

A Model for Motor Control and Learning.

Proceedings of the 5th IJCAI.

Raphael, B. (1968):
.
programming a Robot. Proceedings of the IFIP Congress. Edinburgh, Aug-68.
Raphael, B. (1970):

The Relevance of Robot Research to Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of
the 4th Systems Symposium at Case Western Reserve University, Balierji,
R.B. and Mesarovic, M.D. (Eds.), 1970.

Raphael, B. (1976):

W.H. Freeman.

The Th1nlcing Computer.

Rapoport, A. (1955):
~pp.lications

of

In:formation

to

Mathematical Biophysics, Volume-17.

a

Theory-

Visions.

of

Bulletin

of

Rapoport, A. (1962):

Some Selr-orga.niation Parameters in Three-Pt:rso(J Groups. Principles of
Self-Organization, Von Forester, H. &. Zopf, W. (Eds), 1962, Pergamon Press.

Rauch-Hinde:n, W.B. (1985):

Artificial Intelligence

in

Applications, Prentice-Hall.

Business,

Science,

and Industry.

Volume-II:

Razran G. (1971):
~nd in Evolution: An Bast West Synthesis of Learned Behavior and
Cognition. Houghton Mifflin.

Reg~u:I~ (~:?;al
Memory.

Inhibition

in

Parallel

Activation

Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI, 1985.

Reichard. Jo (1978):

Robots: Fact, Fiction and Prediction.

Models of Associative

Thames and Hudson.

RestIe F. (1976):
~ning: Animal Behavior and Human Cognition.

McGraw-Hill.

Reuver, H.A. (1978):
Learning. within the Contez:t of General Systems Theory.
Progress in
Cybernetics. Systems Research, Volume-IV, Trappl, R. &; Pask, G. (Eds).
Reuver, B.A. (1980):

Tne Theory of Learning by Gal'perin and the Theory of ~!!Y'ninll Systems.
Progress In Cybernetics and Systems Research, Volume-(VII), Pichler, F.R.
and Hanika, F.de.P. (Eds.).

Rhode~,

F.H.T. (1976):

Tne Evolution of Life.

Rich, Eo (1983):

Artificial Intelligence.

Penguin.
McGraw-Hill.

.BURBNeBS -

Roberts, L.G. (1960):
Pattern

Recognition

With

an

Convention ReCord, Part 2, 1960.
Rolls, E.T. (1976):

The Brain and Reward.

The Chemistry of LYe.

Rose, S. (1976):

The Conscious Brain.

Network.

IRE

International

Pergamon.

Rose, J.S. (1978):
A Course on Group Theory.
Rose, S. (1970):

Adaptive

xvii

i

Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Penguin.
Penguin.

Rosen, C•.A. and Nilsaon, N.J. (1961):
An Intelligent Automaton. IEEE International Convention Record, Vol-15.

Rosen~-tin1!~t

Act Intelligently.

Rosenberg,R.S. and Rowe,

P.". (1981):

Science Journal, October 1968.

Spafial Problems for a SilIlulateCl Robot.

Proceedings of the 7th IJCAI.

Rosenblatt, F. (1968):

The Perceptronl.. a Probabilistic Model for Int'ormation Organh;ation and
Storage in the l1rain. Psychological Review, Volume-66.

Rosenblatt. F. (1969):
..
Two Theorems of Statistical Separability in the Perceptron. Proceedings of
the S7IIlposium on Mechanir.ation of Thought Processes (I).
Rosenblatt, F. (1960):

Perceptual GeneralDation Over Transformation grouP&
Self Organising
Systems: ProceecUngs of an Interdisciplinary Conference, 1969, Yovits, M.C.
and Cameron, S. (Eas.), Pergamon Press.

Rosenblatt, F. (1962):
Principles 01 lIeurodyDlJlllics and the Theory 01 Brain Mechanism& Spartan.
Rosenblatt, F. (1962):
A Comparison 01 Several Perceptron Model&
Self-Qrganizing Systems,
Yovits, M.C., Jacobi, G.T. and GolOstein, G.D. (Eds.), 1962, Spartan Books.
Rosenblatt, F. (1962):
strategic

ApP'roaches

.

to the StudT 01 BrBJD Models.

Self-Qrganiz&tion, Von Forester, H.

&;

Principles of
Zopf, W. (Eds), 1962, Pergamon Press.

Rosenblueth, .A., Wiener, N. and BiJlgelow, J. (1943):
Behaviour, Purpose and TeleolOgy. PhilOsophy of Science, Volume-10, 1943.
Ross, T. (1933):

Machines That Think.

Scientific American, April 1933.

RushhJlA'iiI i!97~:"e. Man-Machine Studies Report UC-DSE/7, University of
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Russell, D.W. and Bees, S.J. Y!'e6):

System Control - A
Study 01 a Statistical Learning Automaton.
Progress in Cybernetics and Systems Research, Volume-2.

Sacerdoti, B.D. (1973):
PlIuining in a lIierarchy of Abstraction Space&
Safford, E.L. (1978):

The Complete Handbook 01 Robotic&

safford, B.L. (1982):
Handbook 01 Advanced Robotics.

Proc. of the IJCAI-3, 1973.

TAB Books.

TAB Books.

Sampson, J.R. (1976):

Adaptive Information Processing - An Introductory Survey. Springer-Verlag.

Samuel. .A.L. (1959):

SOme Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checker& Computers
and Thought, Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J. (Eds.), 1963, MoGraw-HllL

Samuel, .A.L. (1960):

SOme Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers.

Journal of Research and Development, Volume-3.

IBM

R.F.a.ICBS Sandewell, E. (1974):
Biological Software.

xviii

Proceedings of the 6th IJCAI, 1979.

Savage, J.M. (1977):
~olution.
Rmehart and Winston.
Schaffel" J.D. and Grefenstette, J.J. (1985):
Multi-Ob~tive Learning Via Genetic Algorithms.
IJCAI, 1985.
Schank, C. (1982):
Looking at Learning.
Intelligence, 1982.

Proceedings of the 9th

Proceedings of the European Conference on Artificial

Schank R. and Bunter, L. (1985):
T'iJe Quest to Understand Thinking.

BYTE, April 1985.

schindler, M. (1984):
Software Technology: Artificial Intelligence.
1984.

Electronic Design, August

Schutzenberger, M.P. (1954):
A Tentative Classification of Goal-Seeking Behaviours.
Emery, F.E. (Ed.), Penguin, 1969.

Systems Thinking,

Selfridge, O.G. (1955):
.
Pitr;ern Recognition and Learnmg. Information Theory - Symposium on
Information Theory held at the Royal Institute, Cherry, C. (Ed.).
Selfridge, O.G. (1956):
Pitr;ern Recognition and Learning.
Butterworth, 1956.

Information Theory, Cherry, E.C. (Ed.),

Selfridge. O.G. (1959):
PANDEMONluM: A Paradigm for Learninll. Proceedings of the Symposium
on Mechanization of Thought Processes (1).
Selfridge O.G. and Neisser. U. (1960):
Pit'lern Recognition bT Machine. Computers and Thought, Feigenbaum, E.A.
and Feldman, J. (Eds.), 1963, McGraw-Bill.
Selfridge (1962):
The OrganiJUJtion of OrlIaniJUJtion. Self-Organizing Systems, Vovils, M.C.,
Jacobi, G.T. and Golostem, G.D. (Eds.), 1962, Spartan Books.
Shannon, C.B. and Weaver. W (1949):
The Mathematical Theory of Communication.

Illinois Press.

Shannon, C.B. (1951):
Presentatlon 01 a Maze-Solving Machine. Transactions of 8lh Cybernetics
Conference, Josiah Macy Junior Foundation.
Shannon, C.B. (1953):
Computers and Automata.

Proceedings of the IRE, Volume-41, 1953.

Shannon". C.B. (1956):
A univerSal Turing Machine with Two '-''lternal States. Automata St Jdies,
Shannon, C.E. and McCarthy, J. (Eds.), "Jrinceton University Pr~ss.
Shannon, C.B. and McCarth1, J. (Bds.~ (1956):
Automata Studies. Prmceton Umversity Press.
Shaw, D.B. (1985):
NON-VON's Applicability to Three AI Task Areas.
IJCAI, 1985.

Proceedings of the 9th

Shih, L.Y. (1982):
Stability of Automatic Guidance for a Mobile Robot.
National Conference on A.I., 1982.
SilkloaBY, L. and DreuBsi, J. (1973):
An Efficient Robot Planner Which
Proceedings of the 3rd IJCAI, 1973.
Simon B.A. and Siklossy L. (1972):
Representation anJ Meaning:
Systems. Prentice-Hall.

Generates

Experiments

With

its

Proceedings of the

Own

Information

SimonL B.A. (1956):
.
National Choice and the Structure of the Environment.
Emery, F.E. (Ed.), Penguin, 1969.

Procedures.
Processing

Systems Thinking,

::i-~·~·

.

~: .'-

,..
-

.

..

st.on"'~S~!~)~bines

Learn. Machine Learning: The Artificial Intelligence
Approach, Michalski, R.S., Carbonell, J.G. and Mitchell, T.M. (Eds.), Tioga
PUblishing, 1983.

St.ona, G. (1983):
Are Computers Alive? Harvester Press.

SinaeM~·l::oA1~l~a1ogue or

the Human Recognition System.
Optical Society of America, Volume-51.

Skinner, B.P. (1961):
Cumulative Record: Enlarged Edition.

Journal of the

Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Sklanak.7, J. (1964):
Adaptation, Learning, SeU-Repair, and Feedback. IEEE Spectrum, May 1964.
S ....leAr~}J!PJ~telligence: Tbe Heuristic Programming Approacb.

McGraw-Hill.

SloJDan A. and Croucher, M. (1981):
i1b y Robota bave Emotions. Proceedings of the 7th IJCAI, 1981.
Saitht.. M.B. (1973):
uesign 01 a Low Cost, General Purpose Robot.
IJCAI, 1973.

SaithlJ~,J::?~)tbeor,Y

and C,Ybernetics.

SlIith J.M. (1976):
Tbe Theory 01 Evolution.

Proceedings of the 3rd

Journal of Cybernetics, Volume-4.

Penguin.

So~,

B.M. and RilleJDBll, B.M. (1977):
Levels 01 Pattern Description in Learning.

Proceedings of the 5th IJCAI.

So. . .rhoff. G. (1969):

The ADStract Characteristics 01 Living Systems.
P.B. (Ed.), Penguin, 1969.

So. . .rhotf, G. (1974):

Logic 01 the Living Brain.

Stanfield, D.B. (1979):
My Compuler Runs Ma.es.

Systems Thinking, Emery,

Wiley.
BYTE, June 1979.

Staud~

P. (1980):
Applied Model 0/ Learning. Prog~s in Cybernetics and Systems Research,
VolulDe-(VII), Pichler, P.R. and
°ka, P.de.P. (Eds.).

Steele~

&J. (Bel.) (1960):
Bionic STfllpoBium (1st): Living Prototypes - The Key to New Technology.

SteiDt.:h, L and Plake, U.A.W. (1963):
Learning Matrices and Tbeir Applications.
Computers, December 1963.
Ste~OVB,

o.

A Logical
VolulDe-7.

and Havel, I.M. (1976):
Tbeory at Robot Problem

stevena, J.L (1985):
Reverse Engineering tbe Brain.

IEEE Transactions on Electronic

Solving.

Artificial

BYTE, April 1985.

stevena, L. (1985):
ArtiliciiJl Intelligence - Tbe Searcb lor a Perfect Machine.
Stewart~.D.J.

(1969):
A NOtatiOn tor Logical Nets.

Intelligence,

Hayden.

Cybernetica, Volume-2, 1959.

Stewart, D.J. (1967):
Logical Neta and OrJ(lUJjsms That Learn. Automaton Theory and Learning
Systems, Stewart, D.J. (Ed.), 1967, Academic Press.
Stewart, D.J. (Ed.) (1967):
Automaton TheorT and Learning Systems.

Academic Press.

Su.eno, M. and Terano" T. (1978):
A Model 01 Learning BiuJecI on Fuzzr In/ormation. Progress in Cybernetics
and Systems Research-III, Trappl, R. and Klir, G.J. (Eds.).

•

-",p ::

REFaRaNcal -

Suther1and, N.S. (1968):

"'-'",,,

Machines Like Man.

~

i

Science Journal, October 1968.

(1979):

SliH of Intelligent Robot.

Taylor W.K. (1968):

(197~):

I1rBln and Learmng.

Proceedings of the 6th IJCAI, 1979.

Science Journal, October 1968.

Machines that Learn.

TeylelZl T..J. (Ed.)

D.Reidel Publishing.

Thathacbar t M.A.L. and Oommen, B.J. (1983):

Learmng Automata Processing Ergodicity of the Mean: The
Case.

A.M. (1977):

'The NavigaUon System of the JPL Robot.

Thor~,

Two-Action

IEEE Transactions on S-ystems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol:SMC-13.

Thathacbar, M.A.L. and Ramakrishnan (1984):
A Cooperative Game of a Pair of learning Automata.
Thom~son,

xx

C.B. (1984):

Proceedings of the 5th IJCAI.

.

Path Relaxation: Path Planning for a Mobile Robot.

AAAI-1984.
Thor~,

W.B. (1963)1956):

Thor~,

W.B. (1978):

Learning anc1 Instinct in Animals.

Robots and Telechirs.

Proceedings of the

Methuen.

PUrpose in a World of Chance: A Biologist's View.

Thring, N.W. (1984):

Automatica, Vol:20.

Oxford University Press.

Wiley.

Toda, M. (1962):

The DesJl{n for a Fungus-Eater: A Model of Human Behavior
Unsophisticated Environment. Behavioural Science, Volume-7.

in

an

Tolman, B.C. (1959):

Principles of Purposive Behavior. Psychology: A Study of a Science, Koch,
S. (Ea.), Volume-2, McGraw-Hill, 1959.

Torrance, S.B. (Ed.) (1984):

The Mind ana the Machine: Philosophical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence.

Ellis Horwood.
Touretzky:, D.S. and Hinton, G.B. (1985):

Symbols Among the Neurons: Details of a
Connectionist
Architecture. Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI, 1985.

Trapp!, R. (Ed.) (1983):

cybernetics: Theory and Applications.

Trappl, R. (Bd.) (1985):

Impacts of ArtifJcial Intelligence.

Hemisphere Publishing.

Elsevier Science.

Tsypkin, Ya.Z. (1973):

Foundations or the Theory of Learning Systems.

Turing, A.M. (1947):

Turing and the Origins of the Computer.

Academic Press.

New Scientist, February 1980.

Turin., A.M. (1950):

COmputing machinery and Intellhtence.
Computers and
Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J. (Eos.), 1963, McGraw-Hill.

Uhr,L. and Vossler,

c.

Inference

(1963):

Thought,

A Pattern Recognition Program that Generates, Evaluates, and AdJusts its
Own O]H!rators. Computers and Thought, Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J.

(Eds.), 1963, McGraw-Hill.

Uhr, L, (Ed.) (1966):

Pattern Recognition.

Wiley.

Ubr, L. and Kochen, M. (1969):

MIKROKOSMOS and Robotics.

Uhr, L. (1973):

Proceedings of the 1st IJCAI, 1969.

Pattern Recognition, Learning and Thought.

Prentice-Hall.

REFIRIICIS

-

xxi

u~,

M., Mizumoto, M. and Tanaka, K. (1976):
Fuzzy Robot Controls. Journal of Cybernetics, Volume-6.

Uttly, A.M. (1956):
Temporal and Spatial Patterns in a Conditional Probability Machine.
Automata Studies, Shannon, C.E. and McCarthy, J. (Eds.), Princeton
University Press.
Uttly, A.M. (1956):
..
Conditional Probability Machines and CondJtJoned Reflexes.
Automata
Studies, Shannon, C.E. and McCarthy, J. (Eds.), Princeton University Press.
Veelenturf, L.P.J (1981):
An Automata-Theoretical Approach to Developing Learning Neural Networks.
Cybernetics and Systems: An International Journal, Vol:12.
Vigilone, S.S. (1970):
Applications of Pattern Recognition Technology. Adaptive Learning, and
Pattern Recognition Systems: Theory and Applications,Men~el, J.M. and Fu,
K.S. (Eds.), 1970, Academic Press.
Von Forester H. (1959):
On SeU-Organizing Systems and Their Environments.
Self OrlJ,anising
Systems: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference, 1959, YOVIts, ~"J.C.
and Cameron, S. (Eas.), Pergamon Press.
Von Forester H. and Zopf, W. (Eds.) (1962):
Principles of Self-Organization. Pergamon Press.
Von Forester, H., White, J.D., Peterson, L.J. 6. Russel, J.K. (Eds.) (1968):
Purpqsive Systems: Proceedings of the First Annual Symposium of the
American Society of Cybernetics. Spartan Books.
von-Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, o. (1947,1953):
Theory of Games ana Economic Behaviour. Princeton University Press.
von-Neumann, J. (1951):
The General and Logical Theory of Automata.
Cerebral Mechanisms in
Behavior: The Hixon Symposium, Jeffress, L.A. (Ed.), Chapman and Hall.
von-Neumann J. (1956):
probabilistic Lolllc and the SInthesis of Reliable Organisms from Unreliable
Components. Automata Studies, Shannon, C.E. and McCarthy, J. (Eds.),
195&, Princeton University Press.
Walker, J.J. and Young, J.F. (1977):
A Learning Machine WhlCh Learns, Remembers and Reproduces Sequences
without tile Use of Delays. Kybernetes, Volume-6.
Wallace ReA. (1952):
.
TAe Maze-Solving Computer.
Machinery (ACM), Rimtiach.
Walter, W.G. (1950):
An Imitation of Life.

Proceedings of the Association for Computing

Scientific American, Volume-182, 1950.

Walter1 W.G. ~1951):
A MachJne That Learns.

Scientific American, Volume-185, 1951.

Walter W.G. (1953 1961):
The Living Brain. Penguin.
Waterman, D.A. and Ba~es-Roth, F. (Eds.) (1978):
Pattern-Directed Inference Systems. Academic Press.
Watson t W.C. (1981):
PlJysiological Psychology: An Introduction.
Webster J. (1978):
Ro~t Simulation on Microcomputers.

Houghton Mifnin.

BYTE, April 1978.

Wee, W.G. and Fu, K.S. (1969):
A Formulation of Fuzzy Automata and its AppUcation as a Model of
Learning Systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics,
Volume-SSC-5.
Weinstein, M. (1975):
Structured Robotics.

Proceedings of the 4th IJCAI, 1975.

Wendt S. (1968):
A Trainable Classifier with Piecewise Linear Se~ation Using the Learning
Matrix. Proceedings of the IFIP Congress, Edinburgh, August 1968.

RIFIRllielS

-

xxi

i

Widrow, B. (1962):
Generalizatlon and Information Storage in Networks of ADALINE "Neurons".
Self-organizing Systems, Yovits, M.C., Jacobi, G.T. and Golostein, G.D.
(Eds.), 1962, Spartan Books.
Wid row, B., Gupta, N.K. and S. Maitra (1973):
Punish/Reward: Learning with a Critic in Ada,ptive Threshold Systems. IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and CybernetIcs, Volume-SMC-3.
Wiener N. (1948):
Cybernetics.

MIT Press.

Wilson M.J.D. and Aleksander (1976):
Arraylike Learning Systems. Journal of Cybernetics, Volume-6.
Wilson1 M.J.D. (1978):
Artificial Perception in Adaptive Arrays. Technical Memorandum, N/R/065,
BruneI UniversIty, Department of Electrical Engineering.
Winograd T. (1973):
Understanding Natural Language.

Edinburgh University Press.

Winograd, T., Davis, R.J.. Dreyfus.l S., and Smith, B. (1985):
Expert Systems: HOW Far uan They Go? Proceedings of the 9th IJCAI.
Winston, P.B. (1983):
Learning Physical Descriptions from Functional Definitions, Examples, and
Precedents. Proceedings of the AAAI-1983.
Winston, P.B. (1977 1984):
ArtUicial Intelligence.

Addison-Wesley.

Witkowski, C.M. (1983):
A Parallel Processor Algorithms for Robot Route Planning.
the 8th IJCAI, 1983.

Proceedings of

Witten, I.B. (1977):
In Search of PURR-PUSS: A Visitor's Experience. Man-Machine Studies
Report UC-DSE/ll, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Witten I.B. and Gaines B.R. (1978):
The Role of Randomness in System Theory. Progress in Cybernetics and
Systems Research, Volume-(III), Trappl, R., Klir, G.J. and Ricciardi, L.
(Eds.), 1978.
Wooldridge, D.E. (1963}:
The Machinery of the Brain.

McGraw-Hill.

Yazdani, M. and Narayanan, A. (Eds.) (1984):
ArtUicial Intelligence - Human Effects. Ellis Horwood.
Young J.F. (1973):
~ybernetic Engineering.

Butterworths.

Young, J.Z. and Margerison, T. (Eds.) (1969):
From Molecule to Man. Thames and Hudson.
Yovits..l M.C. and Cameron, S. (Eds.) (1960):
~e11' Organising Systems: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference,
1959. Pergamon Press.
Yc·.~tl!!

M"C., Jacobi, G.T. and Golostein, G.D. (Eds.) (1962):
Systems. Spartan Books.

~elf-Organizing

Zadeh, L.A. (1973):
Outline of a New Approach to the Analysis of Complex Systems and
Decision Processes. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetica,
Volume-SMC-3.
ZadehL, L.A. (1973):
1'he Concept of a Linguistic Variable and its Apl!}ication. Learning Systems
and Intelhgent Robots, Fu, K.S. and Tou, J.T. (Eds.), 1973, Plenum Press.

